38 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1928–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Terrygreen2 sentences2026Ct. Oct. 18, 2021) (“With respect to the Rule 9(b) standard, because the Chapter 75 claim is premised on deceptive conduct, the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies.”); cf. Value Health Sols., Inc., 2019 NCBC LEXIS 70 , at *27 (“In pleading actual fraud, the particularity requirement is met by alleging time, place, and content of the fraudulent representation, identity of the person making the representation and what was obtained as a result of the fraudulent acts or representations.” (quoting Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 85 (1981) (emphasis added))); Hale v. MacLeod, 294 N.C. 2022Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(b); see Terry v. Terry, 302 N.C. 77, 84 (1981) (“[A]llegations of fraud must be pleaded with greater particularity[.]”). | 3 | 3 |
Ragsdale v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2012App. 777, 782 , 561 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2002) (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138 , 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)). {31} Claims of fraud are held to a heightened pleading standard pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 2012App. 777, 782 , 561 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2002) (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138 , 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)). {31} Claims of fraud are held to a heightened pleading standard pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. | 2 | 2 |
Harrold v. Dowdgreen2 sentences2012App. 777, 782 , 561 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2002) (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138 , 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)). {31} Claims of fraud are held to a heightened pleading standard pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. 2012App. 777, 782 , 561 S.E.2d 914, 918 (2002) (citing Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138 , 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974)). {25} Claims of fraud are held to a heightened pleading standard pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. | 2 | 2 |
Kentallen, Inc. v. Town of Hillsboroughgreen2 sentences2007App. at 770 , 431 S.E.2d at 233 (holding that “[the petitioner’s] allegation that it is the ‘owner of adjoining property’ does not satisfy the pleading requirement^]”). 2007App. at 770, 431 S.E.2d at 233 (holding that petitioner’s allegation that it is the “owner of adjoining property” does not satisfy the pleading requirement). | 2 | 2 |
Topshelf Management, Inc. v. Campbell-Ewald Co.green1 sentence2026Ct. Oct. 18, 2021) (“With respect to the Rule 9(b) standard, because the Chapter 75 claim is premised on deceptive conduct, the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) applies.”); see also Topshelf Mgmt., Inc. v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 117 F. Supp. 3d 722, 731 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“Rule 9(b) applies to [UDTPA] claims alleging detrimental reliance on false or deceptive representations.”). | 1 | 1 |
Dealers Supply Co., Inc. v. Cheil Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2023A claim of negligent misrepresentation is “closely akin to fraud, differing primarily in the requisite state of mind of the purported actor.” Dealers Supply Co., Inc. v. Cheil Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 579, 590 (2004) (citing Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189 , 202 n.14 (M.D.N.C. 1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Loftin v. Loftingreen1 sentence2021See Rule 9(b) (establishing the pleading standard rather than evidentiary standard for fraud claims); In re Estate of Loftin, 21 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Plasman v. Decca Furniture (Usa), Inc.green1 sentence2020App. 684, 689 , 811 S.E.2d 616, 621 (2018) (noting that North Carolina is a “notice pleading” state), a lower pleading standard than the plausibility standard used by the federal courts, see Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2020App. 274 , 286, 777 S.E.2d 314, 323 (2015) (“[T]he higher federal plausibility pleading standard differs from [North Carolina’s] notice pleading standard[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
Daphne Craddock v. Lincoln National Life Insurancgreen1 sentence2020See Craddock, 533 F. App’x at 335–36 (reversing district court, which dismissed ADEA claim because the allegations affirmatively showed that the plaintiff was not meeting her employer’s expectations, because the prima facie elements of an ADEA claim are “not a pleading requirement”); Blakney v. N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc.green2 sentences2018See Watts , 317 N.C. at 115-16 , 343 S.E.2d at 884 (citations omitted). 2018See Watts , 317 N.C. at 115-16 , 343 S.E.2d at 884 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Fabrikant v. Currituck Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
Carrington v. Browngreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., Carrington v. Brown, 136 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Can Am South, LLC v. State, North Carolina Department of Health & Human Servicesgreen2 sentences2017However, we need not resolve this issue because even assuming-without deciding-that such a pleading requirement existed, Plaintiffs met that burden in paragraph 89 of their amended complaint by alleging that "Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity...." While Defendants argue that the waiver language contained in this paragraph was legally insufficient because it failed to plead with specificity a recognized exception to sovereign immunity, we have previously held that "precise language alleging that the State has waived the defense of sovereign immunity is not necessary, but, rather 2017However, we need not resolve this issue because even assuming-without deciding-that such a pleading requirement existed, Plaintiffs met that burden in paragraph 89 of their amended complaint by alleging that "Defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity...." While Defendants argue that the waiver language contained in this paragraph was legally insufficient because it failed to plead with specificity a recognized exception to sovereign immunity, we have previously held that "precise language alleging that the State has waived the defense of sovereign immunity is not necessary, but, rather | 1 | 1 |
| Ashcroft v. Iqbalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons' Farms, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Helms v. Hollandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peterkin v. Columbus County Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
CommScope Credit Union v. Butler & Burke, LLP
green
2 sentences2022CommScope, 369 N.C. at 51 ; Burton, 259 N.C. at 476–77. 2022CommScope, 369 N.C. at 51 ; Burton, 259 N.C. at 476–77. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Burton v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2022CommScope, 369 N.C. at 51 ; Burton, 259 N.C. at 476–77. 2022CommScope, 369 N.C. at 51 ; Burton, 259 N.C. at 476–77. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Moore v. Proper
green
2 sentences2020Moore, 366 N.C. at 32 , 726 S.E.2d at 817 . 2020Moore, 366 N.C. at 32 , 726 S.E.2d at 817 . | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences2018In Washburn v. Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust , our Court of Appeals quoted language from VisionAIR, Inc. v. James to establish a pleading standard now propounded by the majority of this Court: " 'a plaintiff must identify a trade secret with sufficient particularity so as to enable a defendant to delineate that which he is accused of misappropriating,' " *554 Washburn , 190 N.C. 2015Ct. Dec. 9, 2014), www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2014_NCBC_65.pdf (holding plaintiff’s trade secret identification sufficient under Rule 12(b)(6) but not for discovery of defendant’s trade secrets). {19} The allegations in DSM’s Amended Complaint, while not sufficiently particular to permit reciprocal discovery, are nonetheless more detailed and specific, and less sweeping and conclusory, than those allegations our courts have found to fail the pleading standard of Rule 12, see, e.g., Washburn, 190 N.C. | 2 | 2015–2018 |
