Alford plea in Rhode Island

2019Because applicant's notice of appeal was filed on April 23, 2012, before this amendment took effect, his appeal is proper. 2 Although the criminal information states that applicant was drinking a bottle of malt liquor, in his affidavit applicant avers that he was drinking a can of beer; this factual dispute has no bearing on this Court's analysis but points to the difficulties that a trial could present. 3 The applicant was not present at the hearing. 4 "The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offe

2019Because applicant's notice of appeal was filed on April 23, 2012, before this amendment took effect, his appeal is proper. 2 Although the criminal information states that applicant was drinking a bottle of malt liquor, in his affidavit applicant avers that he was drinking a can of beer; this factual dispute has no bearing on this Court's analysis but points to the difficulties that a trial could present. 3 The applicant was not present at the hearing. 4 "The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offe

2019Because applicant's notice of appeal was filed on April 23, 2012, before this amendment took effect, his appeal is proper. 2 Although the criminal information states that applicant was drinking a bottle of malt liquor, in his affidavit applicant avers that he was drinking a can of beer; this factual dispute has no bearing on this Court's analysis but points to the difficulties that a trial could present. 3 The applicant was not present at the hearing. 4 "The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offe

2008Based on the testimony of trial counsel, the transcript of the plea proceeding, and applicant’s own responses to questioning, we deem this contention unavailing. 5 The applicant next argues that the trial justice erred in accepting his plea because there was insufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt to support an Alford plea. - This Court has characterized “[t]he so-called Alford plea [as] a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offense may plead guilty even though he maintains his innocence as long as the state presents a fa

2018Nevertheless, "[a]lthough a criminal defendant may be relieved of the embarrassment of admitting participation in the crime or comforted by the fact that he or she has maintained his innocence * * * the result is abundantly clear: the defendant stands convicted of the crime." Mattatall v. State , 947 A.2d 896 , 899 n.4 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Armenakes v. State , 821 A.2d 239 , 242 (R.I. 2003) ).

2008Based on the testimony of trial counsel, the transcript of the plea proceeding, and applicant’s own responses to questioning, we deem this contention unavailing. 5 The applicant next argues that the trial justice erred in accepting his plea because there was insufficient evidence of defendant’s guilt to support an Alford plea. - This Court has characterized “[t]he so-called Alford plea [as] a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offense may plead guilty even though he maintains his innocence as long as the state presents a fa

2008Because Mattatall’s Alford plea was accepted in an earlier proceeding and judgment entered, the trial justice had every right to consider this conviction for purposes of the habitual-offender statute.” Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1118 .

2003“When a defendant enters an Alford plea, which is accepted by the [Cjourt, then such a plea in a later judicial proceeding constitutes a conviction, irrespective of the fact that the defendant maintains his [or her] innocence and does not stand up and confess guilt.” State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 (R.I.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838 , 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992).

2003“When a defendant enters an Alford plea, which is accepted by the [Cjourt, then such a plea in a later judicial proceeding constitutes a conviction, irrespective of the fact that the defendant maintains his [or her] innocence and does not stand up and confess guilt.” State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 (R.I.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838 , 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992).

1994See State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1118 (R.I.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 74 (1992).

2019Because applicant's notice of appeal was filed on April 23, 2012, before this amendment took effect, his appeal is proper. 2 Although the criminal information states that applicant was drinking a bottle of malt liquor, in his affidavit applicant avers that he was drinking a can of beer; this factual dispute has no bearing on this Court's analysis but points to the difficulties that a trial could present. 3 The applicant was not present at the hearing. 4 "The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offe

2019Because applicant's notice of appeal was filed on April 23, 2012, before this amendment took effect, his appeal is proper. 2 Although the criminal information states that applicant was drinking a bottle of malt liquor, in his affidavit applicant avers that he was drinking a can of beer; this factual dispute has no bearing on this Court's analysis but points to the difficulties that a trial could present. 3 The applicant was not present at the hearing. 4 "The so-called Alford plea is a procedure approved by the Supreme Court of the United States under which a person charged with a criminal offe

2008Standard of Review Section 10-9.1-1 provides that the remedy of postconviction relief is available to any person who has been convicted of a crime and who thereafter alleges either that the conviction violated the applicant’s constitutional rights or that the existence of newly discovered material facts requires vacation of the conviction in the interest of justice. 7 Larngar v. Wall, 918 A.2d 850, 855 (R.I.2007).

2006A Standard of Review A motion to withdraw a plea “ ‘is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court and * * * a decision of the court thereon will not be disturbed by this [Cjourt unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” State v. Eason, 786 A.2d 365, 367 (R.I.2001).

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677 , 774 *244 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14 Or.App. 273 , 511 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973) (refusing to impinge on the right of a trial justices to refuse to accept a guilty plea).

2003See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677 , 774 *244 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14 Or.App. 273 , 511 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973) (refusing to impinge on the right of a trial justices to refuse to accept a guilty plea).

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677 , 774 *244 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14 Or.App. 273 , 511 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973) (refusing to impinge on the right of a trial justices to refuse to accept a guilty plea).

2003See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677 , 774 *244 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14 Or.App. 273 , 511 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973) (refusing to impinge on the right of a trial justices to refuse to accept a guilty plea).

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See United States v. Harlan, 35 F.3d 176 , 182 n. 7 (5th Cir.1994) (refusing to endorse an Alford plea, though valid, concluding that subsequent challenges to the voluntariness or factual basis of the plea impact on their usefulness); United States v. Brooks, 43 C.M.R. 945 , 952, 1971 WL 12912 (1971) (asserting that Uniform Code of Military Justice does not permit a plea of guilty to enter amid protestations of innocence); Washington v. Superior Court, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Ct.App.1994) (maintaining that Alford pleas are tolerated but disfavored in Arizona because the public is n

2003See Commonwealth v. Gendraw, 55 Mass.App.Ct. 677 , 774 *244 N.E.2d 167, 174 (2002) (maintaining that there is no constitutional right to have an Alford plea accepted; judges are accorded wide discretion in deciding whether to accept any guilty plea); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo.App.Ct.1981) (stating that the trial court is vested with discretion to refuse to accept an Alford plea); State v. Brumfield, 14 Or.App. 273 , 511 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973) (refusing to impinge on the right of a trial justices to refuse to accept a guilty plea).

1992Crofoot v. United States Government Printing Office, 761 F.2d 661, 665 (Fed.Cir.1985).

1992Crofoot v. United States Government Printing Office, 761 F.2d 661, 663 (Fed.Cir. 1985).