legitimate claim in Maryland

2006Id. at 524 , 763 A.2d 209 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)).

2006Id. at 524 , 763 A.2d 209 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)).

2021On appeal, this Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that, under the circumstances, the anti-CSI effect instruction had improperly addressed the weight of the evidence, thereby undermining the defendant’s legitimate defense that the State had not linked the large knife to the crime and invading the province of the jury. 421 Md. at 451 - 54.

2012This Court held that, even if the trial court had found good cause for the late filing, “the [trial] court would have acted properly in denying the motion because [the motion] failed to state a legitimate defense to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument and the right of the appellees to foreclose.” Id. at 722 , 40 A.3d 494 (citation omitted). (b) Constructive Trusts and Confidential Relationships In Porter v. Zuromski, 195 Md.App. 361, 368-69 , 6 A.3d 372 (2010), with Judge Robert A. Zarnoch speaking for this Court, we discussed the remedy of a constructive trust and the effect of de

2012This Court held that, even if the trial court had found good cause for the late filing, “the [trial] court would have acted properly in denying the motion because [the motion] failed to state a legitimate defense to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument and the right of the appellees to foreclose.” Id. at 722 , 40 A.3d 494 (citation omitted). (b) Constructive Trusts and Confidential Relationships In Porter v. Zuromski, 195 Md.App. 361, 368-69 , 6 A.3d 372 (2010), with Judge Robert A. Zarnoch speaking for this Court, we discussed the remedy of a constructive trust and the effect of de

2012This Court held that, even if the trial court had found good cause for the late filing, “the [trial] court would have acted properly in denying the motion because [the motion] failed to state a legitimate defense to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument and the right of the appellees to foreclose.” Id. at 722 , 40 A.3d 494 (citation omitted). (b) Constructive Trusts and Confidential Relationships In Porter v. Zuromski, 195 Md.App. 361, 368-69 , 6 A.3d 372 (2010), with Judge Robert A. Zarnoch speaking for this Court, we discussed the remedy of a constructive trust and the effect of de

2012This Court held that, even if the trial court had found good cause for the late filing, “the [trial] court would have acted properly in denying the motion because [the motion] failed to state a legitimate defense to the validity of the lien or the lien instrument and the right of the appellees to foreclose.” Id. at 722 , 40 A.3d 494 (citation omitted). (b) Constructive Trusts and Confidential Relationships In Porter v. Zuromski, 195 Md.App. 361, 368-69 , 6 A.3d 372 (2010), with Judge Robert A. Zarnoch speaking for this Court, we discussed the remedy of a constructive trust and the effect of de

2010See Johnson v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 Conn.App. 1 , 758 A.2d 442, 450-51 (2000) (affirming the denial of a Connecticut prisoner’s petition to quash a Massachusetts detainer because, until the prisoner’s charges were resolved in Connecticut, he was “unable to stand trial” in Massachusetts, thereby tolling the 180-day requirement); *176 State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 1976) (prisoner unable to stand trial in Iowa during pendency of proceedings in Kansas); State v. Binn, 208 N.J.Super. 443 , 506 A.2d 67, 69-70 (App.Div.1986) (prisoner unable to stand trial in New Jersey because of the legitima

2010See Johnson v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 Conn.App. 1 , 758 A.2d 442, 450-51 (2000) (affirming the denial of a Connecticut prisoner’s petition to quash a Massachusetts detainer because, until the prisoner’s charges were resolved in Connecticut, he was “unable to stand trial” in Massachusetts, thereby tolling the 180-day requirement); *176 State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 1976) (prisoner unable to stand trial in Iowa during pendency of proceedings in Kansas); State v. Binn, 208 N.J.Super. 443 , 506 A.2d 67, 69-70 (App.Div.1986) (prisoner unable to stand trial in New Jersey because of the legitima

2010See Johnson v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 Conn.App. 1 , 758 A.2d 442, 450-51 (2000) (affirming the denial of a Connecticut prisoner’s petition to quash a Massachusetts detainer because, until the prisoner’s charges were resolved in Connecticut, he was “unable to stand trial” in Massachusetts, thereby tolling the 180-day requirement); *176 State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 1976) (prisoner unable to stand trial in Iowa during pendency of proceedings in Kansas); State v. Binn, 208 N.J.Super. 443 , 506 A.2d 67, 69-70 (App.Div.1986) (prisoner unable to stand trial in New Jersey because of the legitima

2010See Johnson v. Comm’r of Corr., 60 Conn.App. 1 , 758 A.2d 442, 450-51 (2000) (affirming the denial of a Connecticut prisoner’s petition to quash a Massachusetts detainer because, until the prisoner’s charges were resolved in Connecticut, he was “unable to stand trial” in Massachusetts, thereby tolling the 180-day requirement); *176 State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Iowa 1976) (prisoner unable to stand trial in Iowa during pendency of proceedings in Kansas); State v. Binn, 208 N.J.Super. 443 , 506 A.2d 67, 69-70 (App.Div.1986) (prisoner unable to stand trial in New Jersey because of the legitima

2007Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that supports claims of entitlement to those benefits. *155 In Riger, supra, 278 Md. 281 , 363 A.2d 481 , Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court of Appeals, summarized several important due process decisions with regard to benefits, stating, id. at 291-92 , 363 A.2d 481 : Various types of benefits under federal and state statutes have been held to constitute “property” subject to procedura

2007Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that supports claims of entitlement to those benefits. *155 In Riger, supra, 278 Md. 281 , 363 A.2d 481 , Judge Eldridge, speaking for the Court of Appeals, summarized several important due process decisions with regard to benefits, stating, id. at 291-92 , 363 A.2d 481 : Various types of benefits under federal and state statutes have been held to constitute “property” subject to procedura

2000The failure of the police to follow protocol or, even without a General Order, to refuse to look for fingerprints is a proper and legitimate defense tactic for attempting to create reasonable doubt, Eley v. State, 288 Md. 548 , 419 A.2d 384 (1980), but it is somewhat disingenuous for Wise to raise the issue of police misconduct and then argue that the testimony of the State to counter his allegation was not relevant.

