Alford plea in Ohio

2026“The trial court must inquire into and seek to ‘resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence.’” Id., quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn.10 . {¶32} “Before accepting an Alford plea, a trial court ‘must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s protestations of innocence’ the defendant has made a rational calculation that the plea bargain offered is in his or her best interest by avoiding the risks of a greater punishment if a jury returns a guilty verdict.” Id. at ¶ 40, quoting State v. Wasilewski, 2020-Ohio-5141, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), quoting Padgett at 338 . {

2026State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971), syllabus. {¶34} “In addition to the above, an Alford plea requires a factual basis for the charges be provided to ensure that the defendant has made a rational calculation, based on the strength of the State’s case, between the risk of trial and the consequences of pleading guilty.” Obhof, 2023-Ohio-408, at ¶ 42 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Gil, 2019- Ohio-839, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.) and Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn.10 . {¶35} Contrary to Patton’s assertion, his decision appears to be the product of a “rational calculation” of the charges and penalties he

2026“Although a plea may be entered knowingly and intelligently, the Alford plea ‘involves a rational calculation that is significantly different from the calculation made by a defendant who admits he is guilty . . . .’” Id., quoting State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 338 (2d Dist. 1990).

2026“The trial court must inquire into and seek to ‘resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of innocence.’” Id., quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn.10 . {¶32} “Before accepting an Alford plea, a trial court ‘must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s protestations of innocence’ the defendant has made a rational calculation that the plea bargain offered is in his or her best interest by avoiding the risks of a greater punishment if a jury returns a guilty verdict.” Id. at ¶ 40, quoting State v. Wasilewski, 2020-Ohio-5141, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), quoting Padgett at 338 . {

2026State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971), syllabus. {¶34} “In addition to the above, an Alford plea requires a factual basis for the charges be provided to ensure that the defendant has made a rational calculation, based on the strength of the State’s case, between the risk of trial and the consequences of pleading guilty.” Obhof, 2023-Ohio-408, at ¶ 42 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Gil, 2019- Ohio-839, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.) and Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, fn.10 . {¶35} Contrary to Patton’s assertion, his decision appears to be the product of a “rational calculation” of the charges and penalties he

2026State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971), syllabus. {¶8} In addition to compliance with Crim.R. 11, a trial court should not accept an Alford plea “unless there is a factual basis for that plea.” Krieg at ¶ 14 , quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 .

2017No. 05AP-982, 2006-Ohio-3144, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Carter, 124 Ohio App.3d 423, 429 (2d Dist.1997) ("An Alford plea is 'merely a species of a guilty plea, having the effect of waiving [a defendant's] right to appeal.' "). {¶ 10} In arguing appellant waived the right to raise the issues presented on appeal, the state relies on case law generally holding that a plea of guilty waives a defendant's ability to challenge the denial of pretrial motions.

2014“An Alford plea is ‘merely a species of guilty plea[,]’” and “is predicated upon the defendant’s desire to obtain a lesser penalty rather than risk the consequences of a jury trial.” State v. Carter, 124 Ohio App.3d 423, 429 (1997); State v. Krieg, 9th Dist.

2026This Court has recognized “[a]n Alford plea is merely a species of guilty plea where the trial court accepts the guilty plea of the defendant despite the defendant’s protestations of innocence.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Krieg, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 8-9 (9th Dist.). {¶7} When accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must satisfy the requirements of Crim.R. 11, which “requires a meaningful dialogue between the court and the defendant to insure 3 that the defendant entered his guilty plea both knowingly and intelligently.” Krieg at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio S

2026See also State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-111, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.) (suggesting that a “bill of particulars, . . . witness statements[,] . . . investigative reports, . . . [or a] recitation of basic facts at the plea hearing” can suffice for an Alford plea); State v. Krieg, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.) (finding that the trial court’s possession of a bill of particulars was sufficient to supply the court with a factual basis for the defendant’s Alford plea). {¶14} Notably, Berentz does not claim that his plea was anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

2026Id. at 37-38; see also State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1987) (“no constitutional error was found in accepting a guilty plea which contained a protestation of innocence, if the defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and if the record before the court contains strong evidence of guilt”). {¶57} In State v. Diehl, 2017-Ohio-7708 (7th Dist.), we acknowledged “an Alford plea is a species of a guilty plea.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 , ¶ 13, and further distinguished no contest pleas and Alford pleas as follows: We agree Alf

2014At the same time by impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.”) (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations omitted.) Whereas, to properly accept an Alford plea, the trial court adhered to a lesser burden of proof: that the record contain “strong evidence of guilt.” Krieg at ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1987).

