23 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Breidenbach v. Bolishgreen2 sentences2002Here, the trial court applied the heightened pleading standard of Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997), and found the petition did not allege a violation of a clearly defined constitutional right. 2001McCormick correctly asserted at oral argument that the Tenth Circuit decision in Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), nullified the heightened pleading standard used previously in Tenth Circuit federal courts under Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). | 2 | 2 |
Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Kan.green2 sentences2002The heightened pleading standard requires the complaint/petition to contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.” McCormick, 272 Kan. at 637 (quoting Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Kan., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232-33 [D. 2001The United States District Court for the District of Kansas said: “‘In die context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, . . . the qualified immunity defense is limited to the pleadings,’ and ‘the allegations in the complaint and any reasonable inferences . . . from them’ are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. [Citation omitted.] In this context, die court applies ‘a heightened pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow die district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions take were not ob | 1 | 2 |
Beck v. Kansas Adult Authoritygreen2 sentences1995See Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 24-29 , 735 P.2d 222 (1987); Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. 1995See Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 24-29 , 735 P.2d 222 (1987); Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. | 1 | 2 |
Rinsley v. Frydmangreen2 sentences2026See Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 301-03 , 559 P.2d 334 (1977) (explaining that the Schulze holding was about requiring the defendant to file a motion for a more definite statement to rectify insufficient pleadings); see also K.S.A. 60-209(j) (detailing the Kansas pleading requirements for libel and slander—a person may "allege generally that defamatory matter was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff, and if that allegation is not denied in the answer, it need not be proved at trial"). 2026See Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 301-03 , 559 P.2d 334 (1977) (explaining that the Schulze holding was about requiring the defendant to file a motion for a more definite statement to rectify insufficient pleadings); see also K.S.A. 60-209(j) (detailing the Kansas pleading requirements for libel and slander—a person may "allege generally that defamatory matter was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff, and if that allegation is not denied in the answer, it need not be proved at trial"). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigationgreen1 sentence2022Because the gravamen of the KCPA claims were "based on fraudulent concealment," the Thompson court applied the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) to the plaintiff's KCPA claims. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 932 ; see also In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1150 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc.green1 sentence2022Kan. 2003) (KCPA claims for deceptive trade practices must "'set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.'") (quoting Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F. 3d 1246, 1252 [10th Cir. 1997]). | 1 | 1 |
Frith v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2022Co. of America, 9 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 [S.D. | 1 | 1 |
David Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.green1 sentence2022The federal district court disagreed, finding the "three general purposes" for pleading with particularity were applicable in the case: 16 "The Court notes there are three general purposes for the heightened pleading requirement in Rule 9(b): 'to enable defendants to prepare meaningful responses, to preclude the use of a groundless fraud claim as a pretext to discover a wrong, and to safeguard defendants from lightly made charges which might damage their reputations.' In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 263-264 ([W.D.] Okla. 1983); see Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co | 1 | 1 |
In Re Longhorn Securities Litigationgreen1 sentence2022The federal district court disagreed, finding the "three general purposes" for pleading with particularity were applicable in the case: 16 "The Court notes there are three general purposes for the heightened pleading requirement in Rule 9(b): 'to enable defendants to prepare meaningful responses, to preclude the use of a groundless fraud claim as a pretext to discover a wrong, and to safeguard defendants from lightly made charges which might damage their reputations.' In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 263-264 ([W.D.] Okla. 1983); see Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc.green2 sentences2022The Thompson court found further support for a heightened pleading standard based on precedent: "'Although the language of Rule 9(b) confines its requirements to claims of . . . fraud, the requirements of the rule apply to all cases where the gravamen of the claim is fraud even though the theory supporting the claim is not technically termed fraud.'" 