structural error in Georgia

2025Structural error Sors argues that trial counsel failed to pursue his preferred defense of actual innocence and his preferred strategy in support of that defense, and that this amounts to structural error, which requires no showing of prejudice.1 But see Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (where structural errors are “raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice will not be presumed”).

2025Structural error Sors argues that trial counsel failed to pursue his preferred defense of actual innocence and his preferred strategy in support of that defense, and that this amounts to structural error, which requires no showing of prejudice.1 But see Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (where structural errors are “raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice will not be presumed”).

2023See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (104 SCt 944, 79 LE2d 122) (1984) (the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error and requires automatic reversal); Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) (827 SE2d 639) (2019) (same).

2023See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (104 SCt 944, 79 LE2d 122) (1984) (the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error and requires automatic reversal); Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) (827 SE2d 639) (2019) (same).

2025Finally, Riley contends that his trial counsel conceded guilt at trial and thereby created a structural error that must be presumed prejudicial under McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S. 414 ( 138 SCt 1500 , 200 LE2d 821) (2018).

2025Finally, Riley contends that his trial counsel conceded guilt at trial and thereby created a structural error that must be presumed prejudicial under McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U. S. 414 ( 138 SCt 1500 , 200 LE2d 821) (2018).

2019The above-described abuses of discretion resulted in a structural error—deprivation of Black’s counsel of choice—that requires reversal and, under the circumstances, a new trial. 9 “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice . . . commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (II) ( 126 SCt 2557 , 165 LE2d 409) (2006).

2019The above-described abuses of discretion resulted in a structural error—deprivation of Black’s counsel of choice—that requires reversal and, under the circumstances, a new trial. 9 “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice . . . commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (II) ( 126 SCt 2557 , 165 LE2d 409) (2006).

2023See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (104 SCt 944, 79 LE2d 122) (1984) (the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error and requires automatic reversal); Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) (827 SE2d 639) (2019) (same).

2023See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (104 SCt 944, 79 LE2d 122) (1984) (the improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error and requires automatic reversal); Oliver v. State, 305 Ga. 678, 680 (2) (827 SE2d 639) (2019) (same).

2019The improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and requires automatic reversal. *642 McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ; Wiggins , 298 Ga. at 370 (2), 782 S.E.2d 31 .

2019The improper denial of the right to self-representation is a structural error not subject to a harmlessness analysis, and requires automatic reversal. *642 McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ; Wiggins , 298 Ga. at 370 (2), 782 S.E.2d 31 .

2024As we have explained, a structural error “is a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunt v. State, 268 Ga. App. 568 , 570–71 (1) ( 602 SE2d 312 ) (2004).

2024As we have explained, a structural error “is a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hunt v. State, 268 Ga. App. 568 , 570–71 (1) ( 602 SE2d 312 ) (2004).

2025“Structural errors usually are based on a violation of a constitutional right. . . .” Sinkfield v. State, 311 Ga. 524, 527 (1) ( 858 SE2d 703 ) (2021). 1 Sors does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

2025“Structural errors usually are based on a violation of a constitutional right. . . .” Sinkfield v. State, 311 Ga. 524, 527 (1) ( 858 SE2d 703 ) (2021). 1 Sors does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

2025See Hall v. Warden, 686 FApp’x 671, 677–78 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding that Griffin’s actual-prejudice standard was contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Robbins, 528 US 259 (2000)); see also Hall, 686 FApp’x at 685–89 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (concluding that Robbins was 20 Morris did not argue below, much less present any evidence in support, that the result of his trial would have been different had his absence been prevented or corrected.

2025“Structural error is a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Alexander v. State, 313 Ga. 521, 526 (2) ( 870 SE2d 729 ) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025“Structural error is a defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Alexander v. State, 313 Ga. 521, 526 (2) ( 870 SE2d 729 ) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024While claims of structural error are not subject to harmless-error analysis, see id., such claims are nevertheless still “capable of forfeiture.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 750 (5) ( 784 SE2d 759 ) (2016).

2024While claims of structural error are not subject to harmless-error analysis, see id., such claims are nevertheless still “capable of forfeiture.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 750 (5) ( 784 SE2d 759 ) (2016).

