dual inquiry in Illinois

2005"Because a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. [Citation.] A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: `(1) "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 228 [, 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d at 266 ], quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 , 88

2005"Because a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. [Citation.] A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: `(1) "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception," and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 228 [, 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d at 266 ], quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 , 88

2021People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

2019See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 18 ; People v. Gempel, 2016 IL App (3d) 140833 , ¶ 56 (applying the dual standard of review for a motion to suppress evidence to a trial court’s ruling on attenuation).

2010A Terry analysis includes a dual inquiry: (1) “ ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’ and (2) ‘whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228 , quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 , 20 L.

2010A Terry analysis includes a dual inquiry: (1) "'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception,' and (2) 'whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Gonzales, 204 Ill. 2d at 228 , quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 , 20 L.

2023See Blagden v. McMillin, 2023 IL App (4th) 220238, ¶ 40 (noting de novo review requires the court to consider the matter anew as if the case had not been heard before and no deference to the circuit court’s conclusions or rationale is required). ¶ 34 The evaluation of a Terry stop entails a dual inquiry in deciding whether a law enforcement officer’s investigatory detention is reasonable: (1) “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception” and (2) “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S.

2021Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). -5- Determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop involves a dual inquiry: “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 . ¶ 16 Bass concedes that the initial stop was lawful but disputes whether the officers’ actions were within the scope of the stop’s initial purpose.

2021Cir. 1923).” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77 (2002), overruled on other grounds by In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530-32 (2004) (adopting a dual standard of review for Frye rulings).

2021Cir. 1923).” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77 (2002), overruled on other 25 grounds by In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530-32 (2004) (adopting a dual standard of review for Frye rulings).

2021People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

2021People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011); see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

2021People v. Litwin, 2015 IL App (3d) 140429, ¶ 34 . “ ‘Under Terry, the reasonableness of police action taken during an investigative detention involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the officer’s action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Baldwin, 388 Ill.

2015"Under Terry, the reasonableness of police action taken during an investigative detention involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the officer's action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." People v. Baldwin, 388 Ill.

2017People v. Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d 386, 431 (2009). ¶ 79 There is a dual standard of review regarding the admissibility of expert testimony.

2016People v. Nelson, 235 Ill. 2d 386, 431 (2009). ¶ 79 There is a dual standard of review regarding the admissibility of expert testimony.

2021Cir. 1923).” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77 (2002), overruled on other grounds by In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530-32 (2004) (adopting a dual standard of review for Frye rulings).

2021Cir. 1923).” Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77 (2002), overruled on other 25 grounds by In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 530-32 (2004) (adopting a dual standard of review for Frye rulings).

2015In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 221 , 641 N.E.2d 345, 355 (1994). ¶ 23 This dual standard appears not only in the portion of the Probate Act at issue here regarding a disabled adult's estate but also in the section of the Probate Act concerning the disabled adult's person.

2015In re C.E., 161 Ill.2d 200, 221 , 641 N.E.2d 345, 355 (1994). ¶ 23 This dual standard appears not only in the portion of the Probate Act at issue here regarding a disabled adult's estate but also in the section of the Probate Act concerning the disabled adult's person.

2013Here, the district court failed to apply this dual requirement when it found [defendant’s] pat-down was justified by officer safety concerns but did not determine whether [defendant’s] initial detention was justified by reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was engaged in criminal activity.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Dorlette, 706 F. Supp. 2d 290, 298 (D.

2013Here, the district court failed to apply this dual requirement when it found [defendant’s] pat-down was justified by officer safety concerns but did not determine whether [defendant’s] initial detention was justified by reasonable suspicion that [defendant] was engaged in criminal activity.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Dorlette, 706 F. Supp. 2d 290, 298 (D.

2013Conn. 2010) (“[A]n officer may ‘act instantly on reasonable suspicion that the persons temporarily detained are armed and dangerous’ by conducting ‘a limited search of outer clothing for weapons,’ but only if the officer has ‘already lawfully stopped’ the person pursuant to ‘suspicion (reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot.’ Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 786 .” (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2010) (“the government leaped to the officer safety rationale for a protective frisk for weapons, ignoring the ma

2013Conn. 2010) (“[A]n officer may ‘act instantly on reasonable suspicion that the persons temporarily detained are armed and dangerous’ by conducting ‘a limited search of outer clothing for weapons,’ but only if the officer has ‘already lawfully stopped’ the person pursuant to ‘suspicion (reasonably grounded, but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot.’ Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 786 .” (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 2010) (“the government leaped to the officer safety rationale for a protective frisk for weapons, ignoring the ma

2009People v. Davis, 352 Ill.

2009People v. Davis, 352 Ill.App.3d 576, 579 , 286 Ill.Dec. 882 , 815 N.E.2d 92 (2004).

2007A Terry analysis requires a dual inquiry: “(1) whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” People v. Hall, 351 Ill.

2007A Terry analysis requires a dual inquiry: "(1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." People v. Hall, 351 Ill.

2007IV, §13 (“The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable”); Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21-22 , 802 N.E.2d 752, 758-59 (2003) (“The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special privilege or benefit upon a person or group of persons while excluding others similarly situated. [Citation.] Although the legislature enjoys broad discretion in making statutory classifications, the legislature is prohibited, under the special legislation clause, from making arbitrary classi

2007IV, §13 (“The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable”); Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21-22 , 802 N.E.2d 752, 758-59 (2003) (“The special legislation clause expressly prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special privilege or benefit upon a person or group of persons while excluding others similarly situated. [Citation.] Although the legislature enjoys broad discretion in making statutory classifications, the legislature is prohibited, under the special legislation clause, from making arbitrary classi

2006With reference to the second part of the dual inquiry, the fourth amendment would not allow the officer to "`"fundamentally alter[ ] the nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition about past, present[,] and future wrongdoing, absent an independent basis for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause."'" Harris, 207 Ill.2d at 523 , 280 Ill.Dec. 294 , 802 N.E.2d at 225 , quoting Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 235 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d at 269 , quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1240 (10th Cir.2001) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2006With reference to the second part of the dual inquiry, the fourth amendment would not allow the officer to “ ‘ “fundamentally alter[ ] the nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition about past, presentí,] and future wrongdoing, absent an independent basis for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause.” ’ ” Harris, 207 Ill. 2d at 523 , 802 N.E.2d at 225 , quoting Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235 , 789 N.E.2d at 269 , quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2002This court has recognized that the measure of deference to be afforded any trial court determination depends on "the substantive and procedural backdrop against which the appealed order or ruling arose." People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 378 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).

2002This court has recognized that the measure of deference to be afforded any trial court determination depends on “the substantive and procedural backdrop against which the appealed order or ruling arose.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378 (1998).

2023See Blagden v. McMillin, 2023 IL App (4th) 220238, ¶ 40 (noting de novo review requires the court to consider the matter anew as if the case had not been heard before and no deference to the circuit court’s conclusions or rationale is required). ¶ 34 The evaluation of a Terry stop entails a dual inquiry in deciding whether a law enforcement officer’s investigatory detention is reasonable: (1) “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception” and (2) “whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S.

2021Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). -5- Determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop involves a dual inquiry: “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 . ¶ 16 Bass concedes that the initial stop was lawful but disputes whether the officers’ actions were within the scope of the stop’s initial purpose.

2021Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1995). ¶ 27 A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is subject to a dual standard of review.

2021People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (2010) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).

2021Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). -5- Determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop involves a dual inquiry: “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 . ¶ 16 Bass concedes that the initial stop was lawful but disputes whether the officers’ actions were within the scope of the stop’s initial purpose.

2020People v. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511, 527 (2005).