English rule in Arkansas

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1952In Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866 , 187 S.W.2d 961, 964 , we approved *117 the following statement from Schneider on Workmen's Compensation (Perm.Ed.) § 1328: "The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242: `An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.'" In that case a workman died eight months after suffering from heat prostration on the job and

1952In Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866 , 187 S.W.2d 961, 964 , we approved *117 the following statement from Schneider on Workmen's Compensation (Perm.Ed.) § 1328: "The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, [1910] A.C. 242: `An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.'" In that case a workman died eight months after suffering from heat prostration on the job and

1912Rep. 380 , the court, after reciting the English rule, said: “But in this country the Supreme Court of the United States, the court of last resort in some States, and this court, have, after full consideration, determined that the power of alienation is not a necessary incident to an equitable estate for life, and that the owner of the property may so dispose of it as to secure the enjoyment by the beneficiary without making it alienable by him or liable for his debts.” The American rule is likewise given in Heaton v. Dixon, 133 S. W. 162 , citing Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 , and numerous

1912Rep. 380 , the court, after reciting the English rule, said: “But in this country the Supreme Court of the United States, the court of last resort in some States, and this court, have, after full consideration, determined that the power of alienation is not a necessary incident to an equitable estate for life, and that the owner of the property may so dispose of it as to secure the enjoyment by the beneficiary without making it alienable by him or liable for his debts.” The American rule is likewise given in Heaton v. Dixon, 133 S. W. 162 , citing Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716 , and numerous

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

2000Constantinea on the De Facto Doctrine, § 346 (1910) (citing such cases as State v. Badger, 90 Mo. App. 183 (1901); State v. Powell, 101 Iowa 382 , 70 N.W. 592 (1897); Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879); Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N.C. 546 (1875); Brady v. Howe, 50 Miss. 607 (1874); Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N.H. 560 (1874); and State v. Jacobs, 17 Ohio 143 (1848)).

1993And in In Re Brasher’s Estate, 54 Az. 430, 96 P.2d 747 (1940) it was pointed out there were two lines of authority on the strictness of this rule — one being the English rule holding unanimously the attestation of a will is not valid unless the testator signs before the attesting witnesses and this is followed by a number of American jurisdictions.

1993And in In Re Brasher’s Estate, 54 Az. 430, 96 P.2d 747 (1940) it was pointed out there were two lines of authority on the strictness of this rule — one being the English rule holding unanimously the attestation of a will is not valid unless the testator signs before the attesting witnesses and this is followed by a number of American jurisdictions.

1990The Court noted that it had already rejected the "English rule" which renders void those votes cast for a candidate whose disqualification is "notorious."* Collins v. McClendon, 177 Ark. at 45 , citing Swepston v. Barton, supra. As stated by the Court in Collins, "(t)he real issue . . . was, which candidate received a majority of the legal votes cast?" 177 Ark. at 45 .

1990This is, of course, the determination that must be made under A.C.A. 7-7-304 (a)(3), which states: If no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast for an office or position at the preferential primary election, the names of the two (2) candidates who received the highest number of votes for an office or position shall be printed upon the ballots at the general primary election. ___________. * Under the "American rule," adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the voters' knowledge is not material, and the votes are to be counted. 133 A.L.R. 340 (1941); Swepston v. Barton, supra; Collins v.

1990The Court noted that it had already rejected the "English rule" which renders void those votes cast for a candidate whose disqualification is "notorious."* Collins v. McClendon, 177 Ark. at 45 , citing Swepston v. Barton, supra. As stated by the Court in Collins, "(t)he real issue . . . was, which candidate received a majority of the legal votes cast?" 177 Ark. at 45 .

1990The Court noted that it had already rejected the "English rule" which renders void those votes cast for a candidate whose disqualification is "notorious."* Collins v. McClendon, 177 Ark. at 45 , citing Swepston v. Barton, supra. As stated by the Court in Collins, "(t)he real issue . . . was, which candidate received a majority of the legal votes cast?" 177 Ark. at 45 .

1989The Arkansas Supreme Court specifically established the validity of spendthrift trusts in Bowlin v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97 , 198 S.W. 288 (1917), where it rejected the English doctrine condemning spendthrift trusts and adopted the American doctrine upholding them "both upon reason and because the American doctrine is supported by the increasing weight of authority." 131 Ark. at 101 .

1989The Arkansas Supreme Court specifically established the validity of spendthrift trusts in Bowlin v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 131 Ark. 97 , 198 S.W. 288 (1917), where it rejected the English doctrine condemning spendthrift trusts and adopted the American doctrine upholding them "both upon reason and because the American doctrine is supported by the increasing weight of authority." 131 Ark. at 101 .

1989Recently, in Cotham v. First National Bank of Hot Springs, 287 Ark. 167 , 697 S.W.2d 101 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of spendthrift trusts in rejecting an attempt by the beneficiaries to terminate a spendthrift trust.

1989Recently, in Cotham v. First National Bank of Hot Springs, 287 Ark. 167 , 697 S.W.2d 101 (1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of spendthrift trusts in rejecting an attempt by the beneficiaries to terminate a spendthrift trust.

