English rule in Indiana

2006See Arlington State Bank v. Colvin (1989), Ind.App., 545 N.E .2d 572, 575, trans. denied; Goodwine v. Kelley et al. (1904), 33 Ind.App. 57, 61-62 , 70 N.E. 832, 834 ; see also Stoneburner v. Fletcher (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 545, 551 (customary measure of damages as difference between contract price and market value found inapplicable because difference between contract price and market price was zero); Farmers’ & Citizens’ Building, Loan & Savings Association v. Rector (1899), 22 Ind.App. 101, 102-103 , 53 N.E. 297, 298 (difference between contract price and fair market value is measure o

2006See Arlington State Bank v. Colvin (1989), Ind.App., 545 N.E .2d 572, 575, trans. denied; Goodwine v. Kelley et al. (1904), 33 Ind.App. 57, 61-62 , 70 N.E. 832, 834 ; see also Stoneburner v. Fletcher (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 545, 551 (customary measure of damages as difference between contract price and market value found inapplicable because difference between contract price and market price was zero); Farmers’ & Citizens’ Building, Loan & Savings Association v. Rector (1899), 22 Ind.App. 101, 102-103 , 53 N.E. 297, 298 (difference between contract price and fair market value is measure o

1972On the margin of the first page was the word “Void,” beneath which were the initials' “C.H.T;” Our Supreme Court, in Tinsley , discussed the English rule and our rule, and discussed the case of Woodfill, et al. v. Patton, et al. (1881), 76 Ind. 575 , 40 Am.

1972On the margin of the first page was the word “Void,” beneath which were the initials' “C.H.T;” Our Supreme Court, in Tinsley , discussed the English rule and our rule, and discussed the case of Woodfill, et al. v. Patton, et al. (1881), 76 Ind. 575 , 40 Am.

2019John , 751 N.E.2d 657 , 658 (Ind. 2001).

2019John , 751 N.E.2d 657 , 658 (Ind. 2001).

1982Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., (1966) 179 Neb. 783 , 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 .

1982Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v. Merritt Beach Co., (1966) 179 Neb. 783 , 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 .

1972We may also assume that because of that knowledge every lawyer would understand that “provided the driver’s negligence and not that of the injured person was the proximate cause of the injury” really means “that the injured person must extricate herself from her position of peril if she is aware of it and can extricate herself.” As we said in Montgomery v. Reily (1970), 148 Ind. App. 54 , 263 N. E. 2d 752, 756 , 23 Ind. Dec. 520 , 526, “[a] particularly astute jury, in the light of other instructions dealing with negligence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence, might be able to recogn

1972We may also assume that because of that knowledge every lawyer would understand that “provided the driver’s negligence and not that of the injured person was the proximate cause of the injury” really means “that the injured person must extricate herself from her position of peril if she is aware of it and can extricate herself.” As we said in Montgomery v. Reily (1970), 148 Ind. App. 54 , 263 N. E. 2d 752, 756 , 23 Ind. Dec. 520 , 526, “[a] particularly astute jury, in the light of other instructions dealing with negligence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence, might be able to recogn

1968The decision in McDonald, supra, was apparently based upon the English rule that: “To give damages out of a trust fund would not be .to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.” Feoffees of Heriot’s Hospital v. Ross (1846), 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 513.

1968The decision in McDonald, supra, was apparently based upon the English rule that: “To give damages out of a trust fund would not be .to apply it to those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose.” Feoffees of Heriot’s Hospital v. Ross (1846), 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 513.

1968(McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, [supra].) Justice PAXSON apparently did not know, when he lauded the English rule, that England had abandoned it, and apparently was unaware that the Massachusetts court built its decision on a foundation that did not exist.” Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital (1965), 417 Pa. 486 .

1968(McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, [supra].) Justice PAXSON apparently did not know, when he lauded the English rule, that England had abandoned it, and apparently was unaware that the Massachusetts court built its decision on a foundation that did not exist.” Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital (1965), 417 Pa. 486 .

1968Likewise, Indiana apparently followed Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and other states, in adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity or “qualified charitable immunity.” In 1942 in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 , Justice Rutledge wrote extensively on the doctrine of charitable immunity and pointed out certain factual and legal fallacies in the doctrine.

1968Likewise, Indiana apparently followed Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and other states, in adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity or “qualified charitable immunity.” In 1942 in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 , Justice Rutledge wrote extensively on the doctrine of charitable immunity and pointed out certain factual and legal fallacies in the doctrine.

