English rule in Alabama

1964CARROLL: We would like to except to the Court’s ruling. “(Jury brought around and seated in jurybox.)” As the appellant aptly points out in his brief, this court through Mr. Justice Harwood, then our Presiding Judge, stated in Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , that we use the so-called English rule of cross-examination.

1964CARROLL: We would like to except to the Court’s ruling. “(Jury brought around and seated in jurybox.)” As the appellant aptly points out in his brief, this court through Mr. Justice Harwood, then our Presiding Judge, stated in Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , that we use the so-called English rule of cross-examination.

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1934The “time when” in section 13 of the Code as applied was adverted to in Sims v. Sims, 210 Ala. 465 , 98 So. 462 , saying: “But this statute applies to acts required to be done within a certain time, and not to time which must intervene before certain things can be done or before certain rights are barred, such as the foregoing quoted provision or the statute of limitations. “ ‘Whatever may be the English doctrine upon the subject, it is the practice of our court to include one day and exclude the other, except when the statute requires so many entire days to intervene — in which case both are

1934The “time when” in section 13 of the Code as applied was adverted to in Sims v. Sims, 210 Ala. 465 , 98 So. 462 , saying: “But this statute applies to acts required to be done within a certain time, and not to time which must intervene before certain things can be done or before certain rights are barred, such as the foregoing quoted provision or the statute of limitations. “ ‘Whatever may be the English doctrine upon the subject, it is the practice of our court to include one day and exclude the other, except when the statute requires so many entire days to intervene — in which case both are

1924Under the old "English rule" it was not permissible to prove a disputed handwriting by comparison or "by placing a writing not in evidence in the case in juxtaposition with the one in dispute for the purpose of allowing a witness or the jury to inspect the two in determining whether or not they were written by the same person." Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79 .

1916Under what is known as “the old English rule” obtaining in this state before the enactment of this statute, it was not permissible to prove a disputed handwriting by comparison — that is, by placing a writing not in evidence in the case in juxtaposition with the one in dispute for the purpose of allowing a witness or the jury to inspect the two in determining whether or not they were written by the same person. — Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79 ; Snider v. Burks, 84 Ala. 53 , 4 South. 225 ; Curtis v. State, 118 Ala. 131 , 24 South. 111 ; Hickory v. U. S., 151 U. S. 303 , 14 Sup. Ct. 334, 38 L.

1916In Johnston v. Hainesworth, supra, on this question it is said: “Until the testimony is taken, it cannot be known whether any conflict will arise so as to make it necessary to refer the decision to a jury, and it is premature .to direct one previously.” In Rice v. Tobias, 83 Ala. 348 , 3 South. 670 , is the expression: “The statute then, as under the Code of 1876, authorized an issue of fact to be tried when ‘necessary,’ as under the old English rule of chancery practice.

1916In Johnston v. Hainesworth, supra, on this question it is said: “Until the testimony is taken, it cannot be known whether any conflict will arise so as to make it necessary to refer the decision to a jury, and it is premature .to direct one previously.” In Rice v. Tobias, 83 Ala. 348 , 3 South. 670 , is the expression: “The statute then, as under the Code of 1876, authorized an issue of fact to be tried when ‘necessary,’ as under the old English rule of chancery practice.

1912It is of course true, as argued by appellant, that the old English doctrine of ancient lights is not, and never has been, in force in this state. — Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500 .

1912It is of course true, as argued by appellant, that the old English doctrine of ancient lights is not, and never has been, in force in this state. — Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500 .

1910The English rule seems to be that when lands are bought with partnership funds, and for partnership purposes, and the title taken in the name of the partnership, a court of equity will treat them as personalty for all purposes; but the better considered American decisions' hold that such lands are to be treated as personalty until the purposes of the partnership- are accomplished, and then as realty, with the attributes of a tenancy in common. — Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 210 ; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 .

1910The English rule seems to be that when lands are bought with partnership funds, and for partnership purposes, and the title taken in the name of the partnership, a court of equity will treat them as personalty for all purposes; but the better considered American decisions' hold that such lands are to be treated as personalty until the purposes of the partnership- are accomplished, and then as realty, with the attributes of a tenancy in common. — Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 210 ; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 .

