structural error in Iowa

2026The party claiming structural error need not “show he would have obtained a different outcome absent the counsel’s structural error.” Id.

2022Id. [W]hen counsel commits a structural error, the defendant does not have to show he would have obtained a different outcome absent the counsel’s structural error because such an analysis “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” Id. (citation omitted). 5 We note that Wycoff has not established counsel’s conduct was due to inaction rather than an exercise of judgment.

2021See Krogmann, 914 N.W.2d at 313 (“Situations where a showing of prejudice is not required for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims generally manifest as what have been labeled ‘structural errors.’ A structural error or defect has been said to arise when the flaw ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds.’ Structural error occurs and prejudice is presumed where, under the circumstances, the likelihood of counsel rendering effective assistance is too remote.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

2021See Krogmann, 914 N.W.2d at 313 (“Situations where a showing of prejudice is not required for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims generally manifest as what have been labeled ‘structural errors.’ A structural error or defect has been said to arise when the flaw ‘affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds.’ Structural error occurs and prejudice is presumed where, under the circumstances, the likelihood of counsel rendering effective assistance is too remote.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).

2025First, “[w]hen a defendant fails to preserve a claim of structural error and instead raises the error in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,” as Miller did here, “the defendant must still establish constitutional prejudice.” Smith, 7 N.W.3d at 727; see also Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 299 (2017) (“[I]n the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue 14 is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s actual ‘effect on the outcome.’”).

2018The Court noted it treats an unconstitutional courtroom closure as a structural error "[i]n the direct review context." Id. at ----, 137 S.Ct. at 1905 .

2021Structural error occurs when: (1) counsel is completely denied, actually or constructively, at a crucial stage of the proceeding; (2) where counsel does not place the prosecution’s case against meaningful adversarial testing; or (3) where surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness, such as where counsel has an actual conflict of interest in jointly representing multiple defendants. 11 State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)).

2018Structural error occurs only when "the criminal adversary process itself is 'presumptively unreliable.' " Id. at 252 (quoting United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648 , 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ).

2021Structural error occurs when: (1) counsel is completely denied, actually or constructively, at a crucial stage of the proceeding; (2) where counsel does not place the prosecution’s case against meaningful adversarial testing; or (3) where surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness, such as where counsel has an actual conflict of interest in jointly representing multiple defendants. 11 State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)).

2014See State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008); see also Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 253 (finding applicant was “constructively without counsel” 6 and application was “dismissed without . . . meaningful adversarial testing”).

2006State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 2003) (citing McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir.1998) ("Despite the strong presumption that constitutional error can be harmless, we conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.") (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)).

2006State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 2003) (citing McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Despite the strong presumption that constitutional error can be harmless, we conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)).

2022When a structural error occurs, “the underlying . . . proceeding is so unreliable the constitutional or statutory right to counsel entitles 4 the defendant to a new proceeding without the need to show the error actually caused prejudice.” Id.

2018A structural error or defect has been said to arise when the flaw "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds." Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. at 1265 .

2006State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 2003) (citing McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir.1998) ("Despite the strong presumption that constitutional error can be harmless, we conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.") (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)).

2006State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa 2003) (citing McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Despite the strong presumption that constitutional error can be harmless, we conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)).

2020Id. 14 “That said, the concept of prejudice is defined in different ways depending on the context in which it appears”; “the prejudice inquiry is not meant to be applied in a ‘mechanical’ fashion.” Id. at 1911 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “[W]hen a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.’” Id. (citation omitted).

2020Id. 14 “That said, the concept of prejudice is defined in different ways depending on the context in which it appears”; “the prejudice inquiry is not meant to be applied in a ‘mechanical’ fashion.” Id. at 1911 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “[W]hen a court is evaluating an ineffective-assistance claim, the ultimate inquiry must concentrate on ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.’” Id. (citation omitted).

2022Even if, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not, “the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial.” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 ; see also Lawrence, 167 N.W.2d at 919 (reversing murder conviction and remanding for a new trial when public was unjustifiably excluded from trial during reading of jury instructions).

2022Even if, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not, “the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial.” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 ; see also Lawrence, 167 N.W.2d at 919 (reversing murder conviction and remanding for a new trial when public was unjustifiably excluded from trial during reading of jury instructions).

2011Stated another way, when counsel commits a structural error, the defendant does not have to show he would have obtained a different outcome absent the counsel’s structural error because such an analysis “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409, 420 (2006) (presuming prejudice where trial court erroneously inhibited defendant from having his choice of counsel).

2011Stated another way, when counsel commits a structural error, the defendant does not have to show he would have obtained a different outcome absent the counsel’s structural error because such an analysis “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409, 420 (2006) (presuming prejudice where trial court erroneously inhibited defendant from having his choice of counsel).

2017See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting “[p]roperly defending this case, in all its complexity, has required, and will continue to require, substantial financial resources,” and “[i]n these circumstances, 12 demonstrating prejudice after the fact would be all but impossible” and concluding “there is no need for a particularized showing of prejudice here”).2 But the facts do not fit neatly into the structural error scenarios set forth in Lado. 804 N.W.2d at 252 .

2017But see Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (finding support for a structural error analysis in “cases involving criminal defense counsel burdened by conflicts of interest”).

2026See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (holding “[i]t is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal”).

2026See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (holding “[i]t is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal”).

2025A structural error is one which “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Thongvanh v. State, 938 N.W.2d 2 , 13 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).

2025These types of errors contaminate the whole trial process and “necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citation omitted).

2022See Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866 .

2020In United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “The selection of a grand or petit jury in violation of either the equal protection or the fair cross-section guarantee is structural error.” 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014).

2020In United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “The selection of a grand or petit jury in violation of either the equal protection or the fair cross-section guarantee is structural error.” 421 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2014).

2019See State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Iowa 2012).

2018As Justice Breyer stated for the plurality, "[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States , 491 U.S. 617 , 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646 , 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) ).

2018As Justice Breyer stated for the plurality, "[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States , 491 U.S. 617 , 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646 , 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) ).

2018See Cronic , 466 U.S. at 659-61 , 104 S.Ct. at 2047 -48 (citing Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 , 53, 56, 57-58, 53 S.Ct. 55 , 58, 59, 60, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ).

2018See Cronic , 466 U.S. at 659-61 , 104 S.Ct. at 2047 -48 (citing Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 , 53, 56, 57-58, 53 S.Ct. 55 , 58, 59, 60, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ).

2018Cf. Luis v. United States , 578 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1083 , 1087, 194 L.Ed.2d 256 (2016) (plurality opinion) (granting interlocutory appeal from asset freeze that prevented the defendant from hiring the counsel of her choice).

2018See id. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 1089 .

2018In Luis, the United States Supreme Court held over the dissent of three justices that a freeze of untainted assets constituted a structural error when it affected a defendant’s ability to obtain the counsel of her choice. 578 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1089 .

2018In Luis , the United States Supreme Court held over the dissent of three justices that a freeze of untainted assets constituted a structural error when it affected a defendant's ability to obtain the counsel of her choice . 578 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 1089 .

2018However, even if counsel’s representation was unethical, a “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).

2017See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006).

2017The Iowa Supreme Court broached the subject in State v. Dahl, 874 N.W.2d 348, 352 (Iowa 2016).