legitimate claim in Michigan

2019A “plaintiff can raise a legitimate claim of active negligence by showing that [a] defendant negligently performed an act and that its negligent performance was likely to result in harm.” Johnson v A & M Custom Built Homes of West Bloomfield, LPC, 261 Mich App 719, 725 ; 683 NW2d 229 (2004). -2- In contrast, a claim sounds in premises liability when the injury results from a condition on the land.

2018A “plaintiff can raise a legitimate claim of active negligence by showing that [a] defendant negligently performed an act and that its negligent performance was likely to result in harm.” Johnson v A & M Custom Built Homes of West Bloomfield, LPC, 261 Mich App 719, 725 ; 683 NW2d 229 (2004).

2019A “plaintiff can raise a legitimate claim of active negligence by showing that [a] defendant negligently performed an act and that its negligent performance was likely to result in harm.” Johnson v A & M Custom Built Homes of West Bloomfield, LPC, 261 Mich App 719, 725 ; 683 NW2d 229 (2004). -2- In contrast, a claim sounds in premises liability when the injury results from a condition on the land.

2018A “plaintiff can raise a legitimate claim of active negligence by showing that [a] defendant negligently performed an act and that its negligent performance was likely to result in harm.” Johnson v A & M Custom Built Homes of West Bloomfield, LPC, 261 Mich App 719, 725 ; 683 NW2d 229 (2004).

2017Thus, we conclude that [MCL 769.1l’s] application makes a legitimate presumption that the prisoner is not indigent. [Id. (footnote omitted.)] “[I]f a prisoner believes that his unique individual financial circumstances rebut [MCL 769.1l’s] presumption of nonindigency, he may petition the court to reduce or eliminate the amount that the remittance order requires him to pay.” Id. at 296 . [W]hen reviewing a prisoner’s claim, lower courts must receive the prisoner’s petition and any proofs of his unique and extraordinary financial circumstances.

2017Thus, we conclude that [MCL 769.1l’s] application makes a legitimate presumption that the prisoner is not indigent. [Id. (footnote omitted.)] “[I]f a prisoner believes that his unique individual financial circumstances rebut [MCL 769.1l’s] presumption of nonindigency, he may petition the court to reduce or eliminate the amount that the remittance order requires him to pay.” Id. at 296 . [W]hen reviewing a prisoner’s claim, lower courts must receive the prisoner’s petition and any proofs of his unique and extraordinary financial circumstances.

2025“To have a protected property interest, one must possess more than a unilateral expectation to the claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.” York v Civil Serv Comm, 263 Mich App 694, 702-703 ; 689 NW2d 533 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“To have a protected property interest, one must possess more than a unilateral expectation to the claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.” York v Civil Serv Comm, 263 Mich App 694, 702-703 ; 689 NW2d 533 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025As recognized in In re Surety Bond for Costs, 226 Mich App at 331-332 , a court may only require security if there is a substantial reason for it, explaining: Security should not be required unless there is a substantial reason for doing so. [Farleigh v Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1251, 199 Mich App 631, 634 ; -3- 502 NW2d 371 (1993).] A “substantial reason” for requiring security may exist where there is a “tenuous legal theory of liability,” or where there is good reason to believe that a party’s allegations are “groundless and unwarranted.” Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mic

2024Surety Bond, 226 Mich App at 332 ; MCR 2.109(B).

1990In Schwartz, supra at 478-479 , this Court affirmed a grant of summary disposition in favor of an employer where the employee’s claim for a just-cause termination contract was based upon a subjective expectancy: Nonetheless, a mere subjective expectancy on the part of an employee will not create such a legitimate claim.

1986Brewster, supra. However, in Schwartz v Michigan Sugar Co, 106 Mich App 471, 478 ; 308 NW2d 459 (1981), lv den 414 Mich 870 (1982), it was recognized that a mere subjective expectancy on the part of an employee that he will not be discharged except for cause will not create a legitimate claim to continued employment.

2025As recognized in In re Surety Bond for Costs, 226 Mich App at 331-332 , a court may only require security if there is a substantial reason for it, explaining: Security should not be required unless there is a substantial reason for doing so. [Farleigh v Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1251, 199 Mich App 631, 634 ; -3- 502 NW2d 371 (1993).] A “substantial reason” for requiring security may exist where there is a “tenuous legal theory of liability,” or where there is good reason to believe that a party’s allegations are “groundless and unwarranted.” Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mic

2025As recognized in In re Surety Bond for Costs, 226 Mich App at 331-332 , a court may only require security if there is a substantial reason for it, explaining: Security should not be required unless there is a substantial reason for doing so. [Farleigh v Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1251, 199 Mich App 631, 634 ; -3- 502 NW2d 371 (1993).] A “substantial reason” for requiring security may exist where there is a “tenuous legal theory of liability,” or where there is good reason to believe that a party’s allegations are “groundless and unwarranted.” Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mic

2014Of course, narrow tailoring is not required here because fundamental rights are not involved. 51 For a property interest to be protected pursuant to the Due Process Clause, a claimant must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the property interest, not simply “a unilateral expectation of it.” Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 610 ; 424 NW2d 278 (1988), quoting Roth, 408 US at 577 . 52 The Court of Appeals’ reliance on several nonbinding decisions from other jurisdictions for their “general due process analys[e]s,” Bonner, 298 Mich App at 727 , provides nominal, if any, support for

2014Of course, narrow tailoring is not required here because fundamental rights are not involved. 51 For a property interest to be protected pursuant to the Due Process Clause, a claimant must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to the property interest, not simply “a unilateral expectation of it.” Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 610 ; 424 NW2d 278 (1988), quoting Roth, 408 US at 577 . 52 The Court of Appeals’ reliance on several nonbinding decisions from other jurisdictions for their “general due process analys[e]s,” Bonner, 298 Mich App at 727 , provides nominal, if any, support for

1981Rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by the employer, may justify a legitimate claim to continued employment. *478 Toussaint, supra, 617-618 , quoting Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 601-603 ; 92 S Ct 2694 ; 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972).

