42 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1921–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.green2 sentences1992On October 2, 1992, McClinch, the third-party plaintiff, filed an "Objection to Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Strike." DISCUSSION A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted Practice Book 152; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985). 1992On October 2, 1992, McClinch, the third-party plaintiff, filed an "Objection to Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Strike." DISCUSSION A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted Practice Book 152; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91 , 108 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985). | 4 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Praygreen2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). 2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). | 2 | 2 |
William Alfred Reno v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. 2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. | 2 | 2 |
Rocco v. Garrisongreen2 sentences2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). 2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). | 2 | 2 |
RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp.green2 sentences2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). 2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). | 2 | 2 |
Ferryman v. City of Grotongreen2 sentences2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). 2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
Florian v. Lengegreen2 sentences2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit 2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit | 1 | 1 |
Brewster Park, LLC v. Bergergreen2 sentences2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit 2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit | 1 | 1 |
Steele v. Town of Stoningtongreen2 sentences2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). 2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). | 1 | 1 |
Gold v. Rowlandgreen2 sentences2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit 2015Compare Brewster Park, LLC v. Berger, 126 Conn. App. 630 , 635–36, 14 A.3d 334 (2011) (defen- dant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s use and occu- pancy claim under General Statutes § 47a-3c because plaintiff distinctly raised it in complaint, in pretrial memorandum of law, and at trial, despite not specifying statute by number in complaint), and Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268, 274 , 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (defendant sufficiently apprised of plaintiff’s statutory claim when ‘‘the plaintiff plainly and concisely stated the material facts surrounding the cause of action’’ in complaint), wit | 1 | 1 |
Strobel v. Strobelgreen1 sentence2002Freshnex v. Mount Vernon Strategies, Inc ., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 437778 (January 19, 2001, Devlin, J .); Norwest Mortgage v. Edwards , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 057496 (May 4, 1998, Curran, S.T.R .) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 123 , 125); see also Garofalo v. Squillante , 60 Conn. App. 687 , 697-98 n. 4, 760 A.2d 1271 (2000) ( Landau, J ., concurring) ("the defendant may have waived his right to know the statute on which the plaintiffs intended to rely by failing to file a request to revise"), cert. denied, 255 Con | 1 | 1 |
Cas Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish Service, Inc.green1 sentence2002Freshnex v. Mount Vernon Strategies, Inc ., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 437778 (January 19, 2001, Devlin, J .); Norwest Mortgage v. Edwards , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 057496 (May 4, 1998, Curran, S.T.R .) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 123 , 125); see also Garofalo v. Squillante , 60 Conn. App. 687 , 697-98 n. 4, 760 A.2d 1271 (2000) ( Landau, J ., concurring) ("the defendant may have waived his right to know the statute on which the plaintiffs intended to rely by failing to file a request to revise"), cert. denied, 255 Con | 1 | 1 |
Garofalo v. Squillantegreen2 sentences2002Freshnex v. Mount Vernon Strategies, Inc ., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 437778 (January 19, 2001, Devlin, J .); Norwest Mortgage v. Edwards , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 057496 (May 4, 1998, Curran, S.T.R .) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 123 , 125); see also Garofalo v. Squillante , 60 Conn. App. 687 , 697-98 n. 4, 760 A.2d 1271 (2000) ( Landau, J ., concurring) ("the defendant may have waived his right to know the statute on which the plaintiffs intended to rely by failing to file a request to revise"), cert. denied, 255 Con 2002Freshnex v. Mount Vernon Strategies, Inc ., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 437778 (January 19, 2001, Devlin, J .); Norwest Mortgage v. Edwards , Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. 057496 (May 4, 1998, Curran, S.T.R .) ( 22 Conn.L.Rptr. 123 , 125); see also Garofalo v. Squillante , 60 Conn. App. 687 , 697-98 n. 4, 760 A.2d 1271 (2000) ( Landau, J ., concurring) ("the defendant may have waived his right to know the statute on which the plaintiffs intended to rely by failing to file a request to revise"), cert. denied, 255 Con | 1 | 1 |
