37 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1848–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stephen v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225, 234 (1852). 2015See Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225, 234 (1852). | 2 | 2 |
Inquiry Concerning Trammellgreen2 sentences2013See Inquiry Concerning Trammell, 48 Cal. 4th CJP Supp. 56, 63-65 (1999) (judge who engaged in a sexual relationship with a criminal defendant while presiding over cases against two co-defendants was guilty of “willful misconduct,” including “bad faith” in his “corrupt purpose” of furthering that relationship, and violated Canon 3 (E) when he failed to disclose the relationship). (c) Finally, Judge English’s violation of Canon 3 (E) is not harmless error. 2013See Inquiry Concerning Trammell, 48 Cal. 4th CJP Supp. 56, 63-65 (1999) (judge who engaged in a sexual relationship with a criminal defendant while presiding over cases against two co-defendants was guilty of “willful misconduct,” including “bad faith” in his “corrupt purpose” of furthering that relationship, and violated Canon 3 (E) when he failed to disclose the relationship). (c) Finally, Judge English’s violation of Canon 3 (E) is not harmless error. | 2 | 2 |
Waxelbaum v. Waxelbaumgreen2 sentences1947Waxelbaum, v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 825 ( 189 S. E. 283 ); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472 (2) ( 1 S. E. 2d, 12 ). 1947Waxelbaum, v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 825 ( 189 S. E. 283 ); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472 (2) ( 1 S. E. 2d, 12 ). | 2 | 2 |
Shropshire v. Raineygreen2 sentences1936In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615 ( 74 S. E. 245 ), Justice Lumpkin discussed practically all of the former decisions of this court; and in Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566, 571 (supra), cases falling under the general rule and those under the exception are referred to. 1936In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615 ( 74 S. E. 245 ), Justice Lumpkin discussed practically all of the former decisions of this court; and in Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566, 571 (supra), cases falling under the general rule and those under the exception are referred to. | 2 | 2 |
Short v. Ed. Kellogg & Co.green2 sentences2024See Short v. Ed. Kellogg & Co., 10 Ga. 180, 182 (1851) (explaining the “English rule” that “[a]t the Common Law, no judgment was amendable after the term at which it was entered”); Winslow v. Staab, 242 F. 426 (2d Cir. 1917) (“The technical rule of the English courts is that it is the enrollment of the decree which places it beyond the control of the court.”). 2024See Short v. Kellogg & Co., 10 Ga. 180, 182 (1851) (explaining the “English rule” that “[a]t the Common Law, no judgment was amendable after the term at which it was entered”); Winslow v. Staab, 242 F. 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1917) (“The technical rule of the English courts is that it is the enrollment of the decree which places it beyond the control of the court.”). | 1 | 1 |
Winslow v. Staabgreen2 sentences2024See Short v. Ed. Kellogg & Co., 10 Ga. 180, 182 (1851) (explaining the “English rule” that “[a]t the Common Law, no judgment was amendable after the term at which it was entered”); Winslow v. Staab, 242 F. 426 (2d Cir. 1917) (“The technical rule of the English courts is that it is the enrollment of the decree which places it beyond the control of the court.”). 2024See Short v. Kellogg & Co., 10 Ga. 180, 182 (1851) (explaining the “English rule” that “[a]t the Common Law, no judgment was amendable after the term at which it was entered”); Winslow v. Staab, 242 F. 426, 428 (2d Cir. 1917) (“The technical rule of the English courts is that it is the enrollment of the decree which places it beyond the control of the court.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Atlanta, Knoxville & Northern Railway Co.green2 sentences1985Co., 115 Ga. 171, 179-180 ( 41 SE 699 ), wherein they cited the old English rule which “charged the plaintiff with the necessity of having a knowledge of the law as to when to sue, where to sue, and how to sue. 1985Co., 115 Ga. 171, 179-180 ( 41 SE 699 ), wherein they cited the old English rule which “charged the plaintiff with the necessity of having a knowledge of the law as to when to sue, where to sue, and how to sue. | 1 | 1 |
Printup v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1928In Wyche v. Green, 11 Ga. 171 (4), it was said: “As to the degree or quantum of proof that will be required, before relief will be granted against written instruments, the rule is not laid down with inflexible uniformity.” In that case the English rule was stated, and it was declared that the language thereof “has been considered too strong;” but it was further said that such a case “should be clearly made out by proofs which are satisfactory.” In Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 558, 567 ( 63 Am. 1928In Wyche v. Green, 11 Ga. 171 (4), it was said: “As to the degree or quantum of proof that will be required, before relief will be granted against written instruments, the rule is not laid down with inflexible uniformity.” In that case the English rule was stated, and it was declared that the language thereof “has been considered too strong;” but it was further said that such a case “should be clearly made out by proofs