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123 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen2 sentences2024An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which a defendant does not admit factual guilt but acknowledges that the State’s evidence will likely result in a conviction. 400 U.S. 25 . 2023The court observed, “With an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt ‘but admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him 3 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. | 13 | 62 |
State v. Newtongreen2 sentences2013State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 369-70 , 552 P.2d 682 (1976). ¶9 Thus, looking beyond the mere title of the pleas, the practical reason for refusing to accept a no-contest plea at common law — that there was no mechanism to decide if there was an evidentiary basis for the plea — does not exist for an Alford plea. 2013State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 369-70 , 552 P.2d 682 (1976). ¶9 Thus, looking beyond the mere title of the pleas, the practical reason for refusing to accept a no-contest plea at common law — that there was no mechanism to decide if there was an evidentiary basis for the plea — does not exist for an Alford plea. | 4 | 18 |
The Florida Bar v. Cohengreen2 sentences1993See Florida Bar v. Cohen, 583 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1991) (citing Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 1987)). [A]lthough a judgment of guilt entered upon an Alford plea is conclusive proof of guilt of the criminal offense charged, an attorney has a due process right to offer in mitigation an explanation of the circumstances surrounding such a plea. 1993See Florida Bar v. Cohen, 583 So.2d 313, 314 (Fla. 1991) (citing Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 1987)). [A]lthough a judgment of guilt entered upon an Alford plea is conclusive proof of guilt of the criminal offense charged, an attorney has a due process right to offer in mitigation an explanation of the circumstances surrounding such a plea. | 3 | 3 |
State v. DTMgreen2 sentences2025In State v. D.T.M., the defendant moved to withdraw his Alford plea because the victim recanted her testimony. 78 Wn. 2019App. 216, 221 , 896 P.2d 108 (1995), an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw an Alford plea based on a recantation. | 2 | 10 |
MATTER OF DISCIPLINE PROCEEDING AGAINST McLENDONgreen2 sentences2017F ossedal cites one situation in which we did find extraordinary mitigation in a theft case: In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McLendon, 120 Wn.2d 761 , 845 P.2d 1006 (1993). lnMcLendon, an attorney suffering from bipolar disorder misappropriated over $90,000 of client funds from his trust account and was convicted of theft pursuant to an Alford plea. 2017F ossedal cites one situation in which we did find extraordinary mitigation in a theft case: In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McLendon, 120 Wn.2d 761 , 845 P.2d 1006 (1993). lnMcLendon, an attorney suffering from bipolar disorder misappropriated over $90,000 of client funds from his trust account and was convicted of theft pursuant to an Alford plea. | 2 | 7 |
New York Underwriters Insurance v. Dotygreen2 sentences2005App. 546, 550-51 , 794 P.2d 521 (1990) (holding that, while the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to an Alford plea and sen Alford plea is not admissible to establish a party’s intent, such a plea does constitute an “admission”). 2005Co. v. Doty, 58 Wash.App. 546, 550-51 , 794 P.2d 521 (1990) (holding that, while the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to an Alford plea and an Alford plea is not admissible to establish a party's intent, such a plea does constitute an "admission"). | 2 | 6 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2016We disagree. “‘In an Alford plea, the defendant does not admit guilt but concedes that a jury would most likely convict him based on the strength of the State’s evidence.’” State v. MacDonald, 183 Wn.2d 1 , 6 n.1, 346 P.3d 748 (2015) (quoting State v. Scott, 150 Wn. 2015“In an Alford plea, the defendant does not admit guilt but concedes that a jury would most likely convict him based on the strength of the State’s evidence.” State v. Scott, 150 Wn. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2003See State v. Young, 51 Wn. 1996We noted that when a defendant enters an Alford plea, he clearly manifests his intention not to admit to the State’s factual allegations. 51 Wn. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Hubbardgreen2 sentences2005Taylor, 83 Wash.2d at 596 , 521 P.2d 699 ; see also Hubbard, 106 Wash.App. at 157 , 22 P.3d 296 (no reason to treat Alford plea differently from straight plea when independent factual basis supports plea); In re Discipline of McLendon, 120 Wash.2d 761, 771 , 845 P.2d 1006 (1993) (effect of general plea and Alford plea is the same). 2002See State v. Hubbard, *1184 106 Wash.App. 149, 155 , 22 P.3d 296 (a defendant's equivocal factual statement is part of an Alford plea and there is an independent factual basis for the guilty plea, there is no reason to refuse the plea), review denied, 145 Wash.2d 1004 , 35 P.3d 380 (2001). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Talleygreen2 sentences2001See State v. Talley, 134 Wn.2d 176, 182-83 , 949 P.2d 358 (1998). 2001Talley, 134 Wn.2d at 182-83 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Talleygreen2 sentences2001See State v. Paul, 103 Wash.App. 487 , 489 n. 1, 12 P.3d 1036 (2000); State v. Talley, 134 Wash.2d 176, 182-83 , 949 P.2d 358 (1998) (defendant does "not admit the allegations contained in the certification for probable cause, notwithstanding his stipulation that the plea judge could consider it in determining the validity of the guilty plea"). [26] Reply Br. at 5. [27] Response to Personal Restraint Petition at 8. [28] Clerk's Papers at 13. [29] Report of Proceedings (Apr. 5, 1993) at 12. [30] In the absence of prejudice, Hartzell cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 2001See State v. Talley, 134 Wn.2d 176, 182-83 , 949 P.2d 358 (1998). | 2 | 3 |
