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325 Texas opinions name it 8 courts 1916–2026 59 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Mirandagreen2 sentences2023“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the 9 nonmovant.” Id. 2023“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. | 17 | 114 |
Thu Thuy Huynh v. Thuy Duong Nguyengreen2 sentences2023Code Ann. § 17.042 ; see also, e.g., Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc. v. Centauro Cap., S.L.U., 448 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“The [plaintiffs] satisfied their initial burden by alleging that the [defendants] were doing business in Texas within the meaning of section 17.042(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”); Huynh, 180 S.W.3d at 619-20 (“Because [the plaintiff] pleaded in its petition in intervention that [the defendant] conducted business in Texas and committed torts in Texas, [the plaintiff] satisfied this pleading requirement.”). 2023Code Ann. § 17.042 ; Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 619-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants 8 are doing business in Texas.”). | 15 | 17 |
County of Cameron v. Browngreen2 sentences2016Id.; see County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). 2013Id.; see County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). | 12 | 12 |
Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2017See Sci Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). 2010Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997)). | 11 | 11 |
Perna v. Hogangreen2 sentences2012Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 619-20 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see Perna v. Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that the pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging non-resident defendant is doing business in Texas or non-resident defendant committed an act in Texas). 2005See Perna v. Taylor , 146 S.W.3d 791 , 796 B 97 (Tex. App. C Beaumont 2004, no pet.); but see Perna , 162 S.W.3d 648 , 652 B 53. [5] Having concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Unity = s special appearance because Unity is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas, we need not address Unity = s contention that it is not subject to general jurisdiction. [6] In their petition, the Patients allege that Valley is doing business in Texas, thus satisfying the pleading requirement regarding nonresident defendants. | 9 | 10 |
Assurances Générales Banque Nationale v. Dhallagreen2 sentences2021Jani-King, 2016 WL 2609314 , at *4; Assurances Générales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla, 282 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 2015See Assurances Generales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla, 282 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ. | 7 | 7 |
Alencar v. Shawgreen2 sentences2023See Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (minimal pleading requirement satisfied by allegation nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in Texas). 2023Id. (citing Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)). | 6 | 6 |
Foust v. Estate of Waltersgreen2 sentences2010"Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?" Foust v. Estate of Walters , 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co. , 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)). 2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)). | 6 | 6 |
In re Lipskygreen2 sentences2026Id., § 33.004(g). [¶ 22] Texas procedural rules require “notice pleading.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. 2026Id., § 33.004(g). [¶ 22] Texas procedural rules require “notice pleading.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. | 5 | 7 |
Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co.green2 sentences2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)). 2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)). | 5 | 7 |
Steward Health Care System LLC and Southwest General Hospital, LP v. Frank Saidaragreen2 sentences2026See e.g., Yelp, 725 S.W.3d at 178 (collecting cases); Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 129; Dignity Gold, LLC and Dignity Corp., v. Ilmarin Group, LLC, Nat’l One Fin. 2022“This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in Texas.” Saidara, 633 S.W.3d at 126. | 5 | 6 |
Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garciagreen2 sentences2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 . 2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 . | 4 | 4 |
Palmer v. Enserch Corp.green2 sentences2010"When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations." Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford , 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp. , 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 2010“When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations.” Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). | 4 | 4 |
Dougherty v. Giffordgreen2 sentences2010"When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations." Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford , 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp. , 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 2010“When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations.” Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). | 4 | 4 |
the City of El Paso, Texas v. Mazie's, L.P. and Whitney Properties, L.P.green2 sentences2023But “recurrence goes to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and is not a pleading requirement to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.” City of El Paso v. Mazie’s L.P., 408 S.W.3d 13, 25 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied); accord City of Socorro v. Campos, 510 S.W.3d 121 , 130–31 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied); see also Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 555 (evaluating evidence of recurrence after full trial on merits of takings claim). 2016Id. *131 at 25, citing Doss v. City of Victoria, No. 13-07-00306-CV, 2007 WL 4442616 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2007, no pet.)(mem. op.). | 3 | 4 |
American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Colemangreen2 sentences2017Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 807 (stating plaintiffs bear initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to bring nonresident defendants within provisions of long-arm statute)). 2005See Am. Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 807 (stating plaintiffs bear the initial burden of pleading allegations sufficient to bring nonresident defendants within the provisions of the long-arm statute); Siskind v. Villa Found. | 3 | 3 |
Keller v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Ann. art. 28.10 (West 2006) (allowing amendment of information); see also Keller v. State , 125 S.W.3d 600 , 607–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d) (“Appellant has not established that he would have prevailed on a motion to dismiss, given that the indictment contained all the elements of the offense . . . and could have been amended to correct the pleading error.”). 2011Ann. art. 28.10 (West 2006) (allowing amendment of information); see also Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 607-08 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d) (“Appellant has not established that he would have prevailed on a motion to dismiss, given that the indictment contained all the elements of the offense ... and could have been amended to correct the pleading error.”). | 3 | 3 |
El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. De C v. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. De C.V.green2 sentences2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. 4 See Perna v. Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, *620 pet. dism’d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that def 2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. [4] See Perna v. Hogan , 162 S.W.3d 648 , 652 B 53 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V. , 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism = d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by allegin | 3 | 3 |
