26 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Gontarzgreen2 sentences2004He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Lynch v. Gontarz, 120 R.I. 149, 157 , 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ). 2004He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Lynch v. Gontarz, 120 R.I. 149, 157 , 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 ). | 4 | 4 |
Goss v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1980Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 , 95 S.Ct. 729, 735 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 733-34 (1975).” Lynch v. Gontarz, R.I., 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978). 1980Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 , 95 S.Ct. 729, 735 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 733-34 (1975).” Lynch v. Gontarz, R.I., 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Hewitt v. Helmsred2 sentences2005Plaintiffs claim that the IPRARA as well as the Remediation Regulations are independent state law sources conferring a property right on "abutters" and "interested parties" such that they have a legitimate claim of entitlement to partake in the process. 17 Both the statute and the regulations use "language of an unmistakably mandatory character." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471 ; see supra, note 19. 2002Only then do we inquire whether the procedures afforded were “constitutionally sufficient.” See id. at 460, 109 S.Ct. at 1908 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 514 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675, 688 (1983)). “[A]n individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Santorogreen1 sentence2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional | 1 | 1 |
Salisbury v. Stonegreen1 sentence2008Although federal employees are subject to the "longstanding rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end," Stanley v. DOJ , 423 F.3d 1271 , 1274 (2005) (citing Pievsky v. Ridge , 98 F.3d 730 , 734 (3d Cir. 1996)), property rights are "created from and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. ; see also Salisbury v. Stone , 518 A.2d 1355 , 1360 (R.I. 1986) ("An employee's interest in continued employment constitutes a property interest protected by the due process clau | 1 | 1 |
Asermely v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE INS. CO.green2 sentences2008In fact, our Supreme Court in Asermely assumed the insurer's good faith when it held: "Even if the insurer believes in good faith that it has a legitimate defense against the third party, it must assume the risk of miscalculation if the ultimate judgment exceeds the policy limits." Id. 2008Although the Asermely case happened to involve only a single claimant, see id. at 462, there is nothing about our Supreme Court's language in Asermely to suggest that the *Page 14 propositions set forth in it will never apply in multiple claimant cases. | 1 | 1 |
Lile v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Lile v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ("In a post-conviction proceeding, the State may raise the affirmative defense of laches, which acts as a legitimate waiver of the [applicant's] right to challenge a judgment.”). 8 . | 1 | 1 |
Juan A. Davila-Lopes v. Jose Soler Zapatagreen1 sentence2005A claim of entitlement based on a procedural statutory or regulatory scheme may be found where there was a "repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 , 473 (1983) (concluding that State had created a protected liberty interest in prison administration rule); see also Davila-Lopes v. Zapata, 111 F.3d 192 , 196 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that no property interest was created by hospital rule which didn't sufficiently circumscribe hospital administrators' discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Barber v. Exeter-West Greenwich School Committeegreen2 sentences2002A “state employee who, under state law or rules promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge, may demand the procedural protection of due process.” Lynch v. Gontarz, 120 R.I. 149, 157 , 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978); see also Barber v. Exeter-West Greenwich School Committee, 418 A.2d 13, 19-20 (R.I.1980) (holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for *1138 good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position, and may not be deprived of it without due process of law). 2002A “state employee who, under state law or rules promulgated by state officials, has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge, may demand the procedural protection of due process.” Lynch v. Gontarz, 120 R.I. 149, 157 , 386 A.2d 184, 188 (1978); see also Barber v. Exeter-West Greenwich School Committee, 418 A.2d 13, 19-20 (R.I.1980) (holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for *1138 good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position, and may not be deprived of it without due process of law). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David R. Lawsongreen1 sentence1995See United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 694 (2nd Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gary John Crosbygreen1 sentence1985See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Paul v. Davisgreen2 sentences1980See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 , 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165 , 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 419 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 , 95 S.Ct. 729, 735 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 733-34 (1975); Lynch v. Gontarz, R.I., 386 A.2d at 188 . 1980See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-11 , 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165 , 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 419 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 , 95 S.Ct. 729, 735 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 733-34 (1975); Lynch v. Gontarz, R.I., 386 A.2d at 188 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
green
2 sentences2008He [or she] *Page 37 must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Roth , 408 U.S. at 577 . 2005"To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have. . . . a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. | 10 | 1978–2008 |
