pleading requirement in Florida

2024Notwithstanding appellee’s failure to plead entitlement to fees, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the exception to the pleading requirement established in Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991) is applicable.

2023GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 3 We note that in Stockman, our supreme court recognized an exception to the pleading requirement “[w]here a party has notice that an opponent claims entitlement to attorney’s fees, and by its conduct recognizes or acquiesces to that claim or otherwise fails to object to the failure to plead entitlement, that party waives any objection to the failure to plead a claim for attorney’s fees.” 573 So. 2d at 838 .

2023“In assessing the adequacy of the pleading of a claim, the court must accept the facts alleged therein as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader.” MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2022“In assessing the adequacy of the pleading of a claim, the court must accept the facts alleged therein as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader.” MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

2004See Purvis v. Carver, 303 So.2d 681, 681-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

1981Similarly, we held in Purvis v. Carver, 303 So.2d 681, 682 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), "that the chancellor was without jurisdiction to summarily change the visitation provisions of a dissolution decree which had become final where no pleading had been filed directed to the modification of the decree." An oral motion of the husband did not satisfy the pleading requirement.

2015Co. v. Featherston, 978 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (en banc).

2015Co. v. Featherston, 978 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (en banc).

2008"In order to state a cause of action, a complaint must allege sufficient ultimate facts to show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Taylor v. City of Riviera Beach, 801 So.2d 259, 262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2004See Taylor v. City of Riviera Beach, 801 So.2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

2019Jordan v. Nienhuis , 203 So. 3d 974 , 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ; Ray Coudriet Builders, Inc. v. R.K.

2019Jordan v. Nienhuis , 203 So. 3d 974 , 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) ; Ray Coudriet Builders, Inc. v. R.K.

2016“In assessing the adequacy .of the pleading of a claim, the court must accept the .facts alleged therein. as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader.” Lander v. Smith, 906 So.2d 1130, 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Lago, 867 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

2012Garcia v. Iglesias, 77 So.3d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Lander v. Smith, 906 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)), we held that our standard of review was de novo. “ ‘In assessing the adequacy of the pleading of a claim, the court must accept the facts alleged therein as true and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn from those facts must be drawn in favor of the pleader.’” Lander, 906 So.2d at 1132 (quoting MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan v. Logo, 867 So.2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

2012See Green v. Sun Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n, 730 So.2d 1261, 1263 (Fla.1998).

2011This pleading requirement was subsequently clarified in Green v. Sun Harbor Homeowners’ Ass’n, 730 So.2d 1261 (Fla.1998): This Court’s use of the phrase “must be pled” [in Stockman] is to be construed in accord with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.

2025“If the plaintiff meets this initial pleading requirement, the defendant may contest the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations by filing a legally sufficient affidavit or other sworn proof to the contrary.”3 Id. (quoting Rautenberg, 193 So. 3d at 928 (internal quotations omitted)).

2025“The defendant need not contest the ultimate 3 It logically follows that if a plaintiff has not met its initial pleading burden, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss without filing sworn proof merely on the basis that the plaintiff’s complaint does not meet the plaintiff’s initial burden to plead a basis for personal jurisdiction. 6 allegations of the complaint but only the jurisdictional allegations.” Rautenberg, 193 So. 3d at 928-29 .

2025"The purpose of [the pleading requirement in] rule 1.130(a) 'is to apprise the defendant of the nature and extent of the cause of action so that the defendant may plead with greater certainty.' " Meyer, 265 So. 3d at 719 (quoting Amiker v. Mid-Century Ins., 398 So. 2d 974, 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)).

2022“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, ‘[a] court may not go beyond the four corners of the complaint and exhibits attached thereto.’” Id. (quoting Kohl v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 988 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. 4th 2 DCA 2008)).

2020Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 528-29 (Fla. 2009).

2019See DeSilva v. First Cmty. Bank of Am., 42 So. 3d 285, 288-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (discussing the pleading and hearing requirements for appointment of a receiver); Plaza v. Plaza, 78 So. 3d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("Appointing a receiver is a rare and extraordinary remedy. . . . [I]t is an abuse of 2IDCM is a Panamanian company that may have at one time held legal title to the Websites.

2019See DeSilva v. First Cmty. Bank of Am., 42 So. 3d 285, 288-89 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (discussing the pleading and hearing requirements for appointment of a receiver); Plaza v. Plaza, 78 So. 3d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) ("Appointing a receiver is a rare and extraordinary remedy. . . . [I]t is an abuse of 2IDCM is a Panamanian company that may have at one time held legal title to the Websites.

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the -Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So.3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So.3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So. 3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2017“Our courts have repeatedly affirmed that failure to comply with a statutory condition precedent, absent waiver or estoppel, requires dismissal.” City of Coconut Creek v. City of Deerfield Beach, 840 So.2d 389, 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the -Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So.3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So.3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So. 3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the -Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So.3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA. 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So.3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So.3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So.3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2017CONCLUSION We hereby quash the Third District’s decision in Kopel v. Kopel, 117 So. 3d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), and approve cases such as Caduceus Properties, LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 989 (Fla. 2014), Fabbiano v. Demings, 91 So. 3d 893, 895 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), and Armiger v. Associated Outdoor Clubs, Inc., 48 So. 3d 864, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which make clear that an amendment asserting a new cause of action can relate back to the original pleading where the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the original.

2016See, e.g., Davis v. Timeshare Travel Int'l, Inc., 489 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (noting, in dicta, that guarantor's equivocating testimony about her signature could not overcome statutory presumption of its validity where she had only pleaded a general denial to the lender's claims within her answer); Riggs, 36 So. 3d at 933 ("Nothing in the pleadings placed the authenticity of Alday's signature at issue."); Lipton v. Se.

2016See, e.g., Davis v. Time share Travel Int'l, Inc., 489 So.2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (noting, in dicta, that guarantor’s equivocating testimony about her signature could not overcome statutory presumption of its validity where she had only pleaded a general denial to the lender’s claims within her answer); Riggs, 36 So.3d at 933 (“Nothing in the pleadings placed the authenticity of Al-day’s signature at issue.”); Lipton v. Se.

2016See, e.g., Davis v. Timeshare Travel Int'l, Inc., 489 So. 2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (noting, in dicta, that guarantor's equivocating testimony about her signature could not overcome statutory presumption of its validity where she had only pleaded a general denial to the lender's claims within her answer); Riggs, 36 So. 3d at 933 ("Nothing in the pleadings placed the authenticity of Alday's signature at issue."); Lipton v. Se.

2016See, e.g., Davis v. Time share Travel Int'l, Inc., 489 So.2d 47, 48-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (noting, in dicta, that guarantor’s equivocating testimony about her signature could not overcome statutory presumption of its validity where she had only pleaded a general denial to the lender’s claims within her answer); Riggs, 36 So.3d at 933 (“Nothing in the pleadings placed the authenticity of Al-day’s signature at issue.”); Lipton v. Se.

2016Bd. of Pinellas Cty., 975 So.2d 1116, 1122 (Fla.2008) (affirming that a rule of civil procedure “must be given its plain and obvious meaning” (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984))); S2 Global, Inc. v. Tactical Operational Support Servs., LLC, 119 So.3d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (recognizing that when a rule of civil procedure “is-clear and unambiguous and conveys a . clear and, definite meaning,” the plain language of the rule controls); The rule’s language, does, not brook exceptions for certain kinds of conditions precedent, a point we recently made when we rejected a s

2016See, e.g., BMR Funding, LLC v. DDR Corp., 67 So.3d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (”[T]he phrase ‘must be pled’ [in Stockman ] is to be construed in accord with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.