Alford plea in North Carolina

2025David Lamont Alston (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon his Alford plea to second-degree murder for the shooting death of Nicholas Ellis.1 Defendant’s appellate counsel cannot “identify an issue with sufficient merit to support a meaningful argument on appeal.” After careful review, we affirm the trial 1 North Carolina v. Alford permits a trial court to accept a guilty plea whereby the defendant consents to sentencing by the trial court but does not admit his guilt. 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).

2025David Lamont Alston (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon his Alford plea to second-degree murder for the shooting death of Nicholas Ellis.1 Defendant’s appellate counsel cannot “identify an issue with sufficient merit to support a meaningful argument on appeal.” After careful review, we affirm the trial 1 North Carolina v. Alford permits a trial court to accept a guilty plea whereby the defendant consents to sentencing by the trial court but does not admit his guilt. 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).

2021App. 310, 314 , 691 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2010) (“[W]e hold that for purposes of our analysis in the instant case that there is no material difference between a no contest plea and an Alford plea.”); State v. Alston, 139 N.C.

2021App. 787, 792 , 534 S.E.2d 666, 669 (2000) (internal marks omitted) (“[A]n ‘Alford plea’ constitutes a guilty plea in the same way that a plea of nolo contendere or no contest is a guilty plea.”); Alford, 400 U.S. at 37 , STATE V.

2021App. 310, 314 , 691 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2010) (“[W]e hold that for purposes of our analysis in the instant case that there is no material difference between a no contest plea and an Alford plea.”); State v. Alston, 139 N.C.

2021CRAWFORD 2021-NCCOA-272 Opinion of the Court ¶ 13 Defendant argues because “he had entered an Alford plea, [Defendant] had never admitted that he was guilty.” ¶ 14 We have previously held “the fact that the plea that [a] defendant seeks to withdraw was a no contest or an Alford plea does not conclusively establish the factor of assertion of legal innocence for purposes of the Handy analysis.” Chery, 203 N.C.

2020Id. at 707 (citations omitted) . . . ; see generally Smith v. Com., 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.App.1995)) (“’[A]lthough an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’”).

2020Id. at 707 (citations omitted) . . . ; see generally Smith v. Com., 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.App.1995)) (“’[A]lthough an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’”).

2020Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Wis. 1998)). [A]n Alford plea is not the saving grace for defendants who wish to maintain their complete innocence.

2020By entering an Alford plea, respondent “agreed to be[ ] ‘treated as . . . guilty’ whether or not he admitted guilt.” Id. (second alteration in original).

2021Handy, 326 N.C. at 539 , 391 S.E.2d at 163 . ¶8 These factors were first enumerated in Handy, and have subsequently been applied by our appellate courts in determining whether the denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw an Alford plea was proper.

2021Handy, 326 N.C. at 539 , 391 S.E.2d at 163 . ¶8 These factors were first enumerated in Handy, and have subsequently been applied by our appellate courts in determining whether the denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw an Alford plea was proper.

2021Such information “must appear in the record, so that an appellate court can determine whether the plea has been properly accepted.” Id. at 198 , 270 S.E.2d at 421 . ¶ 34 Defendant argues the trial court erred in accepting his Alford plea because “there was nothing of record presented to the trial court to allow the [trial] court to make an independent judicial determination as to whether there was a factual basis for [Defendant’s] plea.” The State argues the Transcript of Plea, the indictments, and the transcript of testimony from Defendant’s mistrial provide a sufficient factual basis for us

2021Such information “must appear in the record, so that an appellate court can determine whether the plea has been properly accepted.” Id. at 198 , 270 S.E.2d at 421 . ¶ 34 Defendant argues the trial court erred in accepting his Alford plea because “there was nothing of record presented to the trial court to allow the [trial] court to make an independent judicial determination as to whether there was a factual basis for [Defendant’s] plea.” The State argues the Transcript of Plea, the indictments, and the transcript of testimony from Defendant’s mistrial provide a sufficient factual basis for us

2021See State v. Mackey, 209 N.C.

2021See State v. Mackey, 209 N.C.

2021Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶ 21 Defendant argues he “did not believe that he had competent counsel throughout the proceedings. [Defendant] even asked Judge Phillips whether he could fire his attorney during the sentencing hearing.” ¶ 22 In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 118 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135 (2011) (internal marks omitted), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1204 , 182 L.

2021Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶ 21 Defendant argues he “did not believe that he had competent counsel throughout the proceedings. [Defendant] even asked Judge Phillips whether he could fire his attorney during the sentencing hearing.” ¶ 22 In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 118 , 711 S.E.2d 122, 135 (2011) (internal marks omitted), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1204 , 182 L.

2020Id. at 707 (citations omitted) . . . ; see generally Smith v. Com., 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.App.1995)) (“’[A]lthough an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’”).

