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13 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Guthmiller v. Webergreen2 sentences2024See Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d 400, 406 (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has identified the depravation of the right to counsel as a structural error that requires reversal without a showing of prejudice); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 , 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 , 144 L. 2024See Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d 400, 406 (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has identified the depravation of the right to counsel as a structural error that requires reversal without a showing of prejudice); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 , 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 , 144 L. | 4 | 6 |
State v. Levygreen2 sentences2014A structural error “renders a trial fundamentally unfair[,]” id., and “resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire proceeding[,]” id. (quoting State v. Levy, 132 P.3d 1076, 1083 (Wash. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014A structural error “renders a trial fundamentally unfair[,]” id,., and “resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire pro-eeeding[,]” id. (quoting State v. Levy, 156 Wash.2d 709 , 132 P.3d 1076, 1083 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 4 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2014When there is a structural error, “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” *674 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014When there is a structural error, “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” *674 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Arguellogreen2 sentences2024See State v. Arguello, 2015 S.D. 103, ¶ 5 , 873 N.W.2d 490, 493 (“Structural error requires reversal without a showing of prejudice.”). 2024See State v. Arguello, 2015 S.D. 103, ¶ 5 , 873 N.W.2d 490, 493 (“Structural error requires reversal without a showing of prejudice.”). | 2 | 2 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d 400, 406 (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has identified the depravation of the right to counsel as a structural error that requires reversal without a showing of prejudice); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 , 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 , 144 L. 2024See Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d 400, 406 (recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has identified the depravation of the right to counsel as a structural error that requires reversal without a showing of prejudice); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 , 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833 , 144 L. | 1 | 5 |
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2014A structural error so “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds that automatic reversal is required.” Guthmiller, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d at 406 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [¶ 17.] The United States Supreme Court has found an error to be structural only when there has been “(1) a deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) a biased judge; (3) an unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant’s race; (4) a deprivation of the right of s 2014A structural error so “affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds that automatic reversal is required.” Guthmiller, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16 , 804 N.W.2d at 406 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282 , 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [¶ 17.] The United States Supreme Court has found an error to be structural only when there has been “(1) a deprivation of the right to counsel; (2) a biased judge; (3) an unlawful exclusion of grand jurors of the defendant’s race; (4) a deprivation of the right of s | 1 | 3 |
People v. Katzenbergergreen2 sentences2014The court found that structural error did not occur because there were no “instructions given by the trial court or comments made by the trial court under the cloak of its authority.” Id. at 128 . 2014The court found that structural error did not occur because there were no “instructions given by the trial court or comments made by the trial court under the cloak of its authority.” Id. at 128. | 1 | 2 |
