pleading requirement in Georgia

2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence.

2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence.

2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence.

2009See Hewett v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 184 (1) ( 442 SE2d 233 ) (1994); Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-124 ( 416 SE2d 102 ) (1992). 1 And, because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes nothing more than a pleading requirement, the affidavit can contain conclusory statements regarding the expert’s competence.

2024See Graham v. Reynolds, 343 Ga. App. 274, 281 (3) ( 807 SE2d 39 ) (2017) (contrasting OCGA § 51-1-29.5, which imposes an evidentiary requirement, with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which imposes a pleading requirement).

2024See Graham v. Reynolds, 343 Ga. App. 274, 281 (3) ( 807 SE2d 39 ) (2017) (contrasting OCGA § 51-1-29.5, which imposes an evidentiary requirement, with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which imposes a pleading requirement).

2024“OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action, and a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 5 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019).

2024“OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action, and a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 5 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019).

2019See Druckman v. Ethridge , 198 Ga. App. 321 , 321 (1), 401 S.E.2d 336 (1991).

2019See Druckman v. Ethridge , 198 Ga. App. 321 , 321 (1), 401 S.E.2d 336 (1991).

2024“Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which 3 See Alred v. Ga. Public Defender Council, 362 Ga. App. 465 , 471, n. 13 ( 869 SE2d 99 ) (2022) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if it is right for any reason, so long as the argument was fairly presented to the court below”). 12 imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the plaintiff, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the merits in a malpractice action.” See Holmes v. Lyons, 346 Ga. App. 99, 102 (1) ( 815 SE2d 252 ) (2018).

2024“Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which 3 See Alred v. Ga. Public Defender Council, 362 Ga. App. 465 , 471, n. 13 ( 869 SE2d 99 ) (2022) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if it is right for any reason, so long as the argument was fairly presented to the court below”). 12 imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the plaintiff, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the merits in a malpractice action.” See Holmes v. Lyons, 346 Ga. App. 99, 102 (1) ( 815 SE2d 252 ) (2018).

2023See Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019) (holding that “allegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters are the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom”) (emphasis supplied); see also Bazemore v. U. S. Bank, N. A., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 730 (c) ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“The claims for theft and residential mo

2023See Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019) (holding that “allegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters are the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom”) (emphasis supplied); see also Bazemore v. U. S. Bank, N. A., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 730 (c) ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“The claims for theft and residential mo

2018Robinson v.Starr , 197 Ga.App. 440 , 441 (2), 398 S.E.2d 714 (1990).

2018Robinson v.Starr , 197 Ga.App. 440 , 441 (2), 398 S.E.2d 714 (1990).

2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).

2008“In no sense is the pleading requirement of section 9-11-9.1 intended to *482 facilitate the just and efficient resolution of motions for summary judgment.” (Footnote omitted.) Id.

2024Nevertheless, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action, and in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is the duty of the appellate court to construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in appellant’s favor. 4 Procter v. Gwinnett Pulmonary Group, P.C., 312 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 718 SE2d 860 ) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2024Nevertheless, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action, and in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, it is the duty of the appellate court to construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the appellant with all doubts resolved in appellant’s favor. 4 Procter v. Gwinnett Pulmonary Group, P.C., 312 Ga. App. 486, 487 (1) ( 718 SE2d 860 ) (2011) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present

2020And in doing so, the court effectively converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.6 Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), a motion for summary judgment “shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” Thus, when a trial court converts a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into one for summary 5 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000) (punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are present

2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015).

2020Moreover, “because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 constitutes an exception to the general liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act, it is to be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Act, so long as such a construction does not detract from the [statute’s] purpose, which is to reduce the filing of frivolous malpractice suits.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gala v. Fisher, 296 Ga. 870, 875 ( 770 SE2d 879 ) (2015).

2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d

2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d

2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d

2014The requirement of filing an expert affidavit at the time the complaint is filed serves this stated purpose because it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at least one act of professional negligence has occurred, thereby reducing the number of frivolous claims filed.”) (citation omitted); Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 336 ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999) (The legislative intent in enacting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “was to enact a statute which sought to reduce the number of frivolous professional malpractice actions by placing a procedural hurdle before those plaintiffs who sought d

1996Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 , 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981).

1996Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 , 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981).

