Alford plea in Tennessee

2026They were able to reconstruct many of the internet searches that [the petitioner] performed. 1 An Alford plea refers to a plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt if the defendant intelligently concludes that his best interests would be served by a plea of guilty. 2 Thus, the petitioner’s plea was a “Hicks” plea in that it provided for a hybrid sentence mixing Range II offender status with Range I release eligibility.

2020As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Albright, an Alford plea differs from a nolo contendere plea in that an Alford plea may be used as an admission of guilt in a subsequent civil proceeding, to-wit: As we noted in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 , 250 n.1 (Tenn. 2016), a criminal defendant may plead guilty pursuant to a “best interest” plea as set forth in the United States Supreme Court case, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

2022In a footnote, the court recognized that a criminal defendant who enters an Alford plea, in which he or she pleads guilty but maintains his or her innocence, “may have a stronger public policy argument than other criminal defendants for the right to seek error coram nobis relief,” but also that “the issue remains one of a policy judgment which is within the province of the legislature, not this Court.” Id. at 250, n. 1 .

2020As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Albright, an Alford plea differs from a nolo contendere plea in that an Alford plea may be used as an admission of guilt in a subsequent civil proceeding, to-wit: As we noted in Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246 , 250 n.1 (Tenn. 2016), a criminal defendant may plead guilty pursuant to a “best interest” plea as set forth in the United States Supreme Court case, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).

2010See State v. Williams, 851 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tenn. Crim.

2005See State v. William, 851 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tenn. Crim.

2021And then moments later, 1 The record makes interchangeable references to Defendant’s “best interest/Alford pleas” and “nolo contendere pleas.” “[T]here are technical differences between a ‘best interest’/Alford plea and a nolo contendere plea,” State v. Albright, 564 S.W.3d 809 , 817 n.5 (Tenn. 2018), but those differences are not material in this case.

2020Indeed, the Supreme Court made clear that one basis for its ruling was that no matter how it was arrived at—either by plea or by a trial on the merits—a conviction resulted: “We emphasize that the methodology utilized for arriving at a conviction, whether it be upon a trial after a plea of not guilty, upon an Alford plea accompanied by a protestation of actual innocence, upon a plea of nolo contendere, or upon a ‘straight’ plea of guilty, does not alter the legal fact of conviction for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 820.5 Even more importantly, the Albright court indicated that it was the convic

2017In any event, assuming Mrs. Kerr would have asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self- incrimination at the Petitioner’s trial, Mrs. Kerr waived the privilege by entering an Alford plea.1 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); see also Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (finding no “material difference” between a guilty plea and a best interest plea when a defendant pleads guilty intelligently and the record before the trial court contains strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt).

2006Guilty Plea -7- The petitioner next argues that his plea was not a knowing and voluntary Alford plea.1 When analyzing a guilty plea, we look to the federal standard announced in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and the state standard set out in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977) superseded on other grounds by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b) and Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b).

2020Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Alford, there is no “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence[.]” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ; see also, e.g., State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174 , 842 A.2d 567 , 588 n.17 (2004) (“A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is . . . the functional equivalent [to an unconditional] plea of nolo contendere which itself has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty on all further proceedings within the indictment. . . .

2020Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Alford, there is no “material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence[.]” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ; see also, e.g., State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174 , 842 A.2d 567 , 588 n.17 (2004) (“A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is . . . the functional equivalent [to an unconditional] plea of nolo contendere which itself has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty on all further proceedings within the indictment. . . .

2020Rev. 1361 , 1373 (July 2003), while a defendant pleading nolo contendere is not subject to estoppel, see, e.g., Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tenn. Crim. -8- App. 1988); see also Tenn. R.

2018Rev. 1361 , 1373 (July 2003), while a defendant pleading nolo contendere is not subject to estoppel, see, e.g. , Teague v. State , 772 S.W.2d 932 , 943 (Tenn. Crim.

2020As the Tennessee Supreme Court succinctly explained, “Although the judicial diversion statute has a component of guilt that could be characterized as a conviction in the general sense, the statute forecloses the entry of a judgment of conviction unless the defendant violates the terms of his diversion.” Rodriguez v. State, 437 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2014).

