English rule in Illinois

2017English, 381 Ill.

2008In 1999, the English defendant filed a postconviction petition with a request for the appointment of counsel while his appeal was pending, English, 381 Ill.

1915The English rule, that ‘in actions on the case, the plea of not guilty shall operate as a denial only of the breach of duty or wrongful act alleged to have been committed by the defendant, and not of the facts stated in the inducement, ’ etc., was adopted by the judges at Hilary term, 4th William IV, * * * 1 Chitty’s Pleadings, 737, and has never been adopted by statute in this State.” City of Champaign v. McMurray, 76 Ill. 353 .

1915The English rule, that ‘in actions on the case, the plea of not guilty shall operate as a denial only of the breach of duty or wrongful act alleged to have been committed by the defendant, and not of the facts stated in the inducement, ’ etc., was adopted by the judges at Hilary term, 4th William IV, * * * 1 Chitty’s Pleadings, 737, and has never been adopted by statute in this State.” City of Champaign v. McMurray, 76 Ill. 353 .

1998Under the English rule, "a fee award is not a sanction" ( S & H Riggers and Erectors, Inc. v OSHRC , 672 F. 2d 426 , 429 (1982)), while Rule 137 expressly speaks of "a sanction" (134 Ill. 2d R. 137).

1998Under the English rule, "a fee award is not a sanction" ( S & H Riggers and Erectors, Inc. v OSHRC , 672 F. 2d 426 , 429 (1982)), while Rule 137 expressly speaks of "a sanction" (134 Ill. 2d R. 137).

1981In Edwards, the supreme court said: “Water which is the result of natural and ordinary percolation through the soil is part of the land itself and belongs absolutely to the owner of the land, and, in the absence of any grant, he may intercept or impede such underground percolations, though the result be to interfere with the source of supply of springs or wells on adjoining premises.” ( 180 Ill. 99, 106 , 54 N.E. 176, 177 .) While the court did not expressly state that it was following the English rule, most authorities consider the foregoing statement to place Illinois in that category. 78 Am

1981In Edwards, the supreme court said: “Water which is the result of natural and ordinary percolation through the soil is part of the land itself and belongs absolutely to the owner of the land, and, in the absence of any grant, he may intercept or impede such underground percolations, though the result be to interfere with the source of supply of springs or wells on adjoining premises.” ( 180 Ill. 99, 106 , 54 N.E. 176, 177 .) While the court did not expressly state that it was following the English rule, most authorities consider the foregoing statement to place Illinois in that category. 78 Am

1954(Strawn v. Strawn, 46 Ill. 412 ; Eimer v. Eimer, 47 Ill. 373 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 63 Ill. 502 ; see, also, Kilgour v. Crawford, 51 Ill. 249 , and Lilly v. Shaw, 59 Ill. 72 .) Although the rule is to the contrary in many other jurisdictions in this country, (2 Perry on Trusts, — 6th ed. — secs. 916-918,) this court refused, under its general chancery powers, following the old English rule, to allow compensation to trustees for their time and trouble in caring for trust estates unless there was a provision for compensation in advance.

1954(Strawn v. Strawn, 46 Ill. 412 ; Eimer v. Eimer, 47 Ill. 373 ; Campbell v. Campbell, 63 Ill. 502 ; see, also, Kilgour v. Crawford, 51 Ill. 249 , and Lilly v. Shaw, 59 Ill. 72 .) Although the rule is to the contrary in many other jurisdictions in this country, (2 Perry on Trusts, — 6th ed. — secs. 916-918,) this court refused, under its general chancery powers, following the old English rule, to allow compensation to trustees for their time and trouble in caring for trust estates unless there was a provision for compensation in advance.

1954Cook v. Gilmore, 133 Ill. 139 ; Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437 .

1954Cook v. Gilmore, 133 Ill. 139 ; Buckingham v. Morrison, 136 Ill. 437 .

1933The court quoted with approval from the Arkansas case (Ashford v. Mace, 103 Ark. 114 ) as follows: “ ‘In 9 Cyc. p. 571, it is. said: “In the United States, while some courts have taken the English rule, most of the courts have taken a different view, and have held that the mere knowledge of the seller of goods or services or of the vendor or lessor of property.that the buyer intends an illegal use of them is no defense to an action for the price or for rent.” . . .

