pleading standard in New Mexico

2024Although Cordova decided to impose a heightened pleading standard “in 3 furtherance of the policy upon which the Anti-SLAPP statute is based,” Cordova did not equate eligibility for Noerr-Pennington immunity with eligibility for the procedural protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute. 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 30 .

2024The district court concluded that The New Mexican was required to 15 meet the heightened pleading standard imposed by Cordova, 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 30 , 16 on claims challenging conduct protected by the First Amendment right to petition. 17 Further concluding that The New Mexican failed to meet Cordova’s heightened 18 pleading standard, the district court granted PNM’s motion for judgment on the 19 pleadings and dismissed The New Mexican’s counterclaims. 1 {3} Cordova’s heightened pleading standard is premised on the Noerr-Pennington 2 doctrine, a body of federal law developed from the United Stat

2025Roberts, 707 F.3d at 1018 (“If the government is allowed to contend at the conclusion of a case that a relator’s initial allegations were insufficient, even though the government implicitly acknowledged the legal sufficiency of the pleadings by choosing to intervene, the relator no longer has the opportunity to cure the deficiency.

2025Second, the dissent observed the discontinuity in using a pleading standard that tests the sufficiency of a complaint at the initiation of an action to determine an award at its conclusion and “warned of the perverse incentive for the government [to use Bledsoe] to strip qui tam plaintiffs of earned proceeds.” Id. (citing Roberts v. Accenture, LLP, 707 F.3d 1011, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 2013)).

2025Chief among those is the 11 twofold explanation that a heightened pleading standard “afford[s a] defendant fair 12 notice of the plaintiff’s claim and . . . safeguards [the] defendant’s reputation and 13 goodwill from improvident charges of wrongdoing.” Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819 , 14 823 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

2025Chief among those is the twofold explanation that a heightened pleading standard “afford[s a] defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and . . . safeguards [the] defendant’s reputation and goodwill from improvident charges of wrongdoing.” Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

2024Ct. In & For Cty. of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361 , 1368-69 18 1 (Colo. 1984) (en banc), that the plaintiffs challenging conduct shielded by Noerr- 2 Pennington should meet a heightened pleading standard.

2024Ct. In & For Cty. of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1368-69 (Colo. 1984) (en banc), that the plaintiffs challenging conduct shielded by Noerr-Pennington should meet a heightened pleading standard.

2024See Measday v. Sweazea, 1968-NMCA-008 , ¶¶ 10-11, 78 N.M. 781 , 438 P.2d 525 (explaining that an illegal contract “require[s] the violation of any law”).

2024See Measday v. Sweazea, 1968-NMCA-008 , ¶¶ 10-11, 78 N.M. 781 , 438 P.2d 525 (explaining that an illegal contract “require[s] the violation of any law”).

2022See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (“The presumption upon review favors the correctness of the [district] court’s actions.”); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70 , 309 P.3d 53 (“[The appellate courts] require[] that the parties adequately brief all appellate issues to include an argument, the standard of review, and citations to authorities for each issue presented.

2022See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100 , ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6 , 800 P.2d 1063 (“The presumption upon review favors the correctness of the [district] court’s actions.”); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70 , 309 P.3d 53 (“[The appellate courts] require[] that the parties adequately brief all appellate issues to include an argument, the standard of review, and citations to authorities for each issue presented.

2015Salazar I, 2005-NMCA-127, ¶¶ 36, 37 (Pickard, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2015Salazar I, 2005-NMCA-127, ¶ 38 (Pickard, J., specially concurring), Our Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of “whether and when a worker can receive benefits under the Act without compromising a potential intentional tort action under Delgado.” Salazar II, 2007-NMSC-019, ¶ 4 .

2015See Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002) (expressing concern that “the background circumstances prong, only required of reverse discrimination plaintiffs, may impermissibly impose a heightened pleading standard on majority victims of discrimination” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins.

2015Salazar I, 2005-NMCA-127, ¶ 38 (Pickard, J., specially concurring), Our Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of “whether and when a worker can receive benefits under the Act without compromising a potential intentional tort action under Delgado.” Salazar II, 2007-NMSC-019, ¶ 4 .

2015Salazar II, 2007-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 4, 30 .

2012However, this does not mean that the complaint must use words such as “fraud” or “fraudulent” to meet the pleading requirement so long as “the facts alleged are such as constitute fraud in themselves, or are facts from which fraud will be necessarily implied.” Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 359 , 492 P.2d 140, 141 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2012However, this does not mean that the complaint must use words such as “fraud” or “fraudulent” to meet the pleading requirement so long as “the facts alleged are such as constitute fraud in themselves, or are facts from which fraud will be necessarily implied.” Romero v. Sanchez, 83 N.M. 358, 359 , 492 P.2d 140, 141 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2005See, e.g., Rule 1-009(B) (“In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”). {16} We also note that Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 606 , relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 67 (1982), which states that the test employed in assessing whether a meritorious defense has been asserted is “essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment.” Id. cmt. e. In New Mexico, summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2002Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 , 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998); and see Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 912-13 (10th Cir.2001) (repudiating the heightened pleading requirement formerly applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to cases involving allegations of malice where qualified immunity is claimed).

2002See Sanchez v. City of Belen, 98 N.M. 57, 60 , 644 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ct.App. 1982) ("New Mexico adheres to the broad purpose of the rules of pleading and construes them liberally.

2002See Sanchez v. City of Belen, 98 N.M. 57, 60 , 644 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ct.App. 1982) ("New Mexico adheres to the broad purpose of the rules of pleading and construes them liberally.