legitimate claim (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
← Pennsylvania issues

legitimate claim in Pennsylvania

103 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1899–2025 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (35)

CaseFollowedCited
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothgreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 19 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1977–2021
2 sentences

2021He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

2017He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Board of Regents, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 .

1019
Commonwealth v. Caspergreen
pa · 1978 · cited in 9 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1982–2020
2 sentences

2020Absent limited circumstances, not relevant here, in which the trial court may presume prejudice, “the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.” Commonwealth v. Casper, 392 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. 1978) (citation omitted).

1996With respect to the underlying merits of appellant’s change of venue motion, we note that “ ‘in reviewing a trial court’s decision [as to a change of venue] the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence as a result of pre-trial publicity.’ ” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978)).

89
Commonwealth v. Kichlinegreen
pa · 1976 · cited in 15 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1978–1994
2 sentences

1993In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 274 , 361 A.2d 282 , 287 (1975), the supreme court stated that “[i]n reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of appellant’s guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.” In Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 151-52 , 392 A.2d 287, 291-92 (1978), the court stated, “It is clear that the mere existence of pre-trial publicity does not warrant a presumption of prejudice.

1993In Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 274 , 361 A.2d 282 , 287 (1975), the supreme court stated that “[i]n reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of appellant’s guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.” In Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 151-52 , 392 A.2d 287, 291-92 (1978), the court stated, “It is clear that the mere existence of pre-trial publicity does not warrant a presumption of prejudice.

615
United States v. Dinitzgreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978Were the permissibility of reprosecution to be governed by a more relaxed standard where a verdict is set aside post-trial than where a mistrial is granted on motion during trial, trial judges might be led ‘to reject the most meritorious mistrial motion . . . and to require, instead, that the trial proceed to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error.’ United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 275 (1976).” II In Commonwealth v. Potter, supra, Mr. Justice Pomeroy stated in his Opinion in Support of Affirmance that Double Je

1978Were the permissibility of reprosecution to be governed by a more relaxed standard where a verdict is set aside post-trial than where a mistrial is granted on motion during trial, trial judges might be led ‘to reject the most meritorious mistrial motion . . . and to require, instead, that the trial proceed to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error.’ United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 275 (1976).” II In Commonwealth v. Potter, supra, Mr. Justice Pomeroy stated in his Opinion in Support of Affirmance that Double Je

33
Commonwealth v. Betheagreen
pa · 1977 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1983–2024
2 sentences

2024Our inquiry here is “not whether the trial court considered legitimate factors in fixing [a] sentence, but whether it considered only such factors.” Id. at 106 (emphasis added).

2021It explained that to determine whether to vacate the sentence where the trial court has committed such an error, courts must ask “not whether the trial court considered legitimate factors in fixing sentence, but whether it considered only such factors.” Id. at 106 .

25
Keeley v. Commonwealth, State Real Estate Commissiongreen
pacommwct · 1985 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1997–2014
2 sentences

2007For example, in Nitterhouse v. Department of General Services, 706 A.2d 381, 383 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), we held that the Department of General Services did not render an adjudication, when it declined to renew a lease because the property owner “had no legitimate expectation of personal or property rights in the awarding of the lease.” See also Keeley v. State Real Estate Commission, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 291 , 501 A.2d 1155, 1157 (1985) (“[t]o have a property interest in a benefit or privilege that is protected by procedural due process, one must clearly have more than an abstract need or desire for it or

2007For example, in Nitterhouse v. Department of General Services, 706 A.2d 381, 383 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), we held that the Department of General Services did not render an adjudication, when it declined to renew a lease because the property owner “had no legitimate expectation of personal or property rights in the awarding of the lease.” See also Keeley v. State Real Estate Commission, 93 Pa.Cmwlth. 291 , 501 A.2d 1155, 1157 (1985) (“[t]o have a property interest in a benefit or privilege that is protected by procedural due process, one must clearly have more than an abstract need or desire for it or

24
Commonwealth v. Romerigreen
pa · 1983 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1985–1989
2 sentences

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion, (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion, (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate

22
Commonwealth. v. Hossgreen
pa · 1971 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1975–1976
2 sentences

1976Commonwealth v. Powell, supra; Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 107 , 283 A.2d 58, 64 (1971); Commonwealth v. Swanson, supra. In some cases the publicity in the community may be so pervasive and inflammatory that this Court will assume that the jury was biased.

1976Commonwealth v. Powell, supra; Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 107 , 283 A.2d 58, 64 (1971); Commonwealth v. Swanson, supra. In some cases the publicity in the community may be so pervasive and inflammatory that this Court will assume that the jury was biased.

22
Commonwealth v. Swansongreen
pa · 1968 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1971–1975
2 sentences

1971Furthermore, “the only legitimate inquiry in this area was whether or not the juror had formed a fixed opinion in the case as to the accused’s guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 300 , 248 A. 2d 12, 16 (1968); Commonwealth v. Corbin, 426 Pa. 24, 26 , 231 A. 2d 138, 139 (1967).