Pamela B. v. Mentgreen2 sentences2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). 2001Practice Book § 25-16 ; see also Practice Book § 10-39 . "[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp ., 231 Conn. 381 , 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton , 212 Conn. 138 , 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). "[T]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the [pleading]." Pamela B. v. Ment , 244 Conn. 296 , 325 , 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates
green
2 sentences1998See Practice Book § 10-39 , formerly § 152; Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998). 1998See Practice Book § 10-39 , formerly § 152; Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d 558 (1998). | 3 | 1998–1998 |
Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority
green
2 sentences1991Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 170 (1988). 1991Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161 , 170 (1988). | 3 | 1990–1991 |
State v. Munger
neutral
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). 2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Bosworth
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). 2023Ed. 2d 60 (1963). 13 Compare State v. Bosworth, 54 Conn. 1, 2 , 4 A. 248 (1886) (‘‘all offenses involving continuous action, and which may be continued from day to day, may be so alleged’’), and Commonwealth v. Pray, 30 Mass. 359, 362 (1833) (‘‘[whenever] the crime consists of a series of acts, they need not be specially described, for it is not each or all the acts of themselves, but the practice or habit which produces the principal evil and constitutes the crime’’ (emphasis omitted)), with State v. Munger, 15 Vt. 290 , 296–97 (1843) (continuando must be disregarded as ‘‘surplusage’’). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Bass v. South Carolina
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. 2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Carl W. Mullis Engineering & Manufacturing Co. v. Nicholson
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. 2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Guidarelli v. United States
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. 2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. W. Baldwin Droms
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. 2023Ed. 2d 226 (2002); United States v. Droms, 566 F.2d 361 , 363 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (‘‘[d]uplicity, of course, is only a pleading rule and would in no event be fatal to the count’’); Reno v. United States, 317 F.2d 499, 502 (5th Cir.) (‘‘[d]uplicity is not a fatal defect’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 828 , 84 S. Ct. 72 , 11 L. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
United States of America v. Avx Corporation, National Wildlife Federation, Intervenor
green
2 sentences2002Me. 2000), was the result of the fact that "the First Circuit has promulgated a heightened pleading requirement for the purposes of standing, requiring a plaintiff to `set forth reasonably definite factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element needed to sustain standing.' U.S. v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108 , 115 (1st Cir. 1992)." The pleading rules applicable to the present motion are those supplied not by the First Circuit but by the Connecticut Practice Book. 2001Me. 2000), was the result of the fact that "the First Circuit has promulgated a heightened pleading requirement for the purposes of standing, requiring a plaintiff to `set forth reasonably definite factual allegations, either CT Page 16592 direct or inferential, regarding each material element needed to sustain standing'." U.S. v. AVX Corp. , 962 F.2d 108 , 115 (1st Cir. 1992). | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Maloney v. Conroy
green
2 sentences2016Additionally, Judge Lee noted that so far as the plaintiffs' claims sought damages for medical malpractice against the Hospital for its treatment of Helen, such claims were barred by Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 392, 545 A.2d 1059 (1988) (holding that bystanders to medical malpractice may not recover for emotional distress). 2016Additionally, Judge Lee noted that so far as the plaintiffs' claims sought damages for medical malpractice against the Hospital for its treatment of Helen, such claims were barred by Maloney v. Conroy, 208 Conn. 392 , 392, 545 A.2d 1059 (1988) (holding that bystanders to medical malpractice may not recover for emotional distress). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Mazurek v. Great American Insurance
green
2 sentences2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). 2015Co., 284 Conn. 16, 28 , 930 A.2d 682 (2007); accord Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541, 557 , 848 A.2d 352 (2004); see also Steele v. Stonington, 225 Conn. 217 , 221 n.7, 622 A.2d 551 (1993) (‘‘we have held that [the pleading requirement of § 10-3 (a)] is merely directory and not mandatory’’). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Contending that there is an absence of any ‘‘legal author- ity to support . . . a pleading requirement that the con- tinuing course of conduct doctrine be specifically labeled as such,’’ the plaintiff emphasizes that pleadings should be read ‘‘broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 266 Conn. 12, 24 , 836 A.2d 1124 (2003); and that ‘‘he included the essential elements of the continuing course of con- duct doctrine within his pleading of avoidance of limita- tions,’’ which should be read in conte 2014Contending that there is an absence of any ‘‘legal author- ity to support . . . a pleading requirement that the con- tinuing course of conduct doctrine be specifically labeled as such,’’ the plaintiff emphasizes that pleadings should be read ‘‘broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Collins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 266 Conn. 12, 24 , 836 A.2d 1124 (2003); and that ‘‘he included the essential elements of the continuing course of con- duct doctrine within his pleading of avoidance of limita- tions,’’ which should be read in conte | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Spears v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2014As long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of . . . § 10-3 (a) will not bar recovery.