English rule in Iowa

1933Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272 , 17 Am.

1931Leggett v. Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272 , 17 Am.

1933Hinkley v. Sac Oil & Pipe Line Co., 132 Iowa 396 , 107 N. W. 629 , 119 Am.

1933Hinkley v. Sac Oil & Pipe Line Co., 132 Iowa 396 , 107 N. W. 629 , 119 Am.

1993See McNeill v. United States, 519 F.Supp. 283 (D.S.C.1981); Sox v. United States, 187 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960).

1993See McNeill v. United States, 519 F.Supp. 283 (D.S.C.1981); Sox v. United States, 187 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960).

1982Furman v. Clute, 50 N.Y. 451, 466 , (1872), or as to indicate “willful defiance of law,” see Sanders v. Rice, 41 R.I. 127, 130 , 102 A. 914, 916 (1918).

1982Furman v. Clute, 50 N.Y. 451, 466 , (1872), or as to indicate "willful defiance of law," see Sanders v. Rice, 41 R.I. 127, 130 , 102 A. 914, 916 (1918).

1947It refers to the case of Parker v. Cobe, supra, and states “that these decisions, following the English rule, admittedly disregard the intent of the testator.” 54 A. 2d 163 .

1947It refers to the case of Parker v. Cobe, supra, and states “that these decisions, following the English rule, admittedly disregard the intent of the testator.” 54 A. 2d 163 .

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1937Among the cases adopting this view, appellant cites Waycross v. Hayes, 48 Ga. App. 317 , 172 S. E. 756 ; Forest *1106 Preserve District v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 389 , 192 N. E. 342 ; Industrial Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40 , 193 N. E. 620 , 96 A. L.

1934L. p. 363, after discussing the English rule, the text says: “In this country, all probate and testamentary matters have in most if not all of the states been by statute confided either to separate courts of probate, under different denominations, or a special jurisdiction over them has been vested in courts having jurisdiction also over other subjects.” That courts of chancery do not have any jurisdiction to establish a lost or destroyed will and that such jurisdiction belongs solely to the probate court, see Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104 , 19 N. E. 427 , 2 L.

1934L. p. 363, after discussing the English rule, the text says: “In this country, all probate and testamentary matters have in most if not all of the states been by statute confided either to separate courts of probate, under different denominations, or a special jurisdiction over them has been vested in courts having jurisdiction also over other subjects.” That courts of chancery do not have any jurisdiction to establish a lost or destroyed will and that such jurisdiction belongs solely to the probate court, see Anderson v. Anderson, 112 N. Y. 104 , 19 N. E. 427 , 2 L.

1929This court is committed to at least one modification of the English rule, and it is stated as follows: “* * * the right of the receiver to recover of the defrauded party on his subscription is recognized when ‘ there are claims in the hands of the receiver to be satisfied out of the corporate assets that accrued after the subscriber had obligated himself.’ ” Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 813 .

1929This court is committed to at least one modification of the English rule, and it is stated as follows: “* * * the right of the receiver to recover of the defrauded party on his subscription is recognized when ‘ there are claims in the hands of the receiver to be satisfied out of the corporate assets that accrued after the subscriber had obligated himself.’ ” Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 813 .

1926It is undoubtedly true that it is the English rule that 'an insurance policy is a personal contract between the insurer and the insured, and that, in event of loss,-the amount payable under the insurance policy belongs solely to the insured. .We recently had occasion to consider this question in the ease of Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44 , and it is unnecessary that we repeat the discussion therein contained, or again review the authorities.’ Our- holding in said case is against the contention of- the appellant herein that the contract of insurance is wholly a personal one between the insurer and

1926It is undoubtedly true that it is the English rule that 'an insurance policy is a personal contract between the insurer and the insured, and that, in event of loss,-the amount payable under the insurance policy belongs solely to the insured. .We recently had occasion to consider this question in the ease of Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44 , and it is unnecessary that we repeat the discussion therein contained, or again review the authorities.’ Our- holding in said case is against the contention of- the appellant herein that the contract of insurance is wholly a personal one between the insurer and

1926A judgment against the vendor would not become a lien upon the land * * * ’ ’ In O’Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 1353 , we accepted the English rule, as laid down in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves.

1926A judgment against the vendor would not become a lien upon the land * * * ’ ’ In O’Brien v. Paulsen, 192 Iowa 1351, 1353 , we accepted the English rule, as laid down in Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves.

1925Co., 17 Iowa 176 ; Simeral v. Dubuque Mut.

1925Co., 17 Iowa 176 ; Simeral v. Dubuque Mut.

1918The English rule is also discussed in Johnson v. Morgan, 178 Iowa 577 .

1918The English rule is also discussed in Johnson v. Morgan, 178 Iowa 577 .

1917Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441; Coll, on Part. 156; Story on Part., § 99.” The court adds that though, in its opinion, the rule has been made more extensive by usage in Pennsylvania, “how can there he a good will of a business in favor of the members of a firm, where the firm has ceased by its own limitation, and no exclusive right to follow the business in that place belongs to them?” This is approved in Lobeck v. Lee, (Neb.) 55 N. W. 650, 654 .

1917Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441; Coll, on Part. 156; Story on Part., § 99.” The court adds that though, in its opinion, the rule has been made more extensive by usage in Pennsylvania, “how can there he a good will of a business in favor of the members of a firm, where the firm has ceased by its own limitation, and no exclusive right to follow the business in that place belongs to them?” This is approved in Lobeck v. Lee, (Neb.) 55 N. W. 650, 654 .

1913A lucid discussion of what is essential to establish scienter is to be found in Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696 ( 15 South. 584 ), where, after stating the three propositions substantially as we have, the court says: If the first phase of the scienter is relied upon for a recovery, the plaintiff must show that the representation was made with actual knowledge of its falsity, unless it can' be a case where defendant, in making the representation that was false, couches it in such positive and unqualified terms as to amount to an affirmation of his knowledge of its truth.

1913A lucid discussion of what is essential to establish scienter is to be found in Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696 ( 15 South. 584 ), where, after stating the three propositions substantially as we have, the court says: If the first phase of the scienter is relied upon for a recovery, the plaintiff must show that the representation was made with actual knowledge of its falsity, unless it can' be a case where defendant, in making the representation that was false, couches it in such positive and unqualified terms as to amount to an affirmation of his knowledge of its truth.

1909In Hansen v. Heating Co., 73 Iowa, 77 , plaintiff agreed to furnish defendant at a certain price all the coal it would need for the season; the coal furnished during any month to be paid for on the 10th of the month following.

1909In Osgood v. Bauder, 75 Iowa, 550 , there was a contract for the shipment of coal to be delivered and paid for in installments.

1897In Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451 (2 N. E.

1897In Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451 (2 N. E.

1886It was held in District Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa, 601 , following the English rule on the sub- 3.-: .Susto^un: iraud: wliat is: pleading. ject, that when one against whom a cause of action has accrued by fraud or fraudulent con- , ceaLment prevents tiie one m whose favor it exists from obtaining knowledge thereof, the limitation of the statute only begins to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might by the use of diligence have been discovered.

1886It was held in District Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa, 601 , following the English rule on the sub- 3.-: .Susto^un: iraud: wliat is: pleading. ject, that when one against whom a cause of action has accrued by fraud or fraudulent con- , ceaLment prevents tiie one m whose favor it exists from obtaining knowledge thereof, the limitation of the statute only begins to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might by the use of diligence have been discovered.