1971Furthermore, “the only legitimate inquiry in this area was whether or not the juror had formed a fixed opinion in the case as to the accused’s guilt or innocence.” Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 300 , 248 A. 2d 12, 16 (1968); Commonwealth v. Corbin, 426 Pa. 24, 26 , 231 A. 2d 138, 139 (1967).

22
Commonwealth v. Lopinsongreen
pa · 1967 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1968–1977
2 sentences

1977As to the first category of questions, we there said, “The only legitimate inquiry in this area was whether or not the juror had formed a fixed opinion in the case as to the accused’s guilt or innocence.” 427 Pa. at 298 , 234 A.2d at 561 (emphasis added).

1977As to the first category of questions, we there said, “The only legitimate inquiry in this area was whether or not the juror had formed a fixed opinion in the case as to the accused’s guilt or innocence.” 427 Pa. at 298 , 234 A.2d at 561 (emphasis added).

14
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalesgreen
scotus · 2005 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2022
2 sentences

2022Regarding claims of unconstitutional property taking, the United States Supreme Court has explained: “The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights[.]” Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (emphasis added); see also Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not protect everything that might be described as a ‘benefit’: []To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must - 26 - J-E02008-21

2015He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 , 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005).

13
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompsongreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2025In Turner, we described “liberty interests” as involving a legal “entitlement.” Id. at 765 , citing, inter alia, Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (“an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”); see also Bell v. Thornburgh, 420 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1980) (“The determinative question is whether the litigant holds such a legitimate ‘claim of entitlement’ that the Constitution, rather than the political branches, must define the procedures attending its removal[.] Claims of entitlement spring from expectations that are ‘justifiable,’ . . . ‘protectable,’ .

2025See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (“an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”); Bell, 420 A.2d at 449 (“Claims of entitlement spring from expectations that are ‘justifiable,’ . . . ‘protectable,’ . . . ‘sufficient,’ . . . or ‘proper.’”).39 39 We acknowledge the reality of the statutory scheme, which refers to a notation in the district register of whether a mail-in elector has “voted” prior to Election Day.

12
Graham v. Pennsylvania State Policegreen
pacommwct · 1993 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1998–2005
2 sentences

1998See Graham v. Pennsylvania State Police, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 377 , 634 A.2d 849, 861 (1993) (stating “a property interest is entitled to protection by the requirements of due process only when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to that right”).

1998See Graham v. Pennsylvania State Police, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 377 , 634 A.2d 849, 861 (1993) (stating “a property interest is entitled to protection by the requirements of due process only when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to that right”).

12
Irvin v. Dowdgreen
scotus · 1961 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1975–1982
2 sentences

1982The role of the trial judge during voir dire is as arbiter of a mixed question of fact and law, and that the canvassing of prospective jurors for the possibility of a hardened opinion in derogation of the constitutional imperative of trial by “impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors,” Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 at 1642 , 6 L.Ed.2d at 755 , is to be performed before the trial judge is not an empty requirement.

1982The role of the trial judge during voir dire is as arbiter of a mixed question of fact and law, and that the canvassing of prospective jurors for the possibility of a hardened opinion in derogation of the constitutional imperative of trial by “impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors,” Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 722 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 at 1642 , 6 L.Ed.2d at 755 , is to be performed before the trial judge is not an empty requirement.

12
Bell v. Thornburghgreen
pa · 1980 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025In Turner, we described “liberty interests” as involving a legal “entitlement.” Id. at 765 , citing, inter alia, Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (“an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”); see also Bell v. Thornburgh, 420 A.2d 443, 449 (Pa. 1980) (“The determinative question is whether the litigant holds such a legitimate ‘claim of entitlement’ that the Constitution, rather than the political branches, must define the procedures attending its removal[.] Claims of entitlement spring from expectations that are ‘justifiable,’ . . . ‘protectable,’ .

2025See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 (“an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”); Bell, 420 A.2d at 449 (“Claims of entitlement spring from expectations that are ‘justifiable,’ . . . ‘protectable,’ . . . ‘sufficient,’ . . . or ‘proper.’”).39 39 We acknowledge the reality of the statutory scheme, which refers to a notation in the district register of whether a mail-in elector has “voted” prior to Election Day.