2018See Rodriguez v. State, 437 S.W.3d 450, 457 (Tenn. 2014) (“Although the judicial diversion statute has a component of guilt that could be characterized as a conviction in the general sense, the statute forecloses the entry of a judgment of conviction unless the defendant violates the terms of his diversion.”).

2018An Alford plea “is one in which the defendant is ‘unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.’” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly, 760 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet min

2018See, e.g., United States v. Gallo , 20 F.3d 7 , 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863 , 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly , 60 Conn.App. 716 , 760 A.2d 1001 , 1004 (2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet minor); Ward v. State , 315 S.W.3d 461 , 463 (Tenn. 2010) (guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery).

2013See Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim.

2006See Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim.

2000Dortch v. State, 705 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn. Crim.

1992See e.g., Dortch v. State, 705 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985).

2018An Alford plea “is one in which the defendant is ‘unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.’” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly, 760 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet min

2018See, e.g., United States v. Gallo , 20 F.3d 7 , 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863 , 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly , 60 Conn.App. 716 , 760 A.2d 1001 , 1004 (2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet minor); Ward v. State , 315 S.W.3d 461 , 463 (Tenn. 2010) (guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery).

2018An Alford plea “is one in which the defendant is ‘unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.’” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly, 760 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet min

2018See, e.g., United States v. Gallo , 20 F.3d 7 , 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863 , 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly , 60 Conn.App. 716 , 760 A.2d 1001 , 1004 (2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet minor); Ward v. State , 315 S.W.3d 461 , 463 (Tenn. 2010) (guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery).

2018An Alford plea “is one in which the defendant is ‘unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.’” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly, 760 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet min

2018See, e.g., United States v. Gallo , 20 F.3d 7 , 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863 , 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly , 60 Conn.App. 716 , 760 A.2d 1001 , 1004 (2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet minor); Ward v. State , 315 S.W.3d 461 , 463 (Tenn. 2010) (guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery).

2018An Alford plea “is one in which the defendant is ‘unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.’” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly, 760 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State, 202 So. 3d 28, 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet min

2018See, e.g., United States v. Gallo , 20 F.3d 7 , 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (guilty plea to possession of unregistered firearm); People v. Ickler , 877 P.2d 863 , 865 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (guilty plea to second degree sexual assault); State v. Reilly , 60 Conn.App. 716 , 760 A.2d 1001 , 1004 (2000) (guilty plea to third degree sexual assault); Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (guilty plea to traveling to meet minor); Ward v. State , 315 S.W.3d 461 , 463 (Tenn. 2010) (guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery).

2026See Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997). 3 The record on appeal does not include a transcript from the petitioner’s Fayette County guilty plea hearing. -2- There were numerous searches in which he attempted to find hitmen.

2024Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2024Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

2020See State v. Albright, 564 S.W.3d 809 , 818 n.5 (Tenn. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 , 204 L.

2020See State v. Albright, 564 S.W.3d 809 , 818 n.5 (Tenn. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2746 , 204 L.

2020But see Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 566 , 636 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Va. 2006) (holding that judicial estoppel did not apply to an Alford plea); Clark v. Baines, 150 Wash. 2d 905, 907 , 84 P.3d 245, 246 (Wash. 2004) (“We hold an Alford plea cannot be used as the basis for collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action.”). -2- conviction.

2020See id. at 811; see also generally Rose v. Blewett, 202 Tenn. 153, 162 , 303 S.W.2d 709 , 712–13 (Tenn. 1957) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482 , 40 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1931)) (“[I]t is a fact that a pronouncement not necessary to the decision of a case, though incidental, and when ‘apparently made with consideration and purpose, is at least a judicial dictum, as distinguished from mere obiter dictum, and is entitled to much weight.’”).

2020See id. at 811; see also generally Rose v. Blewett, 202 Tenn. 153, 162 , 303 S.W.2d 709 , 712–13 (Tenn. 1957) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482 , 40 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1931)) (“[I]t is a fact that a pronouncement not necessary to the decision of a case, though incidental, and when ‘apparently made with consideration and purpose, is at least a judicial dictum, as distinguished from mere obiter dictum, and is entitled to much weight.’”).

