Alford plea in Georgia

2026The trial judge then described the nature of an Alford plea and again asked Williams if he wanted to continue with a “best-interest plea,” to which Williams responded, “Yes, sir.” Following that response, the prosecutor asked Williams, “Do you understand that if you were to plead not guilty or [do] not enter a plea at all then we would go ahead and proceed with the jury trial?” Williams responded, “Yes, ma’am.” The prosecutor then detailed the following on the record: (1) the minimum and maximum ————————————————————— 6 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970). 5 punishments for each of t

2025Before jury selection on the first day of trial, the trial court had the State place its plea offer on the record: Lee could plead guilty to Count 2, concealing the death of another (a misdemeanor), pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970), receive credit for time served, 21 and “walk away.” The trial court explained that an Alford plea meant Lee could plead to a charge in his best interest even if he maintained he “didn’t do [it],” rather than risk a life sentence if the case proceeded to trial and he was found guilty of murder and confirmed that trial counsel had also gone over

2021Rickman, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 14 See McKiernan, 288 Ga. at 142 (2) (affirming an Alford plea when the record showed that the defendant “intelligently concluded that pleading guilty was in his best interest and that the trial court properly reviewed and considered the basis for his plea”); Storch v. State, 276 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 70 ) (2005) (affirming an Alford plea when the court found that the factual basis provided by the State was sufficient to support the plea and in pleading guilty, despite claiming innocence, the defendant chose to avoid trial and a potentially

2017See McGuyton, 298 Ga. at 353-354 (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to murder because the plea was not based on a personal acknowledgment by the defendant that the evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction); McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142-143 (2) ( 702 SE2d 170 ) (2010) (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to felony murder where the defendant maintained at his plea hearing that the shooting was accidental).

2020See McKeever v. State, __ Ga. App. __, *1 (4) (Case No. A19A1417, decided Nov. 15, 2019) (defendant’s Alford plea waived claims of trial court errors unrelated to the voluntariness of the plea); LaFette v. State, 285 Ga. App. 516, 518 (3) ( 646 SE2d 725 ) (2007) (defendant’s Alford plea waived challenges to trial court’s decisions announced before entry of the plea). (b) We now turn to address P. T.’s claim seeking to apply the rule of lenity in the context of his Second Case, in which he was adjudicated delinquent of felony sexual battery following trial.

2020See McKeever v. State, __ Ga. App. __, *1 (4) (Case No. A19A1417, decided Nov. 15, 2019) (defendant’s Alford plea waived claims of trial court errors unrelated to the voluntariness of the plea); LaFette v. State, 285 Ga. App. 516, 518 (3) ( 646 SE2d 725 ) (2007) (defendant’s Alford plea waived challenges to trial court’s decisions announced before entry of the plea). (b) We now turn to address P. T.’s claim seeking to apply the rule of lenity in the context of his Second Case, in which he was adjudicated delinquent of felony sexual battery following trial.

2017See McGuyton, 298 Ga. at 353-354 (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to murder because the plea was not based on a personal acknowledgment by the defendant that the evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction); McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142-143 (2) ( 702 SE2d 170 ) (2010) (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to felony murder where the defendant maintained at his plea hearing that the shooting was accidental).

2017See McGuyton, 298 Ga. at 353-354 (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to murder because the plea was not based on a personal acknowledgment by the defendant that the evidence was legally sufficient to support his conviction); McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142-143 (2) ( 702 SE2d 170 ) (2010) (rejecting claim that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to withdraw an Alford plea to felony murder where the defendant maintained at his plea hearing that the shooting was accidental).

2023(Footnote omitted.) Skinner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 828, 831 (2) ( 678 SE2d 526 ) (2009). “[T]he voluntariness and intelligence of an Alford plea is judged by the same standard as a routine guilty plea: whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Rios v. State, 358 Ga. App. 359 , 360 ( 855 SE2d 372 ) (2021).

2023(Footnote omitted.) Skinner v. State, 297 Ga. App. 828, 831 (2) ( 678 SE2d 526 ) (2009). “[T]he voluntariness and intelligence of an Alford plea is judged by the same standard as a routine guilty plea: whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Rios v. State, 358 Ga. App. 359 , 360 ( 855 SE2d 372 ) (2021).

2009LaFette v. State, 285 Ga. App. 516, 517-518 (2) (b) ( 646 SE2d 725 ) (2007) (State’s account of what it expected evidence to show if case proceeded to trial provided trial court with factual basis for accepting defendant’s Alford plea); Henry, supra, 284 Ga. App. at 439 (1) (prosecutor established factual basis for plea by describing facts underlying charges).