Rhode Island Joint Reinsurance Association v. Genoveva Santana-Sosa, Alias
green
2 sentences2015On appeal, this Court held that “no conceivable resolution of this dispute would result in * * * the borrower[ ], having a legitimate claim to the funds.” Santana-Sosa, 92 A.3d at 197 . 2015We explained that the borrower failed to “explain how an invalid foreclosure would entitle her to receive the insurance proceeds at issue in this interpleader action.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope
green
2 sentences2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional 2013In response, DHS argued that, because a claim is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements, the estate’s failure to give notice that Manchester’s estate had opened for probate precluded it from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. 7 Relying on precedent from this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, it maintained that “[the] estate cannot thwart a legitimate claim using a statute of limitations defense if [it] has failed to give notice to * * * a known or reasonably ascertainable claimant.” See Tulsa Professional | 1 | 2013–2013 |
URI Student Senate v. Town of Narragansett
green
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lynch v. United States
green
2 sentences2011Lynch v. U.S. , 292 U.S. 571 , 579 , 54 S. Ct. 840 , 843 (1934). 2011Lynch v. U.S. , 292 U.S. 571 , 579 , 54 S. Ct. 840 , 843 (1934). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund
green
1 sentence2011The Court in Asermely concluded its discussion with the following unambiguous statement: "Even if the insurer *608 believes in good faith that it has a legitimate defense against the third party, it must assume the risk of miscalculation if the ultimate judgment should exceed the policy limits." Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lanmar Corp. v. Rendine
green
1 sentence2009In Lanmar Corporation , the U.S. District Court broadly held that "even if the building permit was illegally issued under a strict reading of the Pawtucket Ordinance, the plaintiff ha[d] advanced a legitimate claim of a property interest based upon the granting of the special exception and the demolition of the buildings." Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Max Pievsky v. Thomas J. Ridge, in His Capacity as the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2008Although federal employees are subject to the "longstanding rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end," Stanley v. DOJ , 423 F.3d 1271 , 1274 (2005) (citing Pievsky v. Ridge , 98 F.3d 730 , 734 (3d Cir. 1996)), property rights are "created from and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. ; see also Salisbury v. Stone , 518 A.2d 1355 , 1360 (R.I. 1986) ("An employee's interest in continued employment constitutes a property interest protected by the due process clau 2008Although federal employees are subject to the "longstanding rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end," Stanley v. DOJ , 423 F.3d 1271 , 1274 (2005) (citing Pievsky v. Ridge , 98 F.3d 730 , 734 (3d Cir. 1996)), property rights are "created from and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. ; see also Salisbury v. Stone , 518 A.2d 1355 , 1360 (R.I. 1986) ("An employee's interest in continued employment constitutes a property interest protected by the due process clau | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Linda Ekstrom Stanley v. Department of Justice, Ellen B. Vergos v. Department of Justice
green
1 sentence2008Although federal employees are subject to the "longstanding rule in the federal courts that a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end," Stanley v. DOJ , 423 F.3d 1271 , 1274 (2005) (citing Pievsky v. Ridge , 98 F.3d 730 , 734 (3d Cir. 1996)), property rights are "created from and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Id. ; see also Salisbury v. Stone , 518 A.2d 1355 , 1360 (R.I. 1986) ("An employee's interest in continued employment constitutes a property interest protected by the due process clau | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2002Only then do we inquire whether the procedures afforded were “constitutionally sufficient.” See id. at 460, 109 S.Ct. at 1908 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 514 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675, 688 (1983)). “[A]n individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. 2002Only then do we inquire whether the procedures afforded were “constitutionally sufficient.” See id. at 460, 109 S.Ct. at 1908 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 514 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675, 688 (1983)). “[A]n individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Sullivan v. Chafee
green
2 sentences2002In Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1997), a request for legal guidance about the meaning of a charter provision was not a legitimate claim for declaratory judgment. 2002The Supreme Court observed that the request was based on "a precise factual scenario that may never occur again — or at least not with the same parties and with the same factual underpinnings * * *." 703 A.2d at 751 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Strang v. Marsh
green
1 sentence1996Strang v. Marsh, 602 F. Supp. 1565 (D.R.I. 1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Autocrat Coffee, Inc. v. LeBrun
neutral
1 sentence1996Next, Shackleton argues that absent a showing of knowledge that a legitimate claim did not exist against Yarlas, he could not have committed knowing and willful contempt of this Court. 4 Although criminal contempt does have an element of knowledge, it is the knowledge that his actions were indifferent to the court's order, Autocrat Coffee, Inc. , 648 A.2d at 373 , not the knowledge that he may not have a claim against Yarlas for malpractice. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Thomas Burgess
green
1 sentence1985See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Burgess, 691 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir.1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex
green
2 sentences1983Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-12 , 99 S.Ct. at 210-06 , 60 L.Ed.2d at *1364 675-78. 1983Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7-12 , 99 S.Ct. at 210-06 , 60 L.Ed.2d at *1364 675-78. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.