Alford plea in Iowa

2026An abuse of discretion occurs 1 See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] defendant enters an Alford plea by pleading guilty while still maintaining his innocence.”); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached pursuant to a plea agreement.

2025State v. Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 2008). 1 See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] defendant enters an Alford plea by pleading guilty while still maintaining his innocence.”); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Page’s conditional plea agreement reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the adverse ruling now challenged, and success on that challenge could give Page “some relief.” See State v. Scullark, __ N.W.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1717213 , at *2 (Iowa 2025); State

2026An abuse of discretion occurs 1 See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] defendant enters an Alford plea by pleading guilty while still maintaining his innocence.”); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 As a preliminary matter, the right of appeal is limited for convictions reached pursuant to a plea agreement.

2025State v. Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 2008). 1 See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] defendant enters an Alford plea by pleading guilty while still maintaining his innocence.”); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Page’s conditional plea agreement reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the adverse ruling now challenged, and success on that challenge could give Page “some relief.” See State v. Scullark, __ N.W.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1717213 , at *2 (Iowa 2025); State

2020“This requirement exists even where the plea is an Alford plea.” Id.

2018To the contrary, the supreme court has stated “there is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 521 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849–54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788–92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State v. Martin, 778 N.W.2d 201 , 203–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same); State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598 , 603–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same).

2021The State filed a motion for summary disposition arguing McKinnon’s 1 An Alford plea “was designed to permit a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty to a crime without admitting participation in the underlying facts which constitute the crime.” State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 37–38 (1970)).

2018An Alford plea "was designed to permit a defendant to make a voluntary and intelligent decision to plead guilty to a crime without admitting participation in the underlying facts which constitute the crime." State v. Klawonn , 609 N.W.2d 515 , 520 (Iowa 2000) (citing North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160 , 167-68, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) ).

2026Before our supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, it was “well established that a defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (cleaned up); see also State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (following that rule to hold that defendant waived defenses to his conviction “by entering an Alford plea” since such a plea “is a variation of a guilty plea” with the same effect).

2026See State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (reasoning that inferior courts “are 7 This make sense since an Alford plea is merely “a variation of a guilty plea” and “[i]n effect, the pleas are the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” Burgess, 639 N.W.2d at 567 ; see also id. at 567 n.1 (“There is no material difference between the pleas, however, when a defendant intelligently concludes his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the State has overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”). 13 under a duty to follow

2017See Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014); Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d at 788 . 1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to maintain innocence while acknowledging that the State has enough evidence to win a conviction.

2017See State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 2014) (remanding to give the State an opportunity to establish a factual basis for separate acts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon). 1 When a defendant enters an Alford plea, she does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime.

2016“In an Alford plea, because the accused is denying his guilt, a factual basis must be established independent of his statements.” Farley v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Iowa 1979); see State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).

1998However, “in an Alford plea, because the accused is denying his guilt, a factual basis must be established independent of his statements.” Farley v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Iowa 1979).

2020Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 28 (Iowa 2012) (holding the preclusive effect of an Alford plea is limited to the elements of the offense, including the upper limit on the dollar value).

2020Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 28 (Iowa 2012) (holding the preclusive effect of an Alford plea is limited to the elements of the offense, including the upper limit on the dollar value).

2022“An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty to a crime without admitting to the underlying facts that establish the crime.” State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844 , 847 n.1 (Iowa 2011) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).

2018To the contrary, the supreme court has stated “there is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 521 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849–54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788–92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State v. Martin, 778 N.W.2d 201 , 203–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same); State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598 , 603–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same).

2021In exchange, the State dropped the four remaining charges. 1By entering an Alford plea, “the defendant acknowledges the evidence strongly negates the defendant’s claim of innocence and enters a [guilty] plea to avoid a harsher sentence.” Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sturgeon, 487 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Iowa 1992). 3 Pascual appeared in the district court in December 2019 to enter his plea for lascivious acts with a child and provided a written plea to the two aggravated misdemeanors.

