dual requirement in New York

2025This is a "'a dual inquiry: 'whether the officer's action was justified at its [*8]inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place'" ( Id ., quoting People v William II , 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002]).

2017In determining whether the officer had the requisite “founded suspicion” for a level two encounter, the suppression court must consider the totality of circumstances (see People v Mercado, 120 AD3d 441, 442 [2014], affd 25 NY3d 936 [2015]), and “must undertake a dual inquiry: ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place’ ” (People v William II, 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002]).

2021"As the statute makes clear, Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.—James HH.] , 130 AD3d 1187, 1187-1188 [2015] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Raheem A. v Judith B. , 189 AD3d at 1717 ).

2020"As the statute makes clear, Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.] , 130 AD3d 1187, 1187-1188 [2015] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Russell J. v Delaware County Dept. of Social Servs. , 170 AD3d 1433 , 1434-1435 [2019]).

2017It is well settled that the “nature and location of the area where a suspect is detained may be one of the factors considered in determining whether, in a given case, the police acted reasonably” (People v Bronston, 68 NY2d 880, 881 [1986]; see People v Oden, 36 NY2d 382, 385 [1975]).

2017It is well settled that the “nature and location of the area where a suspect is detained may be one of the factors considered in determining whether, in a given case, the police acted reasonably” (People v Bronston, 68 NY2d 880, 881 [1986]; see People v Oden, 36 NY2d 382, 385 [1975]).

2017It is well settled that the “nature and location of the area where a suspect is detained may be one of the factors considered in determining whether, in a given case, the police acted reasonably” (People v Bronston, 68 NY2d 880, 881 [1986]; see People v Oden, 36 NY2d 382, 385 [1975]).

2017It is well settled that the “nature and location of the area where a suspect is detained may be one of the factors considered in determining whether, in a given case, the police acted reasonably” (People v Bronston, 68 NY2d 880, 881 [1986]; see People v Oden, 36 NY2d 382, 385 [1975]).

2017In determining whether the officer had the requisite “founded suspicion” for a level two encounter, the suppression court must consider the totality of circumstances (see People v Mercado, 120 AD3d 441, 442 [2014], affd 25 NY3d 936 [2015]), and “must undertake a dual inquiry: ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place’ ” (People v William II, 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002]).

2017In determining whether the officer had the requisite “founded suspicion” for a level two encounter, the suppression court must consider the totality of circumstances (see People v Mercado, 120 AD3d 441, 442 [2014], affd 25 NY3d 936 [2015]), and “must undertake a dual inquiry: ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place’ ” (People v William II, 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002]).

2021Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father, and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to adoption is not required ( see Matter of Makia R.J. [Michael A.J.] , 128 AD3d 1540 , 1540; Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A.—Jason V.] , 97 AD3d at 866).

2018Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father, and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to [*2]warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoptions is not required ( see Matter of Makia R.J. [Michael A.J.] , 128 AD3d 1540 , 1540; Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A.—Jason V.] , 97 AD3d at 866).

2020Absent a showing of insufficient income or resources, a father is not excused from his obligation to provide his child with some financial support — to the extent of his ability — by the fact that he was incarcerated, a lack of postrelease employment, nor the absence of a court order directing him to pay child support, "particularly where he otherwise fails to prove 'that he was unable to pay anything to support his child'" ( Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.] , 130 AD3d at 1188 , quoting Matter of John Q. v Erica R. , 104 AD3d 1097, 1099 [2013]; see Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.

2015“A biological father’s consent to adopt a child over six months old who was born out of wedlock is required only if the father ‘maintained substantial and continuous contact with the child as manifested by’ payment of reasonable child support and either monthly visitation or regular communication with the child or custodian” (Matter of John Q. v Erica R., 104 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2013], quoting Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d]; see Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A. —Jason V.], 97 AD3d 865 , 865-866 [2012]; Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.—Dakiem N.], 94 AD3d 1362, 1362 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 80

2025The Domestic Relations Law thus "imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Gabriella U. [Amanda T.-James S.] , 193 AD3d 1312, 1313 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Raheem A. v Judith B. , 189 AD3d 1716, 1717 [3d Dept 2020], lvs denied 36 NY3d 907 [2021], 36 NY3d 908 [2021]).

2025The Domestic Relations Law thus "imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Gabriella U. [Amanda T.-James S.] , 193 AD3d 1312, 1313 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Raheem A. v Judith B. , 189 AD3d 1716, 1717 [3d Dept 2020], lvs denied 36 NY3d 907 [2021], 36 NY3d 908 [2021]).