505 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (quoting Frith v. Guardian Life Ins. 2022Because the gravamen of the KCPA claims were "based on fraudulent concealment," the Thompson court applied the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) to the plaintiff's KCPA claims. 505 F. Supp. 2d at 932 ; see also In re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1150 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Grohgreen2 sentences2002See Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 430 , 7 P.3d 1163 (2000). 2002See Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 430 , 7 P.3d 1163 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Currier v. Dorangreen1 sentence2001McCormick correctly asserted at oral argument that the Tenth Circuit decision in Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), nullified the heightened pleading standard used previously in Tenth Circuit federal courts under Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 101green2 sentences1981See Collier v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 101, 228 Kan. 52 , Syl. ¶ 1, 612 P.2d 150 (1980). 1981See Collier v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 101, 228 Kan. 52 , Syl. ¶ 1, 612 P.2d 150 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Edmonds v. Union Pacific Railroadgreen1 sentence1978K.S.A. 60-212(h) provides: “If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256 . . . .” *615 See also Edmonds v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 294 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hamlin v. Kansas Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2020This court has held the pleading requirement for KJRA actions only requires facts demonstrating a right to review; the petition need not include "legal arguments or statutory citations." Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 404 , 204 P.3d 562 (2009). 2020This court has held the pleading requirement for KJRA actions only requires facts demonstrating a right to review; the petition need not include "legal arguments or statutory citations." Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 404 , 204 P.3d 562 (2009). | 2 | 2009–2020 |
Bruch v. Kansas Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2009In Bruch , we indicated that this pleading requirement serves two purposes: (1) It puts the district court and administrative agency on notice as to what issues will be reviewed, and (2) it assures that only issues that were raised at the administrative hearing will be considered on appeal. 282 Kan. at 783 . 2008Moreover, an opposing party is entitled to know the exact nature of the claimed errors, and each error must be separately and distinctly stated so an opponent can adequately prepare and respond to the issues being reviewed. [Citation omitted.]’ ” 282 Kan. at 780 (quoting Kohorst, 348 N.W.2d at 621 ). | 2 | 2008–2009 |
Bruner v. State
green
2 sentences2022Instead, K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512 "merely requires the prisoner to allege that the evidence is related to the investigation or prosecution of his or her conviction, that the State has possession or constructive possession of the evidence, and that the evidence was not previously subjected to DNA testing or that it could be tested using new DNA testing techniques." Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 606 , 88 P.3d 214 (2004). 22 While the pleading requirement set forth in Bruner generally remains true, we must provide some clarification in light of our statutory interpretation. 2022Instead, K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-2512 "merely requires the prisoner to allege that the evidence is related to the investigation or prosecution of his or her conviction, that the State has possession or constructive possession of the evidence, and that the evidence was not previously subjected to DNA testing or that it could be tested using new DNA testing techniques." Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 606 , 88 P.3d 214 (2004). 22 While the pleading requirement set forth in Bruner generally remains true, we must provide some clarification in light of our statutory interpretation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Ayalla v. Southridge Presbyterian Church
green
1 sentence2022App. 2d 312, 319 , 152 P.3d 670 (2007), our court subjected a fraudulent misrepresentation claim to the heightened pleading standard under K.S.A. 60-209(b). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Schuyler v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2019Schuyler v. Roberts, 285 Kan. 677, 679 , 175 P.3d 259 (2008). 2019Schuyler v. Roberts, 285 Kan. 677, 679 , 175 P.3d 259 (2008). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
LaPOINTE v. State
green
1 sentence2017The court pointed out that K.S.A. 60-1507 motions have a heightened pleading standard because the underlying criminal case already developed the record. 42 Kan. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Motor
neutral
2 sentences2016But this court implicitly rejected that in 1976, when comparing 213205 with its predecessor and concluding “there is very little, if any, difference in the meaning of die language used in the two sections.” State v. Motor, 220 Kan. 99, 102 , 551 P.2d 783 (1976). 2016But this court implicitly rejected that in 1976, when comparing 213205 with its predecessor and concluding “there is very little, if any, difference in the meaning of die language used in the two sections.” State v. Motor, 220 Kan. 99, 102 , 551 P.2d 783 (1976). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hemphill v. Shore