2020Id. at 707 (citations omitted) . . . ; see generally Smith v. Com., 27 Va.App. 357 , 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94 , 896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct.App.1995)) (“’[A]lthough an Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions . . . [but the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, including [the] defendant’s lack of remorse.’”).

2019App. ___, ___, 818 S.E.2d 381 , 387 n.1 (2018) (recognizing that “an Alford plea [is] when the defendant pleads guilty without an admission of guilt”); State v. Salvetti, 202 N.C.

2019App. ----, ----, 818 S.E.2d 381 , 387 n.1 (2018) (recognizing that "an Alford plea [is] when the defendant pleads guilty without an admission of guilt"); State v. Salvetti , 202 N.C.

2021If an appellate court determines an IAC claim has been improperly asserted on direct appeal, “it shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent [motion for appropriate relief] proceeding.” Id. at 167 , 557 S.E.2d at 525. ¶ 24 Here, Defendant argues he had incompetent counsel and the trial court erred by “summarily den[ying] [Defendant’s] motion [to withdraw his Alford plea] without . . . giving [Defendant] the opportunity to address his concerns.” Based on the cold Record before us, we are unable to adequately assess Defendant’s IAC c

2021If an appellate court determines an IAC claim has been improperly asserted on direct appeal, “it shall dismiss those claims without prejudice to the defendant’s right to reassert them during a subsequent [motion for appropriate relief] proceeding.” Id. at 167 , 557 S.E.2d at 525. ¶ 24 Here, Defendant argues he had incompetent counsel and the trial court erred by “summarily den[ying] [Defendant’s] motion [to withdraw his Alford plea] without . . . giving [Defendant] the opportunity to address his concerns.” Based on the cold Record before us, we are unable to adequately assess Defendant’s IAC c

2026App. 351 , 352, 870 S.E.2d 148 , 149 (2022); see also State v. Branch, 194 N.C.

2026Rather, we review the Record to determine if the defendant “made [a] concrete assertion of innocence[.]” State v. Graham, 122 N.C.

2024On 3 March 2020, defendant personally pled guilty at a plea hearing, and he did not couch his guilt as an “Alford plea” pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), or as a no-contest plea.1 When the trial court asked 1 See generally State v. Taylor, 374 N.C. 710 , 719 n.3, 843 S.E.2d 46 , 52 n.3 (2020) (“An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea recognized by North Carolina’s General Court of Justice in which a criminal defendant accepts that the State has sufficient evidence to convict him, but the defendant does not actually admit his guilt.”); State v. Norman, 27

2024On 3 March 2020, defendant personally pled guilty at a plea hearing, and he did not couch his guilt as an “Alford plea” pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), or as a no-contest plea.1 When the trial court asked 1 See generally State v. Taylor, 374 N.C. 710 , 719 n.3, 843 S.E.2d 46 , 52 n.3 (2020) (“An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea recognized by North Carolina’s General Court of Justice in which a criminal defendant accepts that the State has sufficient evidence to convict him, but the defendant does not actually admit his guilt.”); State v. Norman, 27

2020State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 372 , 334 S.E.2d 53, 61 (1985).

2020State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 372 , 334 S.E.2d 53, 61 (1985).

2019See State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 149 , 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980) (“The State may withdraw from a plea bargain arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the 5 My research failed to uncover the phrase “Alford plea” occurring anywhere in the text of our General Statutes. -4- STATE.

2019See State v. Collins, 300 N.C. 142, 149 , 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1980) (“The State may withdraw from a plea bargain arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the 5 My research failed to uncover the phrase “Alford plea” occurring anywhere in the text of our General Statutes. -4- STATE.

2019See , e.g. , State v. Ross , 369 N.C. 393 , 395, 794 S.E.2d 289 , 290 (2016) (stating that the "[d]efendant entered an Alford plea of guilty"); State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 705, 766 S.E.2d 289 , 291 (2014) ("Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty[.]"); State v. Baskins , --- N.C.

2019See , e.g. , State v. Ross , 369 N.C. 393 , 395, 794 S.E.2d 289 , 290 (2016) (stating that the "[d]efendant entered an Alford plea of guilty"); State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 705, 766 S.E.2d 289 , 291 (2014) ("Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty[.]"); State v. Baskins , --- N.C.

2019See , e.g. , State v. Ross , 369 N.C. 393 , 395, 794 S.E.2d 289 , 290 (2016) (stating that the "[d]efendant entered an Alford plea of guilty"); State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 705, 766 S.E.2d 289 , 291 (2014) ("Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty[.]"); State v. Baskins , --- N.C.

2019See , e.g. , State v. Ross , 369 N.C. 393 , 395, 794 S.E.2d 289 , 290 (2016) (stating that the "[d]efendant entered an Alford plea of guilty"); State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 705, 766 S.E.2d 289 , 291 (2014) ("Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty[.]"); State v. Baskins , --- N.C.