2009LaFette v. State, 285 Ga. App. 516, 517-518 (2) (b) ( 646 SE2d 725 ) (2007) (State’s account of what it expected evidence to show if case proceeded to trial provided trial court with factual basis for accepting defendant’s Alford plea); Henry, supra, 284 Ga. App. at 439 (1) (prosecutor established factual basis for plea by describing facts underlying charges).

2023Co., 269 Ga. App. 732, 734 (1) ( 605 SE2d 37 ) (2004) (holding that evidence that an insured entered an Alford plea of guilty was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that an insurer had no duty under the policy to provide coverage or a defense).

2023Co., 269 Ga. App. 732, 734 (1) ( 605 SE2d 37 ) (2004) (holding that evidence that an insured entered an Alford plea of guilty was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that an insurer had no duty under the policy to provide coverage or a defense).

2017See Bar Rule 4-106 (a) and (g) (providing for show-cause hearing for attorneys convicted of any felony “whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation” and noting that certified copy of imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4); see also In the Matter of Davis, 292 Ga. 897 , 897-898 & n. 1 ( 742 SE2d 734 ) (2013) (finding no error in special master’s finding that a conviction based on an Alford plea amounts to a violation of 8.4 (a) (2)); In the Matter of Ortman, 289 Ga. 130 ( 709 SE2d

2017See Bar Rule 4-106 (a) and (g) (providing for show-cause hearing for attorneys convicted of any felony “whether by verdict, plea of guilty, plea of nolo contendere or imposition of first offender probation” and noting that certified copy of imposition of first offender treatment shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4); see also In the Matter of Davis, 292 Ga. 897 , 897-898 & n. 1 ( 742 SE2d 734 ) (2013) (finding no error in special master’s finding that a conviction based on an Alford plea amounts to a violation of 8.4 (a) (2)); In the Matter of Ortman, 289 Ga. 130 ( 709 SE2d

2017Culp explained that the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming and that Culp was unable to substantiate Appellant’s continually changing stories about who else supposedly shot the victim, so no strong defense was available. 3 See Glover v. State, 300 Ga. 88, 90 ( 793 SE2d 408 ) (2016) (holding, in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, that “[t]o the extent the evidence was in conflict at the motion hearing, the credibility of Appellant’s testimony was for the trial court to determine”); McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 355 (1) (b) ( 782 SE2d 21 ) (2016) (“Credibility determ

2017Culp explained that the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming and that Culp was unable to substantiate Appellant’s continually changing stories about who else supposedly shot the victim, so no strong defense was available. 3 See Glover v. State, 300 Ga. 88, 90 ( 793 SE2d 408 ) (2016) (holding, in the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, that “[t]o the extent the evidence was in conflict at the motion hearing, the credibility of Appellant’s testimony was for the trial court to determine”); McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 355 (1) (b) ( 782 SE2d 21 ) (2016) (“Credibility determ

2014See Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 7-8 (1) ( 749 SE2d 672 ) (2013) (Bell claimed at the hearing to withdraw his plea that he was innocent and pled guilty because he felt that he did not have any other choice, but even “[ajssuming Bell were correct that he entered an Alford plea, the record shows that he was aware of the evidence against him, the availability of a justification defense, and the maximum and minimum sentences he could receive if convicted at a trial and that he made a decision to avoid the possibility of life without parole by pleading guilty.”).

2014See Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 5, 7-8 (1) ( 749 SE2d 672 ) (2013) (Bell claimed at the hearing to withdraw his plea that he was innocent and pled guilty because he felt that he did not have any other choice, but even “[ajssuming Bell were correct that he entered an Alford plea, the record shows that he was aware of the evidence against him, the availability of a justification defense, and the maximum and minimum sentences he could receive if convicted at a trial and that he made a decision to avoid the possibility of life without parole by pleading guilty.”).

2014It is well established in our case law that it is improper to allow a witness to “testify as to the identity of a person in a video or photograph when such opinion evidence tends only to establish a fact which average jurors could decide thinking for themselves and drawing their own conclusions.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 320 (4) ( 658 SE2d 755 ) (2008).

2014It is well established in our case law that it is improper to allow a witness to “testify as to the identity of a person in a video or photograph when such opinion evidence tends only to establish a fact which average jurors could decide thinking for themselves and drawing their own conclusions.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315, 320 (4) ( 658 SE2d 755 ) (2008).

2009“The voluntariness and intelligence of an Alford plea is judged by the same standard as a routine guilty plea: whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Henry, supra, 284 Ga. App. at 440 (2); Ellis v. State, 243 Ga. App. 431, 432 ( 533 SE2d 451 ) (2000).

2009“The voluntariness and intelligence of an Alford plea is judged by the same standard as a routine guilty plea: whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Henry, supra, 284 Ga. App. at 440 (2); Ellis v. State, 243 Ga. App. 431, 432 ( 533 SE2d 451 ) (2000).

