legitimate claim in Kansas

2013He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 .

2006“To establish a property interest in a particular benefit, appellant must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’ Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 .

2016A prosecutor, however, "may explain the legitimate factors which a jury may consider in assessing witness credibility and may 14 argue why the factors present in the current case should lead to a compelling inference of truthfulness." State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614 , Syl. ¶ 5, 186 P.3d 755 (2008); see, e.g., State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, 262 , 243 P.3d 326 (2010) (finding that prosecutor's remarks in closing regarding victim's credibility "were generally in the nature of reviewing what [the victim] said, asking the jury to assess the credibility of her statements, and querying the jury

2016A prosecutor, however, "may explain the legitimate factors which a jury may consider in assessing witness credibility and may 14 argue why the factors present in the current case should lead to a compelling inference of truthfulness." State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614 , Syl. ¶ 5, 186 P.3d 755 (2008); see, e.g., State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, 262 , 243 P.3d 326 (2010) (finding that prosecutor's remarks in closing regarding victim's credibility "were generally in the nature of reviewing what [the victim] said, asking the jury to assess the credibility of her statements, and querying the jury

1995Protected liberty interests ‘may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States.’ [citation omitted.]” 490 U.S. at 460 .

1992Protected liberty interests ‘may arise from two sources — the Due Process Clause itself *411 and the laws of the States.’ [Citation omitted.]” Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460 .

2022State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 935-37 , 329 P.3d 400 (2014).

2022State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 935-37 , 329 P.3d 400 (2014).

2020Williams v. DesLauriers, 38 Kan.

2013A person s interest in a governmental benefit becomes a property interest for due process purposes “if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to tire benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 33 L.

2013A person s interest in a governmental benefit becomes a property interest for due process purposes “if there are rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to tire benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , 33 L.

2009Ironically, that burden-shifting contradicts the panel’s subsequent observation that even if Desiree had presented proof of “a legitimate defense for moving from her lane of traffic, such as to avoid an obstacle in the road, this would not invalidate the stop as long as Doudican reasonably believed in good faith that a traffic violation had occurred.” 38 Kan.

2000It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. . . .' [ 408 U.S. at 577 .] "Clearly, it is only a vested right which cannot be taken away except by due process of law. (16 Am.Jur.2d § 365, p. 694.) "Kansas law clearly establishes the incumbent to a public office enjoys no property or vested interest in public office." 3 "[T]he tenure of any office not provided for in the constitution may be declared by statute, and when not so declared such office shall be held at the

1998While it is true that a motion in limine may not be used to choke off a legitimate defense, State v. Irons, 250 Kan. 302, 309 , 827 P.2d 722 (1992), a defendant has no legal right to present a defense that is without merit.

1998While it is true that a motion in limine may not be used to choke off a legitimate defense, State v. Irons, 250 Kan. 302, 309 , 827 P.2d 722 (1992), a defendant has no legal right to present a defense that is without merit.

1989Since the appellant could point neither to any state law or mutually explicit understandings giving rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to an award of the contract, nor to any local or state rules “which sufficiently circumscribe the Board’s authority to award the contract in dispute,” Curtis had only a “unilateral expectation” of receiving the ambulance contract. 811 F.2d at 1384-85 .

1981In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , plaintiffs’ gas and electric services were terminated for nonpayment, despite plaintiffs’ attempts to contest the amount of their bills.

1981In Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 , plaintiffs' gas and electric services were terminated for nonpayment, despite plaintiffs' attempts to contest the amount of their bills.

1981Pa. 1976) (water user has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued water service); contra, Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1978).

1981Pa. 1976) (water user has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued water service); contra, Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir.1978).

1933In State v. Conway, 55 Kan. 323 , 40 Pac. 661 , it was said: “It [an alibi] is a legitimate defense, and the instructions requested to the effect that the accused is not required to establish the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the testimony, to entitle him to an acquittal, correctly stated the law. . . . and if, by reason of the evidence relating to that question, the jury should doubt the guilt of the accused, he is entitled to an acquittal. . . . the defendant is not obliged to absolutely show the truth of the claim, nor are the jury required to believe that

1933In State v. Conway, 55 Kan. 323 , 40 Pac. 661 , it was said: “It [an alibi] is a legitimate defense, and the instructions requested to the effect that the accused is not required to establish the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the testimony, to entitle him to an acquittal, correctly stated the law. . . . and if, by reason of the evidence relating to that question, the jury should doubt the guilt of the accused, he is entitled to an acquittal. . . . the defendant is not obliged to absolutely show the truth of the claim, nor are the jury required to believe that

1917Assumption of risk is a legitimate defense in such actions (Barker v. Raihoay Co., 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 ), but we can not, in the face of the record, assume or take judicial notice that the danger of obeying the order received was apparent and so appreciated or realized by the injured workman that he should fail of recovery because of the risk assumed by such obedience.

1917Assumption of risk is a legitimate defense in such actions (Barker v. Raihoay Co., 88 Kan. 767 , 129 Pac. 1151 ), but we can not, in the face of the record, assume or take judicial notice that the danger of obeying the order received was apparent and so appreciated or realized by the injured workman that he should fail of recovery because of the risk assumed by such obedience.

1895(The State v. Johnson, 40 Kas. 266 .) It is a legitimate defense, and the instructions requested to the effect that the accused is not required to establish the defense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the testimony, to entitle him to an acquittal, correctly stated the law.