structural error in Arizona

2026“Structural error is a narrow category” of trial error that “’deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’” State v. Trudell, 258 Ariz. 290 , 293, ¶ 16 (App. 2024) (quoting State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, ¶ 45 (2003)).

2024Structural error has been found in relatively few circumstances, relevant among them, where there is a “complete denial of criminal defense counsel” or “denial of access to criminal defense counsel during an overnight trial recess.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 46 (2003).3 ¶10 A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by both “the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 24, of the Arizona Constitution.” State v. Penney, 229 Ariz. 32, ¶ 10 (App. 2012); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 .

2025"If no objection is made at trial, and the error alleged does not rise to the level of structural error, we review only for fundamental error." State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 12 (2009), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135 (2018).

2016It is not entirely clear from Koepke’s briefs whether her argument is one of complete denial of counsel, a structural error, see State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶ 10 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & n. 2 (2009), or rather an argument that counsel’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 38(d) constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, see State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005) (fundamental error review applies when defendant fails to object to alleged trial error).

2016It is not entirely clear from Koepke’s briefs whether her argument is one of complete denial of counsel, a structural error, see State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶ 10 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & n. 2 (2009), or rather an argument that counsel’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 38(d) constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, see State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005) (fundamental error review applies when defendant fails to object to alleged trial error).

2016It is not entirely clear from Koepke’s briefs whether her argument is one of complete denial of counsel, a structural error, see State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582 , ¶ 10 & n. 2, 208 P.3d 233 , 235-36 & n. 2 (2009), or rather an argument that counsel’s failure to strictly comply with Rule 38(d) constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, see State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005) (fundamental error review applies when defendant fails to object to alleged trial error).

2026Gastelum argues “[t]he fairness and impartiality of juries are fundamental to the integrity of the legal system,” and that accordingly, “empaneling of a biased juror is a structural error that affects the integrity of the legal system.” He relies on State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314 (2000), a capital case in which the trial court excluded jurors for cause who voiced objections to the death penalty; the court did not allow additional voir dire of these jurors, and our supreme court reversed.

2024Structural error is a narrow category reflecting error that “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and in the face of which “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, ¶ 45 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 8–9 (1999)); see also State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314 , 323–24, ¶ 22 (2000) (structural errors “create ‘defects . . . in the trial mechanism’ itself [and] aff

2024Structural error is a narrow category reflecting error that “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and in the face of which “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, ¶ 45 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 8–9 (1999)); see also State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314 , 323–24, ¶ 22 (2000) (structural errors “create ‘defects . . . in the trial mechanism’ itself [and] aff

2018Bush contends that Simmons error is structural because it "undermine[s] confidence in the ... outcome of the proceeding." But the "relatively few instances in which we ... regard error as structural" all involve errors that "deprive defendants of 'basic protections' " and infect " 'the entire trial process' from beginning to end," and include "errors such as a biased trial judge [and the] complete denial of criminal defense counsel." State v. Ring ( Ring III ), 204 Ariz. 534 , 552-53 ¶¶ 45-46, 65 P.3d 915 , 933-34 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2024Structural error is a narrow category reflecting error that “deprive[s] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence” and in the face of which “no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 552, ¶ 45 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 8–9 (1999)); see also State v. Anderson, 197 Ariz. 314 , 323–24, ¶ 22 (2000) (structural errors “create ‘defects . . . in the trial mechanism’ itself [and] aff

2018Bush contends that Simmons error is structural because it "undermine[s] confidence in the ... outcome of the proceeding." But the "relatively few instances in which we ... regard error as structural" all involve errors that "deprive defendants of 'basic protections' " and infect " 'the entire trial process' from beginning to end," and include "errors such as a biased trial judge [and the] complete denial of criminal defense counsel." State v. Ring ( Ring III ), 204 Ariz. 534 , 552-53 ¶¶ 45-46, 65 P.3d 915 , 933-34 (2003) (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.

