legitimate claim in Georgia

2017He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id.

2017He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id.

2005He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pace v. Smith, 248 Ga. 728, 732-733 (3) ( 286 SE2d 18 ) (1982).

2005He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pace v. Smith, 248 Ga. 728, 732-733 (3) ( 286 SE2d 18 ) (1982).

2021A “claim of right” is synonymous with a “claim of title” and a “claim of ownership.” Walker, 285 Ga. at 196 (2); Simmons v. Community Renewal & Redemption, LLC, 286 Ga. 6, 6 (1) ( 685 SE2d 75 ) (2009).

2009Regardless of whether Simmons’ alleged acts constitute possession that has been continuous and exclusive for over 20 years, the evidence clearly shows that he has never had a legitimate claim of right to the property. “[T]he term ‘claim of right’ is synonymous with ‘claim of title’ and ‘claim of ownership.’ (Cit.) While this does not mean that the possession must be accompanied by a claim of title out of some predecessor, it does mean that there must be some claim of title in the sense that the possessor claims the property as his own.” [Cit.] Walker v. Sapelo Island Heritage Auth., 285 Ga. 19

2017Though it may be true that an occupational or business license — once secured — can become a protected property right, see, e.g, Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683 (7) ( 482 SE2d 347 ) (1997); Drury, 263 Ga. at 431 , there is no argument here that the Act deprives Appellants of their CPNCs or of their right to engage in the taxicab business; indeed, a CPNC is still necessary to operate a taxicab in the City of Atlanta.

2017Though it may be true that an occupational or business license — once secured — can become a protected property right, see, e.g, Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683 (7) ( 482 SE2d 347 ) (1997); Drury, 263 Ga. at 431 , there is no argument here that the Act deprives Appellants of their CPNCs or of their right to engage in the taxicab business; indeed, a CPNC is still necessary to operate a taxicab in the City of Atlanta.

2025He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 5 (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Drummond, 237 Ga. at 452, 454 (1).

2022While Sigmon, as a 8 former DeKalb teacher, “surely had an abstract concern in being rehired, [she] did not have a property interest [in such re-employment].” West, supra at 334 (1) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted, emphasis in original).

2022He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Kanitra v. City of Greensboro, 296 Ga. 674, 677 (3) ( 769 SE2d 911 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Kanitra v. City of Greensboro, 296 Ga. 674, 677 (3) ( 769 SE2d 911 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021See Ga. Power Co., 267 Ga. at 766 (2); Halpern, 259 Ga. at 265-266 (1) (it is for the jury to determine whether a possessor 9 maintained hostile possession of the property in good faith that a claim of right exists).

2021See Ga. Power Co., 267 Ga. at 766 (2); Halpern, 259 Ga. at 265-266 (1) (it is for the jury to determine whether a possessor 9 maintained hostile possession of the property in good faith that a claim of right exists).

2021A “claim of right” is synonymous with a “claim of title” and a “claim of ownership.” Walker, 285 Ga. at 196 (2); Simmons v. Community Renewal & Redemption, LLC, 286 Ga. 6, 6 (1) ( 685 SE2d 75 ) (2009).

2021A “claim of right” is synonymous with a “claim of title” and a “claim of ownership.” Walker, 285 Ga. at 196 (2); Simmons v. Community Renewal & Redemption, LLC, 286 Ga. 6, 6 (1) ( 685 SE2d 75 ) (2009).

2004“A plain reading of the essential elements underlying [this] cause of action shows that in order to file a legitimate claim, [the plaintiffs] had to show actual economic loss proximately resulting from [the defendants’] negligent misrepresentation.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co., supra at 427 (1).

2002As an applicant, he has only an ‘unprotected unilateral expectation’ of employment”). 46 See Williams, supra; Cargill v. Zant, 207 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 427 SE2d 809 ) (1993).

2002As an applicant, he has only an ‘unprotected unilateral expectation’ of employment”). 46 See Williams, supra; Cargill v. Zant, 207 Ga. App. 393, 394 ( 427 SE2d 809 ) (1993).

2002He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”) (punctuation omitted); see also DeClue v. City of Clayton, 246 Ga. App. 487, 489 (1) ( 540 SE2d 675 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, generally, one in public employment has no vested right to such employment.”); Johnson v. New York City Police Dept., 2001 U. S. App. LEXIS 26167 at *2 (2nd Cir. 2001) (plaintiff “cannot claim a property interest in a prospective job.

2002He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”) (punctuation omitted); see also DeClue v. City of Clayton, 246 Ga. App. 487, 489 (1) ( 540 SE2d 675 ) (2000) (“Under Georgia law, generally, one in public employment has no vested right to such employment.”); Johnson v. New York City Police Dept., 2001 U. S. App. LEXIS 26167 at *2 (2nd Cir. 2001) (plaintiff “cannot claim a property interest in a prospective job.

