legitimate claim in California

2016Helens (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (Thornton).) To have a property interest in a government benefit like the transfer of a state operating license, Stein must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 ].) Such a claim must be more than a “unilateral hope,” and the mere fact that Stein received renewals “in the past, even for a considerable length of time, does not, without more, rise to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.” (Doran v. Houle (9th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Doran); see also Clar

2016Helens (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (Thornton).) To have a property interest in a government benefit like the transfer of a state operating license, Stein must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 ].) Such a claim must be more than a “unilateral hope,” and the mere fact that Stein received renewals “in the past, even for a considerable length of time, does not, without more, rise to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.” (Doran v. Houle (9th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Doran); see also Clar

2012He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ].) “ ‘ “A person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit{Brown v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 ] {Brown), quoting Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 601 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 570 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 ].) That a low-income tenant receiving subsidized housing benefits

2012He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ].) “ ‘ “A person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit{Brown v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [ 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 ] {Brown), quoting Perry v. Sindermann (1972) 408 U.S. 593, 601 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 570 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 ].) That a low-income tenant receiving subsidized housing benefits

2026Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).) 6.

2026Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 .) The denial of a defendant’s right to a jury trial in a recommitment proceeding, including through the “acceptance of an invalid jury trial waiver[,] . . . is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal.” (People v. Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 .) While we acknowledge that some portions of the record suggest McCaleb wanted to waive his right to a jury t

2024Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.); see People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 310 .) The failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver in an OMHD commitment proceeding “defies ordinary harmless error analysis.” (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134 .) “To speculate about whether a defendant would have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position to make a personal choice would pose insurmountable difficul

2024Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.); see People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 310 .) The failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver in an OMHD commitment proceeding “defies ordinary harmless error analysis.” (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134 .) “To speculate about whether a defendant would have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position to make a personal choice would pose insurmountable difficul

2021“When a person has a legally enforceable right to receive a government benefit provided certain facts exist, this right constitutes a property interest protected by due process.” (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 207 .) This includes “a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval” where the agency lacks discretion to withhold its approval (Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1180 ), as a local government does where an application satisfies the objective criteria specified in section 65913.4.

2011Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” (Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 577 ; see Shelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) “It is the state . . . that defines the substantive nature of the property interest.” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1117 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ] (Coleman).) “The statutory terms that define a particular ri

2025(People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297 , 307–308) “[A] reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent” ( Daniels, supra, at p. 991 ), taking into account the totality of the circumstances (ibid.).

2024Instead, a reviewing court satisfies itself of a legitimate waiver only when the record affirmatively demonstrates it was knowing and intelligent.” (Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.); see People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 310 .) The failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver in an OMHD commitment proceeding “defies ordinary harmless error analysis.” (Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134 .) “To speculate about whether a defendant would have chosen a jury trial if he or she had been in a position to make a personal choice would pose insurmountable difficul

2023That ruling was incorrect. “‘To have a property interest in a benefit’” to which due process rights attach, the plaintiff must “‘have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” (Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 756 ; see Saleeby v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 547, 564 ; Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 311 , 320.) Such entitlements are ““‘created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”’” (Town of Castle Rock, at p. 756; accord, Hobbs, at p. 320; see Chan v. Judicial Coun

2013He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’ ” (Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 756 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 658 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 ] (Castle Rock).) “Such entitlements are, ‘ “of course, . . . not created by the Constitution.

2023That sort of test will often be met in purely private litigation where the spoils are measured in money damages or where property ownership is at stake, but where litigants have a legitimate claim to representation of the public interest, “the intervener need neither claim a pecuniary interest nor a specific legal or equitable interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” (See Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1200 [Save-The-Redwoods League members’ claimed right to use public lands]; County of San Bernadino v. Harsh exercising their supplemental juris

2023That sort of test will often be met in purely private litigation where the spoils are measured in money damages or where property ownership is at stake, but where litigants have a legitimate claim to representation of the public interest, “the intervener need neither claim a pecuniary interest nor a specific legal or equitable interest in the subject matter of the litigation.” (See Simpson Redwood Co. v. State of California (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1200 [Save-The-Redwoods League members’ claimed right to use public lands]; County of San Bernadino v. Harsh exercising their supplemental juris

2016Helens (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (Thornton).) To have a property interest in a government benefit like the transfer of a state operating license, Stein must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 ].) Such a claim must be more than a “unilateral hope,” and the mere fact that Stein received renewals “in the past, even for a considerable length of time, does not, without more, rise to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.” (Doran v. Houle (9th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Doran); see also Clar

2016(Thornton, supra, 425 F.3d at p. 1164 .) In other words, the asserted property interest turns on whether “ ‘the local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance of the permit or to withhold its approval.

2011Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” (Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 577 ; see Shelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) “It is the state . . . that defines the substantive nature of the property interest.” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1117 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ] (Coleman).) “The statutory terms that define a particular ri

2011Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” (Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 577 ; see Shelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 207 .) “It is the state . . . that defines the substantive nature of the property interest.” (Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1117 [ 278 Cal.Rptr. 346 , 805 P.2d 300 ] (Coleman).) “The statutory terms that define a particular ri

2008He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 181, citing Blank v. Kinvan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 319 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 703 P.2d 58 ].) “[A] person cannot state a section 1983 claim absent a foundational showing that the government’s action deprived him of a land use to which he was entitled.” (Breneric, at p. 181.) For all the reasons we have expressed, the Club had no property interest allowing it to develop the island in violation of the County’s land use requirements and zoning ordinances.

2008He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 181, citing Blank v. Kinvan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 319 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 703 P.2d 58 ].) “[A] person cannot state a section 1983 claim absent a foundational showing that the government’s action deprived him of a land use to which he was entitled.” (Breneric, at p. 181.) For all the reasons we have expressed, the Club had no property interest allowing it to develop the island in violation of the County’s land use requirements and zoning ordinances.

2021“When a person has a legally enforceable right to receive a government benefit provided certain facts exist, this right constitutes a property interest protected by due process.” (Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 207 .) This includes “a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permit or approval” where the agency lacks discretion to withhold its approval (Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1180 ), as a local government does where an application satisfies the objective criteria specified in section 65913.4.

2016Helens (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (Thornton).) To have a property interest in a government benefit like the transfer of a state operating license, Stein must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” (Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 ].) Such a claim must be more than a “unilateral hope,” and the mere fact that Stein received renewals “in the past, even for a considerable length of time, does not, without more, rise to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement.” (Doran v. Houle (9th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d 1182, 1186 (Doran); see also Clar

2019Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297 , 314‒315; see Azusa Western, Inc. v. City of West Covina (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 259, 266 [“ ‘It is a firmly established principle of law that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a statute unless his rights are adversely affected thereby ….’ ”].) “The focus of the standing inquiry is on the plaintiff, not on the issues he or she seeks to have determined.” (Surrey v. TrueBeginnings, LLC (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 414, 417 , disapproved on another point in White v. Square, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1019, 1033 .) Here, Gerawan alleged in its complaint it had an inter

2013Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 315 .) The “beneficially interested” standard “is equivalent to the federal „injury in fact‟ test.” (Associated Builders & Contractor, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 362 .) Under the federal test, an injury in fact requires “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, [citations] and (b) „actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical,”‟ [citation].” (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560 , italics added, fn. omitted.) 9 Although Schwartz alleges the City‟s zoning

2016We conclude that the seizure of defendant’s wallet was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” ( Loudermilk, supra, at p. 1004 , second italics added; see People v. Long (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 77, 81-82 [defendant stated his name but denied having any identification on him; officer noticed a wallet-sized bulge in his rear pants pocket; officer directed defendant to look through his wallet; defendant removed wallet and made evasive movement; defendant thumbed through wallet and said nothing in the wallet would identify him; officer asked defendant to hand over the wallet, in whic

2015We conclude that the seizure of defendant’s wallet was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” ( Loudermilk, supra, at p. 1004 , second italics added.) Loudermilk adopted the analysis set forth in State v. Flynn (1979) 92 Wis.2d 427 , (Flynn).

2005The person claiming a property interest subject to constitutional protection must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. ( Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 768, 775 , 206 Cal.Rptr. 910 .) As noted above, the conservatorship estates have no property interest in the "excess interest" either under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or by statute.

2005The person claiming a property interest subject to constitutional protection must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. ( Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 768, 775 , 206 Cal.Rptr. 910 .) As noted above, the conservatorship estates have no property interest in the "excess interest" either under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or by statute.

2022Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” ’ [Citation.]” (Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 756 .) Under article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, “ ‘[t]he “requirement of a statutorily conferred benefit limits the universe of potential due process claims: presumably not every citizen adversely affected by governmental action can assert due process rights; identification of a statutory benefit subject to deprivation is a prerequisite.” ’ ” (Las Lomas Land C

2022Plaintiffs must establish a right to renewal because, generally, “[a] person seeking a benefit provided by the government has a property interest in the benefit for purposes of procedural due process only if the person has ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’ ” (Las Lomas, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 853 , fn. omitted.) a.

2018He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it"]; Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care Services (1975) 15 Cal.3d 489 , 495, 125 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 542 P.2d 1 [stating that plaintiff's case turned on whether it "had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a new contract, i.e., a property right of which [it] could not be deprived without a hearing, or whether it had a mere expectancy or hope that future contracts would be forthcoming"].) What Heller claims here is not merely that a firm has a legitimate interest in the hourly matters on which it is working.

2018He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it"]; Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Department of Health Care Services (1975) 15 Cal.3d 489 , 495, 125 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 542 P.2d 1 [stating that plaintiff's case turned on whether it "had a legitimate claim of entitlement to a new contract, i.e., a property right of which [it] could not be deprived without a hearing, or whether it had a mere expectancy or hope that future contracts would be forthcoming"].) What Heller claims here is not merely that a firm has a legitimate interest in the hourly matters on which it is working.

2015(Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 184 .) “[W]e must determine not whether a sinister purpose lurked behind” the challenged decision, “but rather whether the development restrictions imposed on the subject property substantially advanced some legitimate state purposes so as to justify the denial of the development permit.” (Landgate, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1006, 1022 .) In the land use context, a property owner has a cognizable property interest “only if the owner has ‘a legitimate claim of entitlement’” to the permit or approval.

2008“A plaintiff seeking recovery under section 1983 must plead more than constitutional ‘buzzwords’ to *268 survive demurrer. [Citation.] The plaintiff must allege specific and nonconclusory facts showing the defendant’s acts deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws. [Citation.]” (Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 180 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 ] (Breneric).) “ ‘To state a due process cause of action under section 1983, a party must, as a threshold matter, allege a liberty or property interest within the protectio

2013Guard (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 297, 315 .) The “beneficially interested” standard “is equivalent to the federal „injury in fact‟ test.” (Associated Builders & Contractor, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 362 .) Under the federal test, an injury in fact requires “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, [citations] and (b) „actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical,”‟ [citation].” (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560 , italics added, fn. omitted.) 9 Although Schwartz alleges the City‟s zoning

2001(Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 361-363 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) *316 In this case, defendants argue the term “federal active duty” is limited by federal statute to “full-time duty in the active military service of the United States,” and “does not include full-time National Guard duty,” i.e., the kind of active duty service performed by plaintiff. ( 10 U.S.C. § 101 (d)(1); 32 U.S.C. § 101 (12).) Thus, because he was obviously serving in the California National Guard, defendants argue that plaintiff’s service did not