Alford plea in California

2025“An Alford plea is a plea of guilty in which the defendant maintains his innocence.” (U.S. v. Mancinas-Flores (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3d 677, 681 , citing North Carolina v. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 36 .) Where a defendant states his or her understanding of the evidence the state would introduce at trial, but does not claim innocence anywhere in the plea, federal courts have determined that Alford does not apply.

2025And they’re 5 A plea pursuant to West is a plea of “nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932 .) “Such a plea, also referred to as an Alford plea, based on North Carolina. v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 37–38 …, allows a defendant to plead guilty in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.

2025And they’re 5 A plea pursuant to West is a plea of “nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.” (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932 .) “Such a plea, also referred to as an Alford plea, based on North Carolina. v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 37–38 …, allows a defendant to plead guilty in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.

2024A West plea is indistinguishable from an Alford plea, which pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 37−38, “allows a defendant to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.” (People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424 [asserting that a West plea is “also referred to as an Alford plea”]; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932 (Alvernaz) [West plea is “a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea”].) Based on the change of plea form and his counsel’s statements during sent

2024(See e.g., People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101-1102 [defendant’s silence in response to prior sentencing court’s description of victim’s injuries when discussing restitution not admissible as adoptive admission as to the truth of the nature of the underlying injuries for alleged strike offense]; People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 179 [a defendant’s statements in a post-plea probation report that he used a knife to stab the victim were not part of record of prior conviction because they do not reflect facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted as the prosecu

2022Yet the diagnosis still falls short of demonstrating that she was actually innocent of the crimes, which is her burden here. 3 Moreover, the record does not indicate that the plea was a so-called “Alford plea,” where a defendant maintains his or her innocence but pleads guilty “because the defendant (1) is expecting a favorable recommendation from the prosecution, and (2) believes that if the case were tried, there is a likelihood that he would be convicted.” (People v. Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1121 ; see North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 ; People v. Roberts, supra, at p.

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2024A West plea is indistinguishable from an Alford plea, which pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25 , 37−38, “allows a defendant to plead guilty [or no contest] in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.” (People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424 [asserting that a West plea is “also referred to as an Alford plea”]; In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932 (Alvernaz) [West plea is “a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea”].) Based on the change of plea form and his counsel’s statements during sent

2015(People v. West (1970) 3 Ca1.3d 595, 613.) The Supreme Court has characterized such a plea as 'a plea of nolo contendere, not admitting a factual basis for the plea.' (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 932 .) 'Such a plea, also referred to as an Alford plea, based on North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 , allows a defendant to plead guilty in order to take advantage of a plea bargain while still asserting his or her innocence.' (People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424 .) Madrid's expert, [Michael] McCabe, agreed that this is the effect of such a plea. [Citation.] "Thou

2015Suffice it to say, Saez’s stipulation here to the complaint 33 36, 51 [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1260, 1262, 1264-1265 [defendant’s failure to object to prosecutor’s recital of factual basis constituted admission]; People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911, 914-916 [sufficie

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2015Accordingly, we cannot conclusively say that Saez admitted to personally using a firearm or to pointing a firearm at the victim to effect the false imprisonment. 21 (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 51 [ 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 605 , 178 P.3d 1100 ] [defense counsel’s stipulation to factual basis of plea did not amount to stipulation that facts were true]; People v. Roberts, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1122 [defendant did not admit to “prosecutor’s recital of the factual basis” underlying his Alford plea by not objecting to that recital]; cf. People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 125

2024(See e.g., People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101-1102 [defendant’s silence in response to prior sentencing court’s description of victim’s injuries when discussing restitution not admissible as adoptive admission as to the truth of the nature of the underlying injuries for alleged strike offense]; People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 179 [a defendant’s statements in a post-plea probation report that he used a knife to stab the victim were not part of record of prior conviction because they do not reflect facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted as the prosecu

2024(See e.g., People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1101-1102 [defendant’s silence in response to prior sentencing court’s description of victim’s injuries when discussing restitution not admissible as adoptive admission as to the truth of the nature of the underlying injuries for alleged strike offense]; People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 179 [a defendant’s statements in a post-plea probation report that he used a knife to stab the victim were not part of record of prior conviction because they do not reflect facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted as the prosecu

2015(People v. Flores (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 199, 211 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 ]; see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) But we are bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law.

2015(People v. Flores (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 199, 211 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 ]; see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) But we are bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law.

2015(People v. Flores (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 199, 211 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 ]; see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) But we are bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law.

2015(People v. Flores (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 199, 211 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 ]; see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) But we are bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law.

2014Therefore, except [where an Alford plea is involved], a defendant would normally and reasonably be expected to object to . . . the . . . factual recital if [it] did not accurately reflect the circumstances of the offense . . . .” (Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) Here, defendant and counsel listened as the prosecutor described the offense as including the personal use of a car — ordinarily “capable of being used” in a deadly or dangerous fashion (People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 457 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334 ] (Burton)) under almost any circumstance — to commit an assault on

2014Therefore, except [where an Alford plea is involved], a defendant would normally and reasonably be expected to object to . . . the . . . factual recital if [it] did not accurately reflect the circumstances of the offense . . . .” (Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265.) Here, defendant and counsel listened as the prosecutor described the offense as including the personal use of a car — ordinarily “capable of being used” in a deadly or dangerous fashion (People v. Burton (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 447, 457 [ 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 334 ] (Burton)) under almost any circumstance — to commit an assault on

2014(See People v. Wright (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 706 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ] [pointing out that “a mistake of fact, which produced an error of law” in People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 29 P.3d 197 ], now makes negligence the minimum mental state for assault].) The probation report, though it cannot supply facts involving circumstances of the offense itself, nonetheless shows that defendant had been actively contesting the legal conclusion that his conduct constituted an assault; this demonstrates that under the circumstances his silence at the time of the plea w

2014(See People v. Wright (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703, 706 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 ] [pointing out that “a mistake of fact, which produced an error of law” in People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 29 P.3d 197 ], now makes negligence the minimum mental state for assault].) The probation report, though it cannot supply facts involving circumstances of the offense itself, nonetheless shows that defendant had been actively contesting the legal conclusion that his conduct constituted an assault; this demonstrates that under the circumstances his silence at the time of the plea w

2014(Accord, People v. Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1120-1123 [but finding the prosecutor’s recitation did not come within the hearsay exception for adoptive admissions because “Alford plea” (North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-172 ]) does not admit truth of allegations in pleading guilty (so defendant does not have any motive to contest them) and defendant entered plea before prosecutor recited factual basis]; People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911, 914, 916 [defense concession before entry of plea that prosecution could produce witnesses to support

2014(Accord, People v. Roberts (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1120-1123 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 810 ] [but finding the prosecutor’s recitation did not come within the hearsay exception for adoptive admissions because an Alford plea (North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 [ 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 171-172 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ]) does not admit truth of allegations in pleading guilty (so defendant does not have any motive to contest them) and defendant entered plea before prosecutor recited factual basis]; People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911, 914, 916 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ] [defense concession before en

2011(Id. at pp. 37-38; see also In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 940-941, fn. 9 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 , 830 P.2d 747 ].) The court here explained to defendant that under an Alford plea, he was not admitting the underlying facts of the charged offense. “ ‘[U]nder all of the circumstances shown, [the prosecutor’s comments did not] call[] for a disclaimer ....’” (Simmons, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 713 .) The People rely on People v. Sohal (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 911 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 110 ] (Sohal).