1933The court quoted with approval from the Arkansas case (Ashford v. Mace, 103 Ark. 114 ) as follows: “ ‘In 9 Cyc. p. 571, it is. said: “In the United States, while some courts have taken the English rule, most of the courts have taken a different view, and have held that the mere knowledge of the seller of goods or services or of the vendor or lessor of property.that the buyer intends an illegal use of them is no defense to an action for the price or for rent.” . . .

1898The prevailing doctrine in England appears to be, that courts of equity have no power, by virtue of their general jurisdiction over minors, to order the sale of a minor’s real estate for the purpose of education, maintenance or investment; but many of the courts of this country have refused to follow the English rule, and have held “that where it is for the benefit of the minor, courts of equity have the power, by virtue of their general jurisdiction over the estates of minors and others under disability, to authorize a change from real to personal and from personal to real.” (Huger v. Huger,

1898The prevailing doctrine in England appears to be, that courts of equity have no power, by virtue of their general jurisdiction over minors, to order the sale of a minor’s real estate for the purpose of education, maintenance or investment; but many of the courts of this country have refused to follow the English rule, and have held “that where it is for the benefit of the minor, courts of equity have the power, by virtue of their general jurisdiction over the estates of minors and others under disability, to authorize a change from real to personal and from personal to real.” (Huger v. Huger,

2017Specifically, Harris holds that, 30 days after a postconviction petition’s -9- 2017 IL App (2d) 141251 voluntary withdrawal, a trial court loses jurisdiction to hear a motion to “reinstate” the petition but maintains jurisdiction if the same petition is “refiled.” Defendant notes that the English defendant was allowed to “reinstate” his petition without “refiling” it.

1990For example, in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13 , 374 N.E.2d 437 , the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that America’s historic, blanket ban on contribution among tortfeasors was based on an erroneous expansion of the original English rule that no intentional tortfeasor should be allowed to recover against others for the consequences of his deliberate acts.

1990For example, in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13 , 374 N.E.2d 437 , the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that America’s historic, blanket ban on contribution among tortfeasors was based on an erroneous expansion of the original English rule that no intentional tortfeasor should be allowed to recover against others for the consequences of his deliberate acts.

1987L.J. 73 (1979)), and considered to be a resurrection of the long-discarded 16th- and 17th- century English rule of mitior sensus (Eldredge, The Law of Defamation sec. 24, at 161 (1978)).’ This court stated in Chapski that in the application of the rule there had been inconsistent and contradictory holdings, including a tendency of courts to ‘strain to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of words where such a construction is clearly reasonable and a defamatory meaning is far more probable.’ (Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51 .)” 113 Ill. 2d 273, 278-79 , 497 N.E.2

1987L.J. 73 (1979)), and considered to be a resurrection of the long-discarded 16th- and 17th- century English rule of mitior sensus (Eldredge, The Law of Defamation sec. 24, at 161 (1978)).’ This court stated in Chapski that in the application of the rule there had been inconsistent and contradictory holdings, including a tendency of courts to ‘strain to find unnatural but possibly innocent meanings of words where such a construction is clearly reasonable and a defamatory meaning is far more probable.’ (Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51 .)” 113 Ill. 2d 273, 278-79 , 497 N.E.2

1986Hoar v. Wood (1841), 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 193 .

1986Hoar v. Wood (1841), 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 193 .

1981The court cited with apparent approval Gaudette v. Webb (1972), 362 Mass. 60 , 284 N.E.2d 222 , in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the first Amercian jurisdiction to adopt the English rule barring such claims.

1981The court cited with apparent approval Gaudette v. Webb (1972), 362 Mass. 60 , 284 N.E.2d 222 , in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the first Amercian jurisdiction to adopt the English rule barring such claims.

1981OOO The prospect of multiple proceedings carrying a potential for inconsistent findings provides a basis for overriding the freedom to contract for arbitration. [Citation.] It is not sufficient to show merely that litigation might be a speedier and less expensive means of resolving the controversy.” 282 N.W. 155,159 .

1981OOO The prospect of multiple proceedings carrying a potential for inconsistent findings provides a basis for overriding the freedom to contract for arbitration. [Citation.] It is not sufficient to show merely that litigation might be a speedier and less expensive means of resolving the controversy.” 282 N.W. 155,159 .