2020But see Parson v. Carroll, 272 Va. 560, 566 , 636 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Va. 2006) (holding that judicial estoppel did not apply to an Alford plea); Clark v. Baines, 150 Wash. 2d 905, 907 , 84 P.3d 245, 246 (Wash. 2004) (“We hold an Alford plea cannot be used as the basis for collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action.”). -2- conviction.

2020See id. at 811; see also generally Rose v. Blewett, 202 Tenn. 153, 162 , 303 S.W.2d 709 , 712–13 (Tenn. 1957) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482 , 40 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1931)) (“[I]t is a fact that a pronouncement not necessary to the decision of a case, though incidental, and when ‘apparently made with consideration and purpose, is at least a judicial dictum, as distinguished from mere obiter dictum, and is entitled to much weight.’”).

2020See id. at 811; see also generally Rose v. Blewett, 202 Tenn. 153, 162 , 303 S.W.2d 709 , 712–13 (Tenn. 1957) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 162 Tenn. 482 , 40 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tenn. 1931)) (“[I]t is a fact that a pronouncement not necessary to the decision of a case, though incidental, and when ‘apparently made with consideration and purpose, is at least a judicial dictum, as distinguished from mere obiter dictum, and is entitled to much weight.’”).

2018See Birdsong , 958 P.2d at 1127 ("An Alford plea is a guilty plea.

2018The Connecticut court noted that, when accepting the defendant's plea, the trial court "did not, in any way, indicate that the defendant could unconditionally maintain his innocence for any and all purposes," and concluded that, although the defendant was "free to maintain the innocence associated with his plea," he also was required to comply with the conditions of his probation if he wanted to maintain the "conditional liberty" created thereby. *822 Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , Birdsong , 958 P.2d at 1130 (holding that, "by accepting the Alford plea [to a sex offense],

2018App. 1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a nolo contendere plea admits every essential element of the offense charged, that the plea is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case, and that “nothing is left but to render judgment, for the obvious reason that in the face of the plea e.g., State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567 , 588 n.17 (Conn. 2004) (“A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is . . . the functional equivalent [to an unconditional] plea of nolo contendere which itself has the s

2018App. 1988) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a nolo contendere plea admits every essential element of the offense charged, that the plea is an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case, and that “nothing is left but to render judgment, for the obvious reason that in the face of the plea e.g., State v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567 , 588 n.17 (Conn. 2004) (“A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is . . . the functional equivalent [to an unconditional] plea of nolo contendere which itself has the s

2018Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court decision relied upon by the Gillman court, which held that revocation of a defendant’s probation is not permitted unless a trial court has given the defendant “actual, definite notice” that his “failure to admit guilt as part of treatment would constitute a violation of probation,” 11 Connecticut General Statute section 53a-32a (West 2001) provides as follows: If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to [certain sex offenses] and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of prob

2018Finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court decision relied upon by the Gillman court, which held that revocation of a defendant’s probation is not permitted unless a trial court has given the defendant “actual, definite notice” that his “failure to admit guilt as part of treatment would constitute a violation of probation,” 11 Connecticut General Statute section 53a-32a (West 2001) provides as follows: If a defendant who entered a plea of nolo contendere or a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine to [certain sex offenses] and was ordered to undergo sexual offender treatment as a condition of prob

2018The Connecticut court noted that, when accepting the defendant's plea, the trial court "did not, in any way, indicate that the defendant could unconditionally maintain his innocence for any and all purposes," and concluded that, although the defendant was "free to maintain the innocence associated with his plea," he also was required to comply with the conditions of his probation if he wanted to maintain the "conditional liberty" created thereby. *822 Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , Birdsong , 958 P.2d at 1130 (holding that, "by accepting the Alford plea [to a sex offense],

2018The Connecticut court noted that, when accepting the defendant's plea, the trial court "did not, in any way, indicate that the defendant could unconditionally maintain his innocence for any and all purposes," and concluded that, although the defendant was "free to maintain the innocence associated with his plea," he also was required to comply with the conditions of his probation if he wanted to maintain the "conditional liberty" created thereby. *822 Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted); see also, e.g. , Birdsong , 958 P.2d at 1130 (holding that, "by accepting the Alford plea [to a sex offense],