Alford plea in Colorado

2025P. 11 advisement that “an Alford plea still counts the same as a regular guilty plea.” See People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Colo. 1998) (“An Alford plea is a guilty plea.”).

2023People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 758 (Colo. 2001) (holding that “an Alford plea is no different from a guilty plea” when analyzing whether a defendant may withdraw the plea); Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127 (holding that the trial court’s “obligations to advise the defendant were no greater” for an Alford plea “than with any other guilty plea”).

2023People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 758 (Colo. 2001) (holding that “an Alford plea is no different from a guilty plea” when analyzing whether a defendant may withdraw the plea); Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127 (holding that the trial court’s “obligations to advise the defendant were no greater” for an Alford plea “than with any other guilty plea”).

2005Because “an Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea,” People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 759 (Colo.2001), and, without more, neither detracts from nor adds to the obligations of the parties under a plea agreement, we conclude that the parties’ reasonable expectations of their respective rights and obligations under the agreement never changed, regardless of whether defendant entered an Alford plea or a regular guilty plea.

2025But that is not the only scenario in which a defendant has been found to have waived an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction. ¶ 19 In Medina v. People, 2023 CO 46 , the defendant had entered what is known as an Alford plea — a process approved by the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970), in which a defendant enters a guilty plea despite maintaining his innocence.

2023In so doing, the Court noted that such a scenario (now commonly known as an Alford plea) is functionally identical to a no-contest plea when the defendant “intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.” Id. at 37 . ¶2 Similarly, Delano Marco Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even though he maintained his innocence of that charge.

2005See State v. Brown, 19 Conn.App. 640 , 563 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1989).

2005See State v. Brown, 19 Conn.App. 640 , 563 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1989).

2005The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant, but counsel was subsequently permitted to withdraw from the case under People v. Breaman, 939 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Colo.1997) (counsel may petition court to withdraw from postconviction matter after determining that it has no arguable merit).

2005The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant , but counsel was subsequently permitted to withdraw from the case under People v. Breaman , 939 P.2d 1348, 1351 ( Colo. 1997 ) ( counsel may petition court to withdraw from postconviction matter after determining that it has no arguable merit ) .

1996People v. Gritchen, 908 P.2d 70, 71, n. 1 (Colo.1995); People v. Martin, 897 P.2d 802, 803 (Colo.1995).

1995People v. Martin, 897 P.2d 802, 803 (Colo.1995). 2 .

2001See also People v. Tomey, 969 P.2d 785, 787 (Colo.App.1998), in which the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief from his prior entry of an Alford plea.

2000In People v. Tomey, supra , as here, defendant, after entering an Alford plea, sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim.

2002People v. Gritchen, 908 P.2d 70 , 71 n. 1 (Colo.1995).

1996People v. Gritchen, 908 P.2d 70, 71, n. 1 (Colo.1995); People v. Martin, 897 P.2d 802, 803 (Colo.1995).

2001See State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash.App. 216 , 896 P.2d 108, 110 (1995).

2001See State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash.App. 216 , 896 P.2d 108, 110 (1995).

2023At bottom, though, “[a]n Alford plea is 15 a guilty plea.” Id.; see also United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995) (“An Alford-type guilty plea is a guilty plea in all material respects.”).

2023Higgason, 984 F.2d at 207 . 21 their innocence.7 See People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 59 (Colo. 1988) (“[I]f [a criminal procedure rule] is plain and unambiguous, we apply the rule as written.”). ¶38 This treatment comports with our previous recognition that “[a]n Alford plea is a guilty plea.” Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127 .

2023Compare Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that strong evidence of guilt is not a constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea), with Willett v. Georgia, 608 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a factual basis must support an Alford plea). ¶31 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit holds that strong evidence of actual guilt is not constitutionally required, even in the context of an Alford plea.

2023Willett, 608 F.2d at 540 .