| State v. Dixongreen | 2 | 2 |
| In Re the Personal Restraint of Cookgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Mendoza v. Rivera-Chavezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Hubbardgreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Terry Francis Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Handleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Perezgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Paulgreen | 2 | 2 |
| The Florida Bar v. Pavlickgreen | 2 | 2 |
Clark v. Bainesgreen2 sentences2018Recognizing the ambiguous nature of an Alford plea, the court was very straight-forward in stating its holding: "We hold an Alford plea cannot be used as the basis for collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action." Clark, 150 Wn.2d at 907 (emphasis added). 2018The right to plead guilty extends to entering an Alford plea. 6 A three justice concurrence noted this fact in Clark. 150 Wn.2d at 918 (Ireland, J ., concurring). 7 Even evidence from a criminal case that ended in acquittal can be used in a subsequent civil case. | 1 | 7 |
Falkner v. Foshauggreen2 sentences2018Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wn. 2002See RCW 9.94A.753(9). [10] But see Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wash.App. 113 , 29 P.3d 771 (2001) (following successful appeal, criminal defendant not precluded from suing his defense attorney for malpractice after entering Alford plea to lesser charge.) [11] Relying on cases from Division One, Baines asserts that an Alford plea does not collaterally estop a defendant from asserting a malicious prosecution claim brought by the victim of the crime of which he was convicted. | 1 | 7 |
In re the Personal Restraint of Crossgreen2 sentences2022Restraint of Cross, 178 Wn.2d 519 , 309 P.3d 1186 (2013), in which our Supreme Court upheld a death sentence based on an Alford plea. 2022Restraint of Cross, 178 Wn.2d 519 , 309 P.3d 1186 (2013), in which our Supreme Court upheld a death sentence based on an Alford plea. | 1 | 6 |
Falkner v. Foshauggreen2 sentences2002See RCW 9.94A.753(9). [10] But see Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wash.App. 113 , 29 P.3d 771 (2001) (following successful appeal, criminal defendant not precluded from suing his defense attorney for malpractice after entering Alford plea to lesser charge.) [11] Relying on cases from Division One, Baines asserts that an Alford plea does not collaterally estop a defendant from asserting a malicious prosecution claim brought by the victim of the crime of which he was convicted. 2002App. 113 , 29 P.3d 771 (2001) (following successful appeal, criminal defendant not precluded from suing Ms defense attorney for malpractice after entering Alford plea to lesser charge). | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Postongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jorge Ramirez-Gonzalezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McNuttgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bowermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeRosiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Javier Rivera-Sanchez, A/K/A Jose Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. ANJgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. A.N.J.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Personal Restraint of Montoya
green
2 sentences2005The question then is whether the intervening case Andress has also rendered invalid his plea to second degree intentional murder. 3 ¶22 The basic standard for determining validity of an Alford plea is whether it “ ‘represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’ ” Montoya, 109 Wn.2d at 280 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31). 2005The question then is whether the intervening case Andress has also rendered invalid his plea to second degree intentional murder. [3] ¶ 22 The basic standard for determining validity of an Alford plea is whether it "`represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Montoya, 109 Wash.2d at 280 , 744 P.2d 340 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31 , 91 S.Ct. 160 ). | 11 | 1989–2022 |
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. McGrath
green
2 sentences2004Such coercion, the court concluded, undermines the policy behind collateral estoppel and makes it such that a defendant who enters an Alford plea “has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate the issues normally decided in a full-fledged criminal trial.” Id. at 63 . 2004Such coercion, the court concluded, undermines the policy behind collateral estoppel and makes it such that a defendant who enters an Alford plea "has not had a `full and fair opportunity' to litigate the issues normally decided in a full-fledged criminal trial." Id. at 63 , 708 P.2d 657 . | 6 | 2001–2018 |
Clark v. Baines
green
2 sentences2011Citing to this court's opinion in Clark v. Baines, 150 Wash.2d 905 , 84 P.3d 245 (2004), King argues that an Alford plea would not be conclusive evidence of guilt in a subsequent civil action because in entering an Alford plea, the pleading party does not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the underlying criminal case. 2011Citing to this court’s opinion in Clark v. Baines, 150 Wn.2d 905 , 84 P.3d 245 (2004), King argues that an Alford plea would not be conclusive evidence of guilt in a subsequent civil action because in entering an Alford plea, the pleading party does not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the underlying criminal case. | 6 | 2007–2013 |
State v. Ice
green
2 sentences2024The trial court ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) “to conduct a mental health sentencing alternative evaluation.” VRP (Oct. 11, 2022) at 18. 1 “A defendant who enters an Alford plea does not admit guilt; rather, he concedes that the State’s evidence would likely result in a conviction.” State v. Ice, 138 Wn. 2016State v. Ice, 138 Wn. | 4 | 2009–2024 |
State v. Stowe
green
