English rule in Kentucky

2017Id. at 949 .2 5 Several available sources of legal scholarship trace the common law history of the office of attorney general and the development of its powers and duties.

2017Id. at 949 .2 5 Several available sources of legal scholarship trace the common law history of the office of attorney general and the development of its powers and duties.

1907The English rule has been adopted and followed with approval in many of the state courts, while in many other state courts proceedings in a court of justice are held to be “privileged” only so far as they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of injury, and are therefore “conditionally privileged.” Our court has not passed upon this direct question, although in the case of Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 696 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 86 , 47 S. W. 884 , in passing upon the sufficiency of a petition wherein the plaintiff sought to recover of the defendant because of certain alleged libelou

1907The English rule has been adopted and followed with approval in many of the state courts, while in many other state courts proceedings in a court of justice are held to be “privileged” only so far as they are applicable and pertinent to the subject of injury, and are therefore “conditionally privileged.” Our court has not passed upon this direct question, although in the case of Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 696 , 20 Ky. Law Rep. 86 , 47 S. W. 884 , in passing upon the sufficiency of a petition wherein the plaintiff sought to recover of the defendant because of certain alleged libelou

1874Opinion by Judge Lindsay: The rule by which to determine whether real estate held by partners is to be treated as personalty, is stated by this court, in the case of Cornwall v. Cornwall, 6 Bush 369 , as. follows: “When the property is bought with partnership funds, to be used in carrying on and facilitating the partnership, business and purposes, and is used as a means of continuing and enlarging the partnership business and operations and profits, it is then partnership property, impressed with the characteristics, of personalty for any and ’all purposes, not only between the partners inter

1874Opinion by Judge Lindsay: The rule by which to determine whether real estate held by partners is to be treated as personalty, is stated by this court, in the case of Cornwall v. Cornwall, 6 Bush 369 , as. follows: “When the property is bought with partnership funds, to be used in carrying on and facilitating the partnership, business and purposes, and is used as a means of continuing and enlarging the partnership business and operations and profits, it is then partnership property, impressed with the characteristics, of personalty for any and ’all purposes, not only between the partners inter

2006They instead reserved the right to overrule decisions that were absurd or egregiously incorrect.” Id. (quoting Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W.

2006They instead reserved the right to overrule decisions that were absurd or egregiously incorrect." Id. (quoting Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W.

1954In our opinion in that case, the court said, 3 Bush at page 277 , 66 Ky. at page 277 , “Thus, at a very early period the common law of our British ancestors fully recognized the proprietorship of the owners of the soil to the middle of the main channel of fresh water rivers, which were recognized as public highways, and in which the public had the unobstructed right of navigation, and with which the owner of the soil could in no manner interfere * * This is a clear-cut approval of the English rule that “land under water which is non-tidal in character belongs prima facie not to the Crown, but

1954In our opinion in that case, the court said, 3 Bush at page 277 , 66 Ky. at page 277 , “Thus, at a very early period the common law of our British ancestors fully recognized the proprietorship of the owners of the soil to the middle of the main channel of fresh water rivers, which were recognized as public highways, and in which the public had the unobstructed right of navigation, and with which the owner of the soil could in no manner interfere * * This is a clear-cut approval of the English rule that “land under water which is non-tidal in character belongs prima facie not to the Crown, but

1951Putnam v. Producers Live Stock Marketing Ass’n, 256 Ky. 196 , 75 S.W.2d 1075 , 100 A.L.R., page 834.

1951Putnam v. Producers Live Stock Marketing Ass’n, 256 Ky. 196 , 75 S.W.2d 1075 , 100 A.L.R., page 834.

1943Some of our earlier cases followed the rule and some rejected it, but in Carter v. Flexner, 92 Ky. 400 , 17 S. W. 851 , 853 the question was fully and carefully considered and the English rule definitely rejected.

1943Some of our earlier cases followed the rule and some rejected it, but in Carter v. Flexner, 92 Ky. 400 , 17 S. W. 851 , 853 the question was fully and carefully considered and the English rule definitely rejected.

1935In City National Bank of Paducah v. Exchange Bank of Mayfield, 254 Ky. 579 , 72 S. W. (2d) 1 , notes secured by purchase-money lien were paid by the maker after maturity.