2018See generally Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sturgeon, 487 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Iowa 1992) (“An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty without admitting the elements of the offense.

2023Specifically, he argues (1) the parties agreed to concurrent sentences, (2) had he known he would receive consecutive sentences, he might not have taken the Alford plea, and (3) the evidence against him was uncertain. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and [it] will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

2022He appeals the sentences he received.2 The parties agree that the sentences imposed were within statutory limits, so the sentences are “cloaked with a strong presumption in [their] favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06 (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)).

2021But unlike the typical plea where the accused admits guilt, under the practice approved in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), the accused may “voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” See State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974). 3 I.

2001See State v. Hansen, 221 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1974).

2015See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 62 (Iowa 2013) (“On a claim that a plea bargain is invalid because of a lack of accuracy on the factual basis issue, the entire record before the district court may be examined.”). 3 In identifying the issue or issues presented on appeal, Dixon claims the guilty plea or Alford plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered.

2014Finney, 834 N.W.2d at 62 . 1 An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea where the defendant does not admit participation in the acts constituting the crime but consents to the imposition of a sentence.

2020Nor does he admit that “another, higher crime was committed.” State v. Young, 292 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1980).

2017“If the court uses the commission of a higher crime to inflict severe punishment for the crime actually charged and admitted, that higher crime must be shown . . . by the facts before the court or the defendant’s admission.” Young, 292 N.W.2d at 436 ; see also United States v. Flores-Vasquez, 641 F.3d 667 , 671–72 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming sentence where sentencing court considered defendant’s agreement with government’s statement of facts); United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219, 227 (4th Cir. 2010) (vacating sentencing enhancement where sentencing court relied on defendant’s 8 Alford plea to

2020While minutes of testimony attached to a trial information can be used to establish a factual basis for a charge to which a defendant pleads guilty[,] “[t]he sentencing court should only consider those facts contained in the minutes that are admitted to or otherwise established as true.” State v. Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982)).

2017“We will set aside a sentence and remand a case to the district court for resentencing if the sentencing court relied upon charges of an unprosecuted offense that was neither admitted to by the defendant nor otherwise proved.” State v. Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Iowa 1982).

2020Meyer’s “guilty plea, notwithstanding its Alford character, precludes [her] from contending that [she is] not guilty of that offense.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Engelhardt, 630 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 2001).

2020Meyer’s “guilty plea, notwithstanding its Alford character, precludes [her] from contending that [she is] not guilty of that offense.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Engelhardt, 630 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 2001).

2019“The 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”). 2 The Alford plea was part of a plea agreement which also called for Monson to enter guilty pleas to charges of carrying weapons, possession of marijuana, and possession of methamphetamine in return for charging and sentencing concessions on the part of the State. 3 record does not need to show the totality

2018“The factual basis must be contained in the 6 record, and the record, as a whole, must disclose facts to satisfy all elements of the offense.” State v. Ortiz, 789 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Iowa 2010).

2019As to prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] errors, 4 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“An individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.”). 5 he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 196 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa 2006)).

2019He does not appeal his written Alford plea to operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, a serious misdemeanor. 3 defendant was bound by the rule requiring him to file a motion in arrest of judgment where judge advised him of the “alternate” “five days before sentencing” deadline); see also State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa 2006) (ruling that the court advising of the five-day limitation “conveyed the pertinent information and substantially complied with the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d)”).

2016“In an Alford plea, because the accused is denying his guilt, a factual basis must be established independent of his statements.” Farley v. Glanton, 280 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Iowa 1979); see State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).

1987See State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976) (factual basis may be determined from the minutes in an Alford plea); State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 729 (Iowa Ct.App.1983) (same).

2016McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir.2008).

2016McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008).

2000We first recognized the Alford plea in Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1971).

2000We first recognized the Alford plea in Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1971).