1959In short, that an injury is accidental when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, although the work being done is usual or ordinary.’ ” “In the case of Clark v. Ottenheimer Bros. decided July 1, 1958, 229 Ark. 383 , 314 S. W. 2d 497 , the law as stated in the Bryant Stave Co. case, supra, was affirmed with approval, the Court again stating the law, p. 1040: “ ‘It is our view that an accident may occur when there is no increase in the work load.’ ” “Under the Clark case, supra, the requirements to be made by a claimant are as follows: “ ‘It is conceded that appellant is not en

1959In short, that an injury is accidental when either the cause or result is unexpected or accidental, although the work being done is usual or ordinary.’ ” “In the case of Clark v. Ottenheimer Bros. decided July 1, 1958, 229 Ark. 383 , 314 S. W. 2d 497 , the law as stated in the Bryant Stave Co. case, supra, was affirmed with approval, the Court again stating the law, p. 1040: “ ‘It is our view that an accident may occur when there is no increase in the work load.’ ” “Under the Clark case, supra, the requirements to be made by a claimant are as follows: “ ‘It is conceded that appellant is not en

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1956It says nothing about unusual or extraordinary conditions; and there is no reasonable basis for reading such words into the statute . . .” This statement from Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Text, Sec. 1328, was likewise quoted with approval in the Albertson case: “The majority of the American courts follow the English rule as set out in the case of Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (1910), A. C. 242: ‘An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or condition of health.’

1928All parties dealing with this note knew that it was originally secured by a trust deed on the Siloam Springs property.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee had the same question under consideration in the case of Horn v. Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453 , 201 S. W. 756 , and, in construing this same section of the Negotiable Instruments Law, quoted the English rule stated by Lord Abinger, C.

1928All parties dealing with this note knew that it was originally secured by a trust deed on the Siloam Springs property.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee had the same question under consideration in the case of Horn v. Nicholas, 139 Tenn. 453 , 201 S. W. 756 , and, in construing this same section of the Negotiable Instruments Law, quoted the English rule stated by Lord Abinger, C.

1920The courts are gravitating toward the English rule so thoroughly discussed by Mr. Justice Smith, in Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200 ; for while they say that the enrolled bill is not conclusive of the valid enactment of the law, and that we may look beyond it to the journals, they supply by presumption everything necessary to its validity, save where the journal affirmatively shows a violation of the Constitution.” It is suggested that the presumption must be indulged that the bill was presented to the Governor more than twenty days after the sine die adjournment of the Legislature becaus

1920The courts are gravitating toward the English rule so thoroughly discussed by Mr. Justice Smith, in Chicot County v. Davies, 40 Ark. 200 ; for while they say that the enrolled bill is not conclusive of the valid enactment of the law, and that we may look beyond it to the journals, they supply by presumption everything necessary to its validity, save where the journal affirmatively shows a violation of the Constitution.” It is suggested that the presumption must be indulged that the bill was presented to the Governor more than twenty days after the sine die adjournment of the Legislature becaus

1919J., pp. 242 and 243, it is said that in the States in which the common law doctrine of champerty and maintenance has not been adopted, it is nothing contrary to law, morals or public policy in a contract by an attorney to recover land or other property for an interest in it, even though he also agrees to pay the costs and expenses; and Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608 , is the first case cited in support of the text.

1919J., pp. 242 and 243, it is said that in the States in which the common law doctrine of champerty and maintenance has not been adopted, it is nothing contrary to law, morals or public policy in a contract by an attorney to recover land or other property for an interest in it, even though he also agrees to pay the costs and expenses; and Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608 , is the first case cited in support of the text.

1918The subject was fully reviewed by Judge Battle in the case of Colonial & United States Mortgage Co. v. Sweet, 65 Ark. 152 , and the old English rule of allowing interested parties to raise the bid at any time before confirmation of judicial sales was rejected, and the rule was in substance stated to be that where the sale was fair and regular in all respects it should be confirmed by the court.

1918The subject was fully reviewed by Judge Battle in the case of Colonial & United States Mortgage Co. v. Sweet, 65 Ark. 152 , and the old English rule of allowing interested parties to raise the bid at any time before confirmation of judicial sales was rejected, and the rule was in substance stated to be that where the sale was fair and regular in all respects it should be confirmed by the court.

1912See Ralston v. Roady, 20 Ga. 449 ; Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 ; Alma v. Greene, 13 R.

1912See Ralston v. Roady, 20 Ga. 449 ; Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 ; Alma v. Greene, 13 R.

1908Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 353 , this court said: “By the common law the death of a human, being could not be made the subject of a civil action.” And in Davis v. Railway, 53 Ark. 117 , this court said: “The English rule, which is commonly followed by the courts of the States whose statutes embody the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act, is that the rights of action given by the latter statutes to the personal representative of one whose death has been caused by another is created by the statute, and is not a continuation of the right of action which the deceased had in his lifetime, although the ne

1908Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 353 , this court said: “By the common law the death of a human, being could not be made the subject of a civil action.” And in Davis v. Railway, 53 Ark. 117 , this court said: “The English rule, which is commonly followed by the courts of the States whose statutes embody the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act, is that the rights of action given by the latter statutes to the personal representative of one whose death has been caused by another is created by the statute, and is not a continuation of the right of action which the deceased had in his lifetime, although the ne

1894We do not regard the case of Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark. 118 , cited by counsel, as being strigtly in point, although it does in a manner refer to the then English rule as announced in Thorogood v. Bryan as the law applicable to that case.