2016To determine whether a defendant’s absence may be structural error, we consider “the character of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded . . . to ascertain the impact of the constitutional violation on the overall structure of the criminal proceeding.” State v. Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, 148, ¶ 16 (1998) (quoting Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995)). ¶10 Defendant was physically present for the entire trial.

2009See Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, ¶ 16 , 953 P.2d at 540 . “[B]efore a court can classify a ‘presence error,’ the character of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded must be evaluated to ascertain the impact of the constitutional violation on the overall structure of the criminal proceeding.” Id., quoting Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir.1995). ¶ 16 We must therefore assess whether the conduct of Forte’s sentencing so insulted the basic framework of a criminal sentencing such that the proceeding could no longer serve its core function.

2009Structural error is that “which affects the basic ‘framework within which the trial proceeds’ ” and which so undermines the proceedings that the trial ‘“cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’ ” Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, ¶ 15 , 953 P.2d at 540 , quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). ¶ 15 Our supreme court has made clear that not all species of “presence error” are necessarily structural.

2009Structural error is that “which affects the basic ‘framework within which the trial proceeds’ ” and which so undermines the proceedings that the trial ‘“cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.’ ” Garcia-Contreras, 191 Ariz. 144, ¶ 15 , 953 P.2d at 540 , quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). ¶ 15 Our supreme court has made clear that not all species of “presence error” are necessarily structural.

2024In contrast, a structural error entitles the defendant to “automatic reversal without any inquiry into prejudice.” Id. at 290 .

2024See, e.g., United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447 , 456–57 (5th Cir. 2006). ¶15 “The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 294–95.

2023Structural error occurs “only in a very limited class of cases,” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997), and this does not constitute one of those rare occasions.

2023Structural error occurs “only in a very limited class of cases,” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997), and this does not constitute one of those rare occasions.

2003Consequently, it would be inconsistent with Neder to now find that Ring II is a watershed rule that “implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 , 109 S. Ct. at 1076 ; see, e.g., Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148-49 (relying on Neder to determine that Apprendi is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure); United States v. Gibbs, 125 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705-07 (E.D.

2003Consequently, it would be inconsistent with Neder to now find that Ring II is a watershed rule that "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial." Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ; see, e.g., Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148-49 (relying on Neder to determine that Apprendi is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure); United States v. Gibbs, 125 F.Supp.2d 700, 705-07 (E.D.Pa.2000) (same). ¶ 25 The new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ring II thus does not meet either of the exceptions to Teague's general rule that new rules do not apply retroactively to cases that have becom

2003Consequently, it would be inconsistent with Neder to now find that Ring II is a watershed rule that “implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 , 109 S. Ct. at 1076 ; see, e.g., Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148-49 (relying on Neder to determine that Apprendi is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure); United States v. Gibbs, 125 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705-07 (E.D.

2003Consequently, it would be inconsistent with Neder to now find that Ring II is a watershed rule that "implicate[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial." Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ; see, e.g., Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148-49 (relying on Neder to determine that Apprendi is not a watershed rule of criminal procedure); United States v. Gibbs, 125 F.Supp.2d 700, 705-07 (E.D.Pa.2000) (same). ¶ 25 The new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ring II thus does not meet either of the exceptions to Teague's general rule that new rules do not apply retroactively to cases that have becom

2026“What Does Mitigation Mean To You?” ¶104 McCauley sought to ask in voir dire, “What does mitigation mean to you?” McCauley claims the trial court erred in denying the request, citing State v. Patterson, 230 Ariz. 270 (2012). ¶105 In Patterson, this Court determined that defendant was properly restricted from asking a potential juror “what kind of circumstances she would find mitigating” because defendants “are not entitled to ‘ask potential jurors what types of evidence they will consider to be mitigating.’” 230 Ariz. at 273 ¶¶ 7–8 (quoting Glassel, 211 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 44).