1999See generally State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976) (holding factual basis for an Alford plea may be determined from the minutes).

1999See generally State v. Townsend, 238 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Iowa 1976) (holding factual basis for an Alford plea may be determined from the minutes).

2019See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 3 going to trial.” State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2009).

2018In a pro se brief, Kudron argues (A) the State "never provided any substantive evidence that conceivably proved that [he] ever even committed a crime in the first place," and "Counsel failed to perform [an] essential duty" in failing to file a motion to dismiss based on "the absolute and utter lack of any evidence against" him; (B) the court "refused to hold a hearing [on his motion to withdraw counsel], therefore forcing [him] into a false Alford plea"; (C) he informed the court he had a claim in the Iowa Supreme Court that would have directly affected his district court case, yet the court s

2018See Alford , 400 U.S. at 38 (noting Alford's plea was valid because it was supported by a "factual basis" and because of "Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence"); State v. Klawonn , 609 N.W.2d 515 , 521 (Iowa 2000) ("[T]here is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea."); see also State v. Rodriguez , 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849-54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey , 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788-92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State

2018To the contrary, the supreme court has stated “there is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 521 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849–54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788–92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State v. Martin, 778 N.W.2d 201 , 203–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same); State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598 , 603–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same).

2018See Alford , 400 U.S. at 38 (noting Alford's plea was valid because it was supported by a "factual basis" and because of "Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in his innocence"); State v. Klawonn , 609 N.W.2d 515 , 521 (Iowa 2000) ("[T]here is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea."); see also State v. Rodriguez , 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849-54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey , 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788-92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State

2018To the contrary, the supreme court has stated “there is no material difference between a plea which includes an express admission of guilt and an Alford plea.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 521 ; see also State v. Rodriguez, 804 N.W.2d 844 , 849–54 (Iowa 2011) (analyzing a challenge to an Alford plea under a factual-basis framework); State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785 , 788–92 (Iowa 1999) (same); State v. Martin, 778 N.W.2d 201 , 203–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same); State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d 598 , 603–04 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (same).

2026The State did not argue that Roland failed to satisfy Schmidt’s “clear and convincing standard” for actual- innocence claims by showing that “no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant of the crimes for which the sentencing court found the applicant guilty in light of all the evidence.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797 .

2026But in Schmidt, the court “overrule[d] our cases that do not allow defendants to attack their pleas based on extrinsic grounds when they claim actual innocence” and held that a defendant’s “pleas do not preclude his actual-innocence claim merely because he pled guilty to charges.” Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 790 .

2026Before our supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, it was “well established that a defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (cleaned up); see also State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (following that rule to hold that defendant waived defenses to his conviction “by entering an Alford plea” since such a plea “is a variation of a guilty plea” with the same effect).

2026Before our supreme court’s decision in Schmidt, it was “well established that a defendant’s guilty plea waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea.” State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (cleaned up); see also State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (following that rule to hold that defendant waived defenses to his conviction “by entering an Alford plea” since such a plea “is a variation of a guilty plea” with the same effect).

2026See State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (reasoning that inferior courts “are 7 This make sense since an Alford plea is merely “a variation of a guilty plea” and “[i]n effect, the pleas are the same as the defendant is agreeing to the imposition of a criminal sentence for the crime charged.” Burgess, 639 N.W.2d at 567 ; see also id. at 567 n.1 (“There is no material difference between the pleas, however, when a defendant intelligently concludes his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the State has overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”). 13 under a duty to follow

2025State v. Abrahamson, 746 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 2008). 1 See State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] defendant enters an Alford plea by pleading guilty while still maintaining his innocence.”); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 2 We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because Page’s conditional plea agreement reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss, the adverse ruling now challenged, and success on that challenge could give Page “some relief.” See State v. Scullark, __ N.W.3d __, __, 2025 WL 1717213 , at *2 (Iowa 2025); State