which are satisfactory.” In Printup v. Mitchell, 17 Ga. 558, 567 ( 63 Am. | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1926The benefit which is referred to as giving a right of action by a beneficiary, under the American rule, must not be an indirect or incidental one; but the contract, properly construed, must exhibit an intent to confer a benefit on the third party.” In delivering the opinion of the court in Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 660 ( 78 S. E. 30 , 44 L. 1926The benefit which is referred to as giving a right of action by a beneficiary, under the American rule, must not be an indirect or incidental one; but the contract, properly construed, must exhibit an intent to confer a benefit on the third party.” In delivering the opinion of the court in Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 660 ( 78 S. E. 30 , 44 L. | 1 | 1 |
Keller v. Stategreen2 sentences1923And the same 'order will be made on the request of the defendant, but as matter of indulgence, and not of right.” Since the adoption of the code, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Keller v. State, 102 Ga. 506, 508 ( 31 S. E. 92 ), “a much more equitable practice has been of force, whereby the accused is put upon an equal footing with the State in this respect, and the court is enjoined to effect the object of the rule so ‘far as practicable and convenient.’ . . 1923And the same 'order will be made on the request of the defendant, but as matter of indulgence, and not of right.” Since the adoption of the code, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Keller v. State, 102 Ga. 506, 508 ( 31 S. E. 92 ), “a much more equitable practice has been of force, whereby the accused is put upon an equal footing with the State in this respect, and the court is enjoined to effect the object of the rule so ‘far as practicable and convenient.’ . . | 1 | 1 |
| Mactier's Administrators v. Frithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sheppard v. Bridges
green
2 sentences1936In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615 ( 74 S. E. 245 ), Justice Lumpkin discussed practically all of the former decisions of this court; and in Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566, 571 (supra), cases falling under the general rule and those under the exception are referred to. 1936In Sheppard v. Bridges, 137 Ga. 615 ( 74 S. E. 245 ), Justice Lumpkin discussed practically all of the former decisions of this court; and in Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566, 571 (supra), cases falling under the general rule and those under the exception are referred to. | 4 | 1918–1936 |
Mayor of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co.
green
2 sentences2013As our Supreme Court has recently emphasized, “[j]udicial integrity is a state interest of the highest order because the power and prerogative of a court to resolve disputes rests upon the respect accorded by citizens to a court’s judgments which, in turn, depends upon the issuing court’s absolute probity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Batson-Cook, 291 Ga. at 114 . 2013As our Supreme Court has recently emphasized, “ [ j] udicial integrity is a state interest of the highest order because the power and prerogative of a court to resolve disputes rests upon the respect accorded by citizens to a court’s judgments which, in turn, depends upon the issuing court’s absolute probity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Batson-Cook, 291 Ga. at 114 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Roberts
green
2 sentences1947Waxelbaum, v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 825 ( 189 S. E. 283 ); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472 (2) ( 1 S. E. 2d, 12 ). 1947Waxelbaum, v. Waxelbaum, 54 Ga. App. 823, 825 ( 189 S. E. 283 ); First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Roberts, 187 Ga. 472 (2) ( 1 S. E. 2d, 12 ). | 2 | 1947–1947 |
Beliveau v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1936Thus, in Wharton on Agency, after the author has advocated the English rule, he says (§ 594) : “Tí the opposite party knows that the attorney is without authority or acts in disobedience to his client, the compromise will not be enforced to the injury of the client.’ Belivean v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 68 N. H. 225 ( 40 Atl. 734 , 44 L. 1936Thus, in Wharton on Agency, after the author has advocated the English rule, he says (§ 594) : “Tí the opposite party knows that the attorney is without authority or acts in disobedience to his client, the compromise will not be enforced to the injury of the client.’ Belivean v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 68 N. H. 225 ( 40 Atl. 734 , 44 L. | 2 | 1913–1936 |
Empire State Insurance v. Collins
neutral
2 sentences1933Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. 1920Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. | 2 | 1920–1933 |
Pfeiffer & Co. v. Hunt
neutral
2 sentences1933Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. 1920Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. | 2 | 1920–1933 |
Austell v. Humphries
neutral
2 sentences1933Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. 1933Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. | 2 | 1920–1933 |
Lamar v. State
green
2 sentences1933Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. 1920Co. v. Collins, 54 Ga. 376 ; Pfeiffer v. Hunt, 75 Ga. 513 ; Gunter v. Mooney, 72 Ga. 205 ; Austell v. Humphries, 99 Ga. 408 ( 27 S. E. 736 ); Hawkins v. Central Ry. | 2 | 1920–1933 |
