pleading standard (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
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pleading standard in Rhode Island

12 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc.green
okwd · 1977 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Corp. , 764 A.2d at 161-62 (explaining that the serious nature of claims grounded in fraud justifies a heightened pleading standard); see also Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 76 F.R.D. 83 , 84 (W.D.

2011Corp. , 764 A.2d at 161-62 (explaining that the serious nature of claims grounded in fraud justifies a heightened pleading standard); see also Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 76 F.R.D. 83 , 84 (W.D.

22
Elgar v. National Continental/Progressive Insurancegreen
ri · 2004 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2006–2011
2 sentences

2011Rule 12(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure], and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.” Accordingly, because the trial justice did not exclude matters o

2006See Rule 12(b) (“If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 * * *.”); Elgar v. National Continental/Progressive Insurance Co., 849 A.2d 324, 326 (R.I.2004); Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721, 726 (R.I.2003).

22
Women's Development Corp. v. City of Central Fallsgreen
ri · 2001 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Corp. , 764 A.2d at 161-62 (explaining that the serious nature of claims grounded in fraud justifies a heightened pleading standard); see also Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 76 F.R.D. 83 , 84 (W.D.

2011Corp. , 764 A.2d at 161-62 (explaining that the serious nature of claims grounded in fraud justifies a heightened pleading standard); see also Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc. , 76 F.R.D. 83 , 84 (W.D.

22
Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLPgreen
ri · 2003 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2006–2011
2 sentences

2011Rule 12(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 [of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure], and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.” Accordingly, because the trial justice did not exclude matters o

2006See Rule 12(b) (“If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 * * *.”); Elgar v. National Continental/Progressive Insurance Co., 849 A.2d 324, 326 (R.I.2004); Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721, 726 (R.I.2003).

22
Cipolla v. RI COLLEGE, BD. OF GOVERNORSgreen
ri · 1999 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010See Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure ("If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."); Cipolla v. Rhode Island College , 742 A.2d 277 , 280 (R.I. 1999) ("A motion to dismiss must be made strictly on the pleadings, and under Rule 12(c), a motion to dismiss that relies on facts outside the pleadings must be treated as a Rule

11
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblygreen
scotus · 2007 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008Under Twombly , therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Twombly , 127 S. Ct. at 1967-69 (effectively disavowing the holding of Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41 , 45-46 (1957)).

2008Brown v. Sweeney , 526 F. Supp 2d 126 (Mass. 2007) citing Twombly , 127 S. Ct. at 1966 .

11
Hall v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen
ri · 1999 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006See Rule 15(c); Hall v. Insurance Company of North America, 727 A.2d 667, 669 (R.I.1999).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Conley v. Gibson red
scotus · 1957
2 sentences

2008Under Twombly , therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "a plausible entitlement to relief." Twombly , 127 S. Ct. at 1967-69 (effectively disavowing the holding of Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41 , 45-46 (1957)).

2006In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 , 512 (2002), the Court emphasized its preference for liberal pleading standards in explaining, "the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases." The Court continued, "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 47-48 (1957); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Inte

22006–2008
Konar v. PFL Life Insurance green
ri · 2004
2 sentences

2008Co. , 840 A.2d 1115 , 1118 (R.I. 2004).

2004When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, the party shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.” This Court utilizes a liberal pleading rule, and “has recognized the sufficiency of complaints even when the claims asserted within those complaints lack specificity.” Konar v. PFL Life Insurance Co., 840 A.2d 1115, 1118 .

22004–2008
Richard C. Powers v. Boston Cooper Corporation green
ca1 · 1991
1 sentence

2011Indeed, where the allegations of a complaint contain averments of fraud or mistake, courts have followed Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirements. 6 See Powers v. Boston Cooper Corp. , 926 F.2d 109 , 111 (1st Cir. 1991).

12011–2011
Palazzo v. Alves green
ri · 2008
1 sentence

2011"The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." Palazzo v. Alves , 944 A.2d 144 , 149 (R.I. 2008) (quoting R.I.

