39 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1871–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothgreen2 sentences2001He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 577 (1972). 1994The court did note that "[a]rguably, had a timely request been made this . . . could have constituted an understanding stemming from an independent source sufficient to yield a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by due process." Id., citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 577 , 92 S.Ct. | 1 | 11 |
State v. Ceballosgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 409 , 832 A.2d 14 (2003) (‘‘we reject the notion that, standing alone, a legitimate defense theory can be viewed as inviting improper conduct on the part of the state’s attorney’’), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 , 285 A.3d 1067 (2022); see also State v. Ceballos, supra, 409–10 (defense counsel did not invite prosecutor’s improper comment by describing defendant as good person who emigrated to the United States for better life). 2025See, e.g., State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 409 , 832 A.2d 14 (2003) (‘‘we reject the notion that, standing alone, a legitimate defense theory can be viewed as inviting improper conduct on the part of the state’s attorney’’), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 , 285 A.3d 1067 (2022); see also State v. Ceballos, supra, 409–10 (defense counsel did not invite prosecutor’s improper comment by describing defendant as good person who emigrated to the United States for better life). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2018Additionally, ''[our Supreme Court] has recognized that defendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy.'' State v. Wright , 322 Conn. 270 , 282, 140 A.3d 939 (2016), citing State v. Collins , 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L. 2018Additionally, ''[our Supreme Court] has recognized that defendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy.'' State v. Wright , 322 Conn. 270 , 282, 140 A.3d 939 (2016), citing State v. Collins , 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Thalergreen2 sentences2018Additionally, ''[our Supreme Court] has recognized that defendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy.'' State v. Wright , 322 Conn. 270 , 282, 140 A.3d 939 (2016), citing State v. Collins , 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L. 2016See State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L.Ed.2d 193 (2011). | 1 | 2 |
Barnwell v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences2018Additionally, ''[our Supreme Court] has recognized that defendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy.'' State v. Wright , 322 Conn. 270 , 282, 140 A.3d 939 (2016), citing State v. Collins , 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L. 2016See State v. Collins, 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L.Ed.2d 193 (2011). | 1 | 2 |
Huntington v. Whaleygreen2 sentences2011Huntington v. Whaley, 29 Conn. 391, 398 (1860). 1988The only legitimate inquiry for the jury was, whether the defendant, and those under whom he claimed, had, for the period of fifteen years, had the actual, open, adverse occupancy and possession of the controverted property, claiming it as their own, and actually excluding all other persons from its possession; and there was no presumption, either of law or of fact, that the property was out of the possession of its real owner, or in the adverse occupancy of the defendant or any other person.” Id., 398 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Douglas C.green1 sentence2025See, e.g., State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 409 , 832 A.2d 14 (2003) (‘‘we reject the notion that, standing alone, a legitimate defense theory can be viewed as inviting improper conduct on the part of the state’s attorney’’), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 , 285 A.3d 1067 (2022); see also State v. Ceballos, supra, 409–10 (defense counsel did not invite prosecutor’s improper comment by describing defendant as good person who emigrated to the United States for better life). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cobbgreen2 sentences2011See State v. Cobb, 199 Conn. 322, 329 , 507 A.2d 457 (1986) ("If defense counsel did not approve of . . . the charge, then he should have alerted the court to his previous remarks and suggested whatever curative language he deemed most appropriate.. . . 2011See State v. Cobb, 199 Conn. 322, 329 , 507 A.2d 457 (1986) ("If defense counsel did not approve of . . . the charge, then he should have alerted the court to his previous remarks and suggested whatever curative language he deemed most appropriate.. . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perezgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Perez, 82 Conn. App. 100, 110 , 842 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904 , 852 A.2d 734 (2004). 2010See State v. Perez, 82 Conn. App. 100, 110 , 842 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904 , 852 A.2d 734 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perezgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Perez, 82 Conn. App. 100, 110 , 842 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904 , 852 A.2d 734 (2004). 2010See State v. Perez, 82 Conn. App. 100, 110 , 842 A.2d 1187 , cert. denied, 269 Conn. 904 , 852 A.2d 734 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Bishop v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wright
green
2 sentences2026In State v. Wright, 273 Conn. [418, 870 A.2d 1039 (2005)], our Supreme Court held that the invalidity of the protec- tive order does not constitute a legitimate defense to the charged crime. 2009In State v. Wright, supra, 273 Conn. 418 , our Supreme Court held that the invalidity of the protective order does not constitute a legitimate defense to the charged crime. | 2 | 2009–2026 |
