pleading standard (Maine) · Go Syfert
← Maine issues

pleading standard in Maine

26 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Bean v. Cummingsgreen
me · 2008 · cited in 5 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2020It should be sufficient to allege the statutory elements. 1 Second, Plaintiff has alleged with great deal of 1 Defendants cite Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18 for the proposition that a statut01y pe1jury claim is like a claim of fraud and requires a higher pleading standard with circumstances pied with particularity.

2017P. 8; see also Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18 , ,r 8, 939 A.2d 676, 679 (discussing pleading requirements in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, and noting that Rule 9(b) identifies certain claims that require a heightened pleading standard such as fraud or mistake).

25
Beaucage v. City of Rocklandgreen
me · 2000 · cited in 2 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2004–2017
2 sentences

2017P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ...."); Beaucage v. City ofRockland, 2000 ME 184 , ,r 5, 760 A.2d 1054 ("The filing of the affidavits converted the City's motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment.").

2017P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment ...."); Beaucage v. City ofRockland, 2000 ME 184 , ,r 5, 760 A.2d 1054 ("The filing of the affidavits converted the City's motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment.").

12
Polk v. Town of Lubecgreen
me · 2000 · cited in 2 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2011–2017
2 sentences

2017Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to provide the opposing party with "fair notice of the claim." Polk v. Town ofLubec. 2000 lVIE 152, ~ 18, 756 A.2d 510 , 5141:fil_(quoting E.N Nason, Inc. v. Land-Ho Dev.

2011Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to provide the opposing party with "fair notice of the claim." Polk v. Town ofLubec, 2000 ME 152 , ~ 18, 756 A.2d 510,514 (quoting E.N.

12
American Policyholders' Insurance Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co.green
me · 1977 · cited in 2 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1979–1980
2 sentences

1980In Cumberland Cold Storage , we held that the Superior Court justice had properly laid the underlying damage complaints alongside the insurance policy and then determined that the pleadings were adequate to encompass an occurrence within the coverage of the policy. 373 A.2d at 249 , We emphasized in Cumberland Cold Storage that the pleading test for determination of the duty to defend is based exclusively on the facts as alleged rather than on the facts as they actually are.

1979Therein we adopted the majority view that “the pleading test for determination of the duty to defend is based exclusively on the facts as alleared rather than on the facts as they actually are.” Id. at 249.

12
Conley v. Gibsonred
scotus · 1957 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See 2 Harvey & Merritt, 14 Maine Civil Practice § 8:1 at 353-54 (3d, 2020-2021 ed. 2020); Richards v. Soucy, 610 A.2d 268 , 270 n.3 (Me. 1992) (noting that, according to the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl.

11
Weiszmann v. Kirkland and Ellisgreen
cod · 1990 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018Pleading a RICO count is subject to the heightened pleading standard required for fraud, and a plaintiff alleging mail and wire fraud-as Plaintiff has done here-must "specify the time, place, and content of the alleged false representation, and describe with particularity any allegedly fraudulent transaction, and how the particular mailing or transaction furthered the fraudulent scheme." Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540, 1546 (D.

11
Spickler v. Greenberggreen
me · 1994 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008See id. [¶ 13] Heightened pleading requirements are necessary to ensure that disgruntled litigants are not able to use civil perjury claims as a means to re-litigate cases when they are displeased with the outcomes.

11
Docket No. 97-9205green
ca2 · 1998 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See e.g., Lanza v. Merrill Lynch & Company [nc., 154 F.3d 56 , 60 (2nd Cir. 1998); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437 , 441 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988). 10 and are therefore akin to tort-based claims.

11
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unitgreen
scotus · 1993 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995The heightened pleading requirement provides that "[i]n cases against government officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff’s complaints state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, -, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 , 122 L.Ed.2d 517, 524 (1993) (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir.1985)). 7 .

1995The heightened pleading requirement provides that "[i]n cases against government officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff’s complaints state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, -, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 , 122 L.Ed.2d 517, 524 (1993) (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir.1985)). 7 .