2026This Court has recognized “[a]n Alford plea is merely a species of guilty plea where the trial court accepts the guilty plea of the defendant despite the defendant’s protestations of innocence.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Krieg, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 8-9 (9th Dist.). {¶7} When accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must satisfy the requirements of Crim.R. 11, which “requires a meaningful dialogue between the court and the defendant to insure 3 that the defendant entered his guilty plea both knowingly and intelligently.” Krieg at ¶ 10 , citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio S

2024State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 528 (1996). {¶8} Mr. Davis’s attorney and the trial court informed him that by entering an Alford plea, he would preserve the right to appeal a suppression ruling.

2026Rather, he asserts the trial court’s denial of his request for more time created a “coercive pressure” that left him with no choice but to change his plea. {¶31} “An Alford plea is a plea of guilty entered with a contemporaneous protestation of innocence.” State v. Obhof, 2023-Ohio-408, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.).

2026“Although a plea may be entered knowingly and intelligently, the Alford plea ‘involves a rational calculation that is significantly different from the calculation made by a defendant who admits he is guilty . . . .’” Id., quoting State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 338 (2d Dist. 1990).

2019Ashtabula No. 2014-A-0065, 2015-Ohio-2595 , ¶ 18; State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio-4415 , 814 N.E.2d 51 , ¶ 13 (an Alford plea is a plea “whereby a defendant pleads guilty yet maintains actual innocence of the charges”).

2017This is commonly known as an “Alford plea[.]” State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio-4415 , ¶ 13.

2014See also State v. Casale, 34 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (8th Dist.1986), (where the Court concluded that the trial court’s acceptance of an Alford plea was improper because the record was “devoid of a basic factual framework against which the trial court could weigh the appellant’s claims of innocence against her willingness to waive trial.”) (Emphasis added.) {¶12} As such, the evidence previously submitted to the jury in Mr. King’s first trial could arguably be strong enough proof of Mr. King’s guilt for the purpose of accepting an Alford plea, while still falling short of proof beyond a reasonabl

2007At a minimum, this requires an `inquiry of the defendant concerning his reasons for deciding to plead guilty notwithstanding his protestations of innocence; it may require, in addition, inquiry concerning the state's evidence in order to determine that the likelihood of the defendant's being convicted of offenses of equal or greater magnitude than the offenses to which he is pleading guilty *Page 8 is great enough to warrant an intelligent decision to plead guilty.' Id. {¶ 31} "The essence of an Alford plea is that a Defendant's decision to enter the plea against his protestations of factual i

2024"Although an Alford plea allows a defendant to maintain his factual innocence, the plea has the same legal effect as a guilty plea." Id., citing Carey at ¶ 6 . {¶ 14} Because pleas accompanied by protestations of innocence give rise to an inherent suspicion that a plea may not have been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, "Alford and the cases following it have made it clear that guilty pleas accompanied by an assertion of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, and until the court accepting the plea has attempted to resolve the conflict between the waiv

2021See Carey at ¶ 8 (“The State was never informed that Carey was intending to enter an Alford plea, nor did it agree to condition the plea bargain upon such [qualified terms].”).

2025See State v. May, 2021-Ohio-261, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.) (totality of the circumstances insufficient to characterize the plea as an Alford plea); State v. Swoveland, 2018-Ohio-2875, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.) (the record did not support the appellant's claim that he entered an Alford plea).

2024State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971); see also State v. Wilkerson, 2014-Ohio-3919, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.) (“An Alford plea results when a defendant pleads guilty yet maintains actual innocence of the crime charged.”); State v. May, 2021-Ohio-261, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.); State v. Carey, 2011-Ohio- 1998, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

2025“An Alford plea exists where a defendant enters a guilty plea contemporaneously with a ‘protestation of innocence.’” Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-742, at ¶ 23 , citing Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).

