pleading requirement in Texas

2023Code Ann. § 17.042 ; Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 619-20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants 8 are doing business in Texas.”).

2023Code Ann. § 17.042 ; see also, e.g., Dresser-Rand Grp., Inc. v. Centauro Cap., S.L.U., 448 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“The [plaintiffs] satisfied their initial burden by alleging that the [defendants] were doing business in Texas within the meaning of section 17.042(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”); Huynh, 180 S.W.3d at 619-20 (“Because [the plaintiff] pleaded in its petition in intervention that [the defendant] conducted business in Texas and committed torts in Texas, [the plaintiff] satisfied this pleading requirement.”).

2016Id.; see County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).

2013Id.; see County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002).

2023“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant.” Id.

2023“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, we take as true all evidence favorable to the 9 nonmovant.” Id.

2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. 4 See Perna v. Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, *620 pet. dism’d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that def

2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. [4] See Perna v. Hogan , 162 S.W.3d 648 , 652 B 53 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V. , 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism = d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by allegin

2023See Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (minimal pleading requirement satisfied by allegation nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas or committed tortious acts in Texas).

2023See id. (citing Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)).

2021Jani-King, 2016 WL 2609314 , at *4; Assurances Générales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla, 282 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).

2015See Assurances Generales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla, 282 S.W.3d 688, 695 (Tex. App.––Dallas 2009, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ.

2010Texas courts have recognized that a mistake in naming parties to a lawsuit, such as here, constitutes a case of misnomer. *186 "Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?" Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Wate

2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)).

2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)).

2010“Misnomer cases are analyzed by asking the following questions: (1) Would a judgment under the original pleading bar recovery under the amended pleading? (2) Would the same evidence support both of the pleadings? (3) Is the measure of damages the same in both pleadings? (4) Are the allegations of each pleading subject to the same defenses?” Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (citing Phoenix Lumber Co. v. Houston Water Co., 94 Tex. 456 , 61 S.W. 707, 709 (1901)).

2017See Sci Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997).

2010Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997)).

2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 .

2024Douglas, 544 S.W.3d at 492 ; see Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635 .

2010"When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations." Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2010“When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations.” Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2010"When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations." Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2010“When a party is misnamed, but no one has been misled or disadvantaged by the error in pleading, the relation-back doctrine operates to preserve the claim against a bar of limitations.” Id. (citing Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 677 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ); Palmer v. Enserch Corp., 728 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

2026Id., § 33.004(g). [¶ 22] Texas procedural rules require “notice pleading.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX.

2026Id., § 33.004(g). [¶ 22] Texas procedural rules require “notice pleading.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX.

2023But “recurrence goes to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and is not a pleading requirement to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.” City of El Paso v. Mazie’s L.P., 408 S.W.3d 13, 25 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied); accord City of Socorro v. Campos, 510 S.W.3d 121 , 130–31 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied); see also Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 555 (evaluating evidence of recurrence after full trial on merits of takings claim).

2016Id. *131 at 25, citing Doss v. City of Victoria, No. 13-07-00306-CV, 2007 WL 4442616 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2007, no pet.)(mem. op.).

2011Ann. art. 28.10 (West 2006) (allowing amendment of information); see also Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 607-08 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism'd) ("Appellant has not established that he would have prevailed on a motion to dismiss, given that the indictment contained all the elements of the offense ... and could have been amended to correct the pleading error.").

2011Ann. art. 28.10 (West 2006) (allowing amendment of information); see also Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 607-08 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d) (“Appellant has not established that he would have prevailed on a motion to dismiss, given that the indictment contained all the elements of the offense ... and could have been amended to correct the pleading error.”).

2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. 4 See Perna v. Hogan, 162 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V., 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, *620 pet. dism’d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that def

2005This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas. [4] See Perna v. Hogan , 162 S.W.3d 648 , 652 B 53 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by alleging that defendant is doing business in Texas or that defendant has committed any act in Texas); El Puerto De Liverpool, S.A. de C.V. v. Servi Mundo Llantero S.A. de C.V. , 82 S.W.3d 622, 629 (Tex. App. C Corpus Christi 2002, pet. dism = d w.o.j) (indicating that pleading requirement can be satisfied by allegin

2009See Fowler v. State , 509 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974).

2009See Fowler v. State, 509 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974).

2005Butcher v. Scott , 906 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. 1995); see Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2005Butcher v. Scott , 906 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. 1995); see Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2005Butcher v. Scott , 906 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. 1995); see Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2005Butcher v. Scott , 906 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. 1995); see Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co. , 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2020See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 260 (“It is the essence of the business judgment rule that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a board’s decision . . . .). *** Having concluded that Moody Jr. failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 23.1 to plead a claim for wrongful refusal of his demand, that the appellees demonstrated with unrebutted jurisdictional evidence that the boards’ refusal of Moody Jr.’s demand was a valid exercise of sound business judgment, and that repleading would be futile, we hold that the trial court correctly granted the pleas to the jurisdiction

2008Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1 contains a heightened pleading standard, requiring a shareholder’s allegations of demand futility to “comply with stringent requirements of factual particularity.” See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367 n. 9; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 ; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 .

2023See id. (citing Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)).

2023See id. (citing Alencar v. Shaw, 323 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)).

2026Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658 . -3- 04-25-00303-CV 3.

2011Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010). ―This minimal pleading requirement is satisfied by an allegation that the nonresident defendants are doing business in Texas.‖ Huynh v. Nguyen, 180 S.W.3d 608, 619 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2015LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51. 20 Lindsey, by contrast to National Union, was not a duty-to-defend case, but involved an action We hold [**32] that the trial court did not err by to recover UIM benefits, as in this case.

2015The TTCA waives governmental immunity for “property damage, personal injury, or death aris[ing] from the operation or use of a motor driven vehicle.” 21 LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51 (citing Tex. Civ.

2015P. 166a(c). 13 That is, the defendant must first present evidence to show that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; if the defendant does so, then the plaintiff must then show there is a disputed material fact on the jurisdictional issue.14 If the facts are disputed, the court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction and the issue must be resolved by the finder-of-fact at trial; however, if the evidence is undisputed or if there is no fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court will rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. 15 When reviewing a plea to the

2015P. 166a(c). 13 That is, the defendant must first present evidence to show that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction; if the defendant does so, then the plaintiff must then show there is a disputed material fact on the jurisdictional issue.14 If the facts are disputed, the court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction and the issue must be resolved by the finder-of-fact at trial; however, if the evidence is undisputed or if there is no fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court will rule on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. 15 When reviewing a plea to the