2007It “deprivets] defendants of basic protections without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for guilt or innocence.” Id. (quoting Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 552 ¶45, 65 P.3d at 933 (internal quotations omitted)); see also State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33 , 53 ¶ 74, 116 P.3d 1193, 1213 (2005) (noting in dicta that instruction that improperly reduces state’s burden of proof in penalty phase of capital trial is structural error), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1024 , 126 S.Ct. 1576 , 164 L.Ed.2d 308 (2006).

2024Structural error has been found in relatively few circumstances, relevant among them, where there is a “complete denial of criminal defense counsel” or “denial of access to criminal defense counsel during an overnight trial recess.” State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 46 (2003).3 ¶10 A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by both “the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 24, of the Arizona Constitution.” State v. Penney, 229 Ariz. 32, ¶ 10 (App. 2012); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 .

2018Structural error is one that affects "the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." State v. Torres , 208 Ariz. 340 , ¶ 11, 93 P.3d 1056 (2004), quoting Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). ¶ 8 The right to self-representation is "necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment," such that the state may not "constitutionally hale a person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him ... when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense." Faretta v. Calif

2020Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 218–19 & n.2 (2006); State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534 , 552–53, ¶¶ 45–46 (2003); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). ¶10 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to representation by counsel for criminal defendants.

2009As our supreme court has recently held, "`[v]irtually any error, under particular circumstances, can be harmless.'" Id. at 198, ¶ 29 , 68 P.3d at 424 ; cf. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) ("Only in rare cases has [the U.S. Supreme] Court held that an error is structural, [requiring] automatic reversal."); Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 552, ¶ 46 , 65 P.3d at 933 ("The Supreme Court has defined relatively few instances in which we should regard error as structural.").

2009Escobedo did not object at trial; thus harmless error review has no applicability here. ¶ 58 "If no objection is made at trial, and the error alleged does not rise to the level of structural error, we review only for fundamental error." Id. at ¶ 12 (citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d at 607 ).

2009Escobedo did not object at trial; thus harmless error review has no applicability here. ¶ 58 “If no objection is made at trial, and the error alleged does not rise to the level of structural error, we review only for fundamental error.” Id. at ¶ 12 (citing Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19 , 115 P.3d at 607 ).

2026See Maldonado, 223 Ariz. at 313, ¶ 25 (“If a defendant does not object before trial, as occurred here, the state’s failure to timely file an information will be reviewed on appeal only for fundamental error.”); see also State v. Trudell, 258 Ariz. 290 , 293, ¶ 17 (App. 2024) (“For error that does not rise to the level of structural error, if the defendant fails to object at trial, we review only for fundamental, prejudicial error.”). 5 STATE v. ALFARTOUSI Decision of the Court ¶19 To prevail on fundamental error review, Yaser must show that “(1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2

2026Improperly Denied Mistrial For Juror Misconduct ¶108 McCauley argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to meaningfully investigate juror misconduct and not declaring a mistrial for such misconduct. ¶109 We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial based on alleged jury misconduct, State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 447 ¶ 16 (2003), and a decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing based on alleged misconduct, Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. at 214 ¶ 52. “[J]uror misconduct warrants a new trial if the defense shows actual p

2024See Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 513 (2021).

2024See, e.g., United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447 , 456–57 (5th Cir. 2006). ¶15 “The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 294–95.

2024See, e.g., United States v. Virgil, 444 F.3d 447 , 456–57 (5th Cir. 2006). ¶15 “The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 294–95.

2024See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 45 (2003) (structural error “automatically” results in reversal of guilty verdict); State v. Hancock, 240 Ariz. 393, ¶ 7 (App. 2016) (“Where error is structural, prejudice is presumed and reversal is mandated regardless of whether an objection [wa]s made below.”).

2024“We review both constitutional and structural error claims de novo.” Hancock, 240 Ariz. 393, ¶ 7 .