2003Although “Alford does permit a criminal defendant to plead guilty while claiming to be innocent, where the defendant intelligently concludes that it is in his best interest to entet such a plea, . . . the plea is one of guilt and may be accepted only if the court determines there is a factual basis for a determination of guilt.” (Footnote omitted.) Thompson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 466, 468 (2) ( 517 SE2d 339 ) (1999).

2003Although “Alford does permit a criminal defendant to plead guilty while claiming to be innocent, where the defendant intelligently concludes that it is in his best interest to entet such a plea, . . . the plea is one of guilt and may be accepted only if the court determines there is a factual basis for a determination of guilt.” (Footnote omitted.) Thompson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 466, 468 (2) ( 517 SE2d 339 ) (1999).

1998See Freeman v. State, 211 Ga. App. 716, 717 (1) ( 440 SE2d 490 ) (1994) (not error to accept plea despite defendant’s claim of innocence “when the defendant intelligently concludes it is in his best interest and the judge has inquired into the factual basis for the plea and sought to resolve the conflict between the plea and the claim of innocence”). 1.

1998See Freeman v. State, 211 Ga. App. 716, 717 (1) ( 440 SE2d 490 ) (1994) (not error to accept plea despite defendant’s claim of innocence “when the defendant intelligently concludes it is in his best interest and the judge has inquired into the factual basis for the plea and sought to resolve the conflict between the plea and the claim of innocence”). 1.

2019This type of guilty plea, in which the defendant maintains his or her innocence, is permitted by North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and is commonly referred to as an " Alford plea." See Argot v. State , 261 Ga. App. 569 , 571 (2), 583 S.E.2d 246 (2003) ("Although [ Alford ] does permit a criminal defendant to plead guilty while claiming to be innocent, where the defendant intelligently concludes that it is in his best interest to enter such a plea, the plea is one of guilt and may be accepted only if the court determines there is a factual basis for a

2019This type of guilty plea, in which the defendant maintains his or her innocence, is permitted by North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) and is commonly referred to as an " Alford plea." See Argot v. State , 261 Ga. App. 569 , 571 (2), 583 S.E.2d 246 (2003) ("Although [ Alford ] does permit a criminal defendant to plead guilty while claiming to be innocent, where the defendant intelligently concludes that it is in his best interest to enter such a plea, the plea is one of guilt and may be accepted only if the court determines there is a factual basis for a

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SC 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970) (an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understanding^ consent to the imposition of a sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime). 2 See Jones v. State, 268 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 603 SE2d 73 ) (2004). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. 4 Id. 5 See Brower v. State, 230 Ga. App. 126, 126 (1) ( 495 SE2d 600 ) (1998). 6 See Ransom v. State, 293 Ga. App. 651, 653 ( 667 SE2d 686 ) (2008).

2009Ellington and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (91 SC 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970) (an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understanding^ consent to the imposition of a sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime). 2 See Jones v. State, 268 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 603 SE2d 73 ) (2004). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. 4 Id. 5 See Brower v. State, 230 Ga. App. 126, 126 (1) ( 495 SE2d 600 ) (1998). 6 See Ransom v. State, 293 Ga. App. 651, 653 ( 667 SE2d 686 ) (2008).

2024Because we conclude that the trial court did not violate Rule 33.9, we do not 4 “Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, judgment should not be entered upon such plea without such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9. “[T]he requirement that a factual basis be shown for a plea is to protect against someone pleading guilty when that person may know what he has done but may not know that those acts do not constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Tate v. S

2024Because we conclude that the trial court did not violate Rule 33.9, we do not 4 “Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, judgment should not be entered upon such plea without such inquiry on the record as may satisfy the judge that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.9. “[T]he requirement that a factual basis be shown for a plea is to protect against someone pleading guilty when that person may know what he has done but may not know that those acts do not constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Tate v. S

2023See, e.g., McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 353 (1) (a) ( 782 SE2d 21 ) (2016). 8 defendant of [her] rights during a guilty plea proceeding does not require any particular language or ‘magic words.’” (Citation omitted.) Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 876 (2) (a) ( 750 SE2d 340 ) (2013).

2023See, e.g., McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 353 (1) (a) ( 782 SE2d 21 ) (2016). 8 defendant of [her] rights during a guilty plea proceeding does not require any particular language or ‘magic words.’” (Citation omitted.) Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 876 (2) (a) ( 750 SE2d 340 ) (2013).

