Alford plea in North Dakota

2018"When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned." North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ; see also Kooser v. State , 2012 ND 101 , ¶ 7, 816 N.W.2d 802 ("We have held Alford pleas may be accepted in North Dakota."); State v. Hagemann , 326 N.W.2d 861 , 870 (N.D. 1982) ("[W]e have never required that the defendant personally pro

2012Hagemann, 326 N.W.2d at 870 .

2022State v. Watson, 2019 ND 164, ¶¶ 34, 41 , 930 N.W.2d 145 . [¶3] After his Golden Valley conviction was reversed, Watson moved to withdraw his conditional Alford plea in the Hettinger and Stark County cases, arguing that it had been contingent upon his conviction in the Golden Valley case.

2022State v. Watson, 2019 ND 164, ¶¶ 34, 41 , 930 N.W.2d 145 . [¶3] After his Golden Valley conviction was reversed, Watson moved to withdraw his conditional Alford plea in the Hettinger and Stark County cases, arguing that it had been contingent upon his conviction in the Golden Valley case.

2019See United States v. Rodriguez, 77 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curium) (“[B]y entering a valid Alford-type guilty plea, [the defendant] waived all issues preceding his plea except those relating to jurisdiction.”) Since Legare did not preserve his right to appeal denial of his pretrial motion, we affirm the district court’s criminal judgment.

2019See United States v. Rodriguez, 77 F.3d 487 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curium) (“[B]y entering a valid Alford-type guilty plea, [the defendant] waived all issues preceding his plea except those relating to jurisdiction.”) Since Legare did not preserve his right to appeal denial of his pretrial motion, we affirm the district court’s criminal judgment.

2019Assuming, without deciding whether the doctrine applies, Legare’s claim does not fall within the exception of the Menna- Blackledge doctrine, and he has not preserved his right to appeal the district 1 court’s denial of his motion in limine seeking permission to argue and instruct the jury on defense of others. [¶5] In Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, stating the “doctrine’s basic teaching that ‘a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may

2019Assuming, without deciding whether the doctrine applies, Legare’s claim does not fall within the exception of the Menna- Blackledge doctrine, and he has not preserved his right to appeal the district 1 court’s denial of his motion in limine seeking permission to argue and instruct the jury on defense of others. [¶5] In Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, stating the “doctrine’s basic teaching that ‘a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may

2019Assuming, without deciding whether the doctrine applies, Legare’s claim does not fall within the exception of the Menna- Blackledge doctrine, and he has not preserved his right to appeal the district 1 court’s denial of his motion in limine seeking permission to argue and instruct the jury on defense of others. [¶5] In Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, stating the “doctrine’s basic teaching that ‘a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may

2019Assuming, without deciding whether the doctrine applies, Legare’s claim does not fall within the exception of the Menna- Blackledge doctrine, and he has not preserved his right to appeal the district 1 court’s denial of his motion in limine seeking permission to argue and instruct the jury on defense of others. [¶5] In Class v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine, stating the “doctrine’s basic teaching that ‘a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may

2018"When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned." North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ; see also Kooser v. State , 2012 ND 101 , ¶ 7, 816 N.W.2d 802 ("We have held Alford pleas may be accepted in North Dakota."); State v. Hagemann , 326 N.W.2d 861 , 870 (N.D. 1982) ("[W]e have never required that the defendant personally pro

2018"When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned." North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ; see also Kooser v. State , 2012 ND 101 , ¶ 7, 816 N.W.2d 802 ("We have held Alford pleas may be accepted in North Dakota."); State v. Hagemann , 326 N.W.2d 861 , 870 (N.D. 1982) ("[W]e have never required that the defendant personally pro

2025See, e.g., Pemberton v. State, 2021 ND 85, ¶ 13 , 959 N.W.2d 891 (holding attempted 2 “knowing” murder is non-cognizable); State v. Swanson, 2019 ND 181, ¶ 15 , 930 N.W.2d 645 (holding conspiracy to “knowingly” commit murder is non- cognizable); Dominguez v. State, 2013 ND 249, ¶ 22 , 840 N.W.2d 596 (holding attempted “extreme indifference” murder is non-cognizable); State v. Borner, 2013 ND 141, ¶ 20 , 836 N.W.2d 383 (holding conspiracy to commit “extreme indifference” murder is non-cognizable); but see State v. Vervalen, 2024 ND 124, ¶ 7 , 8 N.W.3d 816 (holding attempted “intentional” murder