2024We note that an Alford plea exists when a defendant enters a guilty plea contemporaneously with a “protestation of innocence.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1970); State v. Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-742 , 85 N.E.3d 1032 , ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clemm, 8th Dist.

2026See State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-111, ¶ 2 (4th Dist.) (“The intelligence and voluntariness of an Alford plea must be established by evidence in the record supporting guilt.

2026See also State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-111, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.) (suggesting that a “bill of particulars, . . . witness statements[,] . . . investigative reports, . . . [or a] recitation of basic facts at the plea hearing” can suffice for an Alford plea); State v. Krieg, 2004-Ohio-5174, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.) (finding that the trial court’s possession of a bill of particulars was sufficient to supply the court with a factual basis for the defendant’s Alford plea). {¶14} Notably, Berentz does not claim that his plea was anything other than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

2023Lucas No. 2019-Ohio-1486, ¶ 17-18 (citing our own precedent as well as precedent in other districts concluding an Alford guilty plea waives any alleged errors relative to denial of a motion to suppress). 3. {¶ 10} Based on our own controlling precedent, Snow-Veley waived his ability to challenge the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress by entering an Alford plea.

2019No. L-18-1038, 2019-Ohio-1486, ¶ 8 (noting that, in addition to the Crim.R. 11(C) requirements, an Alford plea requires the trial court to "ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant's protestations of innocence, he has made a rational calculation that it is in his best interest to accept the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor.").

2013Before accepting an Alford plea, “[t]he trial judge must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s protestations of innocence, he has made a rational calculation that it is in his best interest to accept the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor.” State v. Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d 332, 338 (2d Dist.1990) citing Alford, supra, at 38, fn. 10 ; see also Anderson, supra, at ¶8 . {¶10} In the context of an Alford plea, the Ohio Supreme Court has held: {¶11} Where the record affirmatively discloses that: (1) defendant’s guilty plea was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2)

2013Lake No. 2005-L-178, 2006-Ohio-5167 ,] ¶8, citing [State v.]Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004- Ohio-4415, ¶13, * * *. ‘Although an Alford plea allows the defendant to maintain his factual innocence, the plea has the same legal effect as a plea of “guilty,” and upon acceptance by the trial court, the defendant stands convicted as though he had been found guilty by a trier of fact.’ Id. (citations omitted). ‘Before accepting an Alford plea, “(t)he trial judge must ascertain that notwithstanding the defendant’s protestations of innocence, he has made a rational calculation that it is in his best i

2026State v. Byrd, 2008-Ohio-3909, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.). {¶12} An Alford plea, just like an ordinary guilty plea, must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

2013Athens No. 07CA29, 2008-Ohio-3909, ¶19 (where a trial court did not specifically ask a defendant why he was entering the plea, the appellate court still concluded there was sufficient evidence to show a defendant was motivated to enter Alford plea because defense attorney conveyed the defendant’s reasons and the rationale was sufficient to demonstrate appellant had a basis to fear the result of a jury 5 trial.) And, although the trial court did not orally confirm whether appellant was actually motivated by what counsel disclosed, neither appellant nor his attorney objected to the court’s state

2026State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus; see also State v. Hutchison, 2018-Ohio-200, ¶ 55 (5th Dist.). {¶27} Accordingly, when it affirmatively appears that a defendant seeks to enter an Alford plea, the trial court must conduct a more detailed Crim.R. 11 colloquy to determine the defendant’s reasoning for pleading guilty despite maintaining innocence.

2023Id. {¶ 28} In his July 26, 2023 motion, Hubal sought to withdraw his Alford plea because his plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made due to his trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to fully investigate Jane 2's allegations against him.