2 sentences2022“An Alford plea is valid when it ʻrepresents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’ ” State v. Stowe, 71 Wn. 2018“Misinformation with respect to the outcome of an Alford plea is especially problematic” because a defendant unwilling to admit culpability will “rapidly change[] [her] calculations about the costs and benefits of standing trial.” State v. Stowe, 71 Wn. | 4 | 2013–2022 |
In Re the Personal Restraint of Clements
green
2 sentences2025Enforcing a plea in light of a recantation constitutes a manifest injustice where the recanted testimony was the sole basis for conviction, such as with an Alford plea.2 Clements, 125 Wn. 2009App. 634, 648 , 106 P.3d 244 (2005), in which Division One of our court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying Clements’ request to withdraw his Alford plea based on a victim’s recantation. | 3 | 2009–2025 |
State v. Scott
green
2 sentences2016App. 281, 294-95 , 207 P.3d 495 (2009)). 2015App. 281, 294-95 , 207 P.3d 495 (2009) (citing State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 372 , 552 P.2d 682 (1976)). | 3 | 2015–2016 |
State v. Arnold
green
2 sentences2015App. 379, 382 , 914 P. 2d 762 ( 1996). 2 45274 -0 -II / 45280 -4 -II In entering his Alford plea, Davis did not admit to committing attempted burglary in the second degree but acknowledged that a jury could find him guilty based on the facts set forth in the probable cause statement. 2007Arnold, 81 Wn. | 3 | 2007–2015 |
Matter of Personal Restraint of Ness
green
2 sentences2006App. 817, 824 , 855 P.2d 1191 (1993). ¶41 When a defendant enters an Alford plea, the trial court must exercise extreme care to ensure that the plea satisfies constitutional requirements. 2006In re Personal Restraint of Ness, 70 Wash.App. 817, 824 , 855 P.2d 1191 (1993). ¶ 41 When a defendant enters an Alford plea, the trial court must exercise extreme care to ensure that the plea satisfies constitutional requirements. | 3 | 1995–2006 |
State v. Ice
green
2 sentences2024App. 745, 748 , 158 P.3d 1228 (2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1008 (2008); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. 2009Restraint of Ice, 138 Wash.App. 745 , 749, 158 P.3d 1228 (2007) (footnote omitted), review denied, 163 Wash.2d 1008 , 180 P.3d 784 (2008). | 2 | 2009–2024 |
State v. GLASER-GIBSON
neutral
2 sentences2024App. 745, 748 , 158 P.3d 1228 (2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1008 (2008); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 , 91 S. Ct. 160 , 27 L. 2009Restraint of Ice, 138 Wash.App. 745 , 749, 158 P.3d 1228 (2007) (footnote omitted), review denied, 163 Wash.2d 1008 , 180 P.3d 784 (2008). | 2 | 2009–2024 |
State v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014State v. Washington, 36 Wn. 2014State v. Washington, 36 Wn. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Cross
green
2 sentences2013Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 593 . ¶14 There are advantages to an Alford plea. 2013Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 593 . ¶14 There are advantages to an Alford plea. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Ray
green
2 sentences2013State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 435 , 427 S.E.2d 171 (1993). 2013State v. Ray, 310 S.C. 431, 435 , 427 S.E.2d 171 (1993). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Yates green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Yates
green
2 sentences2011As the WSBA points out, a defendant has no right to a plea bargain, Answering Brief of WSBA at 15 (citing State v. Yates, 161 Wash.2d 714, 741 , 168 P.3d 359 (2007)), and therefore no right to a particular type of plea. ¶ 14 Moreover, the premise of King's argument is that had he been allowed to enter an Alford plea, then "the factual issue of whether he committed the crime of Mail Fraud as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 would have to be litigated herein to be established as a felony upon which a disbarment or other lawyer discipline could be based." Br. of Att'y at 25. 2011As the WSBA points out, a defendant has no right to a plea bargain, Answering Br. of WSBA at 15 (citing State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 741 , 168 P.3d 359 (2007)), and therefore no right to a particular type of plea. ¶14 Moreover, the premise of King’s argument is that had he been allowed to enter an Alford plea, then “the factual issue of whether he committed the crime of Mail Fraud as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1341 would have to be litigated herein to be established as a felony upon which a disbarment or other lawyer discipline could be based.” Br. of Att’y at 25. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Schlup v. Delo red | 2 | 2009–2009 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Turay green | 2 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Turay neutral | 2 | 2009–2009 |
| Matter of Personal Restraint of Young red | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Hoffman green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Ehli green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Steven Darrell Diamond green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Norval neutral | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Stevens v. Bispham green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Moten green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Osborne green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Spencer neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State Of Washington v. S.D.H. neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re Detention of Hovinga green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Craig green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In re the Detention of Hovinga green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. McNutt green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Stout green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re Detention of Stout green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Price green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Spencer green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.