2022“A directed verdict is authorized only when there is no conflict in the evidence on any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions, demands a particular verdict.” City of Roswell v. Bolton, 271 Ga. App. 1, 3 (1) ( 608 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“A directed verdict is authorized only when there is no conflict in the evidence on any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions, demands a particular verdict.” City of Roswell v. Bolton, 271 Ga. App. 1, 3 (1) ( 608 SE2d 659 ) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022See also McFarlane v. McFarlane, 298 Ga. 361, 361 (1) ( 782 SE2d 29 ) (2016) (holding that “[a] trial court’s decision regarding a modification of custody will be upheld on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, and where there is any evidence to support the trial court’s decision, this Court cannot say there was an abuse of discretion” (citation omitted)). 28 During the three-day final evidentiary hearing on Alford’s petition for grandparent visitation, substantial evidence was presented to support Alford’s claim for grandparent visitation, including testimony from the parties,

2022See also McFarlane v. McFarlane, 298 Ga. 361, 361 (1) ( 782 SE2d 29 ) (2016) (holding that “[a] trial court’s decision regarding a modification of custody will be upheld on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, and where there is any evidence to support the trial court’s decision, this Court cannot say there was an abuse of discretion” (citation omitted)). 28 During the three-day final evidentiary hearing on Alford’s petition for grandparent visitation, substantial evidence was presented to support Alford’s claim for grandparent visitation, including testimony from the parties,

2021As to the potential harmful effect of the other-act evidence, the trial court instructed the jury both before the admission of the evidence and in the general jury charge at the close of the evidence that the other-act evidence could be considered only for limited purposes and that Moody was only on trial for the offenses charged in this case.39 The jury was advised of the nature of Moody’s prior Alford plea, was instructed that the argument of counsel was not evidence, and was aware that Moody had been sentenced to 18 months in prison, which makes it “less likely that the jury 39 See Howell,

2021Rickman, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 14 See McKiernan, 288 Ga. at 142 (2) (affirming an Alford plea when the record showed that the defendant “intelligently concluded that pleading guilty was in his best interest and that the trial court properly reviewed and considered the basis for his plea”); Storch v. State, 276 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 70 ) (2005) (affirming an Alford plea when the court found that the factual basis provided by the State was sufficient to support the plea and in pleading guilty, despite claiming innocence, the defendant chose to avoid trial and a potentially

2021Rickman, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 14 See McKiernan, 288 Ga. at 142 (2) (affirming an Alford plea when the record showed that the defendant “intelligently concluded that pleading guilty was in his best interest and that the trial court properly reviewed and considered the basis for his plea”); Storch v. State, 276 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 70 ) (2005) (affirming an Alford plea when the court found that the factual basis provided by the State was sufficient to support the plea and in pleading guilty, despite claiming innocence, the defendant chose to avoid trial and a potentially

2021Rickman, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 14 See McKiernan, 288 Ga. at 142 (2) (affirming an Alford plea when the record showed that the defendant “intelligently concluded that pleading guilty was in his best interest and that the trial court properly reviewed and considered the basis for his plea”); Storch v. State, 276 Ga. App. 789, 791 (1) (a) ( 625 SE2d 70 ) (2005) (affirming an Alford plea when the court found that the factual basis provided by the State was sufficient to support the plea and in pleading guilty, despite claiming innocence, the defendant chose to avoid trial and a potentially

2020Co., 218 Ga. App. 652, 653 ( 463 SE2d 42 ) (1995) (“A guilty plea is an admission against interest and prima facie evidence of the facts admitted.”) (punctuation omitted).

2020Co., 218 Ga. App. 652, 653 ( 463 SE2d 42 ) (1995) (“A guilty plea is an admission against interest and prima facie evidence of the facts admitted.”) (punctuation omitted).

2020Our courts have held that when a person in Cannon’s position gives contradictory testimony as to her culpability, absent a reasonable explanation, such as incapacity at the guilty plea, “the law will construe this contradiction against [her].”7 This is based on the principle in Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.,8 sufficient factual basis exists to support the plea of guilt, the collateral consequences flowing from an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt.”) (punctuation and citations omitted), adopting quoted language from Blohm v. Comm. of Internal R

2020Co. v. Moss, 212 Ga. App. 326, 327 ( 441 SE2d 809 ) (1994) (“Once the party moving for summary judgment has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must then come forward with rebuttal evidence sufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (punctuation omitted). 7 (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 328 . 8 256 Ga. 27 ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986). 8 which held that the contradictory testimony of a party-witness, unless reasonably explained, will be construed against the party-witness on summary judgment

2020Co. v. Moss, 212 Ga. App. 326, 327 ( 441 SE2d 809 ) (1994) (“Once the party moving for summary judgment has made a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-movant, who must then come forward with rebuttal evidence sufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.”) (punctuation omitted). 7 (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 328 . 8 256 Ga. 27 ( 343 SE2d 680 ) (1986). 8 which held that the contradictory testimony of a party-witness, unless reasonably explained, will be construed against the party-witness on summary judgment