1999All the Justices concur. 1 See OCGA §§ 52-1-1 to 52-1-10. 2 Ga. L. 1992, 2317. 3 The term “structure” is defined by OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 4 The term “tidewaters” is defined by OCGA § 52-1-3 (4). 5 OCGA § 52-1-5 sets forth the DNR’s power to order the removal of such structures. 6 OCGA § 52-1-10 (a). 7 See OCGA § 52-1-6. 8 See OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 9 OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 10 See OCGA § 12-2-1 (c). 11 OCGA § 12-2-1 (c), (d). 12 262 Ga. 506 ( 422 SE2d 195 ) (1992). 13 Id. at 508-510 . 14 Id. at 509 . 15 See Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 724 ( 198 SE2d 659 ) (1973), in which Hancock County raise

1999All the Justices concur. 1 See OCGA §§ 52-1-1 to 52-1-10. 2 Ga. L. 1992, 2317. 3 The term “structure” is defined by OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 4 The term “tidewaters” is defined by OCGA § 52-1-3 (4). 5 OCGA § 52-1-5 sets forth the DNR’s power to order the removal of such structures. 6 OCGA § 52-1-10 (a). 7 See OCGA § 52-1-6. 8 See OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 9 OCGA § 52-1-3 (3). 10 See OCGA § 12-2-1 (c). 11 OCGA § 12-2-1 (c), (d). 12 262 Ga. 506 ( 422 SE2d 195 ) (1992). 13 Id. at 508-510 . 14 Id. at 509 . 15 See Hancock County v. Williams, 230 Ga. 723, 724 ( 198 SE2d 659 ) (1973), in which Hancock County raise

1998See Gilbert, supra at 750 (4).

1997The same principle is applicable: the licensees must have more than a unilateral expectation that their licenses will be renewed year after year—they must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to license renewal ( Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 ) "based upon a state law, regulation, policy, or a mutually explicit understanding a governmental body puts forth...." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir.1994).

1997The same principle is applicable: the licensees must have more than a unilateral expectation that their licenses will be renewed year after year — they must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to license renewal (Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U. S. at 577 ) “based upon a state law, regulation, policy, or a mutually explicit understanding a governmental body puts forth. . . .” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F3d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994).

1997Compare Bundo v. Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679 , 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976), and Bosselman v. State of Nebraska, 230 Neb. 471 , 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988), where the Michigan and Nebraska supreme courts ruled that a licensee had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10.

1997Compare Bundo v. Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679 , 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976), and Bosselman v. State of Nebraska, 230 Neb. 471 , 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988), where the Michigan and Nebraska supreme courts ruled that a licensee had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10.

1997Compare Bundo v. Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679 , 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976), and Bosselman v. State of Nebraska, 230 Neb. 471 , 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988), where the Michigan and Nebraska supreme courts ruled that a licensee had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10.

1997Compare Bundo v. Walled Lake, 395 Mich. 679 , 238 N.W.2d 154 (1976), and Bosselman v. State of Nebraska, 230 Neb. 471 , 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988), where the Michigan and Nebraska supreme courts ruled that a licensee had a constitutionally-protected interest in obtaining a renewal of a liquor license. 10.

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1997Von Hoff v. Carmichael, 204 Ga. App. 760, 762 (3) ( 420 SE2d 643 ) [(1992)].” (Punctuation omitted.) Pardo v. State, 215 Ga. App. 317, 320 (9) ( 450 SE2d 440 ) (1994); see also Chambliss v. Roberson, 164 Ga. App. 579, 580 (1) ( 298 SE2d 550 ) (1982). “[impartiality might reasonably be questioned” means a reasonable perception, of lack of impartiality by the judge, held by a fair minded and impartial person based upon objective fact or reasonable inference; it is not based upon the perception of either interested parties or their lawyer-advocates, seeking to judge shop and to gain a trial advan

1995Hatcher v. Bd. of Public Educ. and Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir.1987). [5] The holding in Ellis-Adams serves as physical precedent only since two of the six-judge majority concurred in judgment only.

1992To prevail based upon this theory it is necessary to show that the shareholders disregarded the corporate entity and ‘made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist.’ [Cit.] ‘ “The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party ‘has over extended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpet[r]ate fraud or to evade contractual or tort respons

1992To prevail based upon this theory it is necessary to show that the shareholders disregarded the corporate entity and ‘made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist.’ [Cit.] ‘ “The concept of piercing the corporate veil is applied in Georgia to remedy injustices which arise where a party ‘has over extended his privilege in the use of a corporate entity in order to defeat justice, perpet[r]ate fraud or to evade contractual or tort respons