State v. Wright
green
2 sentences2020In support of his argument, the defendant cites to language employed by our Supreme Court in which the court stated: ‘‘[D]efendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy . . . [and] [a] defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State 2020In support of his argument, the defendant cites to language employed by our Supreme Court in which the court stated: ‘‘[D]efendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy . . . [and] [a] defendant may . . . rely upon relevant deficiencies or lapses in the police investigation to raise the specter of reasonable doubt, and the trial court violates his right to a fair trial by precluding the jury from considering evidence to that effect.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State | 2 | 2018–2020 |
Harkless v. Rowe
green
2 sentences2000Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harkless v. Rowe, 232 Conn. 599 , 618 , 657 A.2d 562 (1995); see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 2000Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Harkless v. Rowe, 232 Conn. 599 , 618 , 657 A.2d 562 (1995); see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). | 2 | 1996–2000 |
Hunt v. Prior
green
2 sentences2000Rather, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit or privilege to have a property interest in that benefit. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior , 236 Conn. 421 , 436-37 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). 2000Rather, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit or privilege to have a property interest in that benefit. . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior , 236 Conn. 421 , 436-37 , 673 A.2d 514 (1996). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Double I Ltd. Partnership v. Plan & Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1998Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." (Internal citations omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted) Double I Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission , 218 Conn. 65 , 77 , 588 A.2d 624 (1991). "[A] lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection." O G Industries. 1998Property interests are not created by the Constitution, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." (Internal citations omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted) Double I Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission , 218 Conn. 65 , 77 , 588 A.2d 624 (1991). "[A] lawfully established nonconforming use is a vested right and is entitled to constitutional protection." O G Industries. | 2 | 1994–1998 |
State v. Maldonado
green
2 sentences1994The court finds that Will would have persisted in refusing to name his companion in crime and that the trial court would have had little choice but to instruct the jury to disregard Will's testimony, State v. Maldonado , 193 Conn. 350 , 358 (1984); State v. Altrui , 188 Conn. 161 , 170 (1982). 1994The court finds that Will would have persisted in refusing to name his companion in crime and that the trial court would have had little choice but to instruct the jury to disregard Will's testimony, State v. Maldonado , 193 Conn. 350 , 358 (1984); State v. Altrui , 188 Conn. 161 , 170 (1982). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Altrui
green
2 sentences1994The court finds that Will would have persisted in refusing to name his companion in crime and that the trial court would have had little choice but to instruct the jury to disregard Will's testimony, State v. Maldonado , 193 Conn. 350 , 358 (1984); State v. Altrui , 188 Conn. 161 , 170 (1982). 1994The court finds that Will would have persisted in refusing to name his companion in crime and that the trial court would have had little choice but to instruct the jury to disregard Will's testimony, State v. Maldonado , 193 Conn. 350 , 358 (1984); State v. Altrui , 188 Conn. 161 , 170 (1982). | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1992"The question of whether an applicant has a legitimate claim of entitlement to a license or certificate should depend on whether, absent the alleged denial of due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood that the application would have been granted." Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54 , 59 (2d Cir. 1985). 1992A person may have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a benefit even if some discretion remains in the governmental decision-maker; "a theoretical possibility of discretional action does not automatically classify an application for a license or certificate as a `unilateral hope or expectation.'" Dean Tarry Corp. v. Friedlander, 826 F.2d 210 , 212 (2d Cir. 1987), quoting Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, supra, 59 . | 2 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Bova
green
2 sentences2022Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaning- ful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry consti- tutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837, 844 , 88 A.3d 559 (2014). ‘‘Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 219 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997). 2022Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaning- ful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry consti- tutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837, 844 , 88 A.3d 559 (2014). ‘‘Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 219 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rousseau v. Perricone
neutral