Piper v. Younggreen1 sentence2025See Piper v. Young, 2019 S.D. 65 , ¶¶ 22–24, 936 N.W.2d 793 , 804–05 (stating claim preclusion rules applicable in habeas actions). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Younggreen1 sentence2021This Court has more recently recognized that “Blem does not stand for the proposition that every error in the jury selection process constitutes a structural error.” Miller v. Young, 2018 S.D. 33 , ¶ 19, 911 N.W.2d 644, 650 (distinguishing Blem). 8. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danielgreen2 sentences2021We have previously noted that “[a]lthough the extent of the general examination permitted by the trial court is undefined by statute or prior caselaw of this Court, the trial court’s discretion in conducting voir dire is limited by the right of the parties to have an impartial jury.” State v. Daniel, 2000 S.D. 18 , ¶ 11, 606 N.W.2d 532, 534 . -19- #29095 be fair and impartial if selected. 9 Nevertheless, nothing in chapter 23A-20 strictly forbids the parties from waiving the statutory procedure or the circuit court from asking case-specific questions, and Evans did not object to the court’s pr 2021We have previously noted that “[a]lthough the extent of the general examination permitted by the trial court is undefined by statute or prior caselaw of this Court, the trial court’s discretion in conducting voir dire is limited by the right of the parties to have an impartial jury.” State v. Daniel, 2000 S.D. 18 , ¶ 11, 606 N.W.2d 532, 534 . -19- #29095 be fair and impartial if selected. 9 Nevertheless, nothing in chapter 23A-20 strictly forbids the parties from waiving the statutory procedure or the circuit court from asking case-specific questions, and Evans did not object to the court’s pr | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guthriegreen1 sentence2014As a ______________________________________ (. . . continued) State v. Guthrie, 2001 S.D. 61 , ¶ 46, 627 N.W.2d 401, 420 (“[T]he motion for judgment of acquittal replaced the former motion for directed verdict.”). -5- #26817 result, Hayes maintains that this alleged structural error requires his conviction to be reversed. [¶16.] Constitutional errors are either structural or they are not. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Calderongreen2 sentences2008There, the court wrote that “[t]he right to be present at one’s criminal trial is a fundamental right.” State v. Calderon, 270 Kan. 241 , 13 P.3d 871, 879 (2000). 2008There, the court wrote that “[t]he right to be present at one’s criminal trial is a fundamental right.” State v. Calderon, 270 Kan. 241 , 13 P.3d 871, 879 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gratzgreen2 sentences2000See also People v. Gratz, 35 Mich.App. 42 , 192 N.W.2d 304, 305 (1971) (holding that “a failure to comply with the statutory provisions concerning the selection of juries may not be rectified under [the harmless error] statutory provision”); People v. Miller, 411 Mich. 321 , 307 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1981) (holding that a defendant need not establish that he was prejudiced by the jury selection when the statutory provisions are not complied with). [¶ 30.] Here, there was a substantial failure to comply with jury selection statutes because no examination of the prospective jurors was conducted prior 2000See also People v. Gratz, 35 Mich.App. 42 , 192 N.W.2d 304, 305 (1971) (holding that “a failure to comply with the statutory provisions concerning the selection of juries may not be rectified under [the harmless error] statutory provision”); People v. Miller, 411 Mich. 321 , 307 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1981) (holding that a defendant need not establish that he was prejudiced by the jury selection when the statutory provisions are not complied with). [¶ 30.] Here, there was a substantial failure to comply with jury selection statutes because no examination of the prospective jurors was conducted prior | 1 | 1 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2000See also People v. Gratz, 35 Mich.App. 42 , 192 N.W.2d 304, 305 (1971) (holding that “a failure to comply with the statutory provisions concerning the selection of juries may not be rectified under [the harmless error] statutory provision”); People v. Miller, 411 Mich. 321 , 307 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1981) (holding that a defendant need not establish that he was prejudiced by the jury selection when the statutory provisions are not complied with). [¶ 30.] Here, there was a substantial failure to comply with jury selection statutes because no examination of the prospective jurors was conducted prior 2000See also People v. Gratz, 35 Mich.App. 42 , 192 N.W.2d 304, 305 (1971) (holding that “a failure to comply with the statutory provisions concerning the selection of juries may not be rectified under [the harmless error] statutory provision”); People v. Miller, 411 Mich. 321 , 307 N.W.2d 335, 337 (1981) (holding that a defendant need not establish that he was prejudiced by the jury selection when the statutory provisions are not complied with). [¶ 30.] Here, there was a substantial failure to comply with jury selection statutes because no examination of the prospective jurors was conducted prior | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Levy
green
2 sentences2014A structural error “renders a trial fundamentally unfair[,]” id,., and “resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire pro-eeeding[,]” id. (quoting State v. Levy, 156 Wash.2d 709 , 132 P.3d 1076, 1083 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2011As one court stated, “A structural error resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire proceeding.” State v. Levy, 156 Wash.2d 709 , 132 P.3d 1076, 1083 (2006). | 3 | 2011–2018 |