2000The failure of the police to follow protocol or, even without a General Order, to refuse to look for fingerprints is a proper and legitimate defense tactic for attempting to create reasonable doubt, Eley v. State, 288 Md. 548 , 419 A.2d 384 (1980), but it is somewhat disingenuous for Wise to raise the issue of police misconduct and then argue that the testimony of the State to counter his allegation was not relevant.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1997Even that procedural right to a hearing, however, has been held inapplicable to legislatively mandated reorganizations or reductions in force not based on individual fault or “cause.” See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139 (1st Cir.1989); Smith v. Sorensen, 748 F.2d 427 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 , 105 S.Ct. 2116 , 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); American Federation of Government Employees v. OPM, 821 F.2d 761 (D.C.Cir.1987); Praprotnik v. City of St.

1995Any significant discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the claim of a property interest.” Gardner, 969 F.2d at 68 .

1994Appellants rely principally on two cases for the proposition that Dominick had an "entitlement" to compliance by the defendants with duties specified in the State child protection laws: Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.App. 1987); and Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528 , 675 P.2d 1347 (App. 1987).

1994Appellants rely principally on two cases for the proposition that Dominick had an "entitlement" to compliance by the defendants with duties specified in the State child protection laws: Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.App. 1987); and Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528 , 675 P.2d 1347 (App. 1987).

1994Appellants rely principally on two cases for the proposition that Dominick had an "entitlement" to compliance by the defendants with duties specified in the State child protection laws: Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662 (D.C.App. 1987); and Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528 , 675 P.2d 1347 (App. 1987).

1994That is a legal determination and does not involve any exercise of discretion, (citations omitted). 314 Md. at 634-635 , 552 A.2d 896 .

1994That is a legal determination and does not involve any exercise of discretion, (citations omitted). 314 Md. at 634-635 , 552 A.2d 896 .

1989In Watkins v. State, 59 Md.App. 705 , 478 A.2d 326 (1984), we noted that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are normally left to post-conviction hearing and that the trial courts do not “have a constitutional duty to conduct a specific evidentiary-type inquiry ‘whenever they are confronted with those types of allegations.’ ” Id. at 715 , 478 A.2d 326 .

1989In Watkins v. State, 59 Md.App. 705 , 478 A.2d 326 (1984), we noted that claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are normally left to post-conviction hearing and that the trial courts do not “have a constitutional duty to conduct a specific evidentiary-type inquiry ‘whenever they are confronted with those types of allegations.’ ” Id. at 715 , 478 A.2d 326 .

1986In Bartell v. Bartell, 28 Md.App. 180 , 344 A.2d 139 (1975), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 278 Md. 12 , 357 A.2d 343 (1976), we held simply that a trial judge was in error as a matter of law when he failed to recognize the “declaration of intent” as a legitimate exception to the Hearsay Rule and was further in *262 error as a matter of law when he ruled that statements were automatically excluded if they were “of a clearly self-serving nature.” 5 That case involved domiciliary intent.

1986In Bartell v. Bartell, 28 Md.App. 180 , 344 A.2d 139 (1975), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 278 Md. 12 , 357 A.2d 343 (1976), we held simply that a trial judge was in error as a matter of law when he failed to recognize the “declaration of intent” as a legitimate exception to the Hearsay Rule and was further in *262 error as a matter of law when he ruled that statements were automatically excluded if they were “of a clearly self-serving nature.” 5 That case involved domiciliary intent.

1986In Bartell v. Bartell, 28 Md.App. 180 , 344 A.2d 139 (1975), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 278 Md. 12 , 357 A.2d 343 (1976), we held simply that a trial judge was in error as a matter of law when he failed to recognize the “declaration of intent” as a legitimate exception to the Hearsay Rule and was further in *262 error as a matter of law when he ruled that statements were automatically excluded if they were “of a clearly self-serving nature.” 5 That case involved domiciliary intent.

1986In Bartell v. Bartell, 28 Md.App. 180 , 344 A.2d 139 (1975), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 278 Md. 12 , 357 A.2d 343 (1976), we held simply that a trial judge was in error as a matter of law when he failed to recognize the “declaration of intent” as a legitimate exception to the Hearsay Rule and was further in *262 error as a matter of law when he ruled that statements were automatically excluded if they were “of a clearly self-serving nature.” 5 That case involved domiciliary intent.

1985To show this is seldom a simple task for the employee because, at common law, “an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party.” Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981).

1985To show this is seldom a simple task for the employee because, at common law, “an employment contract of indefinite duration, that is, at will, can be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party.” Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 35 , 432 A.2d 464 (1981).