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
green
2 sentences2022The majority found that purposeful availment could not be shown simply because the English defendant “kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n]” that its products sold to a U. S distributor for nationwide distribution might be sold in New Jersey.16 And as 14 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 297-298 (III). 15 564 U. S. 873 ( 131 SCt 2780 , 180 LEd 2d 765) (2011). 16 Id. at 877, 886 (III) (“[The plaintiff] has not established that J. 2022The majority found that purposeful availment could not be shown simply because the English defendant “kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] know[n]” that its products sold to a U. S distributor for nationwide distribution might be sold in New Jersey.16 And as 14 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 297-298 (III). 15 564 U. S. 873 ( 131 SCt 2780 , 180 LEd 2d 765) (2011). 16 Id. at 877, 886 (III) (“[The plaintiff] has not established that J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Whitsett v. State
neutral
2 sentences1985Co., 115 Ga. 171, 179-180 ( 41 SE 699 ), wherein they cited the old English rule which “charged the plaintiff with the necessity of having a knowledge of the law as to when to sue, where to sue, and how to sue. 1985Co., 115 Ga. 171, 179-180 ( 41 SE 699 ), wherein they cited the old English rule which “charged the plaintiff with the necessity of having a knowledge of the law as to when to sue, where to sue, and how to sue. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Sentell v. Mitchell
neutral
1 sentence1977In Ford v. Smith, 25 Ga., supra, at 680 , the court quoted the English rule as follows: "The rule is, that if the contract be not faithfully performed, the plaintiff shall be entitled only to recover the value of the work and material supplied.” In Sentell v. Mitchell, supra, plaintiff contracted with defendant to furnish millstones, irons and gearing and assemble them; plaintiff furnished the' materials but did not assemble the mill; plaintiff sued; the defendant pled the plaintiffs breach as a bar to recovery; the defense was overruled. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Egan v. Dotson
green
2 sentences1950The history of the evolution of this rule therefore seems to be that our American courts in Krug v. Pitass, supra, and Egan v. Dotson, supra, were following the English rule as originally laid down that malice cannot be imputed in libel cases. 1950The history of the evolution of this rule therefore seems to be that our American courts in Krug v. Pitass, supra, and Egan v. Dotson, supra, were following the English rule as originally laid down that malice cannot be imputed in libel cases. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Craig v. Ambrose
green
2 sentences1939As to the difference between a conveyance to one and his heirs, and a conveyance to one with limitations over to his heirs, and also as to what is a limitation over, see Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134 ( 4 S. E. 1 ); Ewing v. Shropshire, supra; Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707 ( 36 S. E. 409 , 50 L. 1939As to the difference between a conveyance to one and his heirs, and a conveyance to one with limitations over to his heirs, and also as to what is a limitation over, see Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134 ( 4 S. E. 1 ); Ewing v. Shropshire, supra; Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707 ( 36 S. E. 409 , 50 L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Hertz v. Abrahams
green
2 sentences1939As to the difference between a conveyance to one and his heirs, and a conveyance to one with limitations over to his heirs, and also as to what is a limitation over, see Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134 ( 4 S. E. 1 ); Ewing v. Shropshire, supra; Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707 ( 36 S. E. 409 , 50 L. 1939As to the difference between a conveyance to one and his heirs, and a conveyance to one with limitations over to his heirs, and also as to what is a limitation over, see Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134 ( 4 S. E. 1 ); Ewing v. Shropshire, supra; Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707 ( 36 S. E. 409 , 50 L. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
United States v. Field
green
2 sentences1934U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (41 Sup. Ct. 156). 1934U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (41 Sup. Ct. 156). | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Union City Realty & Trust Co. v. Wright
green