11
James Elliott and Joseph Defley v. Leander H. Perez, Jr., Etc., Eugene E. Leon, Jr., Etc., and Frank Kleingreen
ca5 · 1985 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995The heightened pleading requirement provides that "[i]n cases against government officials involving the likely defense of immunity we require of trial judges that they demand that the plaintiff’s complaints state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, -, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 , 122 L.Ed.2d 517, 524 (1993) (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir.1985)). 7 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

CaseNegativeCited
Richards v. Soucygreen
me · 1992 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022See 2 Harvey & Merritt, 14 Maine Civil Practice § 8:1 at 353-54 (3d, 2020-2021 ed. 2020); Richards v. Soucy, 610 A.2d 268 , 270 n.3 (Me. 1992) (noting that, according to the United States Supreme Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl.

11

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Moody v. State Liquor & Lottery Commission green
me · 2004
2 sentences

2011P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for . dgment ..... summary JU ") However, the Law Court has recognized an exception to this general rule covering three types of material outside the pleadings: "[O]fficial public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint [can be considered] without converting a motion to

2011P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for . dgment ..... summary JU ") However, the Law Court has recognized an exception to this general rule covering three types of material outside the pleadings: "[O]fficial public documents, documents that are central to the plaintiffs claim, and documents referred to in the complaint [can be considered] without converting a motion to

52010–2014
Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co green
ca2 · 1949
2 sentences

1980Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); see cases cited in 50 A.L.R. 458 , § 18 at 498-99 (1956) (footnote omitted). . [T]he duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay or indemnify. [T]he duty to indemnify, i. e., ultimate liability, depends upon the true facts.

1977Lee v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); see cases cited *250 in 50 A.L.R.2d 458 , § 18 at 498-99 (1956). 1 Thus, whether Lewis was, in fact, the owner of the building is totally irrelevant here.

21977–1980
In Re Wage Payment Litigation green
me · 2000
2 sentences

2023Dismiss 5.) The only support Curaleaf cites for this heightened pleading standard is In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162 , 1 12, 759 A.2d 217 , where the Law Court recited its definition of "unpaid wages" as "precisely what [is] owing when an employer does not pay an employee for work." Curaleaf invites the court to read the word "precisely" to mean that a plaintiff must allege the exact amount of hours worked without pay and how much they are owed to survive a motion to dismiss.

2023Dismiss 5.) The only support Curaleaf cites for this heightened pleading standard is In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162 , 1 12, 759 A.2d 217 , where the Law Court recited its definition of "unpaid wages" as "precisely what [is] owing when an employer does not pay an employee for work." Curaleaf invites the court to read the word "precisely" to mean that a plaintiff must allege the exact amount of hours worked without pay and how much they are owed to survive a motion to dismiss.

12023–2023
Dana Desjardins v. Michael Reynolds green
me · 2017
2 sentences

2023The court disagrees. 6 Maine's notice pleading standards require only "fair notice of the cause of action by providing a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Desjardins, 2017 ME 99,117 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2023The court disagrees. 6 Maine's notice pleading standards require only "fair notice of the cause of action by providing a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Desjardins, 2017 ME 99,117 , 162 A.3d 228 .

12023–2023
Perri Frame v. Millinocket Regional Hospital green
me · 2013
2 sentences

2023“An amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading where the claim asserted in the amended pleading ‘arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.’” Frame v. Millinocket Reg’l Hosp., 2013 ME 104, ¶ 13 , 82 A.3d 137 (quoting M.R.

2023“An amended pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading where the claim asserted in the amended pleading ‘arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.’” Frame v. Millinocket Reg’l Hosp., 2013 ME 104, ¶ 13 , 82 A.3d 137 (quoting M.R.

12023–2023
Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Financial Corp. green
me · 1998
2 sentences

2019Corp., 1998 ME 46 , ~ 17, 708 A.2d 651 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 674).

2019Corp., 1998 ME 46 , ~ 17, 708 A.2d 651 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 674).