State v. Blem
green
2 sentences2021Nevertheless, on appeal, Evans relies on State v. Blem for the proposition that the court’s deviation from the jury selection statutes constitutes a structural error necessitating automatic reversal. 7 See 2000 S.D. 69 , 610 N.W.2d 803 . 7. 2018Rather, he relies on Blem , in which we held that "a substantial failure to comply with jury selection statutes is a structural error[.]" 2000 S.D. 69 , ¶ 29, 610 N.W.2d at 810 . | 2 | 2018–2021 |
State v. LaMere
green
2 sentences2018Thus, unlike Blem and LaMere , Miller and the State questioned the prospective jurors and the parties were able to "eliminate as far as possible the vagaries of human subjectivity and arbitrariness from the jury selection process[.]" LaMere , 2 P.3d at 214 . [¶ 18.] We likewise conclude that the circuit court's decision to strike juror #108, which in effect gave the State an extra peremptory strike, did not constitute a structural error. 2000Blem claims that a failure to substantially comply with statutory proee-dures governing jury selection is a structural error not subject to harmless error review. [¶ 27.] In State v. LaMere, 2000 Mont. 45 , 2 P.3d 204 , the Montana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether the failure to abide by the statutory provisions of jury selection violated the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. | 2 | 2000–2018 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences2014When there is a structural error, “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” *674 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2014When there is a structural error, “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” *674 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310 , 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
McDonough v. Weber
green
2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 35 (1999) (providing that it is “the complete depravation of counsel” that constitutes a structural error (emphasis added)). -12- #29978 standard of reasonableness.’” 4 McDonough v. Weber, 2015 S.D. 1 , ¶ 22, 859 N.W.2d 26, 37 . 2024Ed. 2d 35 (1999) (providing that it is “the complete depravation of counsel” that constitutes a structural error (emphasis added)). -12- #29978 standard of reasonableness.’” 4 McDonough v. Weber, 2015 S.D. 1 , ¶ 22, 859 N.W.2d 26, 37 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Bearchild
neutral
2 sentences2018As the Montana Supreme Court recognized after LaMere , "[t]echnical departures from the jury selection statutes and violations which do not threaten the goals of random selection and objective disqualification do not constitute a substantial failure to comply." State v. Bearchild , 324 Mont. 435 , 103 P.3d 1006 , 1009 (2004). 2018As the Montana Supreme Court recognized after LaMere , "[t]echnical departures from the jury selection statutes and violations which do not threaten the goals of random selection and objective disqualification do not constitute a substantial failure to comply." State v. Bearchild , 324 Mont. 435 , 103 P.3d 1006 , 1009 (2004). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Waff
green
1 sentence2018In State v. Violett , we also concluded that the circuit court's excusal of a juror in violation of a juror statute constituted only a procedural error. *650 79 S.D. 292 , 304, 111 N.W.2d 598 , 605 (1961), overruled on other grounds by State v. Waff , 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D. 1985). [¶ 19.] Although Blem is a more recent decision and identified that a structural error can occur in the jury selection process, Blem does not stand for the proposition that every error in the jury selection process constitutes a structural error. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Violett
green
2 sentences2018In State v. Violett , we also concluded that the circuit court's excusal of a juror in violation of a juror statute constituted only a procedural error. *650 79 S.D. 292 , 304, 111 N.W.2d 598 , 605 (1961), overruled on other grounds by State v. Waff , 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D. 1985). [¶ 19.] Although Blem is a more recent decision and identified that a structural error can occur in the jury selection process, Blem does not stand for the proposition that every error in the jury selection process constitutes a structural error. 2018In State v. Violett , we also concluded that the circuit court's excusal of a juror in violation of a juror statute constituted only a procedural error. *650 79 S.D. 292 , 304, 111 N.W.2d 598 , 605 (1961), overruled on other grounds by State v. Waff , 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D. 1985). [¶ 19.] Although Blem is a more recent decision and identified that a structural error can occur in the jury selection process, Blem does not stand for the proposition that every error in the jury selection process constitutes a structural error. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.