2 sentences1931But the great weight of authority is to the effect that if the promise is made for the purpose of conferring a benefit on a person, though he be not a party to the contract, or furnish the consideration for the promise, he can bring suit upon it.” In Union City Realty & Trust Co. v. Wright, 138 Ga. 703 ( 76 S. E. 35 ), it was said: “The controlling features of this case have recently been the subject of full consideration by this court, in Sheppard v. Bridges [supra]. 1931But the great weight of authority is to the effect that if the promise is made for the purpose of conferring a benefit on a person, though he be not a party to the contract, or furnish the consideration for the promise, he can bring suit upon it.” In Union City Realty & Trust Co. v. Wright, 138 Ga. 703 ( 76 S. E. 35 ), it was said: “The controlling features of this case have recently been the subject of full consideration by this court, in Sheppard v. Bridges [supra]. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences1923The court will take proper care to effect this object as far as practicable and convenient, but any mere irregularity shall not exclude the witness.” Prior to the adoption of the code, the English rule, applicable to criminal cases, as laid down by Mr. Chitty, was quoted and approved by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 62 , as follows: “ Before the examination commences, the Crown may demand that the witnesses should retire, in order to each being questioned in the absence of the others. 1923The court will take proper care to effect this object as far as practicable and convenient, but any mere irregularity shall not exclude the witness.” Prior to the adoption of the code, the English rule, applicable to criminal cases, as laid down by Mr. Chitty, was quoted and approved by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 62 , as follows: “ Before the examination commences, the Crown may demand that the witnesses should retire, in order to each being questioned in the absence of the others. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Floyd County v. Salmon
green
2 sentences1921In the case of Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313 ( 106 S. E. 280 ), this court said: “ With respect to the time when statutes aré to take effect, the old English rule was that if the act was not directed to operate from any particular time, it took effect from the first day of the session at which it was passed. 1921In the case of Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313 ( 106 S. E. 280 ), this court said: “ With respect to the time when statutes aré to take effect, the old English rule was that if the act was not directed to operate from any particular time, it took effect from the first day of the session at which it was passed. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Gibson v. Patterson
neutral
2 sentences1905The question involved in the present case, however, is not left dependent upon reasoning or construction, but is practically de tided in the case of Gibson v. Patterson, 75 Ga. 549 , where it was said: “ Where a bill was filed iu aid of a libel for divorce, and the principal purpose of it was to secure the wife’s alimony, with proper allegations and proof, the chancellor would have authority to order the arrest of the defendant, and to require him to give bond and security for his compliance with any order that he might grant in the divorce case then pending, for the payment of alimony to his 1905The question involved in the present case, however, is not left dependent upon reasoning or construction, but is practically de tided in the case of Gibson v. Patterson, 75 Ga. 549 , where it was said: “ Where a bill was filed iu aid of a libel for divorce, and the principal purpose of it was to secure the wife’s alimony, with proper allegations and proof, the chancellor would have authority to order the arrest of the defendant, and to require him to give bond and security for his compliance with any order that he might grant in the divorce case then pending, for the payment of alimony to his | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Davis v. Hollingsworth green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Mitchell v. Mitchell
neutral
2 sentences1902Yet, even in such cases, the Vice-Chancellor in Lyon v. Mitchell, supra (p. 481), said that the extent of the estate given under the first devise is to be governed by the words in the limitation over, “where they bear upon, and unite with, and tend to affect the construction of the prior words, and which in many cases may enable us to come to a conclusion respecting it.” He also said (pp. 472-3) that a devise to A. and his issue as tenants in common would be another mode of showing a legal intention on the part of the testator not to create an estate tail; but we think this would apply to esta 1902Yet, even in such cases, the Vice-Chancellor in Lyon v. Mitchell, supra (p. 481), said that the extent of the estate given under the first devise is to be governed by the words in the limitation over, “where they bear upon, and unite with, and tend to affect the construction of the prior words, and which in many cases may enable us to come to a conclusion respecting it.” He also said (pp. 472-3) that a devise to A. and his issue as tenants in common would be another mode of showing a legal intention on the part of the testator not to create an estate tail; but we think this would apply to esta | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Hale v. Hale green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Martin v. Gordon green | 1 | 1898–1898 |
| Toombs v. Hill neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Chouteau v. Allen green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Fairfield Savings Bank v. Chase green | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Cohen & Menko v. Southern Express Co. neutral | 1 | 1886–1886 |
| Taylor v. Scott neutral | 1 | 1886–1886 |
| Henderson v. Merritt neutral | 1 | 1885–1885 |
| Parker & Edgarton v. Foote green | 1 | 1877–1877 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.