Alford plea in Wisconsin

2024All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted. 2 An Alford plea is a guilty plea that allows the defendant to maintain the defendant’s innocence but “accept a conviction and sentence for the crime.” State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85 , ¶¶2, 33, 394 Wis. 2d 238 , 951 N.W.2d 404 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)). 3 For ease of reading, we generally refer to the 2016 complaint and subsequent plea and sentencing as the “2016 case” and the 2019 complaint and subsequent proceedings as the “2019 case.” 2 No. 2023AP911-CR constituted “a full

2022On appeal, Taylor renews the three arguments in support of his motion that he made in the circuit court: (1) his pleas were not knowingly entered because the record of the plea hearing fails to demonstrate that the court explained the elements of the offenses, the plea questionnaire does not state the elements of the offenses, and the record of the plea hearing and the motion hearing demonstrates that Taylor did not understand the elements; (2) his pleas were not voluntarily entered because they were compelled by his belief that his trial counsel was unprepared to defend him at trial; and (3)

2025Our state supreme court has held that “the circuit courts of Wisconsin may, in their discretion, accept Alford pleas.” State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 856 , 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). ¶41 To accept an Alford plea, a circuit court must, among other duties, “determine that the summary of the evidence the [S]tate would offer at trial constitutes ‘strong proof of guilt’” as to each element of the alleged crime.

2025Our state supreme court has held that “the circuit courts of Wisconsin may, in their discretion, accept Alford pleas.” State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 856 , 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995). ¶41 To accept an Alford plea, a circuit court must, among other duties, “determine that the summary of the evidence the [S]tate would offer at trial constitutes ‘strong proof of guilt’” as to each element of the alleged crime.

2020Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (1) (2017-18).10 To accept an Alford plea, "the circuit court must determine that the summary of the evidence the [S]tate would offer at trial constitutes 'strong proof of guilt.'" Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 (citing Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 859-60 ). "'Strong proof of guilt' is not the equivalent of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is 'clearly greater than what is needed to meet the factual basis requirement under a guilty plea.'" Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 (quoting Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27 ).

2020Because an Alford plea often results from agreed-upon plea negotiations between a defendant and the State, a court "need not go to the same length to determine whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would [where] there is no negotiated plea." Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 645 -46 (quoting Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 25 ).

2020See State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657 , 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981). 22 No. 2018AP731-CR defendant pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not admitting having committed the crime." Id. ¶34 An Alford plea shares characteristics of both a guilty plea and a no contest plea, but it is nonetheless different.

2020See State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657 , 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981). 22 No. 2018AP731-CR defendant pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not admitting having committed the crime." Id. ¶34 An Alford plea shares characteristics of both a guilty plea and a no contest plea, but it is nonetheless different.

2014The plea in State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463 , 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) was a so-called "Alford plea." See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (accepting conviction despite contention of innocence); State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 857-858 , 532 N.W.2d 111, 115-116 (1995) (Alford pleas are permitted in Wisconsin.).

2014The plea in State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463 , 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) was a so-called "Alford plea." See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (accepting conviction despite contention of innocence); State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 857-858 , 532 N.W.2d 111, 115-116 (1995) (Alford pleas are permitted in Wisconsin.).

2026State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶¶13 , 18 & n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62 , 716 N.W.2d 886 (discussing the guilty plea waiver rule that “a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea” forfeits or “‘waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including constitutional claims’” (citation and footnote omitted)); see also State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1 , ¶17, 389 Wis. 2d 627 , 937 N.W.2d 579 (stating that whether a defendant adequately preserved or forfeited his right to appellate review of a particular claim is reviewed de novo). 4 No. 2024AP2161-CR ¶10 In contrast, our review of a sentence is limited to whether the circuit cou

2026State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶¶13 , 18 & n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62 , 716 N.W.2d 886 (discussing the guilty plea waiver rule that “a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea” forfeits or “‘waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including constitutional claims’” (citation and footnote omitted)); see also State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1 , ¶17, 389 Wis. 2d 627 , 937 N.W.2d 579 (stating that whether a defendant adequately preserved or forfeited his right to appellate review of a particular claim is reviewed de novo). 4 No. 2024AP2161-CR ¶10 In contrast, our review of a sentence is limited to whether the circuit cou

1996Rather, he characterizes the transcript to reveal only that "he agreed with the trial court's characterization of that situation." He claims that the language in § 971.06, *426 Stats., which says that a defendant "may plead ... no contest," imposed a duty on this trial court to have again asked Salentine: "Sir, what plea do you now wish to enter?" when Salentine said only that he was offering an "Alford plea." He further suggests that the trial court should have then asked him to verbalize whether it was an "Alford plea guilty" or an " Alford plea no contest." The State responds that a trial c