12011–2011
Ludwig v. Kowal green
ri · 1980
1 sentence

2010See Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure ("If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."); Cipolla v. Rhode Island College , 742 A.2d 277 , 280 (R.I. 1999) ("A motion to dismiss must be made strictly on the pleadings, and under Rule 12(c), a motion to dismiss that relies on facts outside the pleadings must be treated as a Rule

12010–2010
Palmisciano v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n green
ri · 1992
1 sentence

2010See Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure ("If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."); Cipolla v. Rhode Island College , 742 A.2d 277 , 280 (R.I. 1999) ("A motion to dismiss must be made strictly on the pleadings, and under Rule 12(c), a motion to dismiss that relies on facts outside the pleadings must be treated as a Rule

12010–2010
Steinberg v. State green
ri · 1981
1 sentence

2010See Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure ("If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."); Cipolla v. Rhode Island College , 742 A.2d 277 , 280 (R.I. 1999) ("A motion to dismiss must be made strictly on the pleadings, and under Rule 12(c), a motion to dismiss that relies on facts outside the pleadings must be treated as a Rule

12010–2010
Ashcroft v. Iqbal green
scotus · 2009
2 sentences

2009With respect to the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss, the United States Supreme Court elaborated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 , 1950 (2009), on the pleading standard it articulated in Twombly , utilizing a two-pronged approach for analyzing a motion to dismiss.

2009First, noted the Ashcroft Court , a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," but "when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, *Page 5 a court should assume their veracity." Ashcroft , 129 S. Ct. at 1950 .

12009–2009
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit green
scotus · 1993
1 sentence

2006In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 , 512 (2002), the Court emphasized its preference for liberal pleading standards in explaining, "the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases." The Court continued, "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 47-48 (1957); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Inte

12006–2006
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2006In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 , 512 (2002), the Court emphasized its preference for liberal pleading standards in explaining, "the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases." The Court continued, "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 47-48 (1957); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Inte

2006In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 , 512 (2002), the Court emphasized its preference for liberal pleading standards in explaining, "the prima facie case operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases." The Court continued, "[t]his simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims." Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 47-48 (1957); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Inte

12006–2006
Haley v. Town of Lincoln green
ri · 1992
2 sentences

1996Our holding in Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845 , 850 n. 1 (R.I.1992), is applicable both to motions for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) and to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

1996NOTES [1] Rule 12(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part: "If on a motion [under 12(b)(6)] to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." [2] Our holding in Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845 , 850 n. 1 (R.I.1992), is applicable both to motions for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) and to motions to dismiss for failure to

11996–1996

Where else courts name it

TX 293 (1916–2026) NY 219 (1927–2026) CA 200 (1899–2026) IL 144 (1878–2026) DE 97 (1982–2026) FL 69 (1963–2025) OH 61 (1989–2026) GA 61 (1972–2025) MI 51 (1974–2025) CT 42 (1921–2023) MO 39 (1911–2022) ID 39 (1924–2025) NC 38 (1928–2026) PA 36 (1930–2025) TN 33 (1995–2022) WV 33 (1963–2025) OR 33 (1922–2026) MA 32 (1952–2021) AL 32 (1909–2025) WI 31 (1979–2026) DC 29 (1946–2024) VA 28 (1987–2025) IN 27 (1891–2025) ME 26 (1977–2024) MD 25 (1988–2022) NJ 25 (1951–2026) KS 23 (1931–2026) OK 23 (1927–2019) IA 23 (1909–2026) UT 22 (1991–2025) CO 20 (1907–2026) AZ 19 (1951–2022) NM 19 (2002–2025) WA 18 (1927–2019) NV 18 (2011–2025) NE 17 (1884–2025) VT 16 (2008–2026) MN 16 (1982–2025) RI 12 (1996–2011) HI 12 (1978–2023) VI 11 (2008–2025) LA 11 (1933–2022) AK 11 (1962–2018) KY 10 (1920–2026) WY 10 (1956–2016) MS 9 (1984–2017) MT 7 (1944–2010) AR 7 (1985–2023) SC 7 (2009–2025) ND 3 (1966–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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