pleading requirement in Maryland

2001Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 , 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1991), involving a Maryland corporation, the Court made clear that pre-suit demand was not merely a pleading requirement, but, through incorporation of State law, a substantive one: “To prevent abuse of this remedy, however, equity courts established as a ‘precondition for the suit’ that the shareholder demonstrate that ‘the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.’ ” Ross v. Bernhard, [ 396 U.S. 531, 534 , 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 73

2001Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 , 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1991), involving a Maryland corporation, the Court made clear that pre-suit demand was not merely a pleading requirement, but, through incorporation of State law, a substantive one: “To prevent abuse of this remedy, however, equity courts established as a ‘precondition for the suit’ that the shareholder demonstrate that ‘the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.’ ” Ross v. Bernhard, [ 396 U.S. 531, 534 , 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 73

2001Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 , 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1991), involving a Maryland corporation, the Court made clear that pre-suit demand was not merely a pleading requirement, but, through incorporation of State law, a substantive one: “To prevent abuse of this remedy, however, equity courts established as a ‘precondition for the suit’ that the shareholder demonstrate that ‘the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.’ ” Ross v. Bernhard, [ 396 U.S. 531, 534 , 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 73

2001Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 , 111 S.Ct. 1711, 1716 , 114 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1991), involving a Maryland corporation, the Court made clear that pre-suit demand was not merely a pleading requirement, but, through incorporation of State law, a substantive one: “To prevent abuse of this remedy, however, equity courts established as a ‘precondition for the suit’ that the shareholder demonstrate that ‘the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.’ ” Ross v. Bernhard, [ 396 U.S. 531, 534 , 90 S.Ct. 733, 736 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729, 73

2018In previous cases, we have emphasized that "although [a movant] has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does not follow automatically that he can prove his claim." State v. Hunt , 443 Md. 238 , 257, 116 A.3d 477 , 488 (2015) ( citing Douglas v. State , 423 Md. 156 , 186, 31 A.3d 250 , 268 (2011) ).

2018In previous cases, we have emphasized that "although [a movant] has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does not follow automatically that he can prove his claim." State v. Hunt , 443 Md. 238 , 257, 116 A.3d 477 , 488 (2015) ( citing Douglas v. State , 423 Md. 156 , 186, 31 A.3d 250 , 268 (2011) ).

1999Maryland Rule 2-322(c) provides that “[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of .as provided in Rule 2-501.... ” See Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 112 Md.App. 526, 537-39 , 685 A.2d 884 (1996)(holding that when the lower court “had before it facts that went beyond the pleadings,” the appellate court would treat the lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, or in the alternati

1999Maryland Rule 2-322(c) provides that “[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of .as provided in Rule 2-501.... ” See Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 112 Md.App. 526, 537-39 , 685 A.2d 884 (1996)(holding that when the lower court “had before it facts that went beyond the pleadings,” the appellate court would treat the lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, or in the alternati

2018In previous cases, we have emphasized that "although [a movant] has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does not follow automatically that he can prove his claim." State v. Hunt , 443 Md. 238 , 257, 116 A.3d 477 , 488 (2015) ( citing Douglas v. State , 423 Md. 156 , 186, 31 A.3d 250 , 268 (2011) ).

2018In previous cases, we have emphasized that "although [a movant] has satisfied the pleading requirement to assert grounds for relief, it does not follow automatically that he can prove his claim." State v. Hunt , 443 Md. 238 , 257, 116 A.3d 477 , 488 (2015) ( citing Douglas v. State , 423 Md. 156 , 186, 31 A.3d 250 , 268 (2011) ).

2010(Emphasis added.) Thus, “when a trial judge is presented with factual allegations beyond those contained in the complaint to support or oppose a motion to dismiss and the trial judge does not exclude such matters, then the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 177 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 104-05 , 928 A.2d 795 (2007) (stating, “[bjecause the court dismissed the complaint without explanation, it is not clear whether any of that material was, in fact, considered.

2010(Emphasis added.) Thus, “when a trial judge is presented with factual allegations beyond those contained in the complaint to support or oppose a motion to dismiss and the trial judge does not exclude such matters, then the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.” Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 177 , 757 A.2d 118 (2000) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Danielczyk, 400 Md. 98, 104-05 , 928 A.2d 795 (2007) (stating, “[bjecause the court dismissed the complaint without explanation, it is not clear whether any of that material was, in fact, considered.

2022In State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 225 Md.

2020See Sager v. Housing Commission of Anne Arundel County, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524 , 548–49 (D.