1993Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989).

1993Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989).

2023See Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019) (holding that “allegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters are the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom”) (emphasis supplied); see also Bazemore v. U. S. Bank, N. A., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 730 (c) ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“The claims for theft and residential mo

2023Assn., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 728 (c), n. 6 ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“[A]llegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters as the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019).

2023See Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019) (holding that “allegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters are the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom”) (emphasis supplied); see also Bazemore v. U. S. Bank, N. A., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 730 (c) ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“The claims for theft and residential mo

2023Assn., 363 Ga. App. 723 , 728 (c), n. 6 ( 872 SE2d 491 ) (2022) (“[A]llegations of mail and wire fraud in a civil RICO action must not only be pled in accordance with the heightened pleading standard of OCGA § 9-11-9 (b), but also are required to include such matters as the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as who made the alleged misrepresentations and to whom.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); accord Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, 349 Ga. App. 248 , 254 (2) (c) ( 825 SE2d 628 ) (2019).

2019Given that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes only a pleading requirement on a plaintiff, "we will address the merits of this appeal as if the trial court had dismissed [Williams's fraud claims for failure to state a claim] rather than granted summary judgment [to the defendants]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Assoc. , 225 Ga. App. 843 , 844 (1), 491 S.E.2d 380 (1997).

2019Given that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes only a pleading requirement on a plaintiff, "we will address the merits of this appeal as if the trial court had dismissed [Williams's fraud claims for failure to state a claim] rather than granted summary judgment [to the defendants]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Assoc. , 225 Ga. App. 843 , 844 (1), 491 S.E.2d 380 (1997).

2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).

2017Thompson v. Ezor , 272 Ga. 849 , 852 (2), 536 S.E.2d 749 (2000) ; Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, 234 Ga. App. 54 , 57 (2), 506 S.E.2d 197 (1998).

2008OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section 9-11-56.”); Aycock v. Calk, 222 Ga. App. 763 ( 476 SE2d 274 ) (1996). 2 Bullington also named as parties defendant Blakely’s vice president, Russell Slade, Farmers Crop Insurance Alliance, Blakely’s successor-in-interest following a corporate merger, and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, w

2008OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (“If, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Code Section 9-11-56.”); Aycock v. Calk, 222 Ga. App. 763 ( 476 SE2d 274 ) (1996). 2 Bullington also named as parties defendant Blakely’s vice president, Russell Slade, Farmers Crop Insurance Alliance, Blakely’s successor-in-interest following a corporate merger, and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company, w

2025See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 307 Ga. 555, 565 (4) ( 837 SE2d 310 ) (2019) (noting difference between federal and Georgia standard). 24 to dismiss complaint challenging multiple fees and APSN charges because the parties relied on different versions of the contract).

2025See Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, 307 Ga. 555, 565 (4) ( 837 SE2d 310 ) (2019) (noting difference between federal and Georgia standard). 24 to dismiss complaint challenging multiple fees and APSN charges because the parties relied on different versions of the contract).

2025See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (IV) (A) ( 129 SCt 1937 , 173 LE2d 868) (2009) (under federal law, legal conclusions recited in complaint “must be supported by factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief”).

2025See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (IV) (A) ( 129 SCt 1937 , 173 LE2d 868) (2009) (under federal law, legal conclusions recited in complaint “must be supported by factual allegations” that “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief”).

2024“Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which 3 See Alred v. Ga. Public Defender Council, 362 Ga. App. 465 , 471, n. 13 ( 869 SE2d 99 ) (2022) (“This Court may affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if it is right for any reason, so long as the argument was fairly presented to the court below”). 12 imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the plaintiff, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the merits in a malpractice action.” See Holmes v. Lyons, 346 Ga. App. 99, 102 (1) ( 815 SE2d 252 ) (2018).

2024As previously noted, whether a hospital must file an expert affidavit with its complaint for a negligence (d) (1) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”); In re Estate of Burkhalter, 354 Ga. App. 231 , 237 (2) (a), n. 32 ( 840 SE2d 614 ) (2020) (“Mere conclusory statements are not the type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Gresham v. Harris, 349 Ga. App. 134 , 138 (1), n. 9 ( 825 SE2d 516 ) (2019) (explaining that “cogent legal analysis . . . is, at a mini