Fowler v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Fowler v. State , 509 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974). 2009See Fowler v. State , 509 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974). | 3 | 3 |
Luken v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Luken , 780 S.W.2d at 266–67; Patterson , 740 S.W.2d at 766–67. 2008See Luken, 780 S.W.2d at 266–67; Patterson, 740 S.W.2d at 766–67. | 3 | 3 |
| Butcher v. Scott Ex Rel. J.L.R.green | 3 | 3 |
| Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.green | 3 | 3 |
Connolly v. Gasmiregreen2 sentences2020The pleading standard for demand futility requires a fact- intensive, director-by-director analysis.” (citing Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc., Nos. 2991-VCP, 3111-VCP, 2008 WL 553205 , at *6-7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2008) (mem. op.), and other Delaware cases)); Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 840 (same). 2013Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Helix Parties’ special exceptions challenging Lucas’s petition regarding., this pleading requirement. 8 See In re Brick, 351 S.W.3d at 607 ; In re Denbury Res., Inc., 2009 WL 4263850 , at *1-2; Connolly, 257 S.W.3d at 848 . | 2 | 3 |
Brehm v. Eisnergreen2 sentences2020See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 260 (“It is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a board’s decision . . . .). *** Having concluded that Moody Jr. failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 to plead a claim for wrongful refusal of his demand, that the appellees demonstrated with unrebutted jurisdictional evidence that the boards’ refusal of Moody Jr.’s demand was a valid exercise of sound business judgment, and that repleading would be futile, we hold that the trial court correctly granted the pleas to the jurisdiction 2008Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 contains a heightened pleading standard, requiring a shareholder’s allegations of demand futility to “comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity.” See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 n. 9; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 ; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 . | 2 | 3 |
| Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhrgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Clark v. Noyesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Mid-American Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Kinggreen | 2 | 2 |
| Railroad Com'n of Texas v. Lone Star Gas Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| Bos v. Smithgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Connor v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Waco v. Kirwangreen | 2 | 2 |
| Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auldgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wackenhut Corrections Corp. v. De La Rosagreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Austin v. Leggettgreen | 2 | 2 |
| City of Austin v. Rangelgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Haber v. Bellgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Thompson v. City of Dallasgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Robinson v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ealey v. Insurance Co. of North Americagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Continental Southern Lines, Inc. v. Hillandgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perna v. Hogangreen2 sentences2012Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 619-20 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see Perna v. Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that the pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging non-resident defendant is doing business in Texas or non-resident defendant committed an act in Texas). 2005See Perna v. Taylor , 146 S.W.3d 791 , 796 B 97 (Tex. App. C Beaumont 2004, no pet.); but see Perna , 162 S.W.3d 648 , 652 B 53. [5] Having concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Unity = s special appearance because Unity is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas, we need not address Unity = s contention that it is not subject to general jurisdiction. [6] In their petition, the Patients allege that Valley is doing business in Texas, thus satisfying the pleading requirement regarding nonresident defendants. | 1 | 10 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Patterson
red
2 sentences2008See Luken , 780 S.W.2d at 266–67; Patterson , 740 S.W.2d at 766–67. 2008Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 293 (quoting Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766 , 774 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)). | 7 | 2003–2008 |
Haines v. Kerner
green
2 sentences2015Therefore, petitioner moves this conrt to review this pleading under the standard established in HAINES v. KERNER, 404 U.S. 519 , 30 L. 2015Therefore, petitioner moves this conrt to review this pleading under the standard established in HAINES v. KERNER, 404 U.S. 519 , 30 L. | 5 | 2015–2015 |
Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 . 2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 . | 4 | 2021–2024 |
In Re Unitec Elevator Services Co.
green
2 sentences2021To hold otherwise “would render the pleading deadlines imposed in subsection (j) meaningless” because a “defendant would never have an incentive to comply with the pleading requirement in subsection (j) when it could simply wait to designate the unknown person sixty days before trial, and obtain a strategic advantage not intended by the legislature.” Id. 2018The court also rejected the –4– relators’ argument “that subsection (j), which prescribes a strict pleading requirement for designating unknown persons, does not provide the exclusive means for designating the unknown vandals and that plaintiffs’ interpretation of the statute is contrary to the statute’s liberalization of rights afforded to defendants under the revised section 33.004.” Id. | 4 | 2011–2021 |
McKanna v. Edgar
green
2 sentences2014Red Bay cites McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965), for the proposition that “a ‘legitimate inference’ can by drawn that [Red Bay] does not do business in Texas if it doesn’t maintain a designated agent for service.” In McKanna, however, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’ inference that the defendant did not maintain a place of regular business in Texas or designate an agent for service in Texas by the mere allegation that service could be made on the Secretary of State of Texas. 1985McKanna v. Edgar, supra (failure to allege that defendant was a non-resident "doing business" in Texas essential to operation of general long-arm *653 statute, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2031b, §§ 2, 3 (1964)); Franecke v. Dolenz, 668 S.W.2d 481, 482-83 (Tex.App.1984, writ dism'd) (failure to allege that defendant was a "non-resident natural person" over whom a Texas court may acquire personal jurisdiction under same statute). | 3 | 1972–2014 |
| State of Texas v. Zalman, Daniel green | 2 | 2023–2025 |
| in Re Yrc Inc. D/B/A Yrc Freight green | 2 | 2022–2023 |
| Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Baker v. Goldsmith green | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| in Re Gilberto Gonzales green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Trelltex, Inc. v. Intecx, L.L.C. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| in Re Eagleridge Operating, Llc green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| White v. Jackson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.