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6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2014Because the analysis in Orman ignores one prong of Terry , we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. ¶ 22 We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry , which itself involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be “armed and presently dangerous.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 , 129 S.Ct. 781 (observing that “to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person 2014Because the analysis in Orman ignores one prong of Terry , we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. ¶ 22 We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry , which itself involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be “armed and presently dangerous.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 , 129 S.Ct. 781 (observing that “to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person | 1 | 1 |
Stuart Carpenter v. Maurice Siglergreen2 sentences1979The reviewing court must determine: `(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related "to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1969)." United States v. Stevie, 578 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir.1977). 1979The reviewing court must determine: ‘(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related “to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” ’ Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1969).” United States v. Stevie, 578 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Charles Stevie, United States of America v. Raymond Lee Reynoldsgreen2 sentences1979The reviewing court must determine: `(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related "to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir.1969)." United States v. Stevie, 578 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir.1977). 1979The reviewing court must determine: ‘(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related “to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” ’ Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1969).” United States v. Stevie, 578 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2014Because the analysis in Orman ignores one prong of Terry , we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. ¶ 22 We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry , which itself involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be “armed and presently dangerous.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 , 129 S.Ct. 781 (observing that “to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person 2014Because the analysis in Orman ignores one prong of Terry , we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. ¶ 22 We also disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that mere knowledge or suspicion that a person is carrying a firearm satisfies the second prong of Terry , which itself involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be “armed and presently dangerous.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27 , 129 S.Ct. 781 (observing that “to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the person | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Young
green
2 sentences2007As Farmers correctly notes, “[o]ther vehicles are included, first, only when they are used by Mr. Good or a family member and, second, only when they are being used with the owner’s permission.”2 Orona was neither a member of Good’s family nor driving with the car rental company’s permission at the time of the accident. ¶15 Second, we disagree with Odom’s contentions that the policy “require[s] that any permissive driver of the rental car be afforded coverage” and that “[t]he identity of the 2 The record does not reflect, nor does Odom argue, that the rental car fell within the following gener 2007As Farmers correctly notes, “[o]ther vehicles are included, first, only when they are used by Mr. Good or a family member and, second, only when they are being used with the owner’s permission.”2 Orona was neither a member of Good’s family nor driving with the car rental company’s permission at the time of the accident. ¶15 Second, we disagree with Odom’s contentions that the policy “require[s] that any permissive driver of the rental car be afforded coverage” and that “[t]he identity of the 2 The record does not reflect, nor does Odom argue, that the rental car fell within the following gener | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Sharpe
green
2 sentences1989United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). 1989United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986We think that the governing principle is as follows: When an attorney is to be called other than on behalf of his client, a motion for disqualification must be supported by a showing that the attorney will give evidence material to the determination of the issues being litigated [and], that the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere,____” Cottonwood Estates v. Paradise Builders, 128 Ariz. at 105 , 624 P.2d at 302 . 1 Thus there is a dual test for “necessity.” First the proposed testimony must be relevant and material. 1986We think that the governing principle is as follows: When an attorney is to be called other than on behalf of his client, a motion for disqualification must be supported by a showing that the attorney will give evidence material to the determination of the issues being litigated [and], that the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere,____” Cottonwood Estates v. Paradise Builders, 128 Ariz. at 105 , 624 P.2d at 302 . 1 Thus there is a dual test for “necessity.” First the proposed testimony must be relevant and material. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Dusky v. United States
green
2 sentences1986The inquiry is whether defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788, 789 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). 2. 1986The inquiry is whether defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788, 789 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). 2. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.