12019–2019
TD Banknorth, N.A. v. Hawkins green
me · 2010
2 sentences

2013P. 15(c);4 see also TD Banknorth, N.A. v. Hawkins, 2010 ME 104 , ¶ 18 n.5, 5 A.3d 1042 (noting that relation back is “a procedural mechanism to determine the date of the filing of the initial [pleading], usually employed when the [pleading] is amended after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations”); AFSCME Council 93 v. Me.

2013P. 15(c);4 see also TD Banknorth, N.A. v. Hawkins, 2010 ME 104 , ¶ 18 n.5, 5 A.3d 1042 (noting that relation back is “a procedural mechanism to determine the date of the filing of the initial [pleading], usually employed when the [pleading] is amended after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations”); AFSCME Council 93 v. Me.

12013–2013
Johanson v. Dunnington green
me · 2001
2 sentences

2010"Dismissal is ''''Tarranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts thllt he might prove in support of his claim." Joha17s01l v. D7I717zi1lgtoll, 2001 ME 169 , 91 5, 785 A.2d 1244, 1245-46 . 3 Ms. Campbell first argues that the immunity provision of 22 M.RS. § 4014 should subject Mr. Malenko's complaint to a heightened pleading standard and that it should be found deficient.

2010"Dismissal is ''''Tarranted when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts thllt he might prove in support of his claim." Joha17s01l v. D7I717zi1lgtoll, 2001 ME 169 , 91 5, 785 A.2d 1244, 1245-46 . 3 Ms. Campbell first argues that the immunity provision of 22 M.RS. § 4014 should subject Mr. Malenko's complaint to a heightened pleading standard and that it should be found deficient.

12010–2010
Shaw v. Southern Aroostook Community School District green
me · 1996
1 sentence

2008We therefore affirm the trial court’s application of the heightened pleading standard in civil perjury claims and now address Bean’s claim specifically. [¶ 14] Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Bean, as we are required to do, Shaw, 683 A.2d at 503 , fails to ameliorate the insufficiency of his claim under the stringent requirements of M.R.

12008–2008
Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories green
ca10 · 1980
1 sentence

2001Id.

12001–2001
Anthony J. Scherer, Jr. v. David J. Balkema green
ca7 · 1988
1 sentence

2001See e.g., Lanza v. Merrill Lynch & Company [nc., 154 F.3d 56 , 60 (2nd Cir. 1998); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437 , 441 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988). 10 and are therefore akin to tort-based claims.

12001–2001
Marston v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company green
me · 1974
1 sentence

1977Our Court recognized this pleading test in Marston v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co., Me., 319 A.2d 111 (1974).

11977–1977

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ME § Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 870 (3) ME § Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5, § 213 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 293 (1916–2026) NY 219 (1927–2026) CA 200 (1899–2026) IL 144 (1878–2026) DE 97 (1982–2026) FL 69 (1963–2025) OH 61 (1989–2026) GA 61 (1972–2025) MI 51 (1974–2025) CT 42 (1921–2023) MO 39 (1911–2022) ID 39 (1924–2025) NC 38 (1928–2026) PA 36 (1930–2025) TN 33 (1995–2022) WV 33 (1963–2025) OR 33 (1922–2026) MA 32 (1952–2021) AL 32 (1909–2025) WI 31 (1979–2026) DC 29 (1946–2024) VA 28 (1987–2025) IN 27 (1891–2025) ME 26 (1977–2024) MD 25 (1988–2022) NJ 25 (1951–2026) KS 23 (1931–2026) OK 23 (1927–2019) IA 23 (1909–2026) UT 22 (1991–2025) CO 20 (1907–2026) AZ 19 (1951–2022) NM 19 (2002–2025) WA 18 (1927–2019) NV 18 (2011–2025) NE 17 (1884–2025) VT 16 (2008–2026) MN 16 (1982–2025) RI 12 (1996–2011) HI 12 (1978–2023) VI 11 (2008–2025) LA 11 (1933–2022) AK 11 (1962–2018) KY 10 (1920–2026) WY 10 (1956–2016) MS 9 (1984–2017) MT 7 (1944–2010) AR 7 (1985–2023) SC 7 (2009–2025) ND 3 (1966–2022)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check