structural error in Kentucky

2021“Denial of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is a structural error. . . . [T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than being simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. at 799-800 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2021In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that the denial of a defendant’s right to a public trial was a structural error.9 Structural errors are those affecting the entire framework of the trial and necessarily render the trial fundamentally unfair.10 These errors are not considered under the harmless-error rule but instead require automatic reversal.11 In reviewing whether a trial court denied a defendant’s right to a public trial, we apply a presumption of prejudice if such a denial is found to have occurred.12 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 547 U.S. 140 , 1

2025Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Ky. 2005).

2020Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Ky. 2005).

2025See Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007) (“Harmless error analysis is simply not appropriate where a substantial right is involved.”). “[T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ For the same reason, a structural error ‘def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts [ 582 U.S. 286 ], 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907-08 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (internal citations omitted).

2020Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007). “[T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ Commonwealth v. Douglas, 553 S.W.3d 795, 799-800 (Ky. 2018).

2021In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that the denial of a defendant’s right to a public trial was a structural error.9 Structural errors are those affecting the entire framework of the trial and necessarily render the trial fundamentally unfair.10 These errors are not considered under the harmless-error rule but instead require automatic reversal.11 In reviewing whether a trial court denied a defendant’s right to a public trial, we apply a presumption of prejudice if such a denial is found to have occurred.12 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 547 U.S. 140 , 1

2021In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the United States Supreme Court held that the denial of a defendant’s right to a public trial was a structural error.9 Structural errors are those affecting the entire framework of the trial and necessarily render the trial fundamentally unfair.10 These errors are not considered under the harmless-error rule but instead require automatic reversal.11 In reviewing whether a trial court denied a defendant’s right to a public trial, we apply a presumption of prejudice if such a denial is found to have occurred.12 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 547 U.S. 140 , 1

2025See Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007) (“Harmless error analysis is simply not appropriate where a substantial right is involved.”). “[T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ For the same reason, a structural error ‘def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts [ 582 U.S. 286 ], 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907-08 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (internal citations omitted).

2025See Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky. 2007) (“Harmless error analysis is simply not appropriate where a substantial right is involved.”). “[T]he defining feature of a structural error is that it ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds,’ rather than being ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ For the same reason, a structural error ‘def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts [ 582 U.S. 286 ], 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907-08 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (internal citations omitted).

2024Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Ky. 2004).

2013Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 229 (Ky.2004) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)).

2025Nevertheless, the task of crafting instructions on multiple charges remains “pregnant with possibilities for error[.]” See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460 (1978).

2024Nevertheless, the task of crafting instructions on multiple charges remains “pregnant with possibilities for error[.]” See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 460 (1978). 29 Recognizing this risk, the trial court adroitly brought the issue of sufficient factual differentiation to the attention of the parties.

2013This Court has' further stated that “non-constitutional errors will rarely — perhaps never — rise to the level of being a structural error.” Crossland v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 223, 232 (Ky.2009).

2012Structural error is defined as "errors ‘which are, per se, reversible because they undermine the fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process.’ ” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411, 418 (Ky.2011) (quoting Crossland v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Ky.2009)).

2025Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to “automatic reversal” regardless of the error’s actual “effect on the outcome.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 582 U.S. 286 , 299 (2017), (Emphasis added). 12 The language “generally entitled to ‘automatic reversal’” found in Weaver, while certainly tipping the balance to the defendant, does not mandate reversal in all circumstances.

2025Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to “automatic reversal” regardless of the error’s actual “effect on the outcome.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 582 U.S. 286 , 299 (2017), (Emphasis added). 12 The language “generally entitled to ‘automatic reversal’” found in Weaver, while certainly tipping the balance to the defendant, does not mandate reversal in all circumstances.

2016A structural error is a "very limited class" of errors that affect the "framework within which the trial proceeds." United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 , 263 (2010).

2016A structural error is a "very limited class" of errors that affect the "framework within which the trial proceeds." United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258 , 263 (2010).

2021“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989); see also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. App. 1996). “[E]rrors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.” Skaggs v. Assad, by and through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citation omitted).

2021“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989); see also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. App. 1996). “[E]rrors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.” Skaggs v. Assad, by and through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citation omitted).

2021“The Court of Appeals is without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989); see also Shelton v. Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. App. 1996). “[E]rrors to be considered for appellate review must be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.” Skaggs v. Assad, by and through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citation omitted).

2020While noting that “no script is always required or always sufficient for a Faretta hearing,” Jackson heavily relies on the trial court’s failure to ask the model questions set out in Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 824-25 (Ky. 2009) (quoting United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987)).

2020While noting that “no script is always required or always sufficient for a Faretta hearing,” Jackson heavily relies on the trial court’s failure to ask the model questions set out in Commonwealth v. Terry, 295 S.W.3d 819, 824-25 (Ky. 2009) (quoting United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1987)).

2020Otherwise, the Commonwealth committed 52 See is. at 255 (citing Sterling v. State of Texas, 791 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. 1990) (“The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, stating: ‘[a] person who is familiar with a substance may identify it.

2018For instance, “[f|ailure to remove biased jurors taints the entire trial,” Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2000), and prejudice is presumed from such a deprivation of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

2014See also: Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 486 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 , 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (Conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial "Because we find that the trial court committed clear error in overruling petitioner's Batson objection[.]”); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir.1998) ("Because the effects of racial discrimination during voir dire ‘may persist through the whole course of the trial proceedings,’ we hold that a Batson/Powers claim is a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review.”) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 , 111 S.Ct. 1364