2023“This structural requirement that both the levy and collection of taxes be done as prescribed by the legislature — like many other structural provisions of our Constitution — preserves liberty because legislators are accountable to the people more directly than bureaucrats or judges.” Bellsouth Telecommunications, 305 Ga. at 151 (2).

2023Because 7 legislators are more directly accountable to the people of Georgia, “the matter of collecting taxes, in the absence of statutory provision therefor, is beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial branch.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S. at 261- 266, an error that the Supreme Court confirmed to be structural in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (106 SCt 617, 88 LE2d 598) (1986) (reaffirming “the Court’s long commitment to a rule of reversal” in the case of racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury); see also Williams, 29 F4th at 1314 (reviewing Class, 138 SCt at

2023Although “the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty). 42 Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S.

2023Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S. at 261- 266, an error that the Supreme Court confirmed to be structural in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (106 SCt 617, 88 LE2d 598) (1986) (reaffirming “the Court’s long commitment to a rule of reversal” in the case of racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury); see also Williams, 29 F4th at 1314 (reviewing Class, 138 SCt at

2023Although “the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty). 42 Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S.

2023Although “[t]he consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . 42 such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted)) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty).

2023Although “the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty). 42 Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S.

2023Although “the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty). 42 Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S.

2023Although “the consequence of a ‘structural’ error is that it is not subject to harmless error review, . . . such errors can still be waived.” Jackson v. Bartow, 930 F3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (holding that a defendant can waive his claim of a prior structural error, specifically a Faretta claim, by validly pleading guilty). 42 Indeed, Tollett itself supports this conclusion, as the Supreme Court there determined that the defendant’s plea in that case waived any claim that African-Americans had been systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, see 411 U.S.

2022The Court explained that “[s]ome courts have held that when a defendant shows that his attorney unreasonably failed to object to a structural error, the defendant is entitled to a new trial without further inquiry, whereas 10 The Court noted that “in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the outcome.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Weaver, 137 SCt at 1910 (III).

2022The Court explained that “[s]ome courts have held that when a defendant shows that his attorney unreasonably failed to object to a structural error, the defendant is entitled to a new trial without further 10 The Court noted that “in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the outcome.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Weaver, 137 SCt at 1910 (III).

2021Thus, 3 As this Court has explained previously, “there is some uncertainty as to whether McCoy’s holding extends to non-capital cases.” Harris v. State, 358 Ga. App. 802 , 809 (1) n.7 ( 856 SE2d 378 ) (2021), citing United States v. Rosemond, 322 FSupp3d 482, 486 (S.D.

2021See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328-329 (4) (781 SE2d 772) (2016) (unlike evidentiary errors, unobjected to errors “based on improper remarks during closing argument are not subject to review on appeal for plain error”). (b) Levatte also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements about reasonable doubt.

2021See Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 328-329 (4) (781 SE2d 772) (2016) (unlike evidentiary errors, unobjected to errors “based on improper remarks during closing argument are not subject to review on appeal for plain error”). (b) Levatte also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements about reasonable doubt.

2019See Barnett v. State, 300 Ga. 551, 554-555 (2) ( 796 SE2d 653 ) (2017) (explaining that the “constitutional guarantee of due process is not concerned with mere appearances of 94 partiality” but with “actual bias” (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)).

2019See Barnett v. State, 300 Ga. 551, 554-555 (2) ( 796 SE2d 653 ) (2017) (explaining that the “constitutional guarantee of due process is not concerned with mere appearances of 94 partiality” but with “actual bias” (citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied)).

2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984); see also Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (prejudice is not presumed where a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14 (3) ( 635 SE2d 723 ) (2006) (setting out standard for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to trial court’s decision to replace a juror).

2014Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984); see also Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484 (3) (c) ( 690 SE2d 177 ) (2010) (prejudice is not presumed where a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14 (3) ( 635 SE2d 723 ) (2006) (setting out standard for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to trial court’s decision to replace a juror).

2014“In reviewing the habeas court’s order, this Court is not required to address the two elements in any particular order ‘or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.’ ” Walker v. Houston, 277 Ga. 470, 470 (1) ( 588 SE2d 715 ) (2003).

2014“In reviewing the habeas court’s order, this Court is not required to address the two elements in any particular order ‘or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.’ ” Walker v. Houston, 277 Ga. 470, 470 (1) ( 588 SE2d 715 ) (2003).