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn. App. 669 , 675–76, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001), aff’d, 263 Conn. 22 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003); see also, e.g., Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 , 556–57, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (permitting plaintiff’s resort to improperly cited accidental failure of suit statute because ‘‘there is no indication that the defendant was misled by the plain- tiffs’ 2014As long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of . . . § 10-3 (a) will not bar recovery.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn. App. 669 , 675–76, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001), aff’d, 263 Conn. 22 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003); see also, e.g., Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 , 556–57, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (permitting plaintiff’s resort to improperly cited accidental failure of suit statute because ‘‘there is no indication that the defendant was misled by the plain- tiffs’ | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Spears v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2014As long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of . . . § 10-3 (a) will not bar recovery.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn. App. 669 , 675–76, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001), aff’d, 263 Conn. 22 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003); see also, e.g., Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 , 556–57, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (permitting plaintiff’s resort to improperly cited accidental failure of suit statute because ‘‘there is no indication that the defendant was misled by the plain- tiffs’ 2014As long as the defendant is sufficiently apprised of the nature of the action . . . the failure to comply with the directive of . . . § 10-3 (a) will not bar recovery.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn. App. 669 , 675–76, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001), aff’d, 263 Conn. 22 , 818 A.2d 37 (2003); see also, e.g., Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 , 556–57, 848 A.2d 352 (2004) (permitting plaintiff’s resort to improperly cited accidental failure of suit statute because ‘‘there is no indication that the defendant was misled by the plain- tiffs’ | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves
green
2 sentences2012The burden is on a plaintiff to plead his case clearly and not to expect the court or his opposing counsel to have to wade through a poorly drafted complaint to glean from it the plaintiff’s theories of relief.” Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 286 Conn. 264 , 277 n.13, 943 A.2d 420 (2008). 2012The burden is on a plaintiff to plead his case clearly and not to expect the court or his opposing counsel to have to wade through a poorly drafted complaint to glean from it the plaintiff’s theories of relief.” Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 286 Conn. 264 , 277 n.13, 943 A.2d 420 (2008). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
LeConche v. Elligers
green
1 sentence2008Accordingly, if the plaintiffs had failed to attach a good faith certificate to the complaint, a pleading requirement set forth in § 52-190a(a), their complaint would have been subject to a motion to strike. [2] See id., at 711, 579 A.2d 1 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Gianquitti v. Sheppard green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Northeast Gunite & Grouting Corp. v. Chapman green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bohan v. Last green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Todd v. Glines green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Pellechia neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Buckman v. People Express, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Morris v. Hartford Courant Co. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Coelho v. Posi-Seal International, Inc. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Christensen v. Bic Corp. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Blancato v. Feldspar Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Suburban Restoration Co., Inc. v. Acmat Corporation, Laborers' International Union of North America, Local 665 Afl-Cio and Robert D. Witte green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| National Transportation Co., Inc. v. Toquet green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Hackett v. Roosevelt School, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Brainard v. Staub green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| G. M. Williams Co. v. Mairs neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Bishop v. Vose green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.