1981Rev. 1322 , 1327 (1966).) The sixth amendment rejected the English rule; Powell said: “If recognition of the right of a defendant charged with a felony to have the aid of counsel depended upon the existence of a similar right at common law as it existed in England when our Constitution was adopted, there would be great difficulty in maintaining it as necessary to due process.” 287 U.S. 45, 60 , 77 L.

1981Rev. 1322 , 1327 (1966).) The sixth amendment rejected the English rule; Powell said: “If recognition of the right of a defendant charged with a felony to have the aid of counsel depended upon the existence of a similar right at common law as it existed in England when our Constitution was adopted, there would be great difficulty in maintaining it as necessary to due process.” 287 U.S. 45, 60 , 77 L.

1980(Constant v. Matteson (1859), 22 Ill. 546 .) In 1887, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute allowing a trustee, with limited exceptions, a reasonable compensation where the trust agreement fails to cover this matter.

1980(Constant v. Matteson (1859), 22 Ill. 546 .) In 1887, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute allowing a trustee, with limited exceptions, a reasonable compensation where the trust agreement fails to cover this matter.

1980(See Arnold v. Alden (1898), 173 Ill. 229 , 50 N.E. 704 .) Illinois, however, did not follow the English rule and allowed compensation for the trustee if provided for in the trust agreement.

1980(See Arnold v. Alden (1898), 173 Ill. 229 , 50 N.E. 704 .) Illinois, however, did not follow the English rule and allowed compensation for the trustee if provided for in the trust agreement.

1979(See People v. Daniels (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 43 , 132 N.E.2d 507 .) Hence, the trial court was within its authority to consider the propriety of the State’s motion to dismiss.

1979(See People v. Daniels (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 43 , 132 N.E.2d 507 .) Hence, the trial court was within its authority to consider the propriety of the State’s motion to dismiss.

1978Neb. 1874); Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); cf. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 , 92 (Conn. 1794), American courts generally adopted the English rule as the common law of this country as well.

1978Neb. 1874); Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854); cf. Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 , 92 (Conn. 1794), American courts generally adopted the English rule as the common law of this country as well.

1978Throughout the period of this adoption, culminating in this Court’s decision in Brame, the courts failed to produce any satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country.” 398 U.S. 375, 381-85 , 26 L.

1978Throughout the period of this adoption, culminating in this Court’s decision in Brame, the courts failed to produce any satisfactory justification for applying the rule in this country.” 398 U.S. 375, 381-85 , 26 L.

1969In support of the contention plaintiff cites 32A CJS, Evidence, § 759 (1964) where the English rule is discussed: “ [W] here a party calls for a paper and inspects it, it is thereby admissible evidence in favor of, but not against, the party who produces it, even though it would have been incompetent if it had not been called for and examined.” Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass 580, 53 NE2d 705 (1944) is cited as American authority for this rule.

1969In support of the contention plaintiff cites 32A CJS, Evidence, § 759 (1964) where the English rule is discussed: “ [W] here a party calls for a paper and inspects it, it is thereby admissible evidence in favor of, but not against, the party who produces it, even though it would have been incompetent if it had not been called for and examined.” Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass 580, 53 NE2d 705 (1944) is cited as American authority for this rule.

1969Therefore, we refuse to adopt the ‘English Rule.’ ” Plaintiff cites Boudinot v. Winter, 190 Ill 394, 398, 60 NE 553 (1901) in support of his contention as to the applicability of the English rule in Illinois.

1969Therefore, we refuse to adopt the ‘English Rule.’ ” Plaintiff cites Boudinot v. Winter, 190 Ill 394, 398, 60 NE 553 (1901) in support of his contention as to the applicability of the English rule in Illinois.

1960(Mattfeld v. Nester, (1948), 226 Minn. 106 , 32 N.W.2d 291 .) The Minnesota court explained in the Mattfeld case that the English rule denying recovery misapplied the maxim that a personal right of action dies with the person, since only the wife’s cause of action for personal injuries would die with her, but not the cause of action belonging to her husband, which was separate and distinct from hers.

1960(Mattfeld v. Nester, (1948), 226 Minn. 106 , 32 N.W.2d 291 .) The Minnesota court explained in the Mattfeld case that the English rule denying recovery misapplied the maxim that a personal right of action dies with the person, since only the wife’s cause of action for personal injuries would die with her, but not the cause of action belonging to her husband, which was separate and distinct from hers.