11
Michigan v. Longgreen
scotus · 1983 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
11
Landgraf v. USI Film Productsgreen
scotus · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
11
Commonwealth v. Rousegreen
pasuperct · 2018 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
11
City of Houston v. Harris County Outdoor Advertising Ass'ngreen
texapp · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Commonwealth v. Faulknergreen
pa · 1991 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Frasconi v. Commonwealthgreen
pacommwct · 2014 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Commonwealth v. Spotzgreen
pa · 2011 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Commonwealth v. Steelegreen
pa · 2008 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Commonwealth v. Natividadgreen
pa · 2007 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Commonwealth v. Spotzgreen
pa · 2006 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Commonwealth v. Colegreen
pa · 1989 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Shelton v. Tuckergreen
scotus · 1960 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
Commonwealth v. Boringgreen
pasuperct · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
In re Condemnation by Pennsylvania Turnpike Commissiongreen
pacommwct · 2014 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
11
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osbornegreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11
Nitterhouse v. Department of General Servicesgreen
pacommwct · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
11
Lowenfield v. Phelpsgreen
scotus · 1988 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
11
Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Penn Dairies, Inc.green
pacommwct · 1984 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
11
Bullins v. City of Philadelphiagreen
paed · 1981 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
Templin v. Hansfordgreen
paed · 1990 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (45)

CaseCitedYears
Sweeney v. Tucker green
pa · 1977
2 sentences

1994Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 , 375 A.2d 698 (1977).

1994Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493 , 375 A.2d 698 (1977).

31985–1994
Amesbury v. Luzerne County Institution District green
pacommwct · 1976
2 sentences

1991Amesbury v. Luzerne County Institution District, 27 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 418, 366 A.2d 631 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 ] (1972).

1991Amesbury v. Luzerne County Institution District, 27 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 418, 366 A.2d 631 (1976); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 ] (1972).

31986–1991
Marino v. Commonwealth green
pacommwct · 1985
2 sentences

1991An individual has a property interest mandating due process protection only when he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the asserted right, Marino v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 40, 486 A.2d 1033 (1985), or in other words, an enforceable expectation governed by statute or contract.

1991An individual has a property interest mandating due process protection only when he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the asserted right, Marino v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 40, 486 A.2d 1033 (1985), or in other words, an enforceable expectation governed by statute or contract.

31986–1991
Condemnation of a Tract of Land green
pacommwct · 1992
2 sentences

2014North Penn Water Authority v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 477 , 650 A.2d 1197 (1994); Appeal of McKonly, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 211 , 618 A.2d 1169 (1992).

2014North Penn Water Authority v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 477 , 650 A.2d 1197 (1994); Appeal of McKonly, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 211 , 618 A.2d 1169 (1992).

22008–2014
North Penn Water Authority v. a Certain Parcel of Land Identified by Last Known Owner & Tax Parcel Number as Malin green
pacommwct · 1994
2 sentences

2014North Penn Water Authority v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 477 , 650 A.2d 1197 (1994); Appeal of McKonly, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 211 , 618 A.2d 1169 (1992).

2014North Penn Water Authority v. A Certain Parcel of Land, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 477 , 650 A.2d 1197 (1994); Appeal of McKonly, 152 Pa.Cmwlth. 211 , 618 A.2d 1169 (1992).

22008–2014
Hasinecz v. Pa. State Police green
pacommwct · 1986
2 sentences

1993Such a property interest is entitled to protection by the requirements of due process only when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to that right. *381 Hasinecz v. Pennsylvania State Police, 100 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 622, 515 A.2d 351 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 516 Pa. 636 , 533 A.2d 94 (1987).

1986As we stated in Hasinecz v. Pennsylvania State Police, 100 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 622 , 515 A.2d 351 (1986): An individual has a property interest mandating due process only when he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the asserted right, Marino v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 40 , 486 A.2d 1033 (1985), or, in other words, an enforceable expectation governed by statute or contract.

21986–1993
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board v. John W. Galbreath & Co. green
pacommwct · 1975
2 sentences

1991Galbreath & Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 283 , 341 A.2d 541 (1975), and I fail to see how the decision to determine an employer's intent when discharging the claimant — whether for justified willful misconduct or on specious grounds asserted only to deny a claimant's legitimate claim for benefits — is any more or less difficult because the conduct occurs before or after the injury or before or after benefits begin.

1991Galbreath & Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 20 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 283 , 341 A.2d 541 (1975), and I fail to see how the decision to determine an employer's intent when discharging the claimant — whether for justified willful misconduct or on specious grounds asserted only to deny a claimant's legitimate claim for benefits — is any more or less difficult because the conduct occurs before or after the injury or before or after benefits begin.