1910The English rule seems to be that when lands are bought with partnership funds, and for partnership purposes, and the title taken in the name of the partnership, a court of equity will treat them as personalty for all purposes; but the better considered American decisions' hold that such lands are to be treated as personalty until the purposes of the partnership- are accomplished, and then as realty, with the attributes of a tenancy in common. — Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 210 ; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 .

1910The English rule seems to be that when lands are bought with partnership funds, and for partnership purposes, and the title taken in the name of the partnership, a court of equity will treat them as personalty for all purposes; but the better considered American decisions' hold that such lands are to be treated as personalty until the purposes of the partnership- are accomplished, and then as realty, with the attributes of a tenancy in common. — Brewer v. Browne, 68 Ala. 210 ; Espy v. Comer, 76 Ala. 501 .

2014English argues that “there is no evidence to corroborate the hearsay testi mony of Assistant Chief Davis, which is the only evidence supporting the Trial Court’s decision.” (English’s brief, p. 18.) In Dunn, the appellant argued that “the only evidence connecting the clothing to the burglary for which Dunn’s probation was sought to be revoked was hearsay” and that “the trial court’s decision was based entirely on hearsay and the Court of Criminal Appeals’ affirmance of that decision conflicts with Goodgain [v. State, 755 So.2d 591 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)].” 163 So.3d at 1004 .

2014Baez v. U.S. Department of Justice, 684 F.2d 999, 1002-04 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam); see generally Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347, 348-49 (5th Cir.1938); Trinidad Asphalt Paving Co. v. Robinson, 52 F. 347 (E.D.Mich.1892); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

2014Baez v. U.S. Department of Justice, 684 F.2d 999, 1002-04 (D.C.Cir.1982) (en banc) (per curiam); see generally Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller, 94 F.2d 347, 348-49 (5th Cir.1938); Trinidad Asphalt Paving Co. v. Robinson, 52 F. 347 (E.D.Mich.1892); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

2014English argues that “there is no evidence to corroborate the hearsay testi mony of Assistant Chief Davis, which is the only evidence supporting the Trial Court’s decision.” (English’s brief, p. 18.) In Dunn, the appellant argued that “the only evidence connecting the clothing to the burglary for which Dunn’s probation was sought to be revoked was hearsay” and that “the trial court’s decision was based entirely on hearsay and the Court of Criminal Appeals’ affirmance of that decision conflicts with Goodgain [v. State, 755 So.2d 591 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)].” 163 So.3d at 1004 .

2009Similarly, the notion, as expressed in Ex parte Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 374 So.2d 1356 (Ala.1979), that trial courts, in certain types of cases, could require language in a supersedeas bond that would make the unsuccessful appellant responsible for the appellee's attorney fees on appeal leaves an "unlevel playing field" in such cases in two respects: 1.

2009Similarly, the notion, as expressed in Ex parte Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 374 So.2d 1356 (Ala.1979), that trial courts, in certain types of cases, could require language in a supersedeas bond that would make the unsuccessful appellant responsible for the appellee's attorney fees on appeal leaves an "unlevel playing field" in such cases in two respects: 1.

1997In fact, in Minges v. City of Birmingham, 251 Ala. 65, 69 , 36 So.2d 93, 96 (1948), Justice Livingston, writing for this Court in an actual case, provided a more complete quote of the relevant passage from American Jurisprudence, as follows: “Under the English rule, a lottery consists in the distribution of money or other property by chance, and nothing but chance, that is, by doing that which is equivalent to drawing lots.

1997In fact, in Minges v. City of Birmingham, 251 Ala. 65, 69 , 36 So.2d 93, 96 (1948), Justice Livingston, writing for this Court in an actual case, provided a more complete quote of the relevant passage from American Jurisprudence, as follows: “Under the English rule, a lottery consists in the distribution of money or other property by chance, and nothing but chance, that is, by doing that which is equivalent to drawing lots.

1985Any matter within the issues of the trial may be put to the witness even though this expands beyond his testimony in chief," 42 Ala. App. at 514 , 169 So.2d at 775 .

1985Any matter within the issues of the trial may be put to the witness even though this expands beyond his testimony in chief," 42 Ala. App. at 514 , 169 So.2d at 775 .

1975They seem to run the gamut from Mr. Justice Harlan's expression that punctuation is disregarded—Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 at 84 , 26 L.Ed. 1111 to Learned Hand's. "* * * [T]he English doctrine that the punctuation of a statute shall not count does not apply in this country."—Lone Pine Lawn Corp. v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 121 F.2d 935 .