1935In City National Bank of Paducah v. Exchange Bank of Mayfield, 254 Ky. 579 , 72 S. W. (2d) 1 , notes secured by purchase-money lien were paid by the maker after maturity.

1935After reviewing the authorities and reasons, the doctrine was expressly repudiated. *813 The New York court followed the English rule in an early case, but in Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522 , it seized on the tenuous distinction afforded by a subsequently enacted statute relating to the construction of powers, to break away from it.

1935After reviewing the authorities and reasons, the doctrine was expressly repudiated. *813 The New York court followed the English rule in an early case, but in Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522 , it seized on the tenuous distinction afforded by a subsequently enacted statute relating to the construction of powers, to break away from it.

1932Co. et al., 209 Ky. 325 , 272 S. W. 753, 754 , in these words: “Although tbe English rule is somewhat' broader, tbe American rule, wbicb is tbe rule in tbis *269 state, is firmly established that statements in pleadings filed in judicial proceedings, if material, relevant, or pertinent to the issues involved, are absolutely privileged, though it is claimed that they are false and alleged with malice.” The petition in which it is claimed that the alleged libelous statements, for which the appellant seeks recovery in the instant action, appear, was filed pursuant to section 518 of the Civil Code

1932Co. et al., 209 Ky. 325 , 272 S. W. 753, 754 , in these words: “Although tbe English rule is somewhat' broader, tbe American rule, wbicb is tbe rule in tbis *269 state, is firmly established that statements in pleadings filed in judicial proceedings, if material, relevant, or pertinent to the issues involved, are absolutely privileged, though it is claimed that they are false and alleged with malice.” The petition in which it is claimed that the alleged libelous statements, for which the appellant seeks recovery in the instant action, appear, was filed pursuant to section 518 of the Civil Code

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1925Gaines v. Aetna Insurance Co., 104 Ky. 695 , 47 S. W. 884 ; Sebree v. Thompson, 126 Ky. 223 , 103 S. W. 374 ; Monroe v. Davis, 118 Ky. 806 , 82 S. W. 450 ; Jaybee Jellico Coal Co. v. Carter, 208 Ky. 241 , 270 S. W. 768 .

1918But opposed to the English rule referred to by Williams on Executors is Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 , where the court held that a debt due from a legatee to the testator which was at the time of the testator’s death barred by the statute of limitation could not be deducted from the legacy unless the lang-uage of the will clearly showed that the testator intended that such deduction should be made.

1918But opposed to the English rule referred to by Williams on Executors is Allen v. Edwards, 136 Mass. 138 , where the court held that a debt due from a legatee to the testator which was at the time of the testator’s death barred by the statute of limitation could not be deducted from the legacy unless the lang-uage of the will clearly showed that the testator intended that such deduction should be made.

1918In Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , the question was clearly presented to the court, and it was held that the executor could not deduct from a legacy a debt due by a legatee to the estate which was barred by limitation, the court saying: “The estate.is just as much of a debtor to’the indebted legatee as the legatee is to the estate.

1918In Holt v. Libby, 80 Me. 329 , the question was clearly presented to the court, and it was held that the executor could not deduct from a legacy a debt due by a legatee to the estate which was barred by limitation, the court saying: “The estate.is just as much of a debtor to’the indebted legatee as the legatee is to the estate.

1912In the case of Wilkins v. Barnes, et al., 79 Ky., 323 , on the last page of its opinion, the court said: “The principal reason, however, is based upon the new condition of our country, the great extent of uninclosed lands, and the habit which is customary of traveling over them without asking permission, and the frequency of opening roads by owners for their own convenience which other persons are permitted to use.

1912In the case of Wilkins v. Barnes, et al., 79 Ky., 323 , on the last page of its opinion, the court said: “The principal reason, however, is based upon the new condition of our country, the great extent of uninclosed lands, and the habit which is customary of traveling over them without asking permission, and the frequency of opening roads by owners for their own convenience which other persons are permitted to use.

1909While it may be admitted that the English rule and the rule of several other States is different from that announced above (Barker v. Midland Railway Co., 86 English Common Law Reports, 46; Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35 , 17 N. E. 89 , 9 Am.