21991–1991
Dixon v. United States green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion, (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate

21985–1989
Moore v. Wainwright green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion, (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate

21985–1989
Woodberry v. Pierce green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate

1989In Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124 , 470 A.2d 498, 501-03 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 , 104 S.Ct. 1922 , 80 L.Ed.2d 469 (1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 150-151 , 392 A.2d 287, 291 (1978), we summarized the law in this area by reference to Commonwealth v. Casper as follows: [A]n application for a change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its exercise of discretion will not be disturbed by an appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion, (citations omitted) In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the only legitimate

21985–1989
Commonwealth v. Scott green
pa · 1976
2 sentences

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

21978–1979
Commonwealth v. Powell green
pa · 1974
2 sentences

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

21978–1979
Commonwealth v. Russell green
pa · 1974
2 sentences

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

21978–1979
Commonwealth v. Hoss green
pa · 1976
2 sentences

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

1979E.g., Commonwealth v. Scott, 469 Pa. 258, 266 , 365 A.2d 140 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 199 , 364 A.2d 1335 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 273 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Pa. 253, 289 , 328 A.2d 507 (1974); Commonwealth *57 v. Russell, 459 Pa. 1 , 326 A.2d 303 (1974). `In reviewing the trial court's decision, the only legitimate inquiry is whether any juror formed a fixed opinion of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity.' Commonwealth v. Kichline, supra, 468 Pa. at 274 , 361 A.2d at 287 .

21978–1979
Commonwealth v. McGrew green
pa · 1953
2 sentences

1974The only legitimate inquiry is confined to “disclosing qualifications or lack of qualifications of a juror and whether a juror has formed a fixed opinion [as to the accused’s guilt or innocence] or may be otherwise subject to disqualification for cause.” Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 297-8 , 234 A. 2d 552 (1967), citing with approval Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 525 , 100 A. 2d 467 (1953).

1974The only legitimate inquiry is confined to “disclosing qualifications or lack of qualifications of a juror and whether a juror has formed a fixed opinion [as to the accused’s guilt or innocence] or may be otherwise subject to disqualification for cause.” Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 297-8 , 234 A. 2d 552 (1967), citing with approval Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 525 , 100 A. 2d 467 (1953).

21974–1975
Commonwealth v. Morris green
pa · 1994
12025–2025
Commonwealth v. Turner green
pa · 2013
12025–2025
Pulte Home Corporation v. Montgomery County, Maryland green
ca4 · 2018
12021–2021
Greenstein v. Commonwealth green
pacommwct · 1986
12019–2019
Jiricko v. Geico Insurance green
pasuperct · 2008
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Pierce green
pa · 1987
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam green
pa · 2001
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Bracey green
pa · 2001
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Bond green
pa · 2002
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Hatchin green
pasuperct · 1998
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Potter green
pa · 1978
12014–2014
Hollock v. Erie Insurance Exchange green
pasuperct · 2004
12013–2013
Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City Of Philadelphia green
ca3 · 1991
12013–2013
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. The Township Of Warrington, Pa green
ca3 · 2003
12013–2013
Vitek v. Jones green
scotus · 1980
12013–2013
Potts v. City of Philadelphia green
paed · 2002
12013–2013
Lyng v. Payne green
scotus · 1986
12011–2011
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. green
scotus · 1982
12007–2007
Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett green
pamd · 1970
12005–2005
Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett green
ca3 · 1971
12005–2005
English v. State green
wyo · 1999
12003–2003
Commonwealth v. O'Kicki green
pasuperct · 1991
11996–1996
Schwartz v. Subaru of America, Inc. green
paed · 1994
11995–1995
Commonwealth v. Patterson green
pa · 1990
11994–1994
Pittsburgh School District Condemnation Case green
pa · 1968
11992–1992

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502 (7) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 763 (7) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711 (6)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 142 (1883–2026) IL 129 (1871–2025) NY 111 (1906–2026) PA 103 (1899–2025) CA 101 (1933–2026) IN 69 (1930–2026) WA 62 (1969–2024) MI 57 (1974–2025) NJ 49 (1923–2026) OH 44 (1977–2024) MO 44 (1880–2024) FL 41 (1931–2026) MS 41 (1977–2024) CT 39 (1871–2026) GA 37 (1976–2025) NM 36 (1954–2026) WV 36 (1928–2021) MA 32 (1977–2020) MD 29 (1864–2021) LA 28 (1926–2023) CO 28 (1952–2025) MN 27 (1979–2024) ID 26 (1975–2024) NC 26 (1905–2026) RI 26 (1978–2015) DC 24 (1974–2021) MT 24 (1980–2019) HI 22 (1985–2025) KS 22 (1895–2022) WI 21 (1976–2021) TN 21 (1938–2026) AL 19 (1871–2016) AZ 19 (1969–2021) UT 18 (1969–2026) OR 18 (1968–2025) KY 18 (1853–2025) IA 17 (1903–2018) OK 16 (1929–2023) WY 14 (1983–2025) NE 13 (1935–2017) ME 12 (1984–2024) DE 11 (1983–2025) SD 10 (1950–2014) NH 10 (1975–2021) VA 10 (1993–2023) SC 8 (1984–2026) VT 7 (1993–2024) ND 6 (1970–2010) NV 5 (1981–2017) AK 4 (1978–2025) AR 3 (1980–2017) VI 3 (2015–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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