structural error in Utah

2017A structural error is an error "affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

2017A structural error is an error "affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).

2005Unlike the challenge to the reasonable doubt instructions, however, this issue does not implicate the structural error doctrine. ¶24 In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 , the United States Supreme Court observed that it had “found such errors only in a very limited class of cases.” Id. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 .

2005Unlike the challenge to the reasonable doubt instructions, however, this issue does not implicate the structural error doctrine. ¶24 In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 , the United States Supreme Court observed that it had “found such errors only in a very limited class of cases.” Id. at 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 .

2019Thus, because a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage of the trial constitutes structural error, and because structural errors are considered "intrinsically harmful ... without regard to their effect on the outcome," Montes is entitled to "automatic reversal." Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 11 II.

2019Thus, because a deprivation of counsel during a critical stage of the trial constitutes structural error, and because structural errors are considered "intrinsically harmful ... without regard to their effect on the outcome," Montes is entitled to "automatic reversal." Neder v. United States , 527 U.S. 1 , 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). 11 II.

2017See State v. Cruz , 2005 UT 45 , ¶ 18, 122 P.3d 543 (noting, in a jury-instruction-error case, a split amongst jurisdictions as to whether a defendant must establish prejudice when alleging the existence of unpreserved structural errors); see also State v. Maestas , 2012 UT 46 , ¶ 57, 299 P.3d 892 ("The denial of counsel is a structural error that does not require a showing of harm 'where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding.' " (Emphases and citation omitted)); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674

2017See State v. Cruz , 2005 UT 45 , ¶ 18, 122 P.3d 543 (noting, in a jury-instruction-error case, a split amongst jurisdictions as to whether a defendant must establish prejudice when alleging the existence of unpreserved structural errors); see also State v. Maestas , 2012 UT 46 , ¶ 57, 299 P.3d 892 ("The denial of counsel is a structural error that does not require a showing of harm 'where assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding.' " (Emphases and citation omitted)); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674

2026We thus reject Allen’s implicit argument that Baker has installed a structural error regime in this context. 20231109-CA 15 2026 UT App 47 State v. Allen in a post-verdict motion, his claim was not properly preserved.

2025Because “the effects of [this kind of] error are simply too hard to measure or cannot be ascertained,” State v. Montes, 2019 UT App 74, ¶ 32 , 442 P.3d 1247 (quotation simplified), “we presume that a structural error affected the outcome of the case and do not require the defendant In terms of the relationship between the two, the United States Supreme Court has held that because a self-representing defendant typically “relinquishes . . . many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” “in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo th

2025Because “the effects of [this kind of] error are simply too hard to measure or cannot be ascertained,” State v. Montes, 2019 UT App 74, ¶ 32 , 442 P.3d 1247 (quotation simplified), “we presume that a structural error affected the outcome of the case and do not require the defendant In terms of the relationship between the two, the United States Supreme Court has held that because a self-representing defendant typically “relinquishes . . . many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel,” “in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo th

2025Jakeman argues that he had “planned to meet with [Counsel] an hour or more before trial so that he could determine whether they were on the same page regarding his defense and possibly represent himself at trial if necessary,” but “when he arrived almost an hour late, [Counsel] was waiting for him outside the courtroom and told him she had found a favorable case that required the [City] prove intent to cause injury for him to be found guilty.” He contends that 20231059-CA 16 2025 UT App 107 Orem City v. Jakeman “[b]ased upon the lack of time, the rushed state of the proceedings, . . . the favo

2025As an initial matter, we note that Lucke argues that his “invalid waiver of counsel amounted to structural error for which prejudice is presumed.” We agree. ¶37 A structural error is one that “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds.” State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 34 , 349 P.3d 712 (quotation simplified).

2025As an initial matter, we note that Lucke argues that his “invalid waiver of counsel amounted to structural error for which prejudice is presumed.” We agree. ¶37 A structural error is one that “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds.” State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 34 , 349 P.3d 712 (quotation simplified).

2019Thus, a court may not apply a harmless error analysis if the error complained of "possibly influenced the jury adversely." Id . at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824 . ¶30 In contrast, the structural error doctrine ensures that "certain basic, constitutional guarantees ... define the framework of any criminal trial." Weaver , 137 S.Ct. at 1907 .

2019And a "criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the Assistance of Counsel" is also of such "fundamental character" that the Court considers its "wrongful deprivation ... a structural error that so affects the framework within which the trial proceeds that courts may not even ask whether the error harmed the defendant." Luis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1083 , 1088-89, 194 L.Ed.2d 256 (2016) (cleaned up). ¶32 "Second, an error has been deemed structural if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure ... [or] cannot be ascertained." Weaver , 137 S.Ct. at 1908 (cle

2019The Court "consider[s] the wrongful deprivation of the right to counsel a structural error that so affects the framework within which the trial proceeds that courts may not even ask whether the error harmed the defendant." Id. (cleaned up). ¶36 But the denial of the right to counsel, standing alone, does not necessarily constitute structural error.

2019And a "criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the Assistance of Counsel" is also of such "fundamental character" that the Court considers its "wrongful deprivation ... a structural error that so affects the framework within which the trial proceeds that courts may not even ask whether the error harmed the defendant." Luis v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1083 , 1088-89, 194 L.Ed.2d 256 (2016) (cleaned up). ¶32 "Second, an error has been deemed structural if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure ... [or] cannot be ascertained." Weaver , 137 S.Ct. at 1908 (cle

2017The United States Supreme Court has “found structural errors only in a very limited class of cases,” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), including when “ ‘assistance of counsel 'has been denied entirely or during a critical stage, of the proceeding,”’ State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 57 , 299 P.3d 892 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002)).

2017The United States Supreme Court has “found structural errors only in a very limited class of cases,” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), including when “ ‘assistance of counsel 'has been denied entirely or during a critical stage, of the proceeding,”’ State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 57 , 299 P.3d 892 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002)).

2015We have recognized that ―structural errors‖ that affect ―the framework within which the trial proceeds‖ are qualitatively different than an ordinary ―error in the trial process itself.‖45 Consequently, we presume that a structural error affected the outcome of the case and do not require the defendant to show prejudice.46 Examples of such errors include mistakes in reasonable doubt instructions,47 the complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding,48 racial discrimination in jury selection,49 lack of an impartial trial judge,50 denial of the right to a public trial,51

2015We have recognized that ―structural errors‖ that affect ―the framework within which the trial proceeds‖ are qualitatively different than an ordinary ―error in the trial process itself.‖45 Consequently, we presume that a structural error affected the outcome of the case and do not require the defendant to show prejudice.46 Examples of such errors include mistakes in reasonable doubt instructions,47 the complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding,48 racial discrimination in jury selection,49 lack of an impartial trial judge,50 denial of the right to a public trial,51

2015See, eg., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶ 11 , 132 P.3d 703 .

2015See, eg., State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996); State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶ 11 , 132 P.3d 703 .

2014Although Jackson asserts trial counsel's ineffectiveness in these issues, because he was represented by different counsel on direct appeal, to reach the issues he must show that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them on direct appeal, See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(c) (LexisNexis 2012); Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62 , 1 21, 194 P.3d 918 .