1975They seem to run the gamut from Mr. Justice Harlan’s expression that punctuation is disregarded—Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 at 84 , 26 L.Ed. 1111 to Learned Hand’s. “* * * [T]he English doctrine that the punctuation of a statute shall not count does not apply in this country.” — Lone Pine Lawn Corp. v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 121 F.2d 935 .

1975They seem to run the gamut from Mr. Justice Harlan’s expression that punctuation is disregarded—Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 at 84 , 26 L.Ed. 1111 to Learned Hand’s. “* * * [T]he English doctrine that the punctuation of a statute shall not count does not apply in this country.” — Lone Pine Lawn Corp. v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 121 F.2d 935 .

1975They seem to run the gamut from Mr. Justice Harlan’s expression that punctuation is disregarded—Hammock v. Loan and Trust Co., 105 U.S. 77 at 84 , 26 L.Ed. 1111 to Learned Hand’s. “* * * [T]he English doctrine that the punctuation of a statute shall not count does not apply in this country.” — Lone Pine Lawn Corp. v. Helvering, 2 Cir., 121 F.2d 935 .

1975Danzey, supra, adopts the former view because, among other things, legislative procedure is based on hearing statutes read, [1] i. e., the ear is the apprehending organ, not the eye.

1975Danzey, supra, adopts the former view because, among other things, legislative procedure is based on hearing statutes read, 1 i. e., the ear is the apprehending organ, not the eye.

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1971Madden v. State, 40 Ala.App. 271 , 112 So.2d 796 , cert. denied, 269 Ala. 697 , 112 So.2d 800 .” Section 443, Title 7, Code 1940, must be reasonably construed so as not to deprive the trial judge of discretion reasonably exercised to limit the range of cross-examination in respect to collateral and irrelevant matter. — Powell v. Powell, 285 Ala. 230 , 231 So.2d 103 .

1966In 1923 the Code Committee, to modify the English rule (see Anno. 99 A.L.R.2d 7, 16, § 2 (a)) as shown in Bales v. State, 63 Ala. 30 , enacted what is T. 30, § 52, of the present Code.

1966In 1923 the Code Committee, to modify the English rule (see Anno. 99 A.L.R.2d 7, 16, § 2 (a)) as shown in Bales v. State, 63 Ala. 30 , enacted what is T. 30, § 52, of the present Code.

1958Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 , 34 Am.Dec. 273.

1958Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 , 34 Am.Dec. 273.

1936Co., 99 Va. 747, 749 , 40 S.E. 27 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 924 , where it was said that the interception of water was for domestic purposes, but it adopted the English rule, although there was no liability under the American rule of “reasonable use.” And in the Compton Case, supra, it is said that if the question comes before the court, it would be free to consider it de novo.

1936Co., 99 Va. 747, 749 , 40 S.E. 27 , 86 Am.St.Rep. 924 , where it was said that the interception of water was for domestic purposes, but it adopted the English rule, although there was no liability under the American rule of “reasonable use.” And in the Compton Case, supra, it is said that if the question comes before the court, it would be free to consider it de novo.

1934Dec. 745 .” As to such a motion for a new trial, as that before us, section 13 of the Code applies by the analogy of our decisions: Cox v. Hutto et al., 216 Ala. 23 , 113 So. 40 , an appeal from an order; Yates v. Dobson, 213 Ala. 547 , 105 So. 691 , the filing of a claim against decedent’s estate; Carnley, Judge, v. Moore, 218 Ala. 274 , 118 So. 409 , as to publication required of a proposed local law; Stewart v. Keller, 197 Ala. 575 , 73 So. 89 , time for presenting bill of exceptions and the expiration thereof.

1934Dec. 745 .” As to such a motion for a new trial, as that before us, section 13 of the Code applies by the analogy of our decisions: Cox v. Hutto et al., 216 Ala. 23 , 113 So. 40 , an appeal from an order; Yates v. Dobson, 213 Ala. 547 , 105 So. 691 , the filing of a claim against decedent’s estate; Carnley, Judge, v. Moore, 218 Ala. 274 , 118 So. 409 , as to publication required of a proposed local law; Stewart v. Keller, 197 Ala. 575 , 73 So. 89 , time for presenting bill of exceptions and the expiration thereof.