Fisher v. . Trust Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. 1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. | 2 | 1928–1932 |
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Floyd
green
2 sentences1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. 1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. | 2 | 1928–1932 |
Bedsole v. . Monroe
green
2 sentences1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. 1928Cotton Mills v. Maslin, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C. 455 , 74 S. E. 465 . *719 In Young v. Young, 81 N. C., 92 , it was held (as stated in the first headnote) : “Where a general right is claimed arising out of a series of transactions tending to one end, the plaintiff may join several causes of action against defendants who have distinct and separate interests, in order to a conclusion o | 2 | 1928–1932 |
Oyster v. Mining Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. 1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. | 2 | 1928–1932 |
Hawk v. . Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. 1932Cotton Mills v. Masline, ante, 12; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C., 313 ; Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C., 224 , 50 S. E., 659 ; Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C., 135 , 52 S. E., 198 ; Hawk v. Lumber Co., 145 N. C., 47 , 58 S. E., 603 ; Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C., 455 , 74 S. E., 465 .” Chapter 344, Public Laws 1931, “An act to amend the Code of Civil Procedure as to joinder of parties.” It amends C. | 2 | 1928–1932 |
Weaver v. Saint Joseph of the Pines, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Weaver v. Saint Joseph of the Pines, Inc., 187 N.C. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Breeden v. Richmond Community College
green
1 sentence2023A claim of negligent misrepresentation is “closely akin to fraud, differing primarily in the requisite state of mind of the purported actor.” Dealers Supply Co., Inc. v. Cheil Indus., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 579, 590 (2004) (citing Breeden v. Richmond Cmty. Coll., 171 F.R.D. 189 , 202 n.14 (M.D.N.C. 1997)). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Greer
green
2 sentences2018The official commentary accompanying N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 states in part: "The pleading rule, requiring factual (but not evidentiary) allegations to support each element, is in accord with our traditional ideas and provides a concise statutory statement." N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 official cmt. (citing Greer , 238 N.C. 325 , 77 S.E.2d 917 ). 2018The official commentary accompanying N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 states in part: "The pleading rule, requiring factual (but not evidentiary) allegations to support each element, is in accord with our traditional ideas and provides a concise statutory statement." N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 official cmt. (citing Greer , 238 N.C. 325 , 77 S.E.2d 917 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Visionair, Inc. v. James & Colossus Inc.
green
2 sentences2018App. at 511 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 ). **619 There are two problems with relying on this language from Washburn to establish a pleading standard: (1) this language from VisionAIR is dicta because VisionAIR evaluated the merits of the misappropriation of trade secrets claim for the purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction, see VisionAIR , 167 N.C. 2018App. at 511 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 ). **619 There are two problems with relying on this language from Washburn to establish a pleading standard: (1) this language from VisionAIR is dicta because VisionAIR evaluated the merits of the misappropriation of trade secrets claim for the purposes of issuing a preliminary injunction, see VisionAIR , 167 N.C. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Simon v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
green
1 sentence2018Co. , 849 F.Supp. 880 , 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski
green
2 sentences2018App. at 510-11 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 , and (2) this language from VisionAIR quotes another preliminary injunction case for this proposition, see id. at 511 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalksi, 157 N.C. 2018App. at 510 -11 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 , and (2) this language from VisionAIR quotes another preliminary injunction case for this proposition, see id. at 511 , 606 S.E.2d at 364 (citing Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski , 157 N.C. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence2017App. 441 , 442, 432 S.E.2d 376 , 377 (1993), in which the defendant successfully filed a "motion to strike the surplus language" from an indictment that violated the separate pleading requirement set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-928, and Stephens , 188 N.C. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2017App. 441 , 442, 432 S.E.2d 376 , 377 (1993), in which the defendant successfully filed a "motion to strike the surplus language" from an indictment that violated the separate pleading requirement set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-928, and Stephens , 188 N.C. 2017App. at 288 , 293 , 655 S.E.2d at 437 , 440 , in which the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to allow the State to amend an indictment in order to ensure compliance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-928 by separating the substantive allegations from the allegations concerning the defendant's prior convictions. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| West v. J.O. Stevenson, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hunter v. Spaulding green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Hoots v. Pryor green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Burgess v. Busby neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Burgess v. Busby green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Grover green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Songwooyarn Trading Co. v. Sox Eleven, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| REDEVELOPMENT COM'N OF CITY OF WASHINGTON v. Grimes green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Stanback v. Stanback green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Fox v. City of Greensboro green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Trapp v. Maccioli neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Regan v. AMERIMARK BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Thigpen v. Ngo green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Trapp v. MacCioli green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Sheldon P. KOTTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTHWEST KIDNEY CENTERS, Defendant-Appellee green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Allen green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Florasynth Laboratories, Inc. v. Goldberg green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Sample v. John L. Roper Lumber Co. green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Blackmore v. . Winders neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Scales v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Young v. . Young neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.