1909While it may be admitted that the English rule and the rule of several other States is different from that announced above (Barker v. Midland Railway Co., 86 English Common Law Reports, 46; Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35 , 17 N. E. 89 , 9 Am.

1907In the case of Stewart v. Hall, etc., 83 Ky. 375 , 7 Ky. L.

1907In the case of Stewart v. Hall, etc., 83 Ky. 375 , 7 Ky. L.

1902Co. ( 101 Ky., 658 ) ( 19 R., 833 ) ( 42 S. W., 342 ) the English rule as to the liability* of connecting carriers is discussed, and stated to be based upon the ground of want of privity of contract between the injured party and the connecting carrier; and, in denying the application of the English rule, Hutch.

1902Co. ( 101 Ky., 658 ) ( 19 R., 833 ) ( 42 S. W., 342 ) the English rule as to the liability* of connecting carriers is discussed, and stated to be based upon the ground of want of privity of contract between the injured party and the connecting carrier; and, in denying the application of the English rule, Hutch.

1902Carr., section 150, is quoted - with approval, as follows: “And the mere fact that the auxiliary carrier acts, in the transportation as the agent of the contracting carrier, and that there is no privity of contract between him and the owner of the goods, furnishes no legal reason why L>> may not be held liable to the owner for any loss which may arise either from negligence or misfeasance.” And in the case of Ireland v. Railroad Co. ( 105 Ky., 400 ) ( 20 R., 1586 ) ( 49 S. W., 188 ), the court is careful to state that “the connecting line, having entered its appearance, it also liable to the o

1902Carr., section 150, is quoted - with approval, as follows: “And the mere fact that the auxiliary carrier acts, in the transportation as the agent of the contracting carrier, and that there is no privity of contract between him and the owner of the goods, furnishes no legal reason why L>> may not be held liable to the owner for any loss which may arise either from negligence or misfeasance.” And in the case of Ireland v. Railroad Co. ( 105 Ky., 400 ) ( 20 R., 1586 ) ( 49 S. W., 188 ), the court is careful to state that “the connecting line, having entered its appearance, it also liable to the o

1899See Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S., 143 ; National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S., 123 .

1899See Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S., 143 ; National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S., 123 .

1878(Rogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray, 376 ; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. 311 ; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 ; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Penn.

1878(Rogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray, 376 ; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. 311 ; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 ; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Penn.

1874Mass. 478.) The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the same doctrine as prevailing in that part of the District of Columbia ceded by the state of Maryland. ( 1 Peters, 105 .) The same rule has been acted on in South Carolina. ( 4 McCord, 88 .) The Supreme Court of Illinois has gone even further, and held the law to be “that where the husband compels the wife to live separate from him, either by abandoning her or by forcing her by whatever means to leave him, and such separation is not merely temporary and capricious, but' permanent and without expectation of again living togethe

1874Mass. 478.) The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the same doctrine as prevailing in that part of the District of Columbia ceded by the state of Maryland. ( 1 Peters, 105 .) The same rule has been acted on in South Carolina. ( 4 McCord, 88 .) The Supreme Court of Illinois has gone even further, and held the law to be “that where the husband compels the wife to live separate from him, either by abandoning her or by forcing her by whatever means to leave him, and such separation is not merely temporary and capricious, but' permanent and without expectation of again living togethe

1868(Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, secs. 125, 126; 16 Mass. R., 157 ; 8 Pick., 423 ; 1 Pick., 506 ; Bullen N. P., 114; Story's Conflict of Laws, secs. 123, 123a, b; 2 Kent's Com., sec. 16.) Mere canonical disabilities, growing out of relationship by marriage, rendered the marriage voidable, but not void; hence, as the court said, such marriages remained good until set aside by an ecclesiastic sentence, according to the English doctrine.

1868(Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, secs. 125, 126; 16 Mass. R., 157 ; 8 Pick., 423 ; 1 Pick., 506 ; Bullen N. P., 114; Story's Conflict of Laws, secs. 123, 123a, b; 2 Kent's Com., sec. 16.) Mere canonical disabilities, growing out of relationship by marriage, rendered the marriage voidable, but not void; hence, as the court said, such marriages remained good until set aside by an ecclesiastic sentence, according to the English doctrine.