2023Compare White Hawk, 693 F.2d at 829 (requiring a “strong factual basis”), with United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ny Rule 11 proceeding requires that a factual basis for the plea be established and we are unwilling to place more requirements in the context of an Alford plea.”). 19 ¶34 State courts are similarly split.

2023Compare White Hawk, 693 F.2d at 829 (requiring a “strong factual basis”), with United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 612 (4th Cir. 1990) (“[A]ny Rule 11 proceeding requires that a factual basis for the plea be established and we are unwilling to place more requirements in the context of an Alford plea.”). 19 ¶34 State courts are similarly split.

2023Compare Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that strong evidence of guilt is not a constitutional prerequisite for an Alford plea), with Willett v. Georgia, 608 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a factual basis must support an Alford plea). ¶31 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit holds that strong evidence of actual guilt is not constitutionally required, even in the context of an Alford plea.

2023Higgason, 984 F.2d at 207 . 21 their innocence.7 See People v. Fuqua, 764 P.2d 56, 59 (Colo. 1988) (“[I]f [a criminal procedure rule] is plain and unambiguous, we apply the rule as written.”). ¶38 This treatment comports with our previous recognition that “[a]n Alford plea is a guilty plea.” Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1127 .

2023See Lacy, 775 P.2d at 5 & n.7 (holding that due process generally does not require that the record demonstrate an adequate factual basis for a plea but declining to address whether the same is true for Alford pleas); In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897 , 905 n.8 (Colo. 2002) (suggesting in dicta that “the trial judge should inquire into factual guilt” when a defendant protests innocence).

2023Lacy, 775 P.2d at 5 .

2001See Washington v. Superior Court of Arizona, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (App.1994) (holding that "because an Afford plea is merely a risk/benefit calculation, not an admission of guilt, where there is an objective basis for defendant's reevaluation, withdrawal should be permitted" (internal citations omitted)). 3 .

2001See Washington v. Superior Court of Arizona, 180 Ariz. 91 , 881 P.2d 1196, 1198 (App.1994) (holding that "because an Afford plea is merely a risk/benefit calculation, not an admission of guilt, where there is an objective basis for defendant's reevaluation, withdrawal should be permitted" (internal citations omitted)). 3 .

2000See State v. Miller, 253 Mont. 395 , 833 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1992)(reaffirming adoption of the "prevailing judicial attitude that recanting testimony is to be viewed with great suspicion," and determining that a court hearing a request to withdraw an Alford plea should grant the request "only when the court is satisfied that the recantation is true"); cf. State v. McCallum, 208 Wis.2d 463 , 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997); but cf. People v. De Jesus, 606 N.Y.S.2d 255 , 199 A.D.2d 529 (N.Y.App.Div.1993).

2000See State v. Miller, 253 Mont. 395 , 833 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1992)(reaffirming adoption of the "prevailing judicial attitude that recanting testimony is to be viewed with great suspicion," and determining that a court hearing a request to withdraw an Alford plea should grant the request "only when the court is satisfied that the recantation is true"); cf. State v. McCallum, 208 Wis.2d 463 , 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997); but cf. People v. De Jesus, 606 N.Y.S.2d 255 , 199 A.D.2d 529 (N.Y.App.Div.1993).

2000See Duran v. Superior Court, 162 Ariz. 206 , 782 P.2d 324 (Ariz.App.1989); State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash.App. 216 , 896 P.2d 108 (1995).

2000See Duran v. Superior Court, 162 Ariz. 206 , 782 P.2d 324 (Ariz.App.1989); State v. D.T.M., 78 Wash.App. 216 , 896 P.2d 108 (1995).

2000See United States v. Chatman, supra (appellate court must be able to discern from the record whether and how the trial court evaluated the credibility of the recanting witness).

2000See United States v. Chatman, supra (appellate court must be able to discern from the record whether and how the trial court evaluated the credibility of the recanting witness).

1998See id., 566 N.W.2d at 174 .

1998See id., 566 N.W.2d at 174 .