2017If the circuit court concludes that Respondent may amend his petition to comply with the pleading requirement in Maryland Rule 4—332(d)(9), Respondent’s averment must allege which convictions he is “actually innocent” of, meaning which offenses he alleges he “did not commit.” See Smallwood, 451 Md. at 320 , 152 A.3d at 793 (holding that “[o]nly defendants who can allege they are ‘actually innocent,’ meaning they did not commit the crimes for which they are convicted, may bring a petition for relief under Crim.

2017If the circuit court concludes that Respondent may amend his petition to comply with the pleading requirement in Maryland Rule 4-332(d)(9), Respondent’s averment must allege which convictions he is “actually innocent” of, meaning which offenses he alleges he “did not commit.” See Smallwood, 451 Md. at 320 , 152 A.2d at 793 (holding that “[o]nly defendants who can allege they are ‘actually innocent,’ meaning they did not commit the crimes for which they are convicted, may bring a petition for relief under Crim.

2015Finally, we “construe liberally filings by pro se inmates, particularly when the statute involved is remedial.” Douglas, 423 Md. at 182 , 31 A.3d at 266 ; see State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 312 , 999 A.2d 1050, 1066 (2010) (referring to § 8-301 as both “procedural” and “remedial”).

2015Finally, we “construe liberally filings by pro se inmates, particularly when the statute involved is remedial.” Douglas, 423 Md. at 182 , 31 A.3d at 266 ; see State v. Matthews, 415 Md. 286, 312 , 999 A.2d 1050, 1066 (2010) (referring to § 8-301 as both “procedural” and “remedial”).

2012We have interpreted this Rule to mean that "[w]hen a party presents factual matters outside the pleadings, and the [trial judge] does not exclude them from consideration in the course of acting on a facial motion to dismiss, the [trial judge] must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment." Dual, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 161 , 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004).

2012We have interpreted this Rule to mean that "[w]hen a party presents factual matters outside the pleadings, and the [trial judge] does not exclude them from consideration in the course of acting on a facial motion to dismiss, the [trial judge] must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment." Dual, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 161 , 857 A.2d 1095, 1100 (2004).

2011See Hansen v. City of Laurel, 193 Md.App. 80, 88 , 996 A.2d 882, 887 (2010) (quoting Rule 2-322(c) which holds that "[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.") We treat it likewise.

2011See Hansen v. City of Laurel, 193 Md.App. 80, 88 , 996 A.2d 882, 887 (2010) (quoting Rule 2-322(c) which holds that "[i]f, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 2-501, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 2-501.") We treat it likewise.

2001The purpose of the demand requirement is to ‘affor[d] the directors an opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment and “waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on such right.’ ” [citation omitted] Ordinarily, it is only when demand is excused that the shareholder enjoys the right to initiate ‘suit on behalf of his corporation in disregard of the directors’ wishes.’ [citation omitted] In our view, the function of the demand doctrine in delimiting the respective powers of the individual shareholder and o

1996As did the Supreme Court of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. at 841 , 107 S.Ct. at 3150, we “view the Fifth Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination.” *27 The Administrative Hearing Officer, when considering the only application before him, appellee’s request for R5 zoning, found that the appellee “has no reasonable use of the subject property in its current OS zoning classification.” That finding was not appealed to the Board.

1996As did the Supreme Court of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. at 841 , 107 S.Ct. at 3150, we “view the Fifth Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination.” *27 The Administrative Hearing Officer, when considering the only application before him, appellee’s request for R5 zoning, found that the appellee “has no reasonable use of the subject property in its current OS zoning classification.” That finding was not appealed to the Board.

1994Ins., supra, wherein the Court of Appeals stated: The insurer must defend its insured if it appears from the suit or other sources available at the time defense is tendered that there is a potential of liability under the policy. *563 See Mitchell, supra, 324 Md. at 62, n. 4, 595 A.2d 469 ; Continental Casualty v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 528 , 489 A.2d 536 (1985); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.

1994Ins., supra, wherein the Court of Appeals stated: The insurer must defend its insured if it appears from the suit or other sources available at the time defense is tendered that there is a potential of liability under the policy. *563 See Mitchell, supra, 324 Md. at 62, n. 4, 595 A.2d 469 ; Continental Casualty v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 528 , 489 A.2d 536 (1985); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.

1994See also Eastern Shore Financial v. Donegal Mutual Ins., 84 Md.App. 609, 624 , 581 A.2d 452 (1990), cert. den. sub nom.

1994See also Eastern Shore Financial v. Donegal Mutual Ins., 84 Md.App. 609, 624 , 581 A.2d 452 (1990), cert. den. sub nom.