1996Rather, he characterizes the transcript to reveal only that "he agreed with the trial court's characterization of that situation." He claims that the language in § 971.06, *426 Stats., which says that a defendant "may plead ... no contest," imposed a duty on this trial court to have again asked Salentine: "Sir, what plea do you now wish to enter?" when Salentine said only that he was offering an "Alford plea." He further suggests that the trial court should have then asked him to verbalize whether it was an "Alford plea guilty" or an " Alford plea no contest." The State responds that a trial c

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

1995App. 1992); Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Cr. 1972); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Osborne, 684 P.2d 683, 687 (Wash. 1984); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Wyo. 1992). [6] Although not required to make the plea acceptable, including a definition of an Alford plea on the guilty plea questionnaire may help to further document the defendant's understanding of the plea.

2025Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 646 , 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998) (stating that preliminary hearing testimony from a victim and an officer constituted a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea).

2025Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 646 , 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998) (stating that preliminary hearing testimony from a victim and an officer constituted a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea).

2025“Because an Alford plea often results from agreed-upon plea 5 In his reply brief, Estrada-Rosales also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by “never stat[ing] that it was finding strong proof of guilt.” However, a court need not use “magic words” when accepting an Alford plea—instead, all that is required is that a court “be satisfied that the facts in the record, as a whole, are sufficient to provide strong proof of guilt and overcome a defendant’s protestations of innocence.” State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85 , ¶36, 394 Wis. 2d 238 , 951 N.W.2d 404 .

2024All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted. 2 An Alford plea is a guilty plea that allows the defendant to maintain the defendant’s innocence but “accept a conviction and sentence for the crime.” State v. Nash, 2020 WI 85 , ¶¶2, 33, 394 Wis. 2d 238 , 951 N.W.2d 404 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)). 3 For ease of reading, we generally refer to the 2016 complaint and subsequent plea and sentencing as the “2016 case” and the 2019 complaint and subsequent proceedings as the “2019 case.” 2 No. 2023AP911-CR constituted “a full

2007See State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56 , ¶ 43 n. 2, 253 Wis.2d 38 , 644 N.W.2d 891 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 202 Wis.2d 21, 27 , 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996); Broadie v. State, 68 Wis.2d 420, 423-24 , 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis.2d 508, 513 , 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973). ¶ 134 This case involved extensive negotiations and, despite unwavering testimony from the victim, the State allowed the defendant to enter a plea while disavowing that he was the shooter. ¶ 135 Second, the defendant could have pled "no contest" or entered an Alford plea, agreeing to accept a convictio

2007See State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56 , ¶ 43 n. 2, 253 Wis.2d 38 , 644 N.W.2d 891 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 202 Wis.2d 21, 27 , 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996); Broadie v. State, 68 Wis.2d 420, 423-24 , 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975); Wilson v. State, 57 Wis.2d 508, 513 , 204 N.W.2d 508 (1973). ¶ 134 This case involved extensive negotiations and, despite unwavering testimony from the victim, the State allowed the defendant to enter a plea while disavowing that he was the shooter. ¶ 135 Second, the defendant could have pled "no contest" or entered an Alford plea, agreeing to accept a convictio

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

2020If "[t]he dual aim of our criminal justice system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer[,]'" id. (quoting 6https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Schrodingers-cat (explaining Nobel Prize-winning Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger's thought experiment presenting the paradox of a cat being both dead and alive at the same time, as a critique of a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics). 7 No. 2018AP731-CR.rgb United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)), "[a]n Alford plea, in my mind, contradicts this very simple proposition[.]" Id. ¶61 Because the right to a jury

2020If "[t]he dual aim of our criminal justice system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer[,]'" id. (quoting 6https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Schrodingers-cat (explaining Nobel Prize-winning Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger's thought experiment presenting the paradox of a cat being both dead and alive at the same time, as a critique of a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics). 7 No. 2018AP731-CR.rgb United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)), "[a]n Alford plea, in my mind, contradicts this very simple proposition[.]" Id. ¶61 Because the right to a jury

2020See Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶20 ("All that is required is for the factual basis to be developed on the record——several sources can supply the facts."); Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 859-60 (concluding "an adequate record of the 'strong proof of guilt'" is sufficient); Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 664 (stating "[t]he record in this case" was sufficient); Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 ("[T]he record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt."). ¶37 When determining whether the record contains facts sufficient to accept a defendant's Alford plea, the circuit court must find strong proof of guilt fo

2020See Thomas, 232 Wis. 2d 714, ¶20 ("All that is required is for the factual basis to be developed on the record——several sources can supply the facts."); Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 859-60 (concluding "an adequate record of the 'strong proof of guilt'" is sufficient); Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 664 (stating "[t]he record in this case" was sufficient); Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 ("[T]he record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt."). ¶37 When determining whether the record contains facts sufficient to accept a defendant's Alford plea, the circuit court must find strong proof of guilt fo

2020See id. ("[W]e do not use [our superintending authority] lightly."). ¶47 Nash proposes that this court exercise its superintending authority, under Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, to impose certain evidentiary standards for establishing a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.

