61 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hewett v. Kalishgreen2 sentences2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence. 2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence. | 6 | 7 |
Bowen v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence. 2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence. | 3 | 8 |
Graham v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2024See Graham v. Reynolds, 343 Ga. App. 274, 281 (3) ( 807 SE2d 39 ) (2017) (contrasting OCGA § 51-1-29.5, which imposes an evidentiary requirement, with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which imposes a pleading requirement). 2024See Graham v. Reynolds, 343 Ga. App. 274, 281 (3) ( 807 SE2d 39 ) (2017) (contrasting OCGA § 51-1-29.5, which imposes an evidentiary requirement, with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which imposes a pleading requirement). | 3 | 3 |
Zephaniah v. Georgia Clinic, P.C.green2 sentences2024“OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action, and a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 5 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019). 2024“OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action, and a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 5 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019). | 3 | 3 |
Druckman v. Ethridgegreen2 sentences2019See Druckman v. Ethridge , 198 Ga. App. 321 , 321 (1), 401 S.E.2d 336 (1991). 2019See Druckman v. Ethridge , 198 Ga. App. 321 , 321 (1), 401 S.E.2d 336 (1991). | 3 | 3 |
Robinson v. Starrgreen2 sentences2018Robinson v.Starr , 197 Ga.App. 440 , 441 (2), 398 S.E.2d 714 (1990). 2018Robinson v.Starr , 197 Ga.App. 440 , 441 (2), 398 S.E.2d 714 (1990). | 2 | 3 |
Thompson v. Ezorgreen2 sentences2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998). 2008“In no sense is the pleading requirement of section 9-11-9.1 intended to *482 facilitate the just and efficient resolution of motions for summary judgment.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. | 2 | 3 |
Procter v. Gwinnett Pulmonary Group & Associates, P.C.green2 sentences2024Nevertheless, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action, and in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is the duty of the appellate court to construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in appellant’s favor. 4 Procter v. Gwinnett Pulmonary Group, P.C., 312 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 718 SE2d 860 ) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2024Nevertheless, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action, and in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is the duty of the appellate court to construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in appellant’s favor. 4 Procter v. Gwinnett Pulmonary Group, P.C., 312 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 718 SE2d 860 ) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Ziglar v. St. joseph’s/candler Health System, Inc.green2 sentences2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent 2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent | 2 | 2 |
Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Nixgreen2 sentences2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present 2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present | 2 | 2 |
Gala v. Fishergreen2 sentences2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015). 2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015). | 2 | 2 |
Handson v. HCA Health Services of Georgia, Inc.green2 sentences2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d 2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d | 2 | 2 |
Labovitz v. Hopkinsongreen2 sentences2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d 2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d | 2 | 2 |
Hollowell v. Jovegreen2 sentences1996Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 , 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). 1996Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 , 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981). | 2 | 2 |
0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Mooregreen2 sentences1993Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 1993Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Associatesgreen2 sentences2019Given that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes only a pleading requirement on a plaintiff, "we will address the merits of this appeal as if the trial court had dismissed [Williams's fraud claims for failure to state a claim] rather than granted summary judgment [to the defendants]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Assoc. , 225 Ga. App. 843 , 844 (1), 491 S.E.2d 380 (1997). 2019Given that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes only a pleading requirement on a plaintiff, "we will address the merits of this appeal as if the trial court had dismissed [Williams's fraud claims for failure to state a claim] rather than granted summary judgment [to the defendants]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Assoc. , 225 Ga. App. 843 , 844 (1), 491 S.E.2d 380 (1997). | 1 | 2 |
Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998). 2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
Aycock v. Calkgreen2 sentences2008OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section 9-11-56.”); Aycock v. Calk, 222 Ga. App. 763 ( 476 SE2d 274 ) (1996). 2 Bullington also named as parties defendant Blakely’s vice president, Russell Slade, Farmers Crop Insurance Alliance, Blakely’s successor-in-interest following a corporate merger, and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, w 2008OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section 9-11-56.”); Aycock v. Calk, 222 Ga. App. 763 ( 476 SE2d 274 ) (1996). 2 Bullington also named as parties defendant Blakely’s vice president, Russell Slade, Farmers Crop Insurance Alliance, Blakely’s successor-in-interest following a corporate merger, and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, w | 1 | 2 |
COLLINS v. ATHENS ORTHOPEDIC CLINIC, P.Agreen1 sentence2025See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 307 Ga. 555, 565 (4) ( 837 SE2d 310 ) (2019) (noting difference between federal and Georgia standard). 24 to dismiss complaint challenging multiple fees and APSN charges because the parties relied on different versions of the contract). | 1 | 1 |
