legitimate claim in Tennessee

2025“When seeking a permit or authorization, a developer has a protectable property interest in a permit or authorization only if it can prove that it has a legitimate claim of entitlement to the permit or authorization.” Parks, 70 S.W.3d at 746 (citing RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Durham v. Eley, 507 F.Supp.3d 3 Pursuant to UDC 9.6.13.A, “If the governing body votes to deny an application, there may be no subsequent similar application submitted by any party for any part of the subject property until 5 years have elapsed from the date

2001RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir.1989).

2018An abstract need or unilateral expectation does not suffice to create a property interest; rather, a person must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Id at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701 .

2018The Supreme Court has explained that the Constitution does not create property interests: “[T]hey are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. 218 F.3d 508, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2000). 14 2.

2001Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.2000); DLC Mgmt.

2001Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir.2000); DLC Mgmt.

2003Merriman, 599 S.W.2d at 559 . 3 In this case: 1.

2001“Rule 15[] sets out some of the broad and legitimate factors a trial judge should weigh in considering a Motion to Amend: Undue delay in filing; lack of notice to the opposing party; bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the amendment.” Merriman v. Smith, 599 S.W.2d 548, 559 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

2026State v. Smith, 436 S.W.3d 751, 769-770 (Tenn. 2014).

2026The Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury, “A ‘report’ is a written or oral statement initiated by a person, not a response to an inquiry by a law enforcement officer.” The Defendant asserted that the instruction was warranted by State v. Levandowski, in which the defendant was charged and convicted of making a false report for lying to a police officer who had come to her home to investigate a report of suspected child abuse. 955 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tenn. 1997).

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2021Co., 38 S.W.3d 555, 557 (Tenn. 2001) (“Loss of consortium is ‘a separate claim from that of an injured spouse.’” (quoting Tuggle v. Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1996))); Jackson v. Miller, 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (“Despite being a separate claim from that of an injured spouse for other damages, loss of consortium is also a derivative claim in that the physical injuries or incapacities of one’s spouse give rise to and establish the claim.”); McPeek v. Lockhart, 174 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t does not necessarily follow that simply b

2018The Defendant argues that he “was forced to defend against an alleged false statement other than that charged in the indictment.” Count one of the indictment alleges that the Defendant did on or about November 21, 2012[,] . . . unlawfully[] and knowingly make a statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by Police Officer Robert Bryson concerning a material fact about an offense within the officer’s concern, knowing that such statement was false and with the intent to hinder the officer from apprehending or locating Skyla Lamb, a person suspected of committing an offense, to wit: Officer Bry

2018See Cauthern v. State, 145 S.W.3d 571, 599 (Tenn. Crim.

2018The Supreme Court has explained that the Constitution does not create property interests: “[T]hey are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id. 218 F.3d 508, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2000). 14 2.

2018The duty of this court “on appeal of a conviction is not to contemplate all plausible inferences in the [d]efendant’s favor, but to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.” State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tenn. 2011). -9- To obtain a conviction in this case, the State was required to prove the following elements: that the Defendant made a false statement in response to a legitimate inquiry by a law enforcement officer; that the statement concerned a material fact about an offense or incident within the officer’s concern; and that the statement was made by the

2005See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-502 ; State v. Ballinger, 93 S.W.3d 881, 890-91 (Tenn. Crim.

1997He contends that a strict and mechanical application of the statute would improperly cut off his right to raise a legitimate claim for relief with respect to the F.B.I. laboratory reports, see Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 211 (Tenn.1992), and that the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act provided him with a one-year window in which to file a claim regarding the suppression of the other information possessed by the F.B.I.