1981Rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by the employer, may justify a legitimate claim to continued employment. *478 Toussaint, supra, 617-618 , quoting Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593, 601-603 ; 92 S Ct 2694 ; 33 L Ed 2d 570 (1972).

1986To determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, courts look to the nature of the interest at stake, because to obtain a protectible right a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, and not just an abstract need, desire or unilateral expectation of it, Edmond v Corrections Dep’t (On Remand), 143 Mich App 527, 533 ; 373 NW2d 168 (1985).

1986To determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, courts look to the nature of the interest at stake, because to obtain a protectible right a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, and not just an abstract need, desire or unilateral expectation of it, Edmond v Corrections Dep’t (On Remand), 143 Mich App 527, 533 ; 373 NW2d 168 (1985).

2022In other words, “[t]o have a property interest protected requires more than a unilateral expectation to the claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Hanlon v Civil Serv Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 723 ; 660 NW2d 74 (2002).

2022In other words, “[t]o have a property interest protected requires more than a unilateral expectation to the claimed interest; the claimant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Hanlon v Civil Serv Comm, 253 Mich App 710, 723 ; 660 NW2d 74 (2002).

2017A vested property right requires a legitimate claim of entitlement based on something more than "an anticipated continuance of the present general laws ...." In re Certified Question , 447 Mich. at 788 , 527 N.W.2d 468 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017A vested property right requires a legitimate claim of entitlement based on something more than "an anticipated continuance of the present general laws ...." In re Certified Question , 447 Mich. at 788 , 527 N.W.2d 468 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2017Here, Tru-Wall, as a subcontractor, owed a duty to plaintiff “to act in a manner that does not cause unreasonable danger to the person or property of others[.]” Ghaffari, 268 Mich App at 465 .

2017Here, Tru-Wall, as a subcontractor, owed a duty to plaintiff “to act in a manner that does not cause unreasonable danger to the person or property of others[.]” Ghaffari, 268 Mich App at 465 .

2025In claiming a violation of its right to procedural due process, Schindler skips over the first step in the analysis and fails to substantively address or even identify the protected property interest that provides the basis for its claim.14 This is a necessary step in the analysis, see, e.g., Hinky Dinky, 261 Mich App at 605-606 , and it is well established that a party “may not simply announce a position and leave it to this Court to make the party’s arguments and search for authority to support the party’s position,” Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514 , 519; 934 NW2d 64 (2019).

2025Additionally, civil litigants have due-process rights, Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485 ; 781 NW2d 853 (2009), as well the right to access the courts, meaning that parties with nonfrivolous claims have the right to bring those claims in court, Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 436 ; 878 NW2d 891 (2015).

2025Additionally, civil litigants have due-process rights, Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485 ; 781 NW2d 853 (2009), as well the right to access the courts, meaning that parties with nonfrivolous claims have the right to bring those claims in court, Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 436 ; 878 NW2d 891 (2015).

2025Additionally, civil litigants have due-process rights, Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485 ; 781 NW2d 853 (2009), as well the right to access the courts, meaning that parties with nonfrivolous claims have the right to bring those claims in court, Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich App 394, 436 ; 878 NW2d 891 (2015).

2024ZCD Transp, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 299 Mich App 336, 341 ; 830 NW2d 428 (2012); MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

2024ZCD Transp, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 299 Mich App 336, 341 ; 830 NW2d 428 (2012); MCL 500.3107(1)(a).

2022Thompson, 490 US at 460 .

2020People v Scott, 275 Mich App 521, 526 ; 739 NW2d 702 (2007).

2020People v Scott, 275 Mich App 521, 526 ; 739 NW2d 702 (2007).

2019Kachudas, 486 Mich at 914 .

2016When the crime was committed, the common-law defense of self-defense had been recognized as a legitimate defense to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 712 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010), and as of the time of trial, Dupree had been extended to a claim of self-defense under the SDA, People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 40 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013), but those cases had not been extended to other possessory offenses such -4- as CCW.3 Because defendant did not have a legally viable claim of self-defense, Kaplan was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction

2016When the crime was committed, the common-law defense of self-defense had been recognized as a legitimate defense to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 712 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010), and as of the time of trial, Dupree had been extended to a claim of self-defense under the SDA, People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 40 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013), but those cases had not been extended to other possessory offenses such -4- as CCW.3 Because defendant did not have a legally viable claim of self-defense, Kaplan was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction

2016“Trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction inapplicable to the facts at bar does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 341 ; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).

2016“Trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction inapplicable to the facts at bar does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 341 ; 553 NW2d 692 (1996).

2016When the crime was committed, the common-law defense of self-defense had been recognized as a legitimate defense to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 712 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010), and as of the time of trial, Dupree had been extended to a claim of self-defense under the SDA, People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 40 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013), but those cases had not been extended to other possessory offenses such -4- as CCW.3 Because defendant did not have a legally viable claim of self-defense, Kaplan was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction

2016When the crime was committed, the common-law defense of self-defense had been recognized as a legitimate defense to the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 712 ; 788 NW2d 399 (2010), and as of the time of trial, Dupree had been extended to a claim of self-defense under the SDA, People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 40 ; 832 NW2d 409 (2013), but those cases had not been extended to other possessory offenses such -4- as CCW.3 Because defendant did not have a legally viable claim of self-defense, Kaplan was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction