9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1889–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blaize v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C.2001) (en banc); Blaize v. United States, 21 A.3d 78, 82-83 (D.C.2011). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Frolich Estategreen2 sentences2011Critics of the traditional common-law rule have observed that it “very probably defeats the testator’s general testamentary intent in most cases.” In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H. 320 , 295 A.2d 448, 451 (1972). 2011Critics of the traditional common-law rule have observed that it “very probably defeats the testator’s general testamentary intent in most cases.” In re Frolich Estate, 112 N.H. 320 , 295 A.2d 448, 451 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Kaliku v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011In light of the admissions in English’s brief and the uncontroverted and compelling proof of flight from the police, including, inter alia, the fact that English, having slowed down before the shooting, sped off with his lights turned off immediately thereafter, English has failed to show that there is “no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....” Kaliku v. United States, 994 A.2d 765, 786 (D.C.2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Rivas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C.2001) (en banc); Blaize v. United States, 21 A.3d 78, 82-83 (D.C.2011). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of McFarlandgreen1 sentence2011See In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299 , 304 & 304 n. 6 (Tenn.2005) (noting that the District of Columbia and eight states "continue to adhere to the traditional common-law or 'English' rule” that a lapsed residuary gift "falls out of the terms of the will and passes by intestate succession to the testator’s heirs at law” rather than the so-called “modern” rule, incorporated in the Uniform Probate Code (which our jurisdiction has not adopted), that "if the residue is devised to two or more persons and the share of one of the residuary devisees fails for any reason, his share passes to t | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Dovellgreen2 sentences1975See Williams v. Dovell, supra 202 Md. at 354-56 , 96 A.2d at 486-87 ; 1 J. 1975See Williams v. Dovell, supra 202 Md. at 354-56 , 96 A.2d at 486-87 ; 1 J. | 1 | 1 |
Ewing v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences1975See Vlamis v. De Weese, 216 Md. 384, 394-95 , 140 A.2d 665, 671-72 (1958) ; Ewing v. Caldwell, 243 N.C. 18, 23 , 89 S.E.2d 774, 777-78 (1955). 1975See Vlamis v. De Weese, 216 Md. 384, 394-95 , 140 A.2d 665, 671-72 (1958) ; Ewing v. Caldwell, 243 N.C. 18, 23 , 89 S.E.2d 774, 777-78 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
Vlamis v. De Weesegreen2 sentences1975See Vlamis v. De Weese, 216 Md. 384, 394-95 , 140 A.2d 665, 671-72 (1958) ; Ewing v. Caldwell, 243 N.C. 18, 23 , 89 S.E.2d 774, 777-78 (1955). 1975See Vlamis v. De Weese, 216 Md. 384, 394-95 , 140 A.2d 665, 671-72 (1958) ; Ewing v. Caldwell, 243 N.C. 18, 23 , 89 S.E.2d 774, 777-78 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Baxtergreen2 sentences1966We agree with the following statement from People v. Baxter, 245 Mich. 229 , 222 N.W. 149, 150 (1928): “If an information admits *842 of conviction of an attempt to commit a felony, an accused may be found guilty of the attempt, though the evidence shows a completed offense.” 14 Reversed. 1 . 1966We agree with the following statement from People v. Baxter, 245 Mich. 229 , 222 N.W. 149, 150 (1928): “If an information admits *842 of conviction of an attempt to commit a felony, an accused may be found guilty of the attempt, though the evidence shows a completed offense.” 14 Reversed. 1 . | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1966It seems clear that the rule is historically and logically one aspect of the wider doctrine of merger of misdemeanor in felony. 10 The English doctrine of merger of offenses has never been fully accepted in this country, particularly in modern times. 11 In Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470 , 109 A.2d 89, 92 (1954), after pointing out that the doctrine of merger is not favored today, the court observed: Historically, there was justification for the doctrine of merger, which included the fact that the incidents of a trial for a felony were so different from those of a trial for a misdemeanor that i 1966It seems clear that the rule is historically and logically one aspect of the wider doctrine of merger of misdemeanor in felony. 10 The English doctrine of merger of offenses has never been fully accepted in this country, particularly in modern times. 11 In Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470 , 109 A.2d 89, 92 (1954), after pointing out that the doctrine of merger is not favored today, the court observed: Historically, there was justification for the doctrine of merger, which included the fact that the incidents of a trial for a felony were so different from those of a trial for a misdemeanor that i | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Donnelly v. United States
green
2 sentences2005Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 , 33 S.Ct. 449 , 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 19 . 2005Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277-78 , 33 S.Ct. 449 , 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 19 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Donovan v. Bachstadt
green
2 sentences1987See Corbin, supra, § 1097, at 523-24; Dobbs, supra, § 12.8, at 833-36; Donovan, supra, 453 A.2d at 163-65 . 1987Id. (reason for application of English rule has ceased since whether ti- *1349 ties are clear can be ascertained by record searches). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Jones v. Jones
green
2 sentences1972The “intent” aspect of domicile has been further described in Jones v. Jones, D.C.Mun.App., 136 A.2d 580 (1957), in the following terms: “In defining the animus manendi necessary to establish domicile, the trial court held that appellant must have had a ‘fixed intent to remain here permanently.’ This reflects the English doctrine of permanence which has long been held inapplicable in this country. 1972App., 136 A.2d 580 (1957), in the following terms: "In defining the animus manendi necessary to establish domicile, the trial court held that appellant must have had a `fixed intent to remain here permanently.' This reflects the English doctrine of permanence which has long been held inapplicable in this country. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
District of Columbia v. Murphy
green
2 sentences1957In defining the.'animus manendi necessary to establish domicile, the trial court held that appellant must have had a “fixed intent to remain here permanently.” This reflects the English doctrine of permanence which has long been held inapplicable in this country. 3 The American test of intent is generally spelled out in terms indicating something less than permanent habitation, i.e., an intent to remain for an indefinite future time 4 or, as sometimes stated in the negative, the absence of any intention to go elsewhere. 5 ' As stated by Justice Jackson in District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. 1957In defining the.'animus manendi necessary to establish domicile, the trial court held that appellant must have had a “fixed intent to remain here permanently.” This reflects the English doctrine of permanence which has long been held inapplicable in this country. 3 The American test of intent is generally spelled out in terms indicating something less than permanent habitation, i.e., an intent to remain for an indefinite future time 4 or, as sometimes stated in the negative, the absence of any intention to go elsewhere. 5 ' As stated by Justice Jackson in District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Williamson v. Berry
green
2 sentences1889Berry, 8 How., 495 , must be construed as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States intended to apply the English doctrine, although the opinion of Mr. Justice Wayne, speaking for the majority of the Court, contains no express declaration on this question. 1889Berry, 8 How., 495 , must be construed as showing that the Supreme Court of the United States intended to apply the English doctrine, although the opinion of Mr. Justice Wayne, speaking for the majority of the Court, contains no express declaration on this question. | 1 | 1889–1889 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.