Ashcroft v. Iqbalgreen2 sentences2025See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (IV) (A) ( 129 SCt 1937 , 173 LE2d 868) (2009) (under federal law, legal conclusions recited in complaint “must be supported by factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief”). 2025See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (IV) (A) ( 129 SCt 1937 , 173 LE2d 868) (2009) (under federal law, legal conclusions recited in complaint “must be supported by factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief”). | 1 | 1 |
Holloway v. Northside Hospitalgreen2 sentences2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal). 2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal). | 1 | 1 |
Minnix v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2024Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), a plaintiff who brings a claim alleging professional negligence against a “professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . [or] [a]ny licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subjection (g) of this Code Section,” must file an expert affidavit with his or her complaint.1 See Minnix v. Dept. of Transp., 272 Ga. 566, 567 ( 533 SE2d 75 ) (2000) (explaining that the expert affidavit requirement 2024Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), a plaintiff who brings a claim alleging professional negligence against a “professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . [or] [a]ny licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subjection (g) of this Code Section,” must file an expert affidavit with his or her complaint.1 See Minnix v. Dept. of Transp., 272 Ga. 566, 567 ( 533 SE2d 75 ) (2000) (explaining that the expert affidavit requirement | 1 | 1 |
Osprey Cove Real Estate, LLC v. Towerview Construction, LLCgreen2 sentences2023See Osprey Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 439 (1), n. 2 ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017) (noting that “it would have been improper for the trial court to consider . . . evidence when evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6)”).7 Ultimately, it would be inappropriate to attempt to reconcile these disparate procedures here due to the lack of analysis in the trial court’s order and the poor state 7 It is true that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are prese 2023See Osprey Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 439 (1), n. 2 ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017) (noting that “it would have been improper for the trial court to consider . . . evidence when evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6)”).7 Ultimately, it would be inappropriate to attempt to reconcile these disparate procedures here due to the lack of analysis in the trial court’s order and the poor state 7 It is true that if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are prese | 1 | 1 |
Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent 2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc.green2 sentences2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent 2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent | 1 | 1 |
Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, LLCgreen2 sentences2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ 2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ | 1 | 1 |
| Davidson v. American Fitness Centers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
HARRIS Et Al. v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANYgreen2 sentences2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ 2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ | 1 | 1 |
SLOSBERG v. GILLERgreen2 sentences2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ 2022Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838 ( 792 SE2d 111 ) (2016); see also OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . , and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by [OCGA §] 9-11-56.”). 2 Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, 285 Ga. App. 650, 652 (1) ( 647 SE2d 353 ) (2007); accord Davidson v. Americ | 1 | 1 |
| DUKES v. MUNOZ Et Al.green | 1 | 1 |
| Porquez v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| DEBBIE ANN CASH v. LG ELECTRONICS, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brooks v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson-El v. Bank of America, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vitner v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Porquez v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Vanstromgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCaskill v. Carillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crook v. Funkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. PHOEBE PUTNEY HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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|---|---|---|
HOLMES Et Al. v. LYONS Et Al.
green
2 sentences2024“Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which 3 See Alred v. Ga. Public Defender Council, 362 Ga. App. 465 , 471, n. 13 ( 869 SE2d 99 ) (2022) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if it is right for any reason, so long as the argument was fairly presented to the court below”). 12 imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the plaintiff, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the merits in a malpractice action.” See Holmes v. Lyons, 346 Ga. App. 99, 102 (1) ( 815 SE2d 252 ) (2018). 2019Notably, "[u]nlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the merits, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action." Holmes v. Lyons , 346 Ga. App. 99 , 102 (1), 815 S.E.2d 252 (2018). | 3 | 2019–2024 |
NORMAN v. XYTEX CORPORATION
green
1 sentence2025For this reason, the “Georgia test is more difficult for movants to pass than the equivalent federal test, because the federal test imposes on plaintiffs a more stringent pleading standard.” Norman, 310 Ga. at 131 n. 4 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Hicks v. McGee green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Ferrell v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Slaughter green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Evans v. City of Atlanta green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Jesse J. Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bruce Tile Co. v. Copelan green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Thompson v. Long green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Crosby v. Jordan green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.