2025See, e.g., Pemberton v. State, 2021 ND 85, ¶ 13 , 959 N.W.2d 891 (holding attempted 2 “knowing” murder is non-cognizable); State v. Swanson, 2019 ND 181, ¶ 15 , 930 N.W.2d 645 (holding conspiracy to “knowingly” commit murder is non- cognizable); Dominguez v. State, 2013 ND 249, ¶ 22 , 840 N.W.2d 596 (holding attempted “extreme indifference” murder is non-cognizable); State v. Borner, 2013 ND 141, ¶ 20 , 836 N.W.2d 383 (holding conspiracy to commit “extreme indifference” murder is non-cognizable); but see State v. Vervalen, 2024 ND 124, ¶ 7 , 8 N.W.3d 816 (holding attempted “intentional” murder

2024See Legare, 2019 ND 276, ¶ 10 (a defendant waives all non-jurisdictional claims and defenses by pleading guilty, unless he preserved those issues in a conditional Alford plea).

2018"When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned." North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ; see also Kooser v. State , 2012 ND 101 , ¶ 7, 816 N.W.2d 802 ("We have held Alford pleas may be accepted in North Dakota."); State v. Hagemann , 326 N.W.2d 861 , 870 (N.D. 1982) ("[W]e have never required that the defendant personally pro

2018See Yost , 2018 ND 157 , ¶ 22, 914 N.W.2d 508 (declining to decide whether *17 N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(4) applied to an Alford plea entered prior to the effective date of the rule). [¶ 27] After reviewing the record, Davies' argument raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was properly obtained.

2018"When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, its validity cannot be seriously questioned." North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ; see also Kooser v. State , 2012 ND 101 , ¶ 7, 816 N.W.2d 802 ("We have held Alford pleas may be accepted in North Dakota."); State v. Hagemann , 326 N.W.2d 861 , 870 (N.D. 1982) ("[W]e have never required that the defendant personally pro

2008An Alford plea is a final plea of guilty, and “ ‘[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; noth *200 ing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.’ ” State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D.1976) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)).

2004Following the 6 October 2000 Alford plea, I did from time to time consult with Simonson &/or Omdahl during the year of probation either in person or by phone, and I considered that they were passively representing me on that criminal issue through 2001. [¶ 10] In Jacobsen v. Haugen, 529 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D.1995), we held the entry of a money judgment was sufficient injury to sustain a legal malpractice action and we rejected an argument that the statute of limitations for bringing a legal malpractice action was tolled until after the appellate process was completed.

2004Following the 6 October 2000 Alford plea, I did from time to time consult with Simonson &/or Omdahl during the year of probation either in person or by phone, and I considered that they were passively representing me on that criminal issue through 2001. [¶ 10] In Jacobsen v. Haugen, 529 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D.1995), we held the entry of a money judgment was sufficient injury to sustain a legal malpractice action and we rejected an argument that the statute of limitations for bringing a legal malpractice action was tolled until after the appellate process was completed.

1982In the instant case [McKay ] defendant merely claims no recollection.” Although our court has never discussed the specific procedures necessary to satisfy the factual basis requirement for an Alford plea, we recently stated, in State v. Mortrud, 312 N.W.2d 354, 357 (N.D.1981), a case expressly limited to its own facts and circumstances, that: “Rule 11 requires the court to address the defendant personally in order to determine the factual basis for the guilty plea and to assure that it is knowing and voluntary.” At first glance it would appear that our statement in Mortrud, supra, that a court

1982In the instant case [McKay ] defendant merely claims no recollection.” Although our court has never discussed the specific procedures necessary to satisfy the factual basis requirement for an Alford plea, we recently stated, in State v. Mortrud, 312 N.W.2d 354, 357 (N.D.1981), a case expressly limited to its own facts and circumstances, that: “Rule 11 requires the court to address the defendant personally in order to determine the factual basis for the guilty plea and to assure that it is knowing and voluntary.” At first glance it would appear that our statement in Mortrud, supra, that a court