2 sentences2022Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaning- ful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry consti- tutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837, 844 , 88 A.3d 559 (2014). ‘‘Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 219 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997). 2022Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaning- ful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry consti- tutes an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rousseau v. Perricone, 148 Conn. App. 837, 844 , 88 A.3d 559 (2014). ‘‘Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 219 , 690 A.2d 1370 (1997). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cobble v. Owens
green
1 sentence2018Additionally, ''[our Supreme Court] has recognized that defendants may use evidence regarding the inadequacy of the investigation into the crime with which they are charged as a legitimate defense strategy.'' State v. Wright , 322 Conn. 270 , 282, 140 A.3d 939 (2016), citing State v. Collins , 299 Conn. 567 , 599-600, 10 A.3d 1005 , cert. denied, 565 U.S. 908 , 132 S.Ct. 314 , 181 L. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Corriveau v. Corriveau
neutral
2 sentences2014Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corriveau v. Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231, 236-37 , 11 A.3d 176 , cert. denied, 300 Conn. 940 , 17 A.3d 476 (2011). 2014Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corriveau v. Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231, 236-37 , 11 A.3d 176 , cert. denied, 300 Conn. 940 , 17 A.3d 476 (2011). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Corriveau v. Corriveau
neutral
2 sentences2014Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corriveau v. Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231, 236-37 , 11 A.3d 176 , cert. denied, 300 Conn. 940 , 17 A.3d 476 (2011). 2014Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corriveau v. Corriveau, 126 Conn. App. 231, 236-37 , 11 A.3d 176 , cert. denied, 300 Conn. 940 , 17 A.3d 476 (2011). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dubreuil v. Witt
green
2 sentences2011Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the *237 discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubreuil v. Witt, 65 Conn. App. 35, 42 , 781 A.2d 503 (2001). 2011Although it is axiomatic that the scope of cross-examination generally rests within the *237 discretion of the trial court, [t]he denial of all meaningful cross-examination into a legitimate inquiry constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubreuil v. Witt, 65 Conn. App. 35, 42 , 781 A.2d 503 (2001). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
green
2 sentences2007He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 277 Conn. 681, 695 , 894 A.2d 919 (2006). 2007He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chatterjee v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 277 Conn. 681, 695 , 894 A.2d 919 (2006). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2006The defendant did not preserve his claim at trial and now seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 9 We agree with the defendant that the record is adequate for review and that the claim is of constitutional magnitude. 2006The defendant did not preserve his claim at trial and now seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 9 We agree with the defendant that the record is adequate for review and that the claim is of constitutional magnitude. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Giaimo v. City of New Haven
green
1 sentence2006He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Swain
green
2 sentences2001The state argues that § 36b-16 requires no specific intent to violate the law, but that it is a “strict liability” offense and that advice of counsel is “not a legitimate defense to the sale of unregistered securities . . . .” At oral argument before this court, the defendant conceded that, if a violation of § 36b-16 is in the nature of strict liability, requiring no specific intent to violate the law, then her claim regarding reliance on the advice of counsel “goes out the window.” “Whether or not a statutory crime requires mens rea or scienter as an element of the offense is largely a questi 2001The state argues that § 36b-16 requires no specific intent to violate the law, but that it is a “strict liability” offense and that advice of counsel is “not a legitimate defense to the sale of unregistered securities . . . .” At oral argument before this court, the defendant conceded that, if a violation of § 36b-16 is in the nature of strict liability, requiring no specific intent to violate the law, then her claim regarding reliance on the advice of counsel “goes out the window.” “Whether or not a statutory crime requires mens rea or scienter as an element of the offense is largely a questi | 1 | 2001–2001 |
D'Amico v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2001“This rule [that a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to possess a protectible interest in a benefit] applies even where the loss suffered is great. [T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Amico v. Johnson, 53 Conn. App. 855, 862 , 733 A.2d 869 (1999), quoting Karan v. Adams, 807 F. Sup. 900, 908 (D. 2001“This rule [that a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to possess a protectible interest in a benefit] applies even where the loss suffered is great. [T]o determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Amico v. Johnson, 53 Conn. App. 855, 862 , 733 A.2d 869 (1999), quoting Karan v. Adams, 807 F. Sup. 900, 908 (D. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Kreminski
green
1 sentence2001In State v. Kreminski, supra, 178 Conn. 145 , this court reviewed a conviction under the Connecticut Securities Act, the predecessor to CUSA. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| cluster 566007 green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Dean Tarry Corporation v. Friedlander green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Kelly Kare, Ltd. v. O'rourke green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Bryan v. Atwater neutral | 1 | 1871–1871 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.