2020Absent a showing of insufficient income or resources, a father is not excused from his obligation to provide his child with some financial support — to the extent of his ability — by the fact that he was incarcerated, a lack of postrelease employment, nor the absence of a court order directing him to pay child support, "particularly where he otherwise fails to prove 'that he was unable to pay anything to support his child'" ( Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.-James HH.] , 130 AD3d at 1188 , quoting Matter of John Q. v Erica R. , 104 AD3d 1097, 1099 [2013]; see Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.

2015“A biological father’s consent to adopt a child over six months old who was born out of wedlock is required only if the father ‘maintained substantial and continuous contact with the child as manifested by’ payment of reasonable child support and either monthly visitation or regular communication with the child or custodian” (Matter of John Q. v Erica R., 104 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2013], quoting Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d]; see Matter of Asia ZZ. [Henry A. —Jason V.], 97 AD3d 865 , 865-866 [2012]; Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.—Dakiem N.], 94 AD3d 1362, 1362 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 80

2003Additionally, in determining whether a stop and frisk is reasonable, courts must undertake a dual inquiry and determine “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place” (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 [1968]).

2002Analysis In determining whether a search and seizure is reasonable, courts must undertake a dual inquiry: “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place” (Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 [1968]; see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 [1976]).

2025The Domestic Relations Law thus "imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Gabriella U. [Amanda T.-James S.] , 193 AD3d 1312, 1313 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Raheem A. v Judith B. , 189 AD3d 1716, 1717 [3d Dept 2020], lvs denied 36 NY3d 907 [2021], 36 NY3d 908 [2021]).

2025The Domestic Relations Law thus "imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Gabriella U. [Amanda T.-James S.] , 193 AD3d 1312, 1313 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Raheem A. v Judith B. , 189 AD3d 1716, 1717 [3d Dept 2020], lvs denied 36 NY3d 907 [2021], 36 NY3d 908 [2021]).

2021"Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father, and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is [*2]sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption[ ] is not required" ( Matter of Mikai R. [Ralph R.] , 166 AD3d at 624; see Matter of J'Adore [Everald E.—Devon F.] , 188 AD3d 1059, 1060 ).

2020"As the statute makes clear, Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Bella FF. [Margaret GG.—James HH.] ), 130 AD3d 1187, 1187-1188 [2015] [citations omitted]; accord Matter of Lillyanna A. [William ZZ.—John B.] , 179 AD3d at 1326 ).

2019"Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (d) imposes a dual requirement upon the biological father — satisfaction of both the support and contact/communication provisions — and the father's unexcused failure to satisfy either of these requirements is sufficient to warrant a finding that his consent to the proposed adoption is not required" ( Matter of Ysabel M. [Ysdirabellinna L.—Elvis M.] , 137 AD3d at 1503 [internal quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted]).

2019DSS is not mandated to engage in "diligent efforts 'to encourage the father to perform the acts' required by the statute" ( Matter of Bella FF. [*2][Margaret GG.—James HH.] , 130 AD3d at 1188 , quoting Domestic Relations Law § 111 [1] [d]; see Matter of William B. , 47 AD3d at 985-986 ).

2019"Only after the [biological] father establishes his right of consent to the adoption, by satisfying both the support and . . . communication provisions of the statute, does the court proceed to determine whether he has forfeited that right by evincing an intent to forego his . . . parental . . . rights and obligations" ( Matter of Andrew Peter H.T. , 64 NY2d 1090, 1091 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Domestic Relations Law § 111[2][a]).

2016As to the support element, we note at the outset that, “absent a showing of insufficient income or resources, the fact that [the father] was in prison does not relieve him from his responsibility to provide some financial support to the extent of his ability” (Matter of Dakiem M. [Demetrius O.—Dakiem N.], 94 AD3d 1362, 1363 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 807 [2012]; see Matter of Hayden II. [Renee II.—Devan JJ.], 135 AD3d 997, 998-999 [2016]; Matter of Maurice N. [Carlos O.], 128 AD3d 1117 , 1118 *1504 [2015]).

2015More generally, I am mindful that in any context an attorney’s submission that does not purport to be on knowledge lacks probative value, thereby undermining fact-based arguments offered therein in support of relief (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980] [affirmation of attorney not on personal knowledge is without evidentiary value on summary judgment motion]).

2010Matter of Andre L., 64 AD2d 479 [1st Dept 1978]; Matter of Nicolette R., 9 AD3d 270 [1st Dept 2004]; and see Matter of Sandra XX., 169 AD2d 992, 994 [3d Dept 1991] [finding in a PINS proceeding that “a placement, if necessary, should be at a facility or with an agency capable of providing services tailored to the child’s special needs”].) This is apparent from the decision in Matter of Andre L. (supra), where the majority opinion observed that the statute establishes “a dual standard requiring that the court take into account two fundamental concerns, i.e., the needs and best interests of the