neutral
2 sentences2012Hemphill, 44 Kan. 2012The panel ultimately was persuaded that constructive fraud claims should be subject to the heightened pleading standard, Hemphill, 44 Kan. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Kohorst v. Iowa State Commerce Commission
green
1 sentence2008Moreover, an opposing party is entitled to know the exact nature of the claimed errors, and each error must be separately and distinctly stated so an opponent can adequately prepare and respond to the issues being reviewed. [Citation omitted.]’ ” 282 Kan. at 780 (quoting Kohorst, 348 N.W.2d at 621 ). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pittsburg State University v. Kansas Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2006The Kansas Court of Appeals has addressed the pleading requirement in Pittsburg State University v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 30 Kan. 2006App. 2d 37 , 36 P.3d 853 (2001). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Drake v. Kansas Department of Revenue
green
2 sentences2005Although the district court erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard in holding that Bloom had failed to state a claim, “ '[a] trial court’s reason for its decision is immaterial if the ruling is correct for any reason.’ ” See Drake v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 272 Kan. 231, 239 , 32 P.3d 705 (2001) (quoting KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118 , 936 P.2d 714 [1997]). 2005Although the district court erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard in holding that Bloom had failed to state a claim, “ '[a] trial court’s reason for its decision is immaterial if the ruling is correct for any reason.’ ” See Drake v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 272 Kan. 231, 239 , 32 P.3d 705 (2001) (quoting KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118 , 936 P.2d 714 [1997]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Although the district court erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard in holding that Bloom had failed to state a claim, “ '[a] trial court’s reason for its decision is immaterial if the ruling is correct for any reason.’ ” See Drake v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 272 Kan. 231, 239 , 32 P.3d 705 (2001) (quoting KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118 , 936 P.2d 714 [1997]). 2005Although the district court erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard in holding that Bloom had failed to state a claim, “ '[a] trial court’s reason for its decision is immaterial if the ruling is correct for any reason.’ ” See Drake v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 272 Kan. 231, 239 , 32 P.3d 705 (2001) (quoting KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118 , 936 P.2d 714 [1997]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Davidson v. Denning
green
2 sentences2003However, K.S.A. 60-212(b) further provides that “[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense provided in subsection (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256 See Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 666-67 , 914 P.2d 936 (1996) (relying on 60-212[b][6] in applying the standard of summaiy judgment). 2003However, K.S.A. 60-212(b) further provides that “[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense provided in subsection (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256 See Davidson v. Denning, 259 Kan. 659, 666-67 , 914 P.2d 936 (1996) (relying on 60-212[b][6] in applying the standard of summaiy judgment). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs
green
2 sentences2002The heightened pleading standard requires the complaint/petition to contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law.” McCormick, 272 Kan. at 637 (quoting Van Deelen v. City of Eudora, Kan., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1232-33 [D. 2002The McCormick court followed the lead of the Tenth Circuit, holding that when a § 1983 violation is claimed, the heightened pleading standard is no longer applicable. 272 Kan. at 638 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs
green
1 sentence2001As noted by our Court of Appeals, “prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, that is, for performing the traditional functions of an advocate.” 28 Kan. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bethany Medical Center v. Knox
green
1 sentence1995See Beck v. Kansas Adult Authority, 241 Kan. 13, 24-29 , 735 P.2d 222 (1987); Bethany Medical Center v. Knox, 10 Kan. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Fidelity Hail Insurance v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Smith v. Hanson neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Perry v. Robertson neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Norton v. Board of County Commissioners neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Kansas State Bank v. Shaible green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Schenk v. City of Kansas green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Ryan v. Burton green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Bowles v. Portelance green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Herthel v. Barth green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Aikins v. Stadell neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Grand Lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows v. Troutman neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.