16 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twomblygreen2 sentences2024We also analyzed our past decisions interpreting the rule and considered the pleading requirements in the context of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Supreme Court decisions that articulated a heightened pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2014Specifically, the majority rejects part of the pleading standard the Supreme Court applied in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). | 1 | 3 |
Baker v. Best Buy Stores, LPgreen2 sentences2015Instead, Medtronic argued for, and the trial court adopted, a stricter pleading standard articulated . . . in Baker v. Best Buy Stores, 812 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. App. 2012).” Appellants claim that the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to adopt the stricter Baker standard when it issued Hardin. 2015Instead, Medtronic argued for, and the trial court adopted, the stricter pleading standard articulated in Baker v. Best Buy Stores, 812 N.W.2d 177 (Minn.App. 2012). | 1 | 3 |
Merry v. Prestige Capital Markets, Ltd.green2 sentences2016Specifically, while a plaintiff must plead falsity with particularity, the heightened pleading standard does not apply to the issues of materiality and loss causation.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2016Specifically, while a plaintiff must plead falsity with particularity, the heightened pleading standard does not apply to the issues of materiality and loss causation.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Stacy Demskie v. U.S. Bank National Associationgreen1 sentence2025In two seminal cases, the United States Supreme Court “articulated a heightened pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 7 N.W.3d 382, 387 (Minn. 2024) (citing Bell Atl. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson Ex Rel. Anderson v. Streamgreen2 sentences2024This argument might support a defense to liability but is irrelevant to whether the pleading states a claim for relief. 3 Crudo focuses her assertions of deficiency on a “reasonability” inquiry and cites Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn. 1980), as establishing the applicable standard of care. 2024But Anderson considers a parent’s liability in the context of their duty of care toward their own child and not a duty to exercise control of their child. 295 N.W.2d at 596-97 (eliminating the doctrine of parental immunity in child-versus-parent negligence claims). | 1 | 1 |
United States Ex Rel. Keshav S. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc. Mohammed Bashiti, United States of America, Movant Belowgreen1 sentence2023Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Because the FCA is an anti-fraud statute, complaints alleging violations of the FCA must comply with Rule 9(b).”). 8 Elder relies on an unpublished decision in which a federal district court applied the pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to a claim under a provision of the FCA that is parallel to Minn. Stat. 15C.02(a)(4). | 1 | 1 |
Bahr v. CAPELLA UNIVERSITYgreen1 sentence2016Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80 (applying rule 8.01 and stating that “a legal conclusion in the complaint is not binding on us. | 1 | 1 |
Natalia Karnatcheva v. JP Morgan Chase Bankgreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Karnatcheva, 704 F.3d at 548 . | 1 | 1 |
Northern States Power Co. v. Franklingreen2 sentences2012See Franklin, 265 Minn. at 395 , 122 N.W.2d at 29 . 2012See Franklin, 265 Minn. at 395 , 122 N.W.2d at 29 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Milk Purchaser Antitrust Litigationgreen1 sentence2010See In re Milk Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 588 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Minn.App.1999) (noting that whether antitrust claims are subject to a heightened pleading standard is a legal issue reviewed de novo). | 1 | 1 |
Nestell v. Stategreen1 sentence2010See Nestell v. State, 758 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Minn.App.2008) (concluding that “by using the phrase ‘petition invoking,’ the legislature intended to require petitions expressly to identify the applicable exception”); Edwards v. State, No. A09-1432, 2010 WL 1753327 , at *2 (Minn.App. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
green
2 sentences2024We also analyzed our past decisions interpreting the rule and considered the pleading requirements in the context of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Supreme Court decisions that articulated a heightened pleading standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2014P. 8(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 6 complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. | 3 | 2014–2025 |
Laura L. Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence2024Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 601–03. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2017When assessing a claim under that standard, a court must “constantly assum[e] the plaintiffs allegations [are] true,” and “a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she would be required to prove at trial.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326-28 , 127 S.Ct. 2499 , 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). 2017When assessing a claim under that standard, a court must “constantly assum[e] the plaintiffs allegations [are] true,” and “a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she would be required to prove at trial.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 326-28 , 127 S.Ct. 2499 , 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Finally, because we hold that upon remand the trial court should enter default judgments against the three defendants who were not signatory parties to the arbitration agreement, we need not address the issue, raised by the parties, of whether the presence of those defendants in the action invokes the balancing test announced in Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20 , 240 N.W.2d 551 (1976), to determine whether a requested arbitration should be granted or denied in the context of multiparty litigation where some, but not all, of the parties are subject to the ar 1982Finally, because we hold that upon remand the trial court should enter default judgments against the three defendants who were not signatory parties to the arbitration agreement, we need not address the issue, raised by the parties, of whether the presence of those defendants in the action invokes the balancing test announced in Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20 , 240 N.W.2d 551 (1976), to determine whether a requested arbitration should be granted or denied in the context of multiparty litigation where some, but not all, of the parties are subject to the ar | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.