2020See id. ("[W]e do not use [our superintending authority] lightly."). ¶47 Nash proposes that this court exercise its superintending authority, under Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, to impose certain evidentiary standards for establishing a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.

2000See State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 856 , 532 N.W.2d 111, 115 (1995); see also State v. Salentine, 206 Wis. 2d 419, 423-25 , 557 N.W.2d 439, 441-42 (Ct. App. 1996).

2000See State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 856 , 532 N.W.2d 111, 115 (1995); see also State v. Salentine, 206 Wis. 2d 419, 423-25 , 557 N.W.2d 439, 441-42 (Ct. App. 1996).

1995The Alford plea is not inconsistent with this Court's decision in Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661 , 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), which held that there must be a factual basis for the charge in order for a circuit court to accept a guilty plea.

1995The Alford plea is not inconsistent with this Court's decision in Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661 , 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), which held that there must be a factual basis for the charge in order for a circuit court to accept a guilty plea.

2020See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 2018-1943 (La. 6/26/19); 276 So. 3d 131 (per curiam); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Wyo. 1992); Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982); and Scarborough v. State, 363 S.W.3d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 27 No. 2018AP731-CR § 948.02(2).

1995App. 1992); Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Cr. 1972); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Osborne, 684 P.2d 683, 687 (Wash. 1984); Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Wyo. 1992). [6] Although not required to make the plea acceptable, including a definition of an Alford plea on the guilty plea questionnaire may help to further document the defendant's understanding of the plea.

2026State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶¶13 , 18 & n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62 , 716 N.W.2d 886 (discussing the guilty plea waiver rule that “a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea” forfeits or “‘waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including constitutional claims’” (citation and footnote omitted)); see also State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1 , ¶17, 389 Wis. 2d 627 , 937 N.W.2d 579 (stating that whether a defendant adequately preserved or forfeited his right to appellate review of a particular claim is reviewed de novo). 4 No. 2024AP2161-CR ¶10 In contrast, our review of a sentence is limited to whether the circuit cou

2024See State v. Quarzenski, 2007 WI App 212, ¶19 , 305 Wis. 2d 525 , 739 N.W.2d 844 (stating that when a court fails to make express credibility findings, “we assume it made implicit findings on a witness’s credibility when analyzing the evidence”); see also State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2002 WI App 207, ¶19 , 257 Wis. 2d 421 , 651 N.W.2d 345 (holding that, when acting as fact finder, the circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of 6 No. 2022AP174-CR witness credibility and of the weight to be given to their testimony).

2024See State v. Quarzenski, 2007 WI App 212, ¶19 , 305 Wis. 2d 525 , 739 N.W.2d 844 (stating that when a court fails to make express credibility findings, “we assume it made implicit findings on a witness’s credibility when analyzing the evidence”); see also State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc., 2002 WI App 207, ¶19 , 257 Wis. 2d 421 , 651 N.W.2d 345 (holding that, when acting as fact finder, the circuit court is the ultimate arbiter of 6 No. 2022AP174-CR witness credibility and of the weight to be given to their testimony).

2024For these reasons, we agree with the State that Riekkoff is materially distinguishable and does not compel a conclusion that Mayotte’s plea was involuntary. ¶20 Furthermore, while Mayotte contends that he did not understand the guilty plea waiver rule at the time he entered his plea, “[n]ot every misunderstanding of the law by a defendant negates the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea.” State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, ¶11 , 276 Wis. 2d 559 , 687 N.W.2d 543 .

2024For these reasons, we agree with the State that Riekkoff is materially distinguishable and does not compel a conclusion that Mayotte’s plea was involuntary. ¶20 Furthermore, while Mayotte contends that he did not understand the guilty plea waiver rule at the time he entered his plea, “[n]ot every misunderstanding of the law by a defendant negates the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea.” State v. Brown, 2004 WI App 179, ¶11 , 276 Wis. 2d 559 , 687 N.W.2d 543 .