1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s

1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s

1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s

1955In Helwig v. Jordan (1876), 53 Ind. 21 , the court adopted the following declaration in 1 Wilson Superior Court Rep. 447: “One who erects a nuisance and after-wards . . . leases his real estate, receiving rent therefor and knowing, or having reason to believe, that the use of the property for the purpose for which it is leased will prove to be injurious to the property of others, or become a nuisance, will be liable to an action for an injury resulting therefrom.” The admission made in Deller v. Hofferberth (1891), 127 Ind. 414 , 26 N. E. 889 , serves to further reveal the line of the court’s

1921In the case of Crompton v. Beach (1892), 62 Conn. 25 , 25 Atl. 446 , 18 L.

1921In the case of Crompton v. Beach (1892), 62 Conn. 25 , 25 Atl. 446 , 18 L.

1919With this modification, we see no reason why this English rule may not be adopted in this state as a plain and just rule, to be followed in all such cases.” The same court in University, etc. v. Spalding (1901), 71 N. H. 163, 51 Atl. 731 , 62 L.

1919With this modification, we see no reason why this English rule may not be adopted in this state as a plain and just rule, to be followed in all such cases.” The same court in University, etc. v. Spalding (1901), 71 N. H. 163, 51 Atl. 731 , 62 L.

1913“The theory of the English courts, and those of this country following their decisions, is that when a lease is made, the beginning of which is fixed at some future date, it is within the contemplation of the parties and a part of their understanding, without which the lease would not have been made, that when the time comes for the lessee to take possession, according to the lease, the lessor shall have the premises open to the entry of the lessee, and that the latter is not liable for rent until he is afforded an opportunity to enter, and is under no obligation to maintain an action against

1913“The theory of the English courts, and those of this country following their decisions, is that when a lease is made, the beginning of which is fixed at some future date, it is within the contemplation of the parties and a part of their understanding, without which the lease would not have been made, that when the time comes for the lessee to take possession, according to the lease, the lessor shall have the premises open to the entry of the lessee, and that the latter is not liable for rent until he is afforded an opportunity to enter, and is under no obligation to maintain an action against

1913Hammond v. Jones (1907), 41 Ind. App. 32 , 83 N. E. 257 .

1913Hammond v. Jones (1907), 41 Ind. App. 32 , 83 N. E. 257 .

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1907The same rule was affirmed and followed in Carson v. McPhetridge (1860), 15 Ind. 327 .

1907The same rule was affirmed and followed in Carson v. McPhetridge (1860), 15 Ind. 327 .

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1907In the case of Hoy v. State, ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 506 , we considered the basis upon which the English rule is founded, and said: “The cases of Gulick v. New [1860], 14 Ind. 93 , and Vogel v. State, ex rel. [1886], 107 Ind. 374 , accept and enforce the English rule.

1899If the promise be made by a father to a son, the moral obligation is strengthened by reason of the existing relation, and the confidence which the one would naturally repose in the other.” The English doctrine declared in the foregoing cases has also been adopted and approved in the following cases: Williams v. Filch, 18 N. Y. 546 ; O’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403 , 47 Am.

1899If the promise be made by a father to a son, the moral obligation is strengthened by reason of the existing relation, and the confidence which the one would naturally repose in the other.” The English doctrine declared in the foregoing cases has also been adopted and approved in the following cases: Williams v. Filch, 18 N. Y. 546 ; O’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403 , 47 Am.

1899If the promise be made by a father to a son, the moral obligation is strengthened by reason of the existing relation, and the confidence which the one would naturally repose in the other.” The English doctrine declared in the foregoing cases has also been adopted and approved in the following cases: Williams v. Filch, 18 N. Y. 546 ; O’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403 , 47 Am.

1899If the promise be made by a father to a son, the moral obligation is strengthened by reason of the existing relation, and the confidence which the one would naturally repose in the other.” The English doctrine declared in the foregoing cases has also been adopted and approved in the following cases: Williams v. Filch, 18 N. Y. 546 ; O’Hara v. Dudley, 95 N. Y. 403 , 47 Am.

1893In this country the severity of the English rule is still further relaxed: “If one builds a dam upon his own premises and thus holds back and accumulates the water for his benefit, or if he brings water upon his premises into a reservoir, in case the dam or the banks of the reservoir give away and the lands of a neighbor are thus flooded, he is not liable for the damage without proof of some fault or negligence on his part. ” Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476 , and authorities cited.