2024“When taking an Alford plea, the trial court cannot determine whether the accused was making an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea absent some basic facts surrounding the charge, demonstrating that the plea cannot seriously be questioned.” “An Alford plea may not be accepted when the record fails to demonstrate facts upon which the trial court can resolve the apparent conflict between a defendant's claim of innocence and the defendant's desire to plead guilty to the charges.” (Citations omitted.) {¶10} State v. Redmond, 2018-Ohio-2778, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Alvelo, 2017-Ohio-74

2023Mahoning No. 17 MA 0068, 2018-Ohio-2778 , where the prosecution presented no background to the charges and presented no facts or evidence, Redmond’s counsel never stated any factual basis for the Alford plea, and Redmond did not stipulate to the prosecution’s evidence.

2019See also State v. Hayes, 101 Ohio App.3d 73, 76 (3d Dist.1995) (concluding that an Alford plea “consists of a guilty plea linked with an on-the-record claim of innocence” and noting it would have been more clear that the defendant was entering an Alford plea if she “had interjected an indication to the court of some additional protestation of innocence”) citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 . -8- Case No. 8-19-19 {¶14} Nevertheless, even if we assume without deciding that Short’s oral request to enter an Alford plea alone constitutes a protestation of innocence, after the trial court refused to accep

2010No. 9-99-50, 2000-Ohio-1700 (Shaw, J., concurring in judgment only.) “In accepting an Alford plea, absent the presentation of some basic facts surrounding the charge, there can be no determination that the accused made an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea, because the absence of a basic factual framework precludes a trial judge from evaluating the reasonableness of the defendant's decision to plead guilty -8- Case No. 10-10-04 notwithstanding the protestation of innocence.” State v. Hayes (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 73, 75 , 654 N.E.2d 1348, 1350 . {¶15} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a

2026Motions to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing “should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992).

2013State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 , 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).

2024In addition, we set forth that “‘“[b]efore accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must . . . require the state to show a basic factual framework for the charge and plea.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Woods, . . . 2014-Ohio-3960, ¶ 6 [(6th 5.

2024In addition, we set forth that “‘“[b]efore accepting an Alford plea, the trial court must . . . require the state to show a basic factual framework for the charge and plea.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Woods, . . . 2014-Ohio-3960, ¶ 6 [(6th 5.

2026See State v. Schmidt, 2010-Ohio-4809, ¶ 13 (3rd Dist.) (explaining that “[a]n Alford plea has the same legal effect as a guilty plea”).

2011See, e.g., Padgett, 67 Ohio App.3d at 337-38 ; Schmidt, 2010-Ohio-4809, at ¶15 . {¶17} Based upon our finding in the first assignment of error, that Carey’s guilty plea was not an Alford plea, this assignment of error is moot.

2024In support, the State cites to, inter alia, State v. Urbanek, 2023-Ohio-2249 , ¶ 81 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Grate, 2020-Ohio-5584, ¶ 197 (“Under the doctrine of invited error, a litigant may not take advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.”). {¶ 12} The State further argues that even without Koperski inviting the error, his arguments still fail, based on State v. Morris, 2020-Ohio-704 (6th Dist.). {¶ 13} In Morris, this court set forth, citing State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 , ¶ 13, that with an Alford plea, a defendant pleads guilty but maintains actual innocence of th

2024Test to Determine whether Alford Plea was Voluntarily, Knowingly, and Intelligently Made {¶ 22} “The test to determine whether an Alford plea was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made is whether: (1) the plea was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) trial counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) trial counsel’s advice was competent in light of the circumstances surrounding the plea;1 (4) the plea was made with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) the plea was motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the conseq

2017No. 05AP-982, 2006-Ohio-3144, ¶ 14 , quoting State v. Carter, 124 Ohio App.3d 423, 429 (2d Dist.1997) ("An Alford plea is 'merely a species of a guilty plea, having the effect of waiving [a defendant's] right to appeal.' "). {¶ 10} In arguing appellant waived the right to raise the issues presented on appeal, the state relies on case law generally holding that a plea of guilty waives a defendant's ability to challenge the denial of pretrial motions.

2014Franklin No. 05AP-982, 2006-Ohio-3144, ¶ 18 (because the defendant did not assert his innocence A guilty plea that is made contemporaneously with claims of innocence, known as an 1 Alford plea, can only be accepted once the trial court has inquired into the factual basis surrounding the charges in order to determine whether the defendant was making an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea.