legitimate claim in Texas

2023See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (to have a property interest protected by due process, a person must have more than an abstract need or unilateral desire for it; a person “must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”).

2021“A mere ‘unilateral expectation’ of a benefit or privilege is insufficient; the plaintiff must ‘have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Id.

2009There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: “where application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally.” Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2009There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: "where application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally." Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

2008Texas A & M University System v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); McCartney v. May, 50 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).

2005Texas A & M University System v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); McCartney v. May, 50 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).

2008Texas A & M University System v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); McCartney v. May, 50 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).

2005Texas A & M University System v. Luxemburg, 93 S.W.3d 410, 422 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied); McCartney v. May, 50 S.W.3d 599, 607 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).

1997We addressed this issue over fifteen years ago in Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), there rejecting the defendant's claim that his retrial should be barred by double jeopardy because of prosecutorial misconduct in an earlier trial: The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions *20 intended to provoke mistrials so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant. [4] But when the trial proceeds to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of serious prejudicial error, the Double Jeopardy Clause will presen

1997We addressed this issue over fifteen years ago in Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), there rejecting the defendant’s claim that his retrial should be barred by double jeopardy because of prose-cutorial misconduct in an earlier trial: The Double Jeopardy Clause does protect a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrials so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant^ 4 But when the trial proceeds to its conclusion despite a legitimate claim of serious prejudicial error, the Double Jeopardy Clause will present no

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas products-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n.8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1981, writ ref‘d n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas prod-uets-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n. 8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2008Jordan v. Jefferson County, 153 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).

2008Jordan v. Jefferson County, 153 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).

2008We did note that there was "a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule," id., stating that: [W]here application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally.

2008We did note that there was “a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule,” id., stating that: [Wjhere application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally.

2016See Smith, 559 S.W.2d at 694 .

2015Smith, 559 S.W.2d at 694 . [17] Sefzik’s permit application merely sought a governmental benefit to which he was not already entitled.

2026Agency, 555 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. 2018) (“To have a constitutionally protected . . . interest, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement rather than a mere unilateral expectation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2018“To have a constitutionally protected property interest, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement rather than a mere unilateral expectation.” Honors Acad., 555 S.W.3d at 61 (cleaned up).

2008See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Govant v. Houston Community College System , 72 S.W.3d 69, 76 (Tex.App.–Houston [14 th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2008See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Govant v. Houston Community College System, 72 S.W.3d 69 , 76 17 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2013He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Yeo, 171 S.W.3d at 870 n.19 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972)). 10 Here, in her first amended petition, Odutayo argues that the City applied the Texas Transportation Code against her “in an unconstitutional and discriminatory way” because, although the City “prohibited the use of Samaritan’s golf carts,” it allowed “other businesses” to do the same.

2010He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Yeo, 171 S.W.3d 863 , 870 n. 19 (Tex.2005) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2701 ).

2025He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id.; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (recognizing that a teacher's lack of formal tenure did not defeat his claim 13 that college's policies and practices gave rise to legitimate expectation of continued employment).

2010A person’s property interest may arise from “such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 , 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas prod-uets-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n. 8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2010See, e.g., Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that had there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect might have supported a legitimate claim of products liability); Cupples Coiled Pipe, Inc. v. Esco Supply Co., 591 S.W.2d 615, 615-16, 618 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529

2024See Kaddatz, 2023 WL 7210337 , at *5; see also Guillory, 2024 WL 2066830 , at *6 (holding that Rule 202 petition was defective when it alleged that deposing former employee would not be burdensome because the employee lived in the county where the deposition would occur and counsel would work with the employee to determine a mutually convenient time and location); In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 362 (Tex. App.–– Austin 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (holding that the benefit of determining whether petitioner has a legitimate claim against respondent is not sufficient alone to ou

2023See DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 856 ; Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 362 (holding that the benefit of determining whether petitioner has a legitimate claim against respondent is not sufficient alone to outweigh the burden on potential deponent). 2.

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas products-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n.8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1981, writ ref‘d n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas prod-uets-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n. 8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas products-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n.8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1981, writ ref‘d n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2011In addition, the Fresh Coat Court cited to other Texas cases in which Texas prod-uets-liability law applied to subcomponents of homes or, in other words, products affixed to real property. 318 S.W.3d at 899 n. 8 (citing Temple EasTex, Inc. v. Old Orchard Creek Partners, Ltd., 848 S.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (treating fiberboard as a product for purposes of products-liability claims); Bennett v. Span Indus., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (noting that has there been a defect in a component installed in a building, that defect mi

2009See State v. Delagarza , 158 S.W.3d 25 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that magistrate had substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search residence existed where, although tip concerning suspected drug dealing came from anonymous informer of unknown reliability, comings and goings at residence were—in officer’s experience—indicative of unlawful drug dealing, officers retrieved trash bags left outside residence containing drug paraphernalia, and bags tested positive for cocaine); see also State v. Raymer , 786 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (holding

2009See State v. Delagarza, 158 S.W.3d 25 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that magistrate had substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search residence existed where, although tip concerning suspected drug dealing came from anonymous informer of unknown reliability, comings and goings at residence were—in officer’s experience—indicative of unlawful drug dealing, officers retrieved trash bags left outside residence containing drug paraphernalia, and bags tested positive for cocaine); see also State v. Raymer, 786 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (holding th

2009See State v. Delagarza , 158 S.W.3d 25 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that magistrate had substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search residence existed where, although tip concerning suspected drug dealing came from anonymous informer of unknown reliability, comings and goings at residence were—in officer’s experience—indicative of unlawful drug dealing, officers retrieved trash bags left outside residence containing drug paraphernalia, and bags tested positive for cocaine); see also State v. Raymer , 786 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (holding

2009See State v. Delagarza, 158 S.W.3d 25 , 27–28 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that magistrate had substantial basis for concluding probable cause to search residence existed where, although tip concerning suspected drug dealing came from anonymous informer of unknown reliability, comings and goings at residence were—in officer’s experience—indicative of unlawful drug dealing, officers retrieved trash bags left outside residence containing drug paraphernalia, and bags tested positive for cocaine); see also State v. Raymer, 786 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.) (holding th

2009See Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 359-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Mitchell, 977 S.W.2d at 578 (“[T]his Court has found reversal, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings, to be the proper remedy where the first trial was unconstitutionally tainted by prosecutorial misconduct.”); Ex parte Davis, 957 S.W.2d at 14-15 ; Ex parte Graves, 271 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, pet. struck) (“Kennedy and its progeny bear only on defense-requested mistrials, and not on postconviction reversals[.]”); Gonzalez, 768 S.W.2d at 472, 473 (noting that, in light of other remedies available to agg

2009See Ex parte Lewis , 219 S.W.3d 335 , 359 B 60 (Tex. Crim.

2009Synod, 616 F. Supp. 735, 739 (N.D.

2009Synod , 616 F. Supp. 735, 739 (N.D.

2008The issue of the incorporation of a product into a house was not addressed in Hovenden either, and the case does not involve the sale of the house, but the Court noted it was undisputed "that defendant sold the bricks to plaintiff; that defendant was engaged in the business of selling used bricks; and that the bricks reached plaintiff without substantial change in the condition in which they were sold to plaintiff by defendant." Id. at 305 ; see also generally Rayon v. Energy Specialties, Inc. , 121 S.W.3d 7, 13-15 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (firebox in house); Bennett v. Span Indus

2008The issue of the incorporation of a product into a house was not addressed in Hovenden either, and the case does not involve the sale of the house, but the Court noted it was undisputed “that defendant sold the bricks to plaintiff; that defendant was engaged in the business of selling used bricks; and that the bricks reached plaintiff without substantial change in the condition in which they were sold to plaintiff by defendant.” Id. at 305 ; see also generally Rayon v. Energy Specialties, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 7, 13-15 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (firebox in house); Bennett v. Span Indus.,

1992See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017-18 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F.Supp. 406, 413 (N.D.Tex.1982).

1992See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1017-18 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Johnston v. Shaw, 556 F.Supp. 406, 413 (N.D.Tex.1982).

1997See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 , 16 S.Ct. 1192 , 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970).

1997See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 , 16 S.Ct. 1192 , 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 , 90 S.Ct. 1757 , 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970).

1987Id.

1987Id.

2025Likewise, a Rule 202 pre-suit deposition is not available simply to identify potential defendants, “without further explanation and evidence.” DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 856 ; see also East, 476 S.W.3d at 69 (vacating an order granting a pre-suit deposition when the petition alleged that the requested depositions were necessary for the naming of all necessary, proper, and indispensable parties).

2023See DeAngelis, 556 S.W.3d at 856 ; Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d at 362 (holding that the benefit of determining whether petitioner has a legitimate claim against respondent is not sufficient alone to outweigh the burden on potential deponent). 2.

2017See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 ; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (“The hallmark of property . . . is 5; see also Tex. Educ.

1993As the Court observes: “The hallmark of property ... is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except ‘for cause.’ ” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 , 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154-55 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

1998In doing so, the court of appeals concluded “[w]hen a trial proceeds to conclusion despite a legitimate claim of serious prejudicial error and the conviction is reversed on appeal, retrial is not jeopardy-barred.” Ex parte Davis, 893 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.App.—Austin 1995).

1997The court of appeals, in affirming the denial of habeas relief, concluded "when a trial proceeds to conclusion despite a legitimate claim of serious prejudicial error and the conviction is reversed on appeal, retrial is not jeopardy-barred." Davis II, 893 S.W.2d at 254 .