structural error in Texas

2022Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10; Lily, 365 S.W.3d at 328 . “[I]n the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s actual ‘effect on the outcome.’” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)).

2020More specifically, a structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. at 340 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).

2020More specifically, a structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. at 340 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)).

2010A structural error is a “defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Id. at 340 , citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

2020A structural error is a “‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 , 117 S. Ct. 1544 , 137 L.

2020A structural error is a “‘defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 , 117 S. Ct. 1544 , 137 L.

2010We note that appellant does not assert that his trial counsel committed a structural error by being so ineffective that counsel’s errors were in essence a "total deprivation of counsel at trial." See Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).

2009We note that appellant does not assert that his trial counsel committed a structural error by being so ineffective that counsel's errors were in essence a "total deprivation of counsel at trial." See Johnson v. State , 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim.

2022Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10; Lily, 365 S.W.3d at 328 . “[I]n the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s actual ‘effect on the outcome.’” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)).

2018Id. at 1908 . "[I]n the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to 'automatic reversal' regardless of the error's actual 'effect on the outcome.' " Id. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) ).

2018Lake, 532 S.W.3d at 411 (affirming its holding in Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim.

2009Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991); see Cain v. State , 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim.

2021In re R.R., 373 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); Green v. State, 36 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 2 of guilty is returned by the jury.

2021In re R.R., 373 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); Green v. State, 36 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 2 waiver of the right to trial by jury, the judgment contains the following language: “Both parties announced ready for trial.

2022I agree with the majority in that Waller would require a reversal and new trial as the findings purporting to justify the closure in this case were not “adequate to support the closure.” See 10 Waller, 467 U.S. at 48 .13 In light of the Supreme Court jurisprudence discussed above, and the emphasis the Supreme Court has put on specific findings to support closing a courtroom, I am skeptical that excluding an individual from the courtroom on such flimsy evidence—evidence that essentially amounts to nothing more than the State saying, “take my word for it”—could ever pass constitutional muster an

2009Structural error has been found, for example, in the deprivation of the right to an impartial judge, Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10 ; the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963); unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 (1986); the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984); the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n.9 (1984); and total deprivation of expert assistance to which the defendant was entitled

2016United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177-78 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)).

2009Structural error has been found, for example, in the deprivation of the right to an impartial judge, Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10 ; the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963); unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 (1986); the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984); the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n.9 (1984); and total deprivation of expert assistance to which the defendant was entitled

2015App. – 2000), Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 209 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2007) The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a violation of the right to an impartial judge is a structural error that defies harm analysis.

2013In Ab-dygapparova v. State, our sister court correctly wrote, “The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a violation of the right to an impartial judge is a structural error that defies harm analysis.” Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 209 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd).

2022“The purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial.” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1907 .

2022Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309–10; Lily, 365 S.W.3d at 328 . “[I]n the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to ‘automatic reversal’ regardless of the error’s actual ‘effect on the outcome.’” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)).

2017The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘‘[T]he denial of the right to self-representation constitutes a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review and instead requires automatic reversal.”); see also United States v. Davila, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 , 186 L.Ed.2d 139 (2013) (listing the "denial of self-representation” as a structural error); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (listing "the denial of the right

2017The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘‘[T]he denial of the right to self-representation constitutes a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review and instead requires automatic reversal.”); see also United States v. Davila, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 , 186 L.Ed.2d 139 (2013) (listing the "denial of self-representation” as a structural error); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (listing "the denial of the right

2022See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 342–45, 83 S. Ct. 792 , 795–97 (1963); Davis v. State, 484 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); see also Casas v. State, 524 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (“[T]he lack of an impartial trial judge is a structural error that violates due process and is not subject to a harm analysis.”). 38 2014 incident during the guilt–innocence proceedings.

2022See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 342–45, 83 S. Ct. 792 , 795–97 (1963); Davis v. State, 484 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); see also Casas v. State, 524 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (“[T]he lack of an impartial trial judge is a structural error that violates due process and is not subject to a harm analysis.”). 38 2014 incident during the guilt–innocence proceedings.

2010See id. at 345 . 3 In the instant case, Appellant does not argue that any one instance of allegedly improper prosecutorial argument constituted structural error.

2009Structural error has been found, for example, in the deprivation of the right to an impartial judge, Fulminante , 499 U.S. at 309-10 ; the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 (1963); unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 (1986); the right to self-representation at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984); the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 49 n.9 (1984); and total deprivation of expert assistance to which the defendant was entitled

2006See Tanguma , 47 S.W.3d at 675-76 .

2006See Tanguma, 47 S.W.3d at 675-76 .

2021App. 2010); see Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (“A structural error affects the framework within which the trial proceeds[.]”).

2025Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Tex. Crim.

2021Structural error, which is subject to automatic reversal, “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself” and “render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair.” Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 290 (Tex. Crim.

2017The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘‘[T]he denial of the right to self-representation constitutes a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review and instead requires automatic reversal.”); see also United States v. Davila, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 , 186 L.Ed.2d 139 (2013) (listing the "denial of self-representation” as a structural error); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (listing "the denial of the right

2017The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."); Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (‘‘[T]he denial of the right to self-representation constitutes a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review and instead requires automatic reversal.”); see also United States v. Davila, - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2139, 2149 , 186 L.Ed.2d 139 (2013) (listing the "denial of self-representation” as a structural error); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (listing "the denial of the right

2021A violation of the right to confrontation is not a structural error but an error of “constitutional dimension.” Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim.

2018Merrit v. State, 529 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Langham v. State, 305 S.W.3d 568, 582 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Hedgpeth, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8881, at *5-6 ; Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 ; Rose, 478 U.S. at 579 .

2008See Hedgpeth , 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8881, at *5-6 ; Neder , 527 U.S. at 19 ; Rose , 478 U.S. at 579 .

2022So do a number of other courts. 35 This is a question that neither this Court nor the United States 35 See, e.g., Fortune v. United States, 59 A.3d 949, 957 (D.C. 2013) (denial of the right to a jury is structural error); Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (“When a defendant is deprived of his right to trial by jury, the error is structural and requires automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction.”); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.”); United States v

2022So do a number of other courts. 35 This is a question that neither this Court nor the United States 35 See, e.g., Fortune v. United States, 59 A.3d 949, 957 (D.C. 2013) (denial of the right to a jury is structural error); Miller v. Dormire, 310 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 2002) (“When a defendant is deprived of his right to trial by jury, the error is structural and requires automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction.”); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e conclude that the denial of a jury trial is a structural error subject to automatic reversal.”); United States v

2021Cf. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468–69 (offering, as example of type of bias that rises to level of structural error, example of adjudicant that had pecuniary interest in outcome of case (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927))).

2021See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309 ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

2015See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (“The public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right”); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (holding that denial of a public trial is a structural error).

2015See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (“The public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right”); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997) (holding that denial of a public trial is a structural error).

2